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A b s t r a c t of T h e s i s 
R e l a t i o n s between Y u g o s l a v i a and B u l g a r i a . 1918-1941 
Within the Balkan p e n i n s u l a there are two South S l a v s t a t e s , 
Y u g o s l a v i a and B u l g a r i a . These two s t a t e s have common, ethnic,, l i n g u i s t i c 
and r e l i g i o u s o r i g i n s but the process of h i s t o r y has been such as to 
d r i v e them apart. During the l a s t century there have been numerous 
attempts to bring the S l a v peoples together w i t h i n a s i n g l e union or 
f e d e r a t i o n but these have f a i l e d . The period from 1918-1941 was a time 
when the most s e r i o u s attempts, were made.- to bring about a rapprochement 
but i t was a l s o a time of the g r e a t e s t b i t t e r n e s s and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t . 
I n the period following the peace settlement of 1918, Yugoslav 
l e a d e r s regarded the c r e a t i o n of the Kingdom as a triumph for the; 
century-long Yugo-Slav movement, and sought to c o n s o l i d a t e t h i s 
achievement by maintaining the s t a t u s quo. B u l g a r i a , however, did not 
see the s i t u a t i o n i n the same l i g h t . Her l e a d e r s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r 
country had a r i g h t to c e r t a i n lands which were now p a r t of the Yugoslav 
Kingdom - p a r t i c u l a r l y Macedonia. 
Although moderate l e a d e r s i n both c o u n t r i e s r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e i r 
d i f f e r e n c e s could only be solved by co-operation and f r i e n d s h i p , some 
Bulgarians b e l i e v e d t h a t only by t e r r o r i s m and the d e s t r u c t i o n of the 
"Yugoslav mosaic" could B u l g a r i a recover her r i g h t f u l r o l e i n European 
a f f a i r s . T h i s powerful minority opinion, which shaped B u l g a r i a n p o l i c y 
i n the inter-war period, was supported by King B o r i s and encouraged by 
those other c o u n t r i e s - e s p e c i a l l y I t a l y and Germany - who wished to 
prevent the formation of a strong S l a v bloc i n South-Eastern Europe, 
Post-war developments have shown t h a t the problems of 1918-1941 
were by no means an i s o l a t e d episode. But the a x i s , Belgrade-Sofia, i s 
a genuine a x i s along which the d e s t i n y of the p e n i n s u l a r e v o l v e s . For 
w h i l s t the two c o u n t r i e s remain p o l i t i c a l l y and economically di v i d e d , 
there can. be no sure foundation f o r peace and s t a b i l i t y igj the Balkans. 
David Shepherd 
R E L A T I O N S B E T W E E N Y U G O S L A V I A 
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( i ) 
Foreword. 
This d i s s e r t a t i o n has been prepared under the 
s u p e r v i s i o n of Mr. W.V. Wallace to whom I owe a 
very s p e c i a l debt of g r a t i t u d e f o r h i s comments and 
c r i t i c i s m s which have been i n v a l u a b l e i n the presentation 
of arguments and i n the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of events. 
I should a l s o l i k e to thank the s t a f f s of the 
B r i t i s h Museum L i b r a r y and the R a t i o n a l L i b r a r y of 
Scotland i n Edinburgh for t h e i r help i n the c o l l a t i o n 
of m a t e r i a l f or t h i s t h e s i s . 
David Shepherd. 
February 19<>8. 
( i i ) 
P r e f a c e . 
The underlying assumption of t h i s t h e s i s i s t h a t i n 
e t h n i c , l i n g u i s t i c and r e l i g i o u s o r i g i n s , the South S l a v 
peoples of S e r b i a , C r o a t i a , Macedonia and B u l g a r i a are one; 
and t h a t h i s t o r i c a l e v o l u t i o n , c u l t u r a l development, economic 
d i s p a r i t y and mutual j e a l o u s y have forced them apart. My 
o b j e c t i s to show how, through the years - and more e s p e c i a l l y 
between 1918-1941 - there have been e f f o r t s to bring the S l a v 
peoples of the Balkans together; e f f o r t s which have done much 
to f u r t h e r a rapprochement, e f f o r t s which have been v i t i a t e d 
by animosity, s e n s e l e s s s t r i f e and personal rancour. Thereby, 
I hope to create an understanding of why, today, as ever, the 
South Slav peoples remain divided by b a r r i e r s g r e a t e r than 
t h e i r geographical f r o n t i e r along the Hhodope mountains* 
( i i i ) 
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Chapter 1. 
The H i s t o r i c a l Background. 
( 2 ) 
There can be no c e r t a i n t y about the o r i g i n of the S l a v 
peoples and not much more i s known of them than that they were 
an Indo-European race who spread in t o parts of E a s t e r n Europe 
between the fourth and s i x t h c e n t u r i e s A.D.* The date and form 
of t h e i r penetration of the Balkan peninsula i s e q u a l l y u n c e r t a i n , 
but there i s reason to b e l i e v e that a major Slav i n v a s i o n took 
place i n the f i f t h and s i x t h c e n t u r i e s , on which the Byzantine 
2 
w r i t e r s of that period provide a good deal of information. The 
Balkan peninsula has always c o n s t i t u t e d a crossroads between E a s t 
and West and t h i s geographical feature has l e d to a f u s i o n of 
races and a f u s i o n of cultures.*^ One such development was the 
conversion of the S l a v peoples to C h r i s t i a n i t y by S t . C y r i l and 
S t . Methodius. The work of these two brothers was not confined 
to evangelism; they invented a w r i t t e n Slav language ( C y r i l l i c ) 
upon which a common c u l t u r e and r a c i a l u n i t y has grown. The 
other major development was the i n f i l t r a t i o n of the peninsula 
by the Bulgar people, whose Black Sea s t a t e had been destroyed 
by the Avars i n 560 A.D. The Bulgars, although belonging to a 
d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l group, maintained t h e i r i d e n t i t y f o r a r e l a t -
i v e l y long time but, being g r e a t l y outnumbered by the l o c a l 
Slav population, were a s s i m i l a t e d , adopting t h e i r language and 
c u l t u r e but l e a v i n g behind them t h e i r e t h n i c name, which was 
adopted by those Slav t r i b e s l i v i n g on.the e a s t e r n side of the 
1. F. Dvornik, The SlavB: T h e i r E a r l y H i s t o r y and C i v i l i z a t -
ion, Boston, 1956, pp. 3-12. 
2. I b i d . . pp. 3 4 - 3 6 . 
3 . 11.J. Kerner and II.N. Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the-
Balkan Entente 1930 - 3 5 . Berkeley, 1 9 3 6 , pp.1-5. 
( 3 ) 
p e n insula.^ 
I t i s one of the great misfortunes of h i s t o r y t h a t even 
from the e a r l i e s t times, the South S l a v t r i b e s should have been 
unable to coalesce into a s i n g l e nation. During times of e x t e r n a l 
danger or under the hand of a strong r u l e r , there were c e r t a i n 
periods of u n i t y but these were u s u a l l y of short duration. The 
F i r s t and Second Bulgarian Kingdoms preserved a S l a v c i v i l i z a t i o n 
for some four hundred years and, l a t e r , the eighth Nemanjid king 
of S e r b i a , Stephen Dusan, b e n e f i t t i n g from the d e c l i n e of the 
Byzantine Empire, succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a Serbo-Roman 
5 
Empire. But these t r a n s i t o r y attempts to form a s i n g l e S l a v 
s t a t e were destroyed by the advance of the Turks who defeated 
a Serbo-Bulgarian army at Kosovo i n 1389. Kosovo s e t the s e a l 
of Ottoman domination i n the Balkans and extinguished the l i g h t 
of South S l a v freedom - and the p o s s i b i l i t y of u n i t y - f o r 
almost f i v e hundred y e a r s . 
During the eighteenth century R u s s i a became i n t e r e s t e d i n 
the Balkans as an area for expansion and the t i d e of fortune 
turned against the Ottoman Empire. I n 1717, Peter the Great 
recognized the independence of Montenegro and Empress Catherine 
had hopes of e s t a b l i s h i n g a huge S l a v Empire extending as f a r 
as Greece and Constantinople. Napoleon too, for the sake of h i s 
s o - c a l l e d Continental system, was i n t e r e s t e d i n c r e a t i n g , under 
French auspices, a c i v i l i z e d S l a v s t a t e which might e v e n t u a l l y 
include a l l C h r i s t i a n people under T u r k i s h r u l e i n the Balkans. 
His establishment of the " I l l y r i a n Provinces" a f t e r the Treaty 
of Schoenbrunn i n 1809 i s g e n e r a l l y regarded as the f i r s t 
modern attempt to create a genuine Yugo-Slavia. S e r b i a , being 
on the outer edge of T u r k i s h r u l e and c l o s e r to t h i s e x t e r n a l 
i n f l u e n c e , was b e t t e r placed to gain independence than B u l g a r i a . 
Karadjordje P e t r o v i c , the leader of the 1804 Serbian u p r i s i n g , 
asked both France and R u s s i a for help to secure n a t i o n a l i n d -
4. Dvornik, op. c i t . , pp. 64-67. 
5. I b i d . , pp. 126-33. 138-46. and 337. 
(4) 
ependence. Hoping for a i d to l i b e r a t e a l l the South S l a v s under 
Tu r k i s h domination, Karadjordje wrote to Napoleont 
"The Serbians assure h i s I m p e r i a l and Royal Majesty 
tha t t h e i r compatriots, the i n h a b i t a n t s of Bosnia, and of 
the grand duchy of Uercegovina and those who l i v e i n the 
Kingdom of Hungary, not excepting the Bulgarians who 
de r i v e , so to speak, from the same branch, w i l l follow t h e i r 
example at the f i r s t move which i s made."^ 
His hopes came to nothing for although there were numerous 
French p r o j e c t s conceived for c r e a t i n g independent s t a t e s , they 
came to nothing when Napoleon res o l v e d to preserve Ottoman 
i n t e g r i t y and attacked R u s s i a i n s t e a d . ^ 
One of the g r e a t e s t v i s i o n s of the nineteenth century was 
tha t of a huge Balkan s t a t e embracing the Greeks, the S l a v s 
and even the Rumanians. But because the b i r t h of freedom i n 
the Balkans came on narrow e t h n i c and geographic l i n e s and 
through n a t i o n a l i n i t i a t i v e , Balkan f e d e r a t i o n "was destined to 
wage a hopeless b a t t l e against the overwhelming n a t i o n a l i s t and 
n 8 i m p e r i a l i s t movements." Rhigas Pheraios was one of the f i r s t 
to urge the need for a u n i f i e d Balkan s t a t e . His proposal, 
made i n 1793-4, envisaged Greek hegemony. He a l s o founded a 
s e c r e t r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i e t y to urge the Bulgarians, Albanians, 
Serbs and Greeks to j o i n together for the overthrow of the 
a 
Ottoman Empire. C z a r t o r y s k i ' s plan for a Balkan f e d e r a t i o n , 
6 . A. Boppe, Documents i n e d i t s sur l e a r e l a t i o n s de l a 
Serbie avec Napoleon I , 1809-14, Belgrade, 1888, nos. 6 and 7. 
See also E. D r i a u l t , La p o l i t i q u e o r i e n t a l e de Napoleon, P a r i s , 
1904, pp. 389-90. 
7. L.S. S t a v r i a n o s , Balkan Federation. A H i s t o r y of the 
Movement towards Balkan Unity i n Modern Times. Northampton, 
Mass. 1944, pp. 38-41. 8. I b i d . . p. 34. 
9. T . I . Geshkoff, Balkan Union. A Road to Peace i n South-
E a s t e r n Europe, New York, 1940, pp. 18 - 1 9 . See a l s o D. Michev 
and B.P. Petkov, La f e d e r a t i o n balkanique, S o f i a 1 9 3 l i p« 6 f f . 
(5) 
put forward i n 1804-5, was designed to strengthen Russian power 
again s t Napoleon but, although the plan l a t e r i n f l u e n c e d the 
v 10 Serbian statesman, Garasanin, i t had no immediate e f f e c t . 
A f t e r the Napoleonic wars, Capodistras suggested a confederation 
* 
of S e r b i a , Moldavia and W a l l a c h i a but Czar Alexander I was 
opposed to t h i s for f e a r that i t might provoke war with Turkey.** 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h at, with the exception of the p r o j e c t of 
Rhigas Pheraios, a l l the schemes of the e a r l y nineteenth century, 
whether f o r South S l a v u n i t y or for the c r e a t i o n of a f e d e r a t i o n , 
were proposed and were to be c a r r i e d out by the Great Powers 
themselves. 
I n 1840, Colquohoun, a B r i t i s h expert on the Near E a s t , 
wrote to Palmerston r e p o r t i n g that: 
"There are at t h i s moment e m i s s a r i e s at Bucharest 
from B u l g a r i a and S e r b i a and there i s no doubt an union 
e x i s t i n g among these three provinces, which may be h i g h l y 
12 
dangerous to the peace of these c o u n t r i e s . " 
The Yugo-Slav and f e d e r a t i o n movements were both by t h e i r 
very nature r e v o l u t i o n a r y . I n the following year, 1841, a 
Bulgarian r e v o l t was s t e r n l y r epressed. Blanqui, who was sent 
by the French government to i n v e s t i g a t e the s i t u a t i o n , returned 
w i t h great resentment f o r T u r k i s h r u l e and widely canvassed the 
i d e a of a Balkan f e d e r a t i o n . 1 ^ A s e r i e s of t h i r t e e n a r t i c l e s 
upon the Balkans appeared i n the Revue des Deux Mondea between 
1842-46 and Cyprien Robert, one of the c o n t r i b u t o r s , p a r t i c u l -
14 
a r l y emphasized the n e c e s s i t y f o r a Serbo-Bulgarian union. 
10. Prince A. C z a r t o r y s k i , Memoirea du Prince Adam C z a r t o r y -
s k i e t correspondance avec l'empereur Alexandre I e r . , P a r i s , 
1887, Vol. I I , p. 65. 
11. S t a v r i a n o s , op. c i t . , pp. 42-43. 
12. J.C. Campbell, French I n f l u e n c e and the r i s e of Roumanian 
Nationalism, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y , 1940, p. 70. 
13. S t a v r i a n o s , op. c i t . , p. 6 2 . 
14. C. Robert, Les S l a v e s en Turquie. P a r i s 1844, V o l . I I , p . 413. 
( 6 ) 
This n e c e s s i t y vas a l s o r e a l i z e d by I l i j a Gara^anin, a t that 
time M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r and l a t e r Serbian M i n i s t e r of 
v 
Foreign A f f a i r s . Garasanin worked out a plan, s i n c e c a l l e d 
h i s Nachertani.ja which envisaged the d i s s o l u t i o n of the Ottoman 
Empire and foresaw a u n i f i c a t i o n of the South S l a v s under 
Serbian l e a d e r s h i p with the c r e a t i o n of a s t a t e independent of 
15 
both A u s t r i a and R u s s i a . L a t e r w r i t e r s h o s t i l e to the i d e a of 
v* a rapprochement have seen i n Garasanin's p r o j e c t a s t r a i g h t -~~" — — — — — — j ^  
forward example of Serbian i m p e r i a l i s m but i n f a c t the 
Nachertani.ja represented a very f a r - s i g h t e d and imaginative 
p o l i c y j u s t i f i e d by the p r e v a i l i n g p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . 
The movement f o r S l a v u n i t y reached a peak i n the year of 
re v o l u t i o n , 1848. Throughout the whole of Europe, n a t i o n a l 
sentiments were awakened and, on March 24, 1849. i n a Pan-Slav 
club i n Belgrade, a d e c l a r a t i o n was made c a l l i n g on the S l a v s ; 
"to l i b e r a t e themselves completely from the Ottoman 
Empire and to cr e a t e a Yugoslav Kingdom under the 
banner of Prince Alexander K a r a d j o r d j e v i c , c o n s i s t i n g of 
Se r b i a , Bosnia, B u l g a r i a , C r o a t i a , S l a v o n i a , Syrmia, D a l -
17 
matia and Southern Hungary." 
I n May 1849» the great Congress of S l a v s vas held i n Prague, 
and i n June, Bakunin expressed h i s hope i n "the establishment 
i n C e n t r a l and E a s t e r n Europe of a f e d e r a t i o n of f r e e S l a v 
18 
r e p u b l i c s . " But nothing came of these hopes and a s p i r a t i o n s 
and the r e s t o r a t i o n of the Hapsburg monarchy to i t s former 
power and the outbreak of the Crimean war diminished the 
clamour f o r u n i t y or f e d e r a t i o n , 
1 5 . Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . pp. 15 - 1 6 . 
1 6 . A. Toshev, The Bulgarian-Serbian Dispute. S o f i a 1 9 5 2 , 
pp. 8 6 - 8 9 . 
1 7 . M.D. Stranjakovic*, "La C o l l a b o r a t i o n des Croates e t des 
Serbes en 1848 - 4 9 . " Le Monde S l a v e . June 1 9 3 5 , p. 3 9 6 . 
18. From Bakunin's "Appeal to the S l a v s " . See E.H. Carr , 
Michael Bakunin. London 1 9 3 7 , p. 1 7 0 . 
( 7 ) 
However, the movement l o r the u n i f i c a t i o n of I t a l y roused 
enthusiasm once more. Between June 13 and 19* 1857, H a z z i n i 
published h i s four S l a v i c l e t t e r s i n the I t a l i a d el Poppo. 
The l e t t e r s , which achieved a wide renown, urged the formation 
of a Yugoslav s t a t e c o n s i s t i n g of C r o a t i a , C a r i n t h i a , S e r b i a , 
19 
Montenegro, Dalinatia, Bosnia and B u l g a r i a . I n S e r b i a , P r i n c e 
Michael Obrenovic, who came to power i n September 1860, had 
grown up i n the atmosphere of n a t i o n a l i s m and r e v o l u t i o n . He 
r e a l i z e d t h a t the Balkan c o u n t r i e s could not by themselves 
achieve the freedom they d e s i r e d , so he decided to form a system 
of a l l i a n c e s from which he could draw m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l 
support. This a l l i a n c e s t r u c t u r e l a t e r came to be known as 
the Balkan League. 
I t was about t h i s time th a t the Bulgarian people as a 
whole began to become p o l i t i c a l l y conscious. However, they too 
r e a l i z e d that they had no hope of g e t t i n g r i d of T u r k i s h 
oppression without outside a i d and the Bulgarian r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s 
spent much of t h e i r time i n the v a r i o u s Balkan c a p i t a l s , 
c o l l e c t i n g arms, organizing insurgent bands and seeking the 
support of f o r e i g n governments, During these y e a r s , the r e l a t i o n s 
between the Serbian and Bulgarian people were very f r i e n d l y . 
Bulgarian e x i l e s were given refuge and m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g i n 
S e r b i a ; Bulgarian students attended Serb schools and Bulgarian 
books and p e r i o d i c a l s were published i n Belgrade. I t was 
t h e r e f o r e n a t u r a l t h a t the Bulgarians should look to t h e i r 
20 
f e l l o w S l a v s i n t h e i r struggle a g a i n s t the Turks. 
But the Serbs found i t d i f f i c u l t to come to any agreement 
wi t h the Bulgarians because there was no recognized leader to 
19. H. Bergman, "Mazzini e t l e s S l a v e s , " Le Monde Slave, I I , 
May 1918, py. 670-4. 
20. M.D. S t r a n j a k o v i c , Oeuvre du rapprochement e t de 1'union 
des Serbes et des Buigarea dans l e passe, P a r i s , 1930, pp. 8-10. 
(8) 
21 whom they could turn. The only leading r e p r e s e n t a t i v e was 
22 
Rakovski, who has been described as a "diplomat", although 
"agent" might be the more appropriate term. But Rakovski had 
23 
h i s doubts about the Serbian government and h i s view i s echoed 
i n a l e t t e r by Miss Muir Mackenzie, one of tvo E n g l i s h l a d i e s 
who met him i n Greece i n I 8 6 3 1 
"Rakovski f i n d s the same shortcomings i n the Serbs 
as we do. i e . They are i n c l i n e d to be narrow-minded and 
fo r t h i s they f r i g h t e n t h e i r neighbours i n s t e a d of 
24 
a t t r a c t i n g them." 
During 1862-3 Rakovski worked for an understanding between 
Greece, S e r b i a , Montenegro and B u l g a r i a . But because he doubted 
the s i n c e r i t y of the Serbian government, nothing happened and 
Prince Michael did not renew h i s contacts w i t h the r e v o l u t i o n -
a r i e s u n t i l the spring of 1367, when the League was almost 
complete. 
I n January I 8 6 7 , the "Bulgarian Benevolent S o c i e t y " i n 
Bucharest i n v i t e d a number of people to "consider the way i n 
which i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e to draw nearer to the Serbian govern-
n c 
ment and prepare for our future l i b e r a t i o n . " On January 2 6 , 
t h i s group formulated Le. programme des rapports p o l i t i q u e s des 
serbo-bulgares ou l e u r entente c o r d i a l e . T h i s programme prov-
ided f o r the c r e a t i o n of a j o i n t kingdom under the Crown of 
Prince Michael. I t would possess a common army, a common 
currency and a government e q u a l l y d i v i d e d between Serbian and 
21. This point was made during the Serbo-Greek t a l k s on 
June 11, 1861. S t a v r i a n o s , op. c i t . . p. 86. 
22. Toshev, op. c i t . . p. 6. A b r i e f assessment of the l i f e 
and achievements of Georgi Rakovski i s given by C.E. Black, 
The Establishment of C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Government i n B u l g a r i a , 
Princeton, 1943, pp. 3 7 - 3 9 . 
2 3 . I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 24. I b i d . , p. 7. 
25. A. Toshev, Balfcansfcite v o l n i (The Balkan Wars), S o f i a , 
1929, Vol, I , pp. 75-76. 
( 9 ) 
26 Bulgarian m i n i s t e r s . This plan was r e l a y e d to Belgrade where 
v 
i t was warmly r e c e i v e d , Garasanin observing t h a t i t was e n t i r e l y 
s a t i s f a c t o r y and urging t h a t i t be c i r c u l a t e d amongst the 
27 
Bulgarian volunteers a f t e r which i t would be signed. 
But the Bulgarian Committee wished to conclude a formal 
t r e a t y with the Serbian government. A new meeting was convened 
i n Bucharest on A p r i l 5, 1867 and was attended by 80 delegates 
from B u l g a r i a . A f t e r twelve' days a new protocol was drawn up 
which would c o n s t i t u t e "the b a s i s f o r a f r a t e r n a l rapprochement." 
The preamble s t a t e d t h e i r preference f o r S e r b i a with whom 
t h e i r i n t e r e s t s were i d e n t i c a l and l a i d s t r e s s upon the n a t i o n a l , 
r e l i g i o u s and geographical f a c t o r s which had l i n k e d the two 
peoples together. The Protocol d i f f e r e d from the January 
programme i n two r e s p e c t s . For the f i r s t time, the j o i n t 
Serbo-Bulgarian Kingdom was to be known as Y u g o s l a v i a . Neverthe-
l e s s , the s.eed of future d i s c o r d was contained i n A r t i c l e 2 which 
ran: 
"The Yugoslav Kingdom s h a l l c o n s i s t of S e r b i a and 
B u l g a r i a , the Bulgarian lands to include B u l g a r i a , Thrace 
28 
and Macedonia." 
The P r o t o c o l , containing t h i s phrase s p e c i f i c a l l y a t t r i b u t -
ing Macedonia to the regions comprising B u l g a r i a , was submitted 
was submitted to Belgrade where i t r e c e i v e d the f u l l approval 
of Garasanin. On May 22, 1867, he r e p l i e d : 
"Having examined the contents of these minutes I 
f i n d t h a t nothing stands i n the way of these benevolent 
o b j e c t s being f u r t h e r e d by S e r b i a a l s o . Therefore, i n f u l l 
agreement w i t h the b a s i s of the proposed points we w i l l 
take steps for a c t i o n l e a v i n g the d e t a i l s to n e g o t i a t i o n s 
29 
for a complete understanding." 
2 6 . Stranjakovic', op. c i t . , pp. 10 - 1 2 . 
2 7 . February 2, I 8 6 7 . S t a v r i a n o s , op. c i t . . p.93* 
28. The f u l l t e x t of the A p r i l Protocol i s given i n Appendix A. 
y 
2 9 . Toshev, B a l k a n s k i t e v o i n i . op. c i t . , I , p. 81. 
(10) 
This l e t t e r was w r i t t e n on the assumption th a t a Yugoslav 
kingdom j o i n t l y composed of S e r b i a and B u l g a r i a would be s e t 
up as soon as the l a t t e r escaped from T u r k i s h domination. Yet 
i t has been used to prove bad f a i t h and i n s i n c e r i t y on the part 
30 
of S e r b i a . Added support f o r t h i s B ulgarian opinion i s given 
by the t r e a t y signed between S e r b i a and Rumania i n January 1868. 
I n A r t i c l e 8 of t h i s t r e a t y , the s i g n a t o r i e s declared t h a t i 
"Old S e r b i a , Bosna, Hercegovina and B u l g a r i a , 
except that p a r t of the l a t t e r country a l l o t e d to 
Roumania, s h a l l be annexed fore v e r to Serbia."'*' 
T h i s apparent d u p l i c i t y does not enhance the popular view 
of Prince Michael but i t d i s p l a y s a tendency, which he showed 
i n h i s dealings with Kossuth and Garasanin, of , d i s t r u s t i n g and 
ignoring the Bulgarians, w h i l s t regarding the Serbs as the 
n a t u r a l l e a d e r s of the South S l a v s and destined by f a t e to 
32 
u n i t e them i n t o a Serb-dominated Yugoslav s t a t e . T h i s a t t i t u d e 
was again g r i s t to the m i l l of those who opposed the notion of 
South S l a v u n i t y but i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t i n S o f i a 
i n 1896 a Congress of students from both c o u n t r i e s pronounced 
an e f f u s i v e t o a s t to the memory of Prince Michael, "the martyr 
who worked to create f o r us a great and powerful s t a t e and 
to r e u n i t e us with you and found thereby a great Balkan kingdom. 
33 
Remain g l o r i o u s amongst us, 0 Immortal Prince." Prince 
Michael was a s s a s s i n a t e d on June 1 0 , 1868, and h i s work f o r 
South Slav u n i t y and the Balkan League perished w i t h him. 
Nevertheless, the impetus had been given to the movement 
for Bulgarian independence. I n 1870, the Exarchate Church was 
s e t up and i n 1871 a magazine e n t i t l e d "The Yugoslav S t a r ; a 
newspaper for the r e c i p r o c a l p o l i c y and r e l a t i o n s between the 
3 0 . Toshev, The Bulgarian-Serbian Dispute, op. c i t . , p. 8. 
3 1 . Geshkoff, op. c i t . . p. 24. 
3 2 . S t a v r i a n o s , op. c i t . , p. 1 0 3 . 
33* S t r a n j a k o v i c , op. c i t . , pp. 20-21. 
( 1 1 ) 
South S l a v s " appeared i n Belgrade. During the same period 
the S o c i a l i s t s espoused the cause of South S l a v u n i t y . 
Omladina - a s e c r e t s o c i e t y b e l i e v i n g i n atheism, r e p u b l i c a n -
ism and r e v o l u t i o n - was s e t up i n 1867. One of i t s f i r s t members 
was Svetozar Markovic, S e r b i a ' s f i r s t S o c i a l i s t leader, who 
l e f t the s o c i e t y i n 1871 and s e t up a newspaper and a p o l i t i c a l 
party. Markovic defined h i s aims as " l i b e r a t i o n and f e d e r a t i o n " , 
at f i r s t w i t h the Bulgarians and u l t i m a t e l y w i t h a l l the Balkan 
35 
peoples. I n B u l g a r i a , Rakovski's successor, Kravelov, wanted 
a confederation between S e r b i a , Rumania and B u l g a r i a but he 
was c a r e f u l to define Macedonia as p a r t of B u l g a r i a ' s t e r r i t o r y . 
At the time of the Bulgarian u p r i s i n g i n May 1876, there 
37 
was great enthusiasm i n S e r b i a f o r the Bulgarian cause. But 
t h e i r enthusiasm was b r i e f . The Serbian armies were defeated 
and a lengthy war ensued between R u s s i a and Turkey which was 
concluded on March 3 , 1878 a t the Treaty of San Stefano. I t 
has been s a i d t h a t "the Treaty of San Stefano a t l a s t c r eated 
a Bulgarian s t a t e on a f a i r l y sound n a t i o n a l b a s i s according to 
"IQ 
contemporary evidence""^ . But d i d t h i s evidence have any e f f e c t 
on the motives of the Russian government? A l a t e r w r i t e r 
observed t h a t ] 
"The Treaty of San Stefano, an ephemeral c r e a t i o n of 
an e x c l u s i v e l y p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r , has remained i n h i s t o r y 
merely as the diplomatic c r e a t i o n of Russian p o l i c y of the 
3 4 . I b i d . , pp. 16-17. 3 5 . "Notre h e r i t a g e r e v o l u t i o n -
naire'.' La f e d e r a t i o n balkanique . no. 146 (December 1931)» P« 19. 
C h r i s t o Botev, one of the most important Bulgarian l e a d e r s , 
regarded S e r b i a as l i t t l e b e t t e r than the Great Powers but was 
w i l l i n g to work wi t h Markovic to c r e a t e a South S l a v f e d e r a t i o n . 
See a l s o W.D. McClellan, Svetozar Markovic and the O r i g i n s of 
Balkan S o c i a l i s m , Princeton, .1964. 
3 6 . S t a v r i a n o s , op. c i t . . p. 117. 
3 7 . For Prince Milan's proclamation of war on J u l y 1, 1876, 
see S t r a n j a k o v i c , op. c i t . , p. 18. 3 8 . S t a v r i a n o s , op. c i t . . p.114. 
(12) 
time, regardlessof a l l h i s t o r i c and e t h n o l o g i c a l consider-
39 
ations".''* 
San Stefano was a d e l i b e r a t e act of Great Power i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n Balkan a f f a i r s and t h i s was to prove a major obstacle to 
the movements towards closer co-operation and f e d e r a t i o n . For 
the "big Bulgaria" of San Stefano was to be a huge country 
s t r e t c h i n g from the Dobrudja to Salonika, embracing large 
numbers of people who were i n no way Bulgarian i n o r i g i n . The 
settlement therefore raised immediate p r o t e s t s . The Treaty of 
B e r l i n , which sought to r e c t i f y the unfortunate consequences 
only succeeded i n e m b i t t e r i n g the i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s . Serbia 
f e l t she had been deceived; Bulgaria, betrayed. 
Despite t h e i r immediate b i t t e r n e s s , the two South Slav 
nations made an e f f o r t to resolve t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s . Early i n 
1880 the government of Serbia entered i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h 
Bulgaria f o r the establishment of a customs union. But 
A u s t r i a promptly interposed strong objections to such a union 
and the n e g o t i a t i o n s l e d to nothing. A Serbian w r i t e r has said 
t h a t "had the customs union been concluded, the war between 
40 
Serbia and Bulgaria would not have taken place." Indeed, i n 
i s s u i n g h i s ultimatum i n 1885» Prince Milan declared t h a t h i s 
reasons f o r making war were "the u n j u s t i f i a b l e customs r e g u l -
a t i o n s " which "had put a stop to a l l commercial intercourse 
41 
between the two countries." I n f a c t , Serbia had become a 
pawn of A u s t r i a and, i n the Austro-Serbian Convention of June 
28, 1881, had surrendered her freedom of a c t i o n i n exchange f o r 
A u s trian i n f l u e n c e to secure Serbian expansion i n any f u t u r e 
Balkan settlement. The war of 1885, which was d i r e c t l y due to 
39. P. P i p i n e l i s , Such are the Bulgars. London 1942, p. 10. 
40. T. D i o u r d i e v i c , "Le Mouvement Balkanique" i n I e r e Conf-
erence balkanique (Athenes, 5-12 octobre 1930) Documents o f f i c -
i e l s . Athens 1931• p. 64. 
41. Die Grosse P o l i t i k der iiuropaischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. B e r l i n , 1 9 ^ 2 - 7 . Vol. V, p. 1 2 . 
(13) 
A u s t r i a n displeasure at Bulgaria's seizure of Eastern Roumelia, 
l a s t e d a mere f o r t n i g h t and culminated i n a decisive Bulgarian 
v i c t o r y at S l i v n i t s a . The Treaty of Bucharest, which e s t a b l i s h -
ed the status quo ante belimn, was signed on March 3» 1886, 
Bulgaria emerged from the war w i t h p restige and had her union 
w i t h Eastern Roumelia recognized by the Great Powers. Russia 
and A u s t r i a became suspicious of each other's i n t e n t i o n s i n the 
Balkans and Serbia's power and p o s i t i o n i n the peninsula were 
eclipsed f o r some twenty years. 
I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s , there was the d i f f i c u l t problem of 
who should possess those areas of Macedonia s t i l l under Otto-
man r u l e . I t w i l l already be c l e a r t h a t a wide d i f f e r e n c e of 
opinion has existed between Serbia and Bulgaria on the question 
of Macedonia. I t i s a subject which has occasioned.much s t r i f e 
and b i t t e r n e s s and has been the c h i e f obstacle to South Slav 
u n i t y . Although by v i r t u e of language and o r i g i n , the Mace-
donians belong to the South Slav races, they are "a separate 
race, akin to both Serbs and Bulgarians but i d e n t i c a l to 
42 
n e i t h e r . They are Macedonians." Thus i t i s wrong to t r y and. 
prove t h a t they *are e i t h e r Serbs or Bulgarians. As P i p i n e l i s , 
one-time Greek ambassador i n Sofia, observed: 
"no u s e f u l purpose i s served by an i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
of the e t h n o l o g i c a l proportions of the Macedonian popul-
a t i o n s - a question on which e t h n o l o g i s t s w i l l f o r long 
continue to d i f f e r according to t h e i r personal p r e f e r -
ences." 
And indeed, personal preferences have been a paramount f e a t u r e . 
A f t e r the F i r s t World War, Bulgaria issued an impressive 
volume of documents and maps to prove her h i s t o r i c a l claims 
44 
to Macedonia. S t a t i s t i c s are a p a r t i c u l a r l y choice refuge 
42. H.O. Harrison, The Soul of Yugoslavia. London, 1941, p.55. 
43. P. P i p i n e l i s , C a i t i f f Bulgaria. London, 1944,p. 37. 
44. Bulgarian M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , La Question 
Buigare e t les e t a t s balkaniques. Sofia 1919. 
( 14) 
f o r the e t h n o l o g i s t s . I n comparing the s t a t i s t i c s of a Serb 
and a Bulgarian there emerges a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t p i c t u r e of 
the Macedonian populations 
Total population of Macedonia 2 , 8 7 0 , 6 2 0 4 6 2,342,524 4J, 
Bulgarians 57 ,600 
Greeks 201,140 267 ,862 
Serbs 2,048 ,320 N i l 
Aroumains 69 ,665 79,401 
Turks 231,400 548 ,225 
Albanians 165,620 194 ,195 
Jews 64 ,645 N i l 
Others 32 ,230 105,530 
Another w r i t e r has observed t h a t to "attempt to assign exact 
percentages to these various races i s impossible. No accurate 
s t a t i s t i c s were a v a i l a b l e so t h a t each race juggled the f i g u r e s 
to s u i t i t s own ends." 4 8 This much can be adduced from the 
f i g u r e s . 
But Bulgarian w r i t e r s are eager to p o i n t to l i t e r a r y and 
h i s t o r i c a l references to support t h e i r claims and Andrei 
Toshev, a Bulgarian diplomat under King Ferdinand and l a t e r 
Prime M i n i s t e r , amassed a number of examples to substantiate 
h i s theory t h a t the i n h a b i t a n t s of Macedonia had long been 
49 
regarded as Bulgarians. The exact nature of the d i f f i c u l t y 
can be most c l e a r l y seen i n the r e l i g i o u s f i e l d . 
45. A wide range of d i f f e r e n t s t a t i s t i c s are given by 
K.Strupp, La S i t u a t i o n J uridique des Macedoniens en Yugoslavie, 
Paris, 1929, Appendix Chart. 
46. S t a t i s t i c s of the Serbian, Spiro Gopcevic (1889) ex. 
Strupp, i b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
47. S t a t i s t i c s of the Bulgarian, Jordan Ivanov (1912) ex. 
Strupp, i b i d . , l o c . c i t . (Ivanov also wrote ( 5 0 ) ; see below). 
48. Stavrianos, op. c i t . , p. 131* 
49. Toshev, The Bulgarian -Serbian Dispute, op. c i t . . pp. 
18 -31 and 37 - 5 1 . 
(15) 
The Bulgarian Exarchate Church was established by I m p e r i a l 
Firman on March 12, 1870. A r t i c l e 10 i s e s p e c i a l l y important: 
"The s p i r i t u a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Bulgarian Exarch-
ate Church w i l l be composed of the m e t r o p o l i t a n dioceses 
of Rustcb.uk, S i l i s t r i a , Choumen, Tirnovo, Sofia, Vratsa, 
V i d i n , Nis, P i r o t , K u s t e n d i l , Samokov, Veles, Varna 
I f the whole or more than t w o - t h i r d s of those who p r a c t i s e 
the Orthodox r i t e i n the l o c a l i t i e s other than those enum-
erated and enunciated above wish to submit themselves to 
the Bulgarian Exarchate Church f o r t h e i r s p i r i t u a l a f f a i r s 
and i f t h i s i s ascertained and established, they w i l l be 
50 
authorized to do t h i s . " 
The p o l i t i c a l motives of t h i s Firman are c l e a r . At the time i t 
was issued, Bulgaria and the dioceses l i s t e d were a l l under 
Turkish r u l e . I n t h i s area, the only r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y was 
exercised by the Greek Orthodox Church, which was d i s l i k e d by 
the Slav population. I t i s noteworthy t h a t although dioceses 
such as Nis and P i r o t were undeniably Serb the i n h a b i t a n t s were 
given no chance to adopt the Serbian Orthodox Church. N a t u r a l l y , 
when the population was o f f e r e d the choice of Exarchate or 
Greek Orthodoxy, the people opted f o r the Slav-speaking Church. 
Between 1872 and 1874, Skopje, Ohrid, B i t o l j and Debra also 
51 
j o i n e d the Exarchate Church. I t i s a f a c t t h a t the " b i g 
Bulgaria" of San Stefano covered the area of the Exarchate Church 
and during the next t h i r t y years of Ottoman r u l e the teaching 
and c u l t u r e of the Exarchate churches and schools were concen-
t r a t e d an making the Serb population of Macedonia believe t h a t 
52 
they were Bulgarian n a t i o n a l s . This movement of " b u l g a r i z a t i o n " 
50. J, Ivanov, Lea Bulgarea devant l e Congres de l a Paix, 
Berne, 1919, p. 158. 51. I b i d . , p. 159. 
5 2 . Stavrianos, op. c i t . . p. 132 . See also C.G. Logio, 
Bulgaria, Past and Present. Manchester,1936, f o r s t a t i s t i c s of 
Bulgarian schools, teachers, churches and p r i e s t s i n the period 
up to 1918. 
(16) 
moved ao s w i f t l y t h a t Serbia decided t o intervene to prevent 
a r e p e t i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n i n Eastern Roumelia, and the 
Society of St. Sava was established i n 1886 to awaken Serbian 
conscience i n Macedonia. 
This three-cornered f i g h t - f o r Greece vas equally concern-
ed - l a s t e d t w e n t y - f i v e years and concerted Balkan a c t i o n was 
out of the question. I n e v i t a b l y , Serbo-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s worse-
ned. I n August 1889, N i k o l a Pasic, Serbian Prime M i n i s t e r , 
, v i s i t e d Sofia to propose an a l l i a n c e against Turkey and a 
d e l i m i t a t i o n of claims i n Macedonia. I t was an opportune moment 
but Stambolov, the Bulgarian Prime M i n i s t e r , would have no 
part i n such a combination and revealed Pasic's plan t o the 
Turks and i n r e t u r n received more Macedonian dioceses f o r the 
53 
Exarchate Church. 
Four years l a t e r , the I n t e r n a l Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization was set up. IMBO's o r i g i n a l aim was to l i b e r a t e 
Macedonia from the Turks and e s t a b l i s h an independent s t a t e 
w i t h i n a South Slav f e d e r a t i o n . Very soon those who wished t o 
use IMRO to prepare Macedonia f o r i t s annexation t o Bulgaria 
gained the ascendancy and the " F e d e r a l i s t s " were faced not 
only w i t h the Turks but also by the S o f i a - d i r e c t e d Vrhoven 
54 
Komitet - the Supreme Committee. 
53. I b i d . . pp. 133-34. The Serbian Radical Party Programme, 
drawn up by Pasic i n 1881, included a demand f o r an immediate 
entente w i t h the Bulgars and Montenegrins and also envisaged 
a complete Balkan f e d e r a t i o n . See Count C. Sforza, F i f t y Years 
of War and Diplomacy i n the Balkans. New York, 1940, pp. 28 - 2 9 . 
54. H.N. B r a i l s f o r d , Macedonia. I t s Races and t h e i r Future, 
London, 1906, pp. 120-24. B r a i l s f o r d s t a t e s t h a t f r o a the 
beginning, a l l IMRO leaders were Bulgarians and many favoured 
the union of Macedonia w i t h Bulgaria. B r a i l s f o r d also stated 
t h a t there was a close connection between Prince Ferdinand of 
, Bulgaria and Sarafov - the leader of the Supremist Committee. 
I b i d . . p. 171. 
(17) 
At the t u r n of the century, the prospect of closer 
Serbo-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s once more appeared possible. During 
1896-7, Serbian newspapers published a r t i c l e s emphasizing the 
55 need f o r rapprochement and mutual a i d between the two peoples. 
Abroad, several s o c i e t i e s exhorting Balkan u n i t y or confederate 
io n were formed. I n 1897, King Alexander v i s i t e d Sofia and 
concluded a gentlemen's agreement w i t h Prince Ferdinand to 
57 
e l i m i n a t e f r i c t i o n i n Macedonia. A f t e r the death of Alexander 
i n 1903, h i s successor, King Peter, anxious f o r h i s country to 
escape A u s t r i a n i n f l u e n c e , i n i t i a t e d r e l a t i o n s between the two 
c o u n t r i e s , which immediately assumed a c o r d i a l nature. On A p r i l 
12, 1904, two t r e a t i e s were sighed. One was a t r e a t y of f r i e n d -
ship, the other a p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e p r o v i d i n g r e c i p r o c a l 
m i l i t a r y a i d against an aggressor and a common p o l i c y i n 
58 
Macedonia. At the end of December 1904, Prince Ferdinand, 
w h i l s t passing through Belgrade, had a short conversation with. 
59 
King Peter at the r a i l w a y s t a t i o n . I n the f o l l o w i n g year, a 
t a r i f f agreement was drawn up between the two countries and 
a commercial t r e a t y on the basis of the "most favoured n a t i o n " , 
was signed w i t h Bulgaria i n December 1906 to thwart the impact 
of the "Pig War" which had developed when A u s t r i a r e a l i z e d 
t h a t Serbia was seeking to escape her economic c o n t r o l . ^ 
55* Stranjakovic, op. c i t . . p. 22. 
56 . Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . p. 17. 
57. Stavrianos, op. c i t . , p. 141. 
58. W.S. Vucinich, Serbia between East and West, the Events of 
1903-8. Stanford, 1954, pp. 143-44. For d e t a i l s of the t r e a t i e s , 
see E.C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars 1912-3. 
Cambridge, 1938» pp. 463-6. I t i s worth not i n g t h a t the e x i s t -
ence of the p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e was unknown t i l l revealed by Toshev 
i n Balkanskite v o i n i , op. c i t . , Vol. I , pp. 153-8. 
59. Vucinich, op. c i t . . pp. 144-5. 
60. I b i d . , pp. 180-88 and Helmreich, op. c i t . , pp. 7-10. 
(18) 
One of the strongest advocates of t h i s pro-Serbian 
p o l i c y i n Bulgaria was Petkov and as long as he remained i n 
power, r e l a t i o n s continued to be f r i e n d l y . But i n March 1907» 
Petkov was assassinated. His successor, Stanchov, encouraged 
closer l i n k s w i t h A u s t r i a . At the same time, f u r t h e r i n c i d e n t s 
occured i n Macedonia and these were followed by a denunciation 
of Serbia's Macedonian p o l i c y i n the Bulgarian Press. 
J.B. Whitehead, the B r i t i s h representative i n Belgrade at t h i s 
time, wrote: 
"To sum up the whole s i t u a t i o n as regards the 
r e l a t i o n s between Serbia and Bulgaria, i t i s cl e a r t h a t 
they can never be c o r d i a l and stable u n t i l the competition 
between the two n a t i o n a l i t i e s f o r an eventual a c q u i s i t i o n 
of the Slav countries s t i l l under Turkish r u l e comes to 
an end. M. Pasic i s i n favour of co-operating w i t h Bulg-
a r i a f o r common aims and of d e f e r r i n g the discussion of 
the r i g h t s of the two nations to the expected i n h e r i t a n c e , 
u n t i l i t should a c t u a l l y f a l l due, but h i s i n t e n t i o n s were 
f r u s t r a t e d by the uncompromising claim of the Bulgarians 
to the whole of the t e r r i t o r y awarded to them at the 
Treaty of San S t e f a n o . " 6 1 
Later i n the year, on September 16, I z v o l s k y and Aerenthal, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y the Russian and Au s t r i a n f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r s , con-
cluded the Buchlau agreement pr o v i d i n g f o r the annexation of 
Bosnia and Hercegovina to the Hapsburg Empire i n exchange f o r 
Aus t r i a n support f o r the opening of the Dardanelles t o Russian 
warships. Although t h i s d i d not d i r e c t l y a f f e c t Serbo-Bulgarian 
r e l a t i o n s , Aerenthal had decided to i s o l a t e Serbia by making 
Bulgaria a party to h i s p o l i c y . On September 23 , Prince Ferdin-
and v i s i t e d Budapest where Aerenthal urged him to throw o f f the 
l a s t vestiges of Turkish suzerainty and declare himself King. 
61. A p r i l 2, 1908. G.P. Gooch and I I . Temperley, B r i t i s h 
Documents on the O r i g i n of the War 1898-1914, London, 1926cc, 
Vol. V, p. 118. 
( 19) 
on October 5« Ferdinand proclaimed the freedom of h i s country 
from Ottoman r u l e and on the f o l l o w i n g day, Aerenthal announced 
t h a t A u s t r i a had f o r m a l l y annexed Bosnia and flercegovina. 
62 
Although r e l a t i o n s between the two countries were co o l , 
the I t a l o - T u r k i s h war of 19111 provided an e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y 
to attack the Ottoman Empire and Russian m i n i s t e r s worked t o 
create a Second Balkan League. Much of t h i s Russian i n i t i a t i v e 
stemmed from resentment over the one-sided outcome of the 
Buchlau agreement and Russia was determined to prevent any 
extension of A u s t r i a n hegemony i n the Balkan peninsula. The 
nations themselves were also w i l l i n g t o co-operate when there 
was a prospect of t e r r i t o r i a l s p o i l s . I n March 1911* the 
pro-Russian Gueshoff became Prime M i n i s t e r i n Bulgaria. He 
also held the post of Foreign M i n i s t e r and sought an immediate 
understanding w i t h S e r b i a . ^ A p r e l i m i n a r y t r e a t y was d e l i v e r -
64 
ed by the Serbian M i n i s t e r i n Sofia and the f i n a l t r e a t y 
i n c l u d i n g i t s secret annex were signed on March 13, 1912. 
The secret annex r a n i 
"Serbia recognizes the r i g h t of Bulgaria to the 
t e r r i t o r i e s to the east of the Rhodopes and the Struma 
r i v e r ; Bulgaria recognizes the r i g h t of Serbia to those 
v 65 s i t u a t e d to the n o r t h of the Sar-Planina." 
I n A r t i c l e 4, i t was e x p l i c i t l y stated t h a t any d i f f e r e n c e s 
which arose from t h i s annex "should be submitted to Russia 
f o r f i n a l d e c i s i o n . T h i s Treaty was r e a l l y the f i r s t major 
6 2 . Helmreich, op. c i t . . p. 24. 
6 3 . I.E. Gueshoff, The Balkan Leafcne. London, 1915, pp. 13-17. 
64. I b i d . , pp. 19 -23 . 
6 5 . Gueshoff gives f u l l d e t a i l s of the Treaty of Friendship 
and A l l i a n c e i n Appendices I and I I , i b i d . . pp. 112-7. The 
M i l i t a r y Convention i s given i n Appendix I I I , pp. 117-22. He also 
considers the boundary question, pp. 24-33* 
6 6 . Geshkoff, op. c i t . . p. 42. 
( 2 0 ) 
accord between Serbia and Bulgaria and y e t , on the eve 
of i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n , Pasic f r a n k l y t o l d h i s colleagues t h a t 
67 
he had no f a i t h i n King Ferdinand. His p r e d i c t i o n was amply 
j u s t i f i e d . 
Following the F i r s t Balkan War which was v i c t o r i o u s l y 
concluded on A p r i l 16, 1913t disagreement broke out among the 
v i c t o r s . At Au s t r i a n i n s i s t e n c e , p a r t of the land a l l o c a t e d t o 
Serbia was now included i n an independent Albania. Serbia 
theref o r e demanded p a r t of Bulgaria's a c q u i s i t i o n s but t h i s 
demand was resented by the Bulgarians who f e l t t h a t they had 
borne the brunt of the Turkish a t t a c k . The Sofia government 
refused to even consider the idea and during the spring of 1913* 
ledonia. 
ERRATUM. on o u t l i n e d 
a . 6 8 The Owing to an e r r o r i n binding, pp. 21 -30 £g 
r a t i o n . 
are misplaced. They are to be found between 
pp. 43 -44 . (which was 
ere amenable 
~to a r b X t r a f i o n and -the l a t t e r threatened to assassinate King 
Ferdinand and Danev i f they should place the dispute before the 
Czar. On June 28, 1 9 l 3 i t h e r e f o r e , King Ferdinand w i t h the 
connivance of h i s new Prime M i n i s t e r , Danev,^ ordered General 
6 7 . llelmreich, 00. c i t . . pp. 58-39* The source of t h i s i n f o r -
mation was Dr. G a v r i l o v i c , a member of the Serbian f o r e i g n 
o f f i c e and l a t e r Pasic's secretary. 
6 8 . I b i d . . pp. 353-57 and Gueshoff, op. c i t . , pp. 6 9 - 7 0 . 
6 9 . Gueshoff, op. c i t . . p. 92 and Stavrianos, op. c i t . . p. 172, 
7 0 . I b i d . . pp. 8 9 - 9 2 . Gueshoff resigned h i s Premiership on 
May 30 , 1913. He stated t h a t he was i n t e n t on keeping the Balkan 
a l l i a n c e i n t a c t and t h a t i n t h i s , he was i n disagreement w i t h 
King Ferdinand and had no desire to undertake "the heavy r e s -
p o n s i b i l i t y of a second war." Before leaving o f f i c e , he had a 
meeting w i t h Pasic at Tsaribrod. Danev was appointedjas h i s 
successor i n mid-June. 
(31) 
"gentle and r e t i r i n g ; a doubter, not a man of 
a c t i o n . Groping, honest, t h e o r e t i c a l r a t h e r than r e a l i s t i c , 
he l i k e s to believe the best of people. His personal 
12 
charm i s considerable. He i s extremely o b l i g i n g . " 
To those who knew him b e t t e r , h i s character was f a r from 
i n o f f e n s i v e . Kosta Todorov, M i n i s t e r P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y and l a t e r 
Bulgarian" M i n i s t e r i n Belgrade, l e f t h i s f i r s t audience w i t h 
King Boris w i t h the impression t h a t "he was too p o l i t e to be 
honest."*' Even those most favourable towards him admit t h a t 
"one could not help but say of Boris what Prince Metternich 
said of h i s f a t h e r : 'Even when one dees not see Ferdinand, one 
14 
hears him!'" 
From 1919 to 1923 King Boris l a y low, w h i l s t Stamboliski, 
the Agrarian leader, who had been one of the c h i e f rebels i n 
the "September Revolution", wasBulgarian Prime M i n i s t e r . A 
French w r i t e r commentedt 
"For three years and a h a l f , during which time the 
Agrarian regime l a s t e d , the King counted f o r almost nothing 
at a l l ; Stamboliski d i d not l e t pass any o p p o r t u n i t y to 
mark the scant regard he had f o r him. He was the 
"Tzartcheto" - the l i t t l e K i n g . " 1 5 
I t i s perhaps hardly s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h i s period of Agrarian 
r u l e under Stamboliski, when the power of King Boris was most 
severely circumscribed, was the era i n which Yugoslav-Bulgarian 
r e l a t i o n s improved and much of the wartime animosity and 
b i t t e r n e s s decreased.. But i n connection w i t h the Agrarian 
government, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note t h a t one of Boris's 
f a v o u r i t e axioms .wast " I I ne f a u t pas v o u l o i r a l l e r t r o p v i t g . 
12. J. Gunther, Inside Europe, London, 1936, p. 393 . 
13« Todorov, op. c i t . . p. I 3 3 
14. Nikolaev, op. c i t . , p. 47. 
15. A. Broudier, L 1Independence RoumaAie. September 27, 1944. 
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i l f a u t savoir a t t e n d r e . T h i s axiom may be regarded as the 
key to a r e a l understanding of Boris's character. 
This b r i e f study of King Boris h i g h l i g h t s one important 
question concerning the post-war settlement of Bulgaria. To 
t h i s we now t u r n . 
. At the time of the Peace Conference, much was made of 
Clemenceau's famous gibe " I s Bulgaria a kingdom or a r e p u b l i c ? " 
I n v i e w of King Boris's l a t e r p o l i c y and i n view of the peace 
terms which were imposed at N e u i l l y , t h i s question deserves 
serious consideration. One English w r i t e r has asserted t h a t i 
"had Bulgaria been declared a r e p u b l i c immediately 
a f t e r her collapse, b e t t e r terms might have been o f f e r e d 
her, f o r p u b l i c opinion i n B r i t a i n and America would have 
surmised t h a t the Bulgarians had d e f i n i t e l y renounced the 
misguided p o l i c y of t h e i r r u l e r s and had resolved to make 
17 
a f r e s h s t a r t . " 
I t was the opinion of Lieutenant Kenworthy t h a t the A l l i e s were 
c h i e f l y responsible f o r the f a i l u r e of the republican movement 
i n Bulgaria. Speaking i n the Blouse of Commons i n A p r i l 1920, 
he s a i d i 
"We prevented the s e t t i n g up of a r e p u b l i c i n 
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian people wished to have a r e p u b l i c 
but t h i s was contrary to B r i t i s h or French p o l i c y and 
B r i t i s h bayonets were used to prop up t h a t d i s c r e d i t e d , 
detested dynasty of Ferdinand of Coburg and h i s people 
were not. permitted t o get r i d of i t . There was a g l o r i o u s 
o p p o r t u n i t y f o r g e t t i n g r i d of one of those offshoots of 
the Geraan r o y a l house who was misgoverning and oppressing 
one of the small peoples of Europe. But t h a t d i d not s u i t 
18 
the p o l i c y of the A l l i e s . " 
16. Nikolaev, op. c i t . . . p. 204. " I t ' s not necessary to want 
to go too q u i c k l y but r a t h e r to know how to w a i t . " 
17. J. Buchan, (Ed), Bulgaria and Romania. The Nations of 
Today Series. London, 1924, pp. 141-42. 
18. Hansard. CJUCV111. ( A p r i l 1 9 i 1 9 2 0 ) , p. 166. 
(33) 
Lieutenant Kenworthy l a i d great emphasis on the A l l i e d support 
f o r Boris's r u l e but i n f a c t , a f t e r the a r m i s t i c e convention 
of September 2 9 , the A l l i e s simply occupied a number of s t r a t -
egic p o i n t s i n Bulgaria which was by no means an occupation i n 
19 
the s t r i c t sense of the word. 
However, e a r l y i n 1919. a Bulgarian delegation was chosen 
to go to Paris to present t h e i r nation's case, and Kosta 
Todorov was appointed to spread propaganda on behalf of Bulgaria 
20 
at the Peace Conference. Working through the fashionable 
salons and the columns of the i n f l u e n t i a l French press he set 
out h i s government's new p o l i c y t h a t "Bulgaria has completely 
broken w i t h the past and had an honest desire to co-operate w i t h 
21 
the r e s t of Europe towards a stable peace." 
The o f f i c i a l Bulgarian delegation at Paris were t r e a t e d 
very c o l d l y and i t i s reported t h a t no one wished to shake hands 
22 
w i t h them when they a r r i v e d , Harold Nicholson summed up h i s 
viewst 
19. G. Desbons, La Buigarie apres l e t r a i t e de N e u i l l y , 
P a r i s , 1930, p. 266 . 
2 0 . Born i n 1889, Todorov was a t h i r d generation r e v o l u t i o n a r y , 
h i s grandfather having been a haiduk against the TurkB and h i s 
f a t h e r a c t i v e i n p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e against Stambulov. As a 
r e s u l t of t h i s , Todorov was born i n e x i l e i n Russia. At an e a r l y 
age he became involved i n the 1905 Russian Revolution and was 
gaoled f o r seven years. Returning to Bulgaria, he was i n d i c t e d 
on a p o l i t i c a l charge. Rather than face t r i a l , he f l e d to the 
West and during the F i r s t World War, fought w i t h the Foreign 
Legion. I n 1916, he volunteered t o d e l i v e r peace proposals to 
the Bulgarian government* On h i s a r r i v a l , he was a r r e s t e d , 
brought to t r i a l and sentenced to 3i~ years imprisonment. Whilst 
i n p r i s o n , he became a close f r i e n d and supporter of Stamboliaki, 
though not a member of the Agrarian p a r t y . Todorov, op. c i t . . 
pp. 1-102. 21. I b i d . , pp. 113-115. 
22. P. P i p i n e l i s , C a i t i f f Bulgaria. London 1944, p. 2 7 . 
(34) 
"For the Bulgarians, I cherished f e e l i n g s of contempt. 
Their t r a d i t i o n s , t h e i r h i s t o r y and t h e i r actual o b l i g a t i o n s 
should have bound them to the Entente I n s p i r e d by 
the most m a t e r i a l motives of a c q u i s i t i o n , they had j o i n e d 
w i t h Germany and by doing so, lengthened the war by two 
years They had j o i n e d our enemies f o r purely s e l f i s h 
purposes; t h e i r expectations had proved erroneous; and 
they were now endeavouring to cast on King Ferdinand the 
blame f o r what had i n f a c t been a movemnt of n a t i o n a l 
egoism. I d i d not f e e l t h a t Bulgaria deserved more mercy 
than she"would h e r s e l f have been prepared i n s i m i l a r 
23 
circumstances to accord." 
At the Peace Conference, the Bulgarian delegation d i d indeed 
t r y t o argue t h a t since "the Bulgarian n a t i o n d i d not approve 
of the a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany and t h a t the a l l i a n c e was forced 
upon i t , Bulgaria should not be held responsible f o r the wrongs 
committed by her w h i l s t under the despotism of her former 
24 
German k i n g . " Within Bulgaria i t s e l f , i n f a c t , p u b l i c opinion 
placed much of the blame f o r the war and the d i s a s t e r of Septem-
25 
ber 1918 upon the i n t r i g u e s of the Macedonian committees. 
The j u s t i c e - or i n j u s t i c e - of the Treaty of N e u i l l y 
depends upon whether i t i s seen as an honourable settlement 
w i t h a vanquished enemy, embodying adequate and l e g i t i m a t e 
precautions f o r the f u t u r e or, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , as a b i t t e r and 
c y n i c a l deception p r a c t i s e d upon the Bulgarian people, who 
had genuinely expected the Peace Conference to respect and 
consider t h e i r views. From the ne g o t i a t i o n s leading to the 
conclusion of the Treaty i t i s q u i t e clear t h a t the peacemakers 
2 3 . H. Nicholson, Peacemaking 1919. London, 1934, pp. 34 -35-
24. T . I . Geshkoff, Balkan Union. A Road to Peace i n South-
Eastern Europe. New York, 1940, p, 5 6 . 
2 5 . Dr. R. A. Reiss, The Com!tadji Question i n Southern 
Serbia. London, 1924, p. 29 
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regarded Bulgaria as a defeated and infamous enemy.^ 
Dr, Temperley observed t h a t t 
"the A l l i e d and Associate powers cannot 
lose s i g h t "of the f a c t t h a t i n ranging h e r s e l f beside 
the Central Powers and remaining there u n t i l the moment 
at which her defeat seemed assured, Bulgaria has broken 
the c h i e f l i n k between Russia and her a l l i e s , opened to 
Germany the road to the East and thus rendered i n e v i t a b l e 
the prolongation of the war. She i s then responsible f o r 
27 
the t e r r i b l e e v i l s which r e s u l t e d from t h i s . " 
What aggravated Bulgaria's p o s i t i o n at the Peace Conference 
was the "exceptional savagery" t h a t had marked the acts of 
violence perpetrated by the Bulgarians i n the occupied 
countries - " a savagery t h a t was established i n the r e p o r t 
of the Committee on the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the authors of the 
28 
war." This Committee had enumerated 32 d i f f e r e n t kinds of 
outrage committed by the forces of the Central Powers and t h e i r 
a l l i e s i n v i o l a t i o n of the d i c t a t e s of common humanity. Three 
kinds of outrage were committed anly by the Bulgariansi the 
d e l i b e r a t e s t a r v a t i o n of c i v i l i a n s , the c o n f i s c a t i o n of property, 
29 
and the confinement of c i v i l i a n s under inhuman c o n d i t i o n s . 
The r e v e l a t i o n of these a t r o c i t i e s ^ 0 and the other d e t a i l s 
provided by the Committee l o s t Bulgaria much of the sympathy 
she had possessed i n Engliah c i r c l e s . 
B ulgaria, however, saw the Treaty as a b i t t e r deception 
and a l e g i t i m a t e source of grievance. I n a l a t e r p r esentation 
26. Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y . 1919-39. F i r s t Series, 
London 1946cc ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as B.D.) I , nos. 8, 11, 17* 
19, 22-24, 30 and 33; also I I , no. 9 . 
27. H.W.V. Temperley, A H i s t o r y of the Peace Conference of 
Paris. London, 1924, IV, p. 414. 
28. P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . . p. 27 2 9 . I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
3 0 . See above Chapter I , p. 25Also f o r s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s , see 
Reiss, op. c i t . pp. 22-27 and 41-45. But f o r a purely p r i v a t e 
( 3 6 ) 
of the Bulgarian case, i t was stated t h a t "the var f o r them 
was of no i n t e r e s t . They were ready to l a y down arms w i t h the 
f u l l hope of r e c e i v i n g j u s t i c e from the A l l i e d democracies. 
Their a c t i o n stopped h o s t i l i t i e s and they were d i r e c t l y 
31 
responsible f o r the peace which followed." I n the same work, 
there i s perhaps the most succinct f o r m u l a t i o n of the b i t t e r n e s s 
and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t which Bulgaria experienced! 
"The great war soon f o l l o w e d , Bulgaria made the 
maximum e f f o r t s and gave numberless s a c r i f i c e s - not to 
conquer f o r e i g n lands or to subdue f o r e i g n populations 
but only f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of i t s oppressed brothers and 
i t s l e g i t i m a t e lands. The heroic f e a t s of her brave army 
were acknowledged even by her enemy. The Fourteen Points 
of President. Wilson were made p u b l i c . They contained a l l 
t h a t Bulgaria looked f o r . Bulgaria had i m p l i c i t f a i t h i n 
them and was the f i r s t t o surrender her arms and t o seek 
peace. I n Salonika, concrete promises were given t h a t she 
should r e t a i n together w i t h other b e n e f i t s received by 
v i r t u e of her arms, an o u t l e t to the Aegean Sea. I n 
r e t u r n f o r t h i s , two s a c r i f i c e s were demanded of her, 
namely the abdication of King Ferdinaad i n favour of 
Crown Boris and the F i r s t S o f i a d i v i s i o n t o be held as 
(continued from the previous page) 
opinion, minimizing the s i g n i f i c a n c e of a t r o c i t i e s i n the Balkans, 
see L. Buxton, The Black Sheep of the Balkans. London, 1920 , 
p. 127 . 
3 1 , Bulgarian National Group, Bulgaria and the Balkan Problems. 
Sofia, 1934, p. 3 8 . (This book was an o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n 
w r i t t e n f o r the Balkan Conference and p r i n t e d w i t h the assistance 
of the Carnegie Endowment f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Peace). The e f f e c t 
of Bulgaria's collapse upon the German war e f f o r t i s borne out 
by D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs. London, 1936, I I , pp. 1 9 H i 
1920, 1944, 1951 and 2002 . See also F i e l d Marshal P. von Hinden-
burg, Out of my L i f e . London, 1920, pp. 428-29. 
(37) 
hostages under the aegis of B r i t a i n and France. Bulgaria 
r e a d i l y assented to a l l the s a c r i f i c e s required of her 
32 
-but the promises remained u n f u l f i l l e d . " ' 
Many poin t s i n t h i s a s s e r t i o n are open to> c r i t i c i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
the ingenious view t h a t Bulgaria l a i d down her arms i n response 
to President Wilson's Fourteen Points. S i m i l a r l y , i n the 
armistiee terms of September 1918* there i s no mention of and 
"concrete promises" on the p a r t of B r i t a i n and France.'*' The 
Bulgarians surrendered f i r s t l y because t h e i r army was t o t a l l y 
defeated by the A l l i e d attack up the Vardar v a l l e y , then because 
of the complete demoralization of t h e i r troops and t h i r d l y 
because of the imminence of c i v i l war w i t h i n B u l g a r i a i t s e l f . 
But t h i s view of Bulgaria's s a c r i f i c e and her desire to seek 
peace was the argument pursued by successive Bulgarian govern-
ments from 1923-1941. which t a l k e d of t h e i r country's " l e g i t i m a t e 
grievances" and the r e v i s i o n of her t e r r i t o r i a l s t a t u s . This 
argument was based upon a f a l s e and perverse view of the 
h i s t o r i c a l p o s i t i o n of Bulgaria between 1915 and 1918. 
I n f a c t , the Treaty of N e u i l l y ' was, i n i t s e l f , a j u s t 
document. I t made no great a l t e r a t i o n t o the t e r r i t o r i a l status 
of Bulgaria drawn up i n the 1913 Treaty of Bucharest but, f o r 
purposes which were wholly s t r a t e g i c , Yugoslavia was awarded 
2,430 sq. kilometres of t e r r i t o r y along the f r o n t i e r , c o n s i s t i n g 
of the; towns of Tsaribrod and Bosilgrad and the Strumica 
s a l i e n t . * 7 The Treaty also forbade m i l i t a r y c o n s c r i p t i o n and 
ordered t h a t the Bulgarian army be reduced t o 20 ,000 s o l d i e r s , 
3 2 . Bulgarian National Group, op. c i t . . p. 2 1 . 
33. Lloyd George, op. c i t . , I I , pp. 1946-47. 
34 . B.D., Series I , I , no. 5 9 . F i n a l peace c o n d i t i o n s were 
decided upon on September 17, 1919. The Treaty was a c t u a l l y 
signed on November 2 7 . 1919. 
35 . For d e t a i l s leading to the settlement of the Yugoslav-
Bulgarian f r o n t i e r see I . J . Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace 
Conference. Yale, I 9 6 3 , pp. 128 -30 , 1 3 7 - 3 8 , 158, 180 and 223-24. 
(38) 
3i000 border guards and no more than 10,000 policemen f o r 
i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y . I n a d d i t i o n , i t was s t i p u l a t e d t h a t Bulgaria 
should make reparations amounting to 5,000 m i l l i o n gold francs, 
a sum l a t e r reduced to 2,250 m i l l i o n s ^ a f t e r prolonged e f f o r t s 
by Todorov, who succeeded i n shoving the peacemakers t h a t such 
•to 
a sum vas beyond Bulgaria's l i m i t e d resources. W r i t i n g on 
the Treaty of N e u i l l y , Or. Temperley stated t h a t "while the 
t e r r i t o r i a l clauses undoubtedly e n t a i l e d some loss on Bulgaria, 
the r e p a r a t i o n clauses were the most f a i r and p r a c t i c a b l e i n 
39 
any t r e a t y . 
But "the Peace Treaty concluded i n N e u i l l y w i t h the 
proclaimed purpose of c r e a t i n g l a s t i n g r e l a t i o n s f o r peace, 
f r i e n d s h i p and g o o d w i l l amongst the Balkan states d i d not b r i n g 
the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h a t which the whole Bulgarian people f o r 
ages past had considered as i t s n a t i o n a l r i g h t and i t s 
40 
l e g i t i m a t e a s p i r a t i o n . " I n s h o r t , i t d i d not give Macedonia 
to Bulgaria. 
As has been seen, the f i r s t l i n e of the Bulgarian argument 
was t h a t the n a t i o n , as a whole, d i d not want war and vas 
w i l l i n g to sign an a r m i s t i c e a t the e a r l i e s t o p p o r t u n i t y . 
Their second argument was the f a m i l i a r one t h a t Macedonia vas 
Bulgarian t e r r i t o r y and t h a t the m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s of the 
Balkan Wars and the F i r s t World War were t h e r e f o r e merely an 
attempt t o recover what was Bulgaria's r i g h t f u l t e r r i t o r y . 
"The Bulgarian people p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the wars only t o a t t a i n 
41 
t h e i r n a t i o n a l u n i f i c a t i o n not f o r any i m p e r i a l i s t i c aims." 
C.J. Logio, a sympathizer of the Bulgarian p o s i t i o n , observed 
t h a t : 
36. £200 m i l l i o n s ( a t 1919 v a l u e s ) . 
37. £90 m i l l i o n s ( " " " ) . 
38. Todorov, op. c i t . , p. 122 
39. Temperley, op. c i t . , IV, p. 412. 
40. Bulgarian National Group, op. c i t . . p. 34. 
41. I b i d . , p. 38 
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"Much has been w r i t t e n about the s e v e r i t y of the 
terms d i c t a t e d to Germany and Austria-Hungary but these 
t r e a t i e s , v i n d i c t i v e and harsh as they appear to some, 
are i n the opinion of the Bulgarians, generous vhen 
compared to the t r e a t y forced on t h e i r country. For i n 
the case of the Germanic Empires the p r i n c i p l e of 
n a t i o n a l i t y was more or less adhered t o , while i n the 
case of Bulgaria, i t simply went by the board. And t h i s 
c o n s t i t u t e s the c a r d i n a l defect of the Bulgarian t r e a t y , 
f o r the economic c o n d i t i o n s , however exacting and ruinous 
they may be, would have been accepted w i t h r e s i g n a t i o n 
and w i t h o u t i l l - w i l l by the Bulgarians, while the t e r r i t o r i a l 
42 
excesions w i l l ever rankle i n the hearts of her people." 
The eleventh of President Wilson's Fourteen Points suggested 
t h a t "the r e l a t i o n s of the several Balkan states to one another" 
should be "determined by f r i e n d l y counsel along h i s t o r i c a l l y 
43 
established l i n e s of allegiance and n a t i o n a l i t y . " Despite 
the f a c t t h a t President Wilson s p e c i f i c a l l y demanded the 
evacuation of Serbia as one of the conditions of a peace 
settlement, Bulgaria put great hope i n the loophole t h a t the 
t h a t the Fourteen Points provided f o r a s s e r t i n g t h a t Macedonia 
belonged to Bulgaria along j u s t such " h i s t o r i c a l l y e stablished 
l i n e s of allegiance and n a t i o n a l i t y . " Indeed, says Nikolaev, 
"she looked forward to a much b r i g h t e r f u t u r e and one of the 
p i l l a r s of t h i s hope was t h a t Bulgaria had never declared war 
on the United States, w i t h whom dipl o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s had 
44 
continued as normal f o r the d u r a t i o n of the war." I t i s 
important to remember t h a t although the d e c l a r a t i o n of the 
Fourteen Points was not regarded as being a t variance w i t h the 
v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of the A l l i e s , i t c o n s t i t u t e d no p a r t of the 
42. Buchan, op. c i t . . p. 154. 
43. H.S. Coinmager, L i v i n g Documents of American H i s t o r y , 
pp. 65-67. 44. Nikolaev, op. c i t . . p. I36 
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4 5 
o f f i c i a l policy- of the A l l i a n c e . J 
Nevertheless, at a meeting at Sofia U n i v e r s i t y i n 
December 1918, a number of Macedonian Bulgarians elected a 
new "National Committee" which p e t i t i o n e d the Entente Powers 
f o r Macedonia's union w i t h Bulgaria: 
" A l l have proclaimed the w i l l i n g n e s s of the Macedonian 
population to u n i t e i t s e l f w i t h the mother-country, 
Bulgaria, an a s p i r a t i o n which has not been r e f u t e d during 
the decades of s t r i f e when blood flowed f r e e l y - and, 
p o i n t i n g out t h a t the Great Powers have again and again 
i n several i n t e r n a t i o n a l matters, solemnly recognized 
the r i g h t of Macedonia to u n i t e i t s e l f w i t h the other 
Bulgarian c o u n t r i e s ; the assembly-general has t h e r e f o r e 
voted the f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n : 
'The delegates of the Macedonian Benevolent 
Societies have drawn from the Buigar population of 
Macedonia the formal desire to u n i t e themselves w i t h 
t h e i r brothers i n Bulgaria and give the executive 
council the imperative mandate to o r i e n t a t e i t B 
a c t i v i t y accordingly on the basis of the f o l l o w i n g two 
p o i n t s : 
1) The I n d i v i s i b i l i t y of Macedonia. 
46 
2) The Union of Macedonia t o Bulgaria'" 
The Bulgarian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference 
a c t u a l l y put forward proposals f o r the annexation of land south 
of the River Morava, the Dobrudja, Macedonia and both East and 
47 
West Thrace. I n a d d i t i o n , they produced two large and 
impressive books of documents and maps which purported to show 
the r i g h t of Bulgaria's claim to e x t r a t e r r i t o r y and also sought 
46. J. Ivanov, Les Bulgarea devant l e Congres de l a Paix. 
Berne, 1919, Appendice aux temoinnages et aux documents, no. 
XXVI1, pp. 290-291. 
45. Lloyd George, op. c i t . . I I , p. 1494. 
47. P i p t n e l i s , op. c i t . , p. 50. 
48 to r e f u t e the accusations brought against her. 
"The Macedonians," they, maintained, " would have 
been p e r f e c t l y happy i f Bulgaria had r e t a i n e d Macedonia 
a f t e r the war, Iha autonomy i d e a l would have been abandoned 
f o r the Macedonians, who have always struck t h e i r chests 
and sworn by autonomy, would have gone bach on t h e i r 
goal at the f i r s t favourable prospect of a Bulgarian 
49 
occupation." 
I t i s known t h a t the head of the Bulgarian delegation urged 
p r i v a t e l y i n a l e t t e r of September 2, 1919 t h a t i n place of 
"the m u t i l a t i o n of Bulgaria", a p l e b i s c i t e should be held 
"embracing a l l the populations d e l i v e r e d from the Turkish yoke 
since 1912". I f t h i s were not f e a s i b l e , he proposed an 
independent Macedonian s t a t e : 
"Let a l l the n a t i o n s , b i g or small, f r e e l y use the 
ports of the new s t a t e thus c o n s t i t u t e d - Salonika, 
Kavalla and Dedeagatch - and l e t t h i s new st a t e serve as 
a pledge f o r the f u t u r e Balkan Confederation i t w i l l 
e l i m i n a t e a l l the p r e t e x t s of r i v a l r i e s and s t r i f e 
between the Balkan states and w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the estab-
50 
l i s h i n g of the f u t u r e confederation." 
I n t h i s connection, i t i s known t h a t the Bulgarian delegates 
had been o f f i c i a l l y authorized to propose the establishment 
of a Yugoslav f e d e r a t i o n i n which Macedonia would be included 
as an autonomous s t a t e . ^ 
48. Bulgarian M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , La (juestion Buigare 
e t les e t a t s balkaniques, S o f i a , 1919; and from the same source, 
La V e r i t e sur -leB accusations contre l a Bulgaria. S o f i a 1919* 
49. S. Christowe, Heroes and Assassins. London, 1935, p. 126. 
50. "Peace i n the Balkans;A Bulgarian S o l u t i o n , " , Nation C1X. 
(November 29, 1919), pp. 699-702. 
51. H.G. Alsberg, "Union i n the Balkans", Nation C1X. (October 
4, 1919), pp. 463-64. See also, Buchan, op. c i t . , p. 158, and 
Buxton, 03. c i t . , p. 124. 
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These proposals regarding an independent Macedonian s t a t e 
show t h a t there had been no change of heart i n the Bulgarian 
leaders. For only when Bulgaria was i n a weak p o s i t i o n d i d her 
leaders t a l k of such independence. At other times, when they 
thought themselves superior i n m i l i t a r y power and diplomatic 
support t o t h e i r neighbours, they preached a Bulgarian Macedonia 
During both world wars, when Bulgaria had the o p p o r t u n i t y to 
proclaim the autonomy and independence of Macedonia she d i d 
53 
not do so. 
The a t t i t u d e and conduct o£ the Bulgarian delegation a t 
the Paris Conference substantiates Dr. Temperley's view t h a t 
54 
Bulgaria had no idea of the r e a l i t y and enormity of her defeat. 
F i r s t l y , they had attempted to cast o f f the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
the war upon t h e i r former k i n g . Secondly, they proclaimed the 
myth t h a t Bulgaria had l a i d down her arms i n the i n t e r e s t s of 
peace and, t h i r d l y , they attempted to r e t a i n c o n t r o l of the 
conquests they had made since 1915 - p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Macedonia -
by a subtle and disingenuous appeal to a bond of n a t i o n a l i t y 
which was u n l i k e l y to a t t r a c t the sympathy of the peacemakers 
at t h a t time. By the terms of N e u i l l y , only 6,798 sq. kilometres 
of the pre-1912 Macedonia was recognized as Bulgarian. The new 
Yugoslav f r o n t i e r s encompassed 25,774 eq. kilometres of i t s land 
55 
and Greece acquired some 34,154 sq. k i l o m e t r e s . Thus Greece 
was the p r i n c i p a l b e n e f i c i a r y of the r e - d i s t r i b u t e d Macedonian 
t e r r i t o r y . But i t was towards her South Slav neighbour t h a t 
Bulgaria manifested her greatest b i t t e r n e s s and h o s t i l i t y , and 
through the inter-war period Bulgaria refused to recognize t h a t 
Macedonia was anything but Bulgarian t e r r i t o r y , u n j u s t l y and 
i l l e g a l l y annexed by Yugoslavia. 
52. Reiss, op. c i t . , p. 118. 
53. I b i d . , pp. 27-28. 
54. Temperley, op. c i t . , l o c . c i t . 
55. Christowe, op. c i t . , p. 129. 
Yugoslavia, or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 
was established on December 1, 1918. The new kingdom presented 
a bewildering v a r i e t y of r e l i g i o n s , laws and systems of 
education and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the i n t e r n a l problems of 
r a t i o n a l i z i n g , modernizing and c e n t r a l i z i n g the new kingdom 
took many years to solve. The st r e n g t h of the Kingdom l a y i n 
i t s being Yugo-Slavia, the South Slav st a t e f o r which the Slavs 
had been hoping f o r so long. Yet i t was here t h a t i t was at i t s 
weakest, f o r those opposed to the c e n t r a l i z i n g tendencies of 
Belgrade and the rigorous laws which were required to hold the 
new stat e together, could accuse i t s r u l e r s of "Serbian Imper-
56 
i a l i s m . " One of the regions i n the new Yugo-Slavia was 
Macedonia and w i t h i n t h i s region there were undoubtedly some 
who were of Bulgarian o r i g i n ( p a r t i c u l a r l y those l i v i n g i n the 
f r o n t i e r s t r i p s i n and around Bosilgrad and Tsaribrod - some 
92,000 i n number) ' and, i n the Treaty of St. Germain, 
Yugoslavia acknowledged the existence of a Bulgarian m i n o r i t y 
w i t h i n the borders of the new states A r t i c l e 4 ra n i 
"The Kingdom of SHS acknowledges as Serb, Croat 
and Slovene subjects, by r i g h t and without any f o r m a l i t y , 
the persons from A u s t r i a n , Hungarian and Bulgarian n a t i o n -
a l i t i e s who are born i n the said t e r r i t o r y from parents 
whose residence had been i n the respective t e r r i t o r i e s , 
although a t the date of t h i s t r e a t y coming i n t o f o r c e , 
59 
t h e i r residence i B not t h a t of t h e i r b i r t h p l a c e . " 
Undoubtedly, then, there was a Bulgarian m i n o r i t y i n Macedonia 
but, once again, the Bulgarian w r i t e r s f a i l t o d i s t i n g u i s h 
between the amorphous Macedonian p o p u l a t i o n and those Slavs 
of a s p e c i f i c a l l y Bulgarian n a t i o n a l i t y . Toshev and others 
accuse the new Kingdom of a wholesale " d e - n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of 
56. A. Toshev, The Bulgarian-Serbian Dispute. So f i a , 1932, p. 
57. Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 122. 
58. The Treaty of St. Germain was signed on September 10, 1919 
59. Toshev, op. c i t . , pp. 72-73. 
(21) 
Savov to attack Serbia without any formal d e c l a r a t i o n of 
war. 
Stavrianos has said t h a t the army's advance was a 
" p o l i t i c a l gesture" r a t h e r than a serious m i l i t a r y a t t a c k , ^ * 
but i t seems t h a t King Ferdinand hoped to achieve so s w i f t a 
f a i t accompli t h a t the Western Powers would recognize h i s 
72 
a c t i o n and not do anything about i t . Nor do the sympathizers 
of Bulgaria see i t as merely a " p o l i t i c a l gesture": " F o o l i s h l y 
presumptive, he (Ferdinand) counted on a s w i f t and complete 
v i c t o r y . " ^ The Bulgarian attack - described by Gueshoff as 
74 
"an act of c r i m i n a l madness" - was repulsed by Serbian, Greek 
75 
and Turkish forces and an a r m i s t i c e was signed on J u l y 31. 
The Treaty of Bucharest, which deprived Bulgaria of many of 
the gains she had made i n the F i r s t Balkan War, was signed on 
August 10, This defeat has had immense repercussions. Had 
Bulgaria agreed to negotiate i n a f r i e n d l y s p i r i t i n 1913» 
many of the i l l s which plagued the Balkans between 1918-41 
could have been a v o i d e d . ^ S i r Edward Grey, the B r i t i s h Foreign 
Secretary, gave an accurate diagnosis of the s i t u a t i o n when he 
said: 
" I t l e f t Bulgaria sore, i n j u r e d and despoiled of 
what she believed belonged to her. Any f u t u r e Balkan peace 
71. Helmreich reported t h a t Savov declared "that'he d i d not 
give an order ( t o a t t a c k ) but only passed on the order, a f t e r 
the King assured him t h a t at the f i r s t exchange of shots between 
Bulgaria and Serbia, an Auatro-Hungarian corps would cross the 
Danube. Op. c i t . , p. 367. 72. P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . , p. 36. 
73. N.P. Nikolaev, La destinee tragique d'un r o i (Boris I I I ) , 
Uppsala, 1952, p. 33* Gueshoff, op. c i t . , pp. 92-3, stated t h a t 
the attack was made without the knowledge or consent of the 
Bulgarian Cabinet. He stated t h a t the attack was a r o y a l d e cision 
enacted "not w i t h o u t the knowledge of the Prime M i n i s t e r , Dr. 
Danev." 74. P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 
75* For d e t a i l s of 2nd. Balkan War, Uelmreich, op. c i t . c h . X V I I I . 
76. P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . , p. 37. 
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vas impossible as long as the\Treaty of Bucharest remain-
ed. Bulgaria henceforth became a p i v o t and a pawn i n the 
77 
hands of the Great Powers i n the Balkans." 
A f t e r the Treaty of Bucharest, Serbia's r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
Bulgaria remained embittered. The Bulgarians waited f o r veng-
eance and the opportunity eame quicker than they expected. I t 
i s clear t h a t there was a close p o l i t i c a l understanding between 
A u s t r i a and Bulgaria between 1912-5. On J u l y 23, 1914, the day 
on which Austria-Hungary issued her ultimatum to Serbia f o l l -
owing the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Count von Berchtold, 
the A u s t r i a n Foreign M i n i s t e r , i n s t r u c t e d h i s m i n i s t e r i n S o f i a 
t h a t I 
"the Macedonian Committees i n Bulgaria should a t once 
begin i n t e n s i v e a c t i v i t y - which the Bulgarian Government 
might n a t u r a l l y and c a t e g o r i c a l l y condemn and disavow -
w i t h the main purpose of c o n c e n t r i c a l l y destroying the 
means of communication (bridges, railways and telegraph) 
thus c u t t i n g o f f Serbia from Salonika i n the south and 
from Bulgaria on the east. As soon as our m o b i l i z a t i o n 
i s declared you are authorized t o f i n d the ways and 
means f o r the promotion of such a c t i v i t y , proceeding 
78 
c a r e f u l l y and s e c r e t l y and using money." 
Thus, when war was imminent, IMRO mobilized t o enter Serbian 
t e r r i t o r y and undertook sabotage and g u e r r i l l a warfare even 
though Bulgaria was not at t h a t time at war w i t h Serbia. 
I n the spring of 1914, Alezandrov and Protogerov , two 
of the chief Supremist leaders, re-shaped IMRO i n Macedonia 
and soon t h e i r men were roaming the countryside, preaching 
77. Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916. 
London, 1925, Vol. I , p. 263. 
11 
78. Document 10550, Osterreich-Ungarns Au s s e n p o l i t i k von der 
Bosnischen Krise 1908 b i s zum Kriegsausbruch 1914, Vienna, 
1930, Vol. 8, pp. 609-611. 
(23) 
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hatred of the Serbs and promising e a r l y l i b e r a t i o n . E a r l y 
i n 1914, the Serbian government extended c o n s c r i p t i o n t o 
Macedonia and i t became one of IMRO's p a r t i c u l a r tasks t o 
i n c i t e men against service i n the Serbian Army and help them 
to escape to Bulgaria through underground contacts. Young men 
reared under the l a x Turkish d i s c i p l i n e resented the Serbian 
a u t h o r i t y ; they and t h e i r f a m i l i e s were warned of h o r r i d 
f a t e s when the Bulgarians " l i b e r a t e d Macedonia" i f they j o i n e d 
80 
the Serbs, As a r e s u l t , several thousands f l e d t o Bulgaria, 
Albania or to the mountains. 
Dr. Beiss, a professor a t Lausanne and war correspondent 
on the Salonika f r o n t , made i n q u i r i e s i n t o the a c t i v i t i e s of 
IMRO upon the outbreak of war i n 1914. On August 21, seven 
81 
" c o m i t a d j i s " were caught t r y i n g to blow up the main l i n e to 
Salonika. A l l seven were i n Bulgarian uniform and c a r r i e d 
Bulgarian weapons. They had come from Sofia and crossed the 
border on August 3-4. I n the possession of the leader was a 
l i s t of sabotage and d e s t r u c t i o n they should e f f e c t "before 
au1 
83 
82 
the i defeat of Serbia." During the l a t e summer and autumn, 
there were other minor acts of t e r r o r i s m and sabotage. 
Captured co m i t a d j i s stated the Austro-Hungarian Legation i n 
Sofia gave them subsidies. Many c h i e f s used to go personally 
to the Legation and were assured by Laska, the m i l i t a r y 
„ 84 attache, t h a t the Serbs would be beaten by the Austrians. 
The f u n c t i o n of the co m i t a d j i s was t h e r e f o r e t o d i v e r t Serbian 
troops from the Northern f r o n t i e r . On Good Friday 1915* several 
hundred Bulgarian c o m i t a d j i s attacked detachments of Serb 
troops at Valandovo and the bridge over the Vardar near 
Strumica s t a t i o n . At the most conservative estimate, the encoun-
t e r cost the l i v e s of 100 Serbian s o l d i e r s . 
79. J. Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, London, 1939» pp. 129-30. 
80. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
81. "Comitadjis" l i t e r a l l y means "members of a committee". 
82. Dr. Beiss, The Comitad.ji Question i n Southern Serbia. 
London, 1924, pp. 9-11. 83. I b i d . , p. 12. 
i k i i « i PP» 13-14. 85. I b i d . . p. 19. 
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On May 24, 1915, several Supremist leaders met i n Sofia 
and f o r m a l l y decided t o work f o r Bulgaria's entry i n t o the 
86 
war on Germany's side. I n September, Bulgaria signed a 
t r e a t y and m i l i t a r y convention w i t h the Central Powers and on 
October 14, King Ferdinand declared war on Serbia. His p o l i c y 
d i d not have the f u l l approval of the Bulgarian people. On 
September 17, there was a c r i t i c a l meeting between King 
Ferdinand and the leaders of f i v e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . Stambol-
i s k i , the Agrarian leader, i s reported to have t o l d the Kingt 
"The people have no confidence i n your a b i l i t y t o 
r u l e . Once before, i n 1913, you brought t h i s country to 
catastrophe. Now you're planning to set y o u r s e l f once more 
87 
against the wishes and i n t e r e s t s of the Bulgarian people." 
Later, i n the Sobranje, he outspokenly expressed h i s hope i n 
a Serb v i c t o r y : 
"You're a Serbl" said a Bulgarian deputy. 
"You're r i g h t ! " Stamboliski i s reported to have r e p l i e d . 
"I'm no Bulgarian. I'm no Serb. I am a Slav of the South -
a Yugoslav! 1 , 8 8 
But Stamboliski was very much a lone voice and i t has been 
suggested t h a t the importance of h i s conversation w i t h the King 
has been exaggerated and became a regul a r subject produced by 
89 
"repentant Bulgarians". 
When Bulgaria and Germany had successf u l l y defeated the 
Serbian armies, Macedonia was annexed to Bulgaria. IMRO, whose 
members now made no mention of autonomy, were made responsible 
86. Swire, og. c i t . , p. 133. 
87. K. Todorov, Balkan Firebrand. The Autobiography of a 
Rebel. Soldier and Statesman, Chicago, 1943, p. 92. See also 
Nikolaev, op. c i t . . p. 124. 
88. Todorov, i b i d . . p. 194. 
89. G.I. Kapchev, Le debacle nationale bulgare devant l a 
Haute Cour. Paris, 1923, p. 78. Kapchev gives a verbatim record 
of the scene between Stamboliski and King Ferdinand. 
(25) 
f o r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the occupied t e r r i t o r y . S h o r t l y 
before the war, Alexandrov's Supremist Committee was given 
30 m i l l i o n gold marks by Germany on the understanding t h a t 
they would form a Macedonian Volunteer D i v i s i o n from those 
90 
who had f l e d i n t o Bulgaria. On September 16, f i v e days 
before Bulgarian m o b i l i z a t i o n , the Macedonian Volunteer 
D i v i s i o n c o n s i s t i n g of 33?764 o f f i c e r s and men were mustered 
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i n S o fia. 
The Macedonian Organization d i s t i n g u i s h e d i t s period of 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n by violence and t e r r o r i s m . General Jekov, 
the CommandeT-in-Chief of Bulgaria's forces, i s reported to 
have ordered "the extermination of a l l Serbian i n t e l l e c t u a l s -
deputies, p r i e s t s , doctors, o f f i c i a l s , teachers" and commanded 
hi s subordinates to "destroy t h i s order a f t e r reading and 
92 
g i v i n g e f f e c t to i t . " 
I n a l l wars, the s t o r i e s of a t r o c i t i e s are l i a b l e to 
exaggeration but c e r t a i n f a c t s do stand out. There was 
widespread massacre, rape and regular execution of the wounded. 
One t h i r d of a l l Serbian prisoners of war i n Bulgaria died 
and the 1917 r e v o l t at XurBumlje l e d to the burning of 
v i l l a g e s and 2,000 executions. The Archbishop of Skopje was 
murdered w i t h the connivance of a Bulgarian bishop who i s 
reputed to have said: "For f i f t y years, we w i l l cut t h r o a t s 
93 
and burn; then we w i l l pray." 
The IMRO leader, Alexandrov, personally received the I r o n 
v 94 
Cross from the Kaiser at Nis and Protogerov became a member 
95 
of the Malinov Cabinet i n June 1918. Between inspections of 
the c o m i t a d j i s , Alexandrov would help i n the work at H.Q. or 
96 
accompany Crown Prince Boris on h i s tours of Macedonia. I n 
view of t h i s , and bearing i n mind the b r u t a l i t y of the occup-
90. Reiss, op. c i t . . p. 20. 93» I b i d . . l o c . o i t . 
91. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 135 94. I b i d . , p. 137. 
92. I b i d . , pp. 138-39. 95. I b i d . , p. 139. 
96. Reiss, op. c i t . . p. 67 
(26 > 
a t i o n forces, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o do more than give a stated f a c t 
from a source favourable to Prince B o r i s i 
"Questions r e l a t i v e to the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the 
occupied t e r r i t o r i e s or to the army supplies and even 
to the i n t e r n a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the country o f t e n 
could not get a s a t i s f a c t o r y s o l u t i o n w i t h o u t the personal 
97 
i n t e r v e n t i o n of the Prince." 
These p a r t i c u l a r d e t a i l s show the degree of involvement of IMRO 
i n Bulgarian a f f a i r s i n Macedonia from 1913-18 and the connect-
i o n , however tenuous, between the Macedonian Organization and 
Crown Prince B o r i s . This i n t u r n throws a great deal of l i g h t 
upon events i n the inter-war period. 
I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t i n any inter-war studies of Yugoslav-
Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s , those h i s t o r i a n s and biographers w i t h 
bulgarophile tendencies, s t u d i o u s l y ignore the events of 
1914-18. I t i s no exaggeration to say t h a t w h i l s t Bulgarian 
l o y a l t y , decency, n o b i l i t y and misfortune i s trumpeted to the 
98 
skies, h i s t o r y "stops" at 1913! H.W.V. Temperley has said 
t h a t because Bulgaria was not occupied l i k e Germany and other 
enemy countries and d i d not know the t a s t e of occupation, such 
as she meted out on others, i t l e d her to some misapprehension 
99 
about the r e a l i t y and enormity of her defeat. I t i s from t h i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t point t h a t we may examine the Peace Settlement and 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian'relations between 1918-41. 
97. Nikolaev, op. c i t . . p. 128. 
98. This i s apparent i n several works r e f e r r e d to i n t h i s 
chapter, notably Toshev, Ivanov, Strupp and Nikolaev. I t i s also 
apparent i n The Bulgarian National Group, Bulgaria and the Balkan 
Problems, Sofia, 1934, and G.Desbons, Bui gar i e apre*s l e t r a i t e 
de N e u i l l y , P a r i s , 1930. A defence of the Bulgarian p o s i t i o n t 
i s given by the Bulgarian M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , La v e r i t e 
sur le s accusations contre l a Bulgarie, Sofia, 1919. 
99. H.W.V. Temperley, A H i s t o r y of the Peace Conference of 
Paris. London, 1924, Vol. 4, pp. 411-2. 
Chapter 2. 
Bulgaria and the Peace Settlement 
(28) 
"The r e i g n of Boris I I I began i n the poorest way, 
i n t r a g i c c o n d i t i o n s ; a defeated n a t i o n , without f r i e n d s 
or support, whose misfortune aroused no p i t y , weakened 
and ruined by three disastrous wars on which i t had 
expended much e f f o r t ; a people a t r o c i o u s l y deceived, 
completely discouraged, d i v i d e d by p o l i t i c a l animosity, 
a profound d i s o r g a n i z a t i o n i n a l l i t s domestic services, 
a t o t a l overthrow of n a t i o n a l l i f e . To draw Bulgaria from 
the depths to which she had sunk, to reclimb the slope, 
to r e - e s t a b l i s h order, to a l l e v i a t e the people's s p i r i t , 
to re-animate the economic l i f e , were urgent tasks."* 
This i s an adequate statement of the s i t u a t i o n i n which 
Bulgaria found h e r s e l f a f t e r signing an ar m i s t i c e w i t h the 
A l l i e s at Salonika on September 29, 1918. Two days before," 
Bulgarian troops i n a r e v o l u t i o n a r y mood had proclaimed a 
Republic at Radomir and, at the moment when the armis t i c e was 
a c t u a l l y being signed, these mutinous troops were marching on 
Sofi a . King Ferdinand ordered General Protogerov, one of the 
Supremist leaders, to hold the c a p i t a l against the re b e l s . 
With the help of M i l i t a r y College cadets and some German troops, 
Protogerov succeeded i n destroying three t r a i n l o a d s of 
2 3 mutineers. By t h i s a c t i o n Bulgaria was spared c i v i l war and, 
on October 4, King Ferdinand abdicated and - went to Vienna. 4 
1. N..P. Nikolaev, La destinee t r a g i que d'un r o i , Uppaala, 
1952, p. 39. 
2. J. Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy. London, 1939» p. 140. 
3. Nikolaev, op. c i t . , p. 135. 
4. M. Padev, Escape from the Balkans, London, 1943. p. 77; 
(29) 
He was succeeded by b i s son. Crown Prince B o r i s . B o r i s , 
to whom reference has already been made i n the previous 
chapter, i s an important, i f not the most important, f i g u r e 
i n Yugoslav-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s during the inter-war years. 
His r e i g n from 1918-1943 covers the e n t i r e p eriod under 
consideration and h i s presence and p o l i t i c a l power give a 
consistency and c o n t i n u i t y to Bulgaria's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I t 
i s t h e r e f o r e u s e f u l to look b r i e f l y at the character and 
background of t h i s man who, at a time of r e v o l u t i o n and 
complete defeat, became King of Bulgaria. 
Boris was born on January 30, 1894, the eldest son i n a 
f a m i l y of fo u r . His mother died i n 1899 and he was brought up 
by a stepmother, Princess Eleonora, who became the second 
Queen of Bulgaria. Those who knew Boris claim t h a t King 
Ferdinand induced i n him an almost "demoralizing fear which 
5 
tormented him? and i t seems t h a t h i s childhood was f a r from 
happy. I n 1912, Boris came of age and i n the f o l l o w i n g year 
he entered the school of war. Boris p a r t i c i p a t e d b r i e f l y i n 
the Second Balkan War and witnessed the defeat, the r e t r e a t 
and the humilation of h i s country, aggravated by an outbreak 
of cholera. This a f f e c t e d him deeply. At the time of the Treaty 
of Bucharest, there was discussion among the higher people 
whether King Ferdinand might abdicate i n favour of h i s son. 
(continued from the previous page) 
Padev states t h a t i n the 1915 Buigaro-German Treaty of A l l i a n c e , 
Ferdinand prudently i n s e r t e d a clause ensuring t h a t " i n case 
the war i s l o s t " he would receive f o r the r e s t of h i s l i f e an 
adequate pension from the German s t a t e . Ferdinand died at Coburg 
on September 10, 1948. For a study of h i s r e i g n , see H.R. Madol, 
Ferdinand of Bulgaria, The Dream of Byzantium, London, 1933. 
5. Nikolaev, op. c i t . , pp. 13-24. This section of the l i f e of 
King Boris i s w r i t t e n by Constant Schaufelberger, who taught him 
f o r f i v e years. 
6. K. Todorov, Balkan Firebrand, The Autobiography of a Rebel, 
Soldier and Statesman, Chicago, 1943» p« 133. 
(30) 
But i t was feared t h a t i f Ferdinand abdicated i t would mean the 
end of the r o y a l t y a l t o g e t h e r . For when Boris was asked about 
t h i s , he commented: "I'm not a l l t h a t keen on r u l i n g ; i f the 
King goes, I s h a l l go w i t h him."^ 
However, by 1915, Boris had changed h i s opinion. He 
regarded the a l l i a n c e w i t h Germany and the attack on Serbia 
as f u r t h e r imprudence on h i s f a t h e r ' s p a r t and he protested 
against the decision. His protest evoked s t e r n paternal wrath 
and Boris was a c t u a l l y put under a r r e s t f o r several days. How-
ever, f o r the r e s t of the war Boris served i n the Bulgarian 
army and saw service i n several theatres of ac t i o n i n the Balkans. 
I t would seem therefore t h a t Boris' p r o t e s t was ra t h e r t i m i d , 
but t h i s o p position to h i s f a t h e r ' s p o l i c y was noted by the 
cabinets i n London and Paris who ascribed i t to h i s c r e d i t 
when he succeeded h i s f a t h e r i n 1918. As has already been 
stated i n the previous chapter, Boris was c l o s e l y involved i n 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the occupied t e r r i t o r y , i n the problems 
g 
of army supplies and i n the i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s of h i s own country. 
I t was even rumoured t h a t the dismissal of Kadoslavov i n 
June 1918 was due to h i s personal i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
As a king, Boris made a very favourable impression on 
those he met. He had a g i f t f o r languages - p a r t i c u l a r l y 
I t a l i a n and French - and was able to converse l u c i d l y and 
i n t e l l i g e n t l y w i t h foreigners i n subjects i n which they had a 
personal i n t e r e s t . This ease of manner and the technique he 
had i n dealing w i t h h i s v i s i t o r s i s e s s e n t i a l to any understand-
ing of h i s character.* For when Bulgaria was a f f e c t e d i n t e r n a l l y 
or e x t e r n a l l y by any f r e s h development, opinion abroad exonerated 
the King from a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , seeing him as: 
7. Nikolaev, op. c i t . , pp. 31-35. 
8. I b i d . , p. 37. 9. I b i d . , p. 128 
10. I b i d . , p. 215. Radoslavov was Bulgarian Prime M i n i s t e r 
from J u l y 5, 1913 t i l l June 20, 1918. 
11. I b i d . , pp. 26-32 
(44) 
the Bulgarian minority"** 0 (a minority estimated a t 800,000 
and i n c l u d i n g a l l Macedonian S l a v s whether Bulgarian or not)*** 
62 
and a p o l i c y of t o t a l " s e r b i a n i z a t i o n " throughout Macedonia. 
Within these blanket terms, the Yugoslavs were accused of 
d e l i b e r a t e l y depriving these Bulgarians of t h e i r educational 
and r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s and of constant p o l i t i c a l and 
economic p e r s e c u t i o n . Bulgarian teachers and p r i e s t s were 
a r r e s t e d , deported or ex p e l l e d and c h i l d r e n attended Serb schools 
i n s t e a d . No Bulgarian books or p e r i o d i c a l s were allowed and a l l 
Bulgarian s c i e n t i f i c , academic and u n i v e r s i t y p u b l i c a t i o n s 
sent to the U n i v e r s i t y of Skopje were returned. Those w i t h 
t h e i r names ending i n " o f f " were obliged to change them to the 
Serbian " i c " and B u l g a r i a was not allowed to provide f o r the 
upkeep of her war cemetries i n Macedonia. I n f a c t these 
complaints were u n j u s t i f i e d i n the sense that the region of 
Macedonia included i n the Yugoslav Kingdom was under Bu l g a r i a n 
c o n t r o l only from 1915-18 and the changes made a f t e r the war 
were simply designed to r e s t o r e the s t a t u s quo which had e x i s t e d 
before the Bulgarian conquest and occupation.. 
A l l these developments were regarded by B u l g a r i a as 
" l e g i t i m a t e g r i e v a n c e s " . Accusations of t e r r o r were made and 
the S o f i a government announced tha t the gr e a t e r number of 
refugees who had f l e d from neighbouring c o u n t r i e s were now 
"overcrowding the l i m i t e d motherland and c r e a t i n g a s p i r i t of 
64 
d i s a i i s f a c t i o n among the whole Bulgarian people." 
Among the malcontents were to be found the 1,662 w a r - c r i m i n a l s 
whose e x t r a d i t i o n Yugoslavia had demanded before the Conference 
60. I b i d . , pp. 78-80 and 93-94. 
61. Bulgarian National Group, op. c i t . , p. 24. 
62. I b i d . , pp. 35 -6 . 
63. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . and Toshev, op. c i t . , l o c . c i t . For a 
co n s i d e r a t i o n of the o r i g i n s and quantity of refugees see 
Appendix B. 64. Christowe, op. c i t . . p. 145 and 
Bulga r i a n National Group, op. c i t . , p. 36. 
(45) 
of Ambassadors. The Yugoslav demand vas based upon A r t i c l e 
118 of the Treaty of N e u i l l y : 
"The Bulgarian government recognizes the r i g h t of 
the A l l i e d and A s s o c i a t e powers to bring before m i l i t a r y 
t r i b u n a l s persons accused of having committed a c t s of 
v i o l a t i o n of the l a v s and customs of war. Such persons s h a l l , 
i f found g u i l t y , be sentenced to punishments l a i d down 
by law The Bulgarian government s h a l l hand over 
to the A l l i e d and A s s o c i a t e powers or to such of them as 
s h a l l so request, a l l persons accused of having committed 
an a c t i n v i o l a t i o n of the laws and customs of war, who 
are s p e c i f i e d e i t h e r by name, or by rank, o f f i c e or 
employment which they held under the Bulgarian author-
i t i e s . 1 , 6 5 
Among the 1,662 whose e x t r a d i t i o n was demanded, were Alexandrov 
and Frotogerov, both of whom were held r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a s e r i e s 
of massacres and executions i n the Old S e r b i a and Morava 
d i s t r i c t s under Bulgarian o c c u p a t i o n . ^ Both Alexandrov and 
Protogerov were a r r e s t e d i n November 1919 and were imprisoned 
for a s h ort w h i l e . However, none of the 1,662 was ever brought-
to t r i a l and both Alexandrov and Protogerov were helped to 
67 
escape. 
I n March 1920, Alexandrov r e v i v e d the I n t e r n a l Macedonian 
Bevolutionary Organization (IMRO) as "an answer to the P a r i s 
68 
crime" and Protogerov spread propaganda i n S o f i a , f i n d i n g 
support among the many dispossessed o f f i c i a l s who had worked 
69 
i n Macedonia during the occupation. Another dangerous source 
of s e d i t i o n were the thousands of young and ambitious army 
o f f i c e r s , now deprived of t h e i r p r o f e s s i o n and s t a t u s , who 
65. R e i s s , op. c i t . . pp. 40-41. 
66. I b i d . , pp. 41-45 
67. Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 145-46. 
68. Chr i s t o v e , op. c i t . . p. 129. 
69. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 144. 
(46) 
deeply resented the peace t r e a t y and opposed the s l i g h t e s t 
s i g n of a c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e towards Y u g o s l a v i a , ^ The 
r e v i v a l of IMBO a t t r a c t e d many of those vho were l i s t e d as 
war-criminals by Y u g o s l a v i a , 7 * and the ranks of the post-war 
c o m i t a d j i s were swelled by those who were g u i l t y of offences 
72 
i n Yugoslavia and f l e d to B u l g a r i a r a t h e r than face t r i a l . 
The r e v i v e d and renewed Macedonian Organization made i t s 
aims quite c l e a r t "IMBO would f i g h t f o r the n a t i o n a l r i g h t s 
of Bulgarians which t h e i r army had f a i l e d t o - l i b e r a t e on the 
b a t t l e f i e l d . " 7 3 
The r e a c t i o n of B u l g a r i a to the peace t r e a t y of N e u i l l y 
and the r e v i v a l of one of the most potent sources of d i s c o r d 
between the two nations, could only cause d i s q u i e t i n Belgrade. 
The manner of the Bulgarian delegation at P e r i s , the renewed 
flood of propaganda i n favour of Macedonian annexation or 
independence and the v i s i b l e r e l u c t a n c e of the Bulgarian 
government to hand over those who were known wa r - c r i m i n a l s 
engendered grave d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n Yugoslav l e a d e r s , who 
saw these developments as a t h r e a t to the future well-being 
of Yugoslavia. Archbishop Stefan of S o f i a i s s u e d a warning! 
"Let i t not be forgotten t h a t without B u l g a r i a , Balkan peace 
74 
i s a b s o l u t e l y impossible I " And H.G. Alsberg, attending a 
meeting of Agrarian l e a d e r s i n B u l g a r i a reportedi 
"Unanimously I was assured t h a t i f Thrace and 
70. Todorov, op. c i t . , p. 136 and Christowe, op. c i t . . p. 155. 
71. R e i s s , op. c i t , l o c . c i t . 
72. I b i d . . pp. 49-66. Dr. R e i s s gives a long and comprehensive 
tab l e of s t a t i s t i c s r e l a t i n g to those who departed from the 
Kratovo d i s t r i c t between 1918-1922. Of the 157 vho went to 
Bu l g a r i a , he recorded that 83 went as d e s e r t e r s , 23 were wanted 
for murder, 3 f o r brigandage, 17 for harbouring c r i m i n a l s and 
the r e s t were e i t h e r minor offenders or l e f t from personal c h i i c e , 
73o Christowe, op. c i t . , p. 155. 
74. Bulgarian National Group, op. c i t . . p. 11. 
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the Aegean coast were taken away from B u l g a r i a and 
there vere no f e d e r a t i o n , then another Balkan War vas 
i n e v i t a b l e . " 7 5 
The successor s t a t e s vere a c u t e l y avare of the danger of 
r e v i s i o n i s m leading to v a r and i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t between 
1920-22, the foundation t r e a t i e s of the L i t t l e Entente vere 
l a i d . 
A l a t e r v r i t e r has observed t h a t i 
"when Belgrade and S o f i a are only l i n k e d together 
by s u s p i c i o n , no diplomatic e f f o r t f o r the p a c i f i c a t i o n 
of the Balkans can succeed, for the South S l a v s form the 
m a j o r i t y of the population and the t e r r i t o r i e s they occupy 
are, s t r a t e g i c a l l y , the most important. The a x i s , 
Belgrade-Sofia, i s a genuine a x i s along which the 
d e s t i n y of the Balkans r e v o l v e s . " 7 7 
Stamboliski, the Agrarian leader and Prime M i n i s t e r from 
October 1919t vas probably one of the few Bulgarian l e a d e r s to 
see the need for an immediate and l a s t i n g understanding v i t h 
Y ugoslavia. Despite $he misfortunes of the Bulgarian delegation 
at P a r i s , he continued to urge the n e c e s s i t y tpr co-operation' 
78 
and u n i t y . Speaking on November 27, a f t e r signing the Treaty ' 
of N e u i l l y , he s a i d i 
" I have signed the t r e a t y but I b e l i e v e th a t sooner 
or l a t e r i t v i l l be r e v i s e d . My p o l i c y aims at peace and 
the brotherhood of a l l peoples. We intend to l i v e up to 
our o b l i g a t i o n s , but ve s h a l l not cease appealing to the 
79 
conscience of the world f o r j u s t i c e to defeated B u l g a r i a . " 
75. Alsberg, op. c i t . . p. 464. 
76. See below, chapter 3, p. 63. Also, N.J. Padelford, Peace 
i n the Balkans. The Movement towards I n t e r n a t i o n a l Organization i n 
the Balkans, New "York, 1935, pp. 180 -5 . 77. Padev, op. c i t . p. 69. 
7?. L.S. S t a v r i a n o s , Balkan Federation. The Moveznnent towards 
Balkan Unity i n Modern Times. Northampton, Mass., 1944, p. 210. 
79. Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 123. 
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On the next day, with the help of Todorov, he d r a f t e d 
l e t t e r s to the Prime M i n i s t e r s of the three important Balkan 
powers: the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Greece and 
Rumania, proposing t h a t the past be forgotten and th a t a l l 
Balkan governments should c o l l a b o r a t e for the common s e c u r i t y 
and the economic welfare of the Balkans. 
80 
"Not one of them answered." 
80. I b i d . , l o C j C i t . 
(49) 
Chapter 3. 
The I n f l u e n c e of I t a l y 
(50) 
But the Bulgarian Prime M i n i s t e r was not a man to give 
up so e a s i l y . Born i n the small v i l l a g e of S l a v o v i t s a on 
March 25, 1879, Alexander Stamboliski was a determined and 
vigorous peasant l e a d e r . His bold opposition to King Ferdinand 
- both f o r h i s a b s o l u t i s t r u l e as w e l l as h i s c a t a s t r o p h i c 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y - brought him the l e a d e r s h i p of the Agrarian 
party and a period of imprisonment from 1915-18. Whilst i n 
p r i s o n , he drew up h i s post-war p o l i t i c a l programme, the 
" P r i n c i p l e s of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union", A r t i c l e 
7 ran: 
"The Agrarian Union favours durable and peaceful 
r e l a t i o n s between B u l g a r i a and her neighbours I t seeks 
to strengthen these good r e l a t i o n s by u n i t i n g B u l g a r i a with 
the other Balkan s t a t e s on a f e d e r a t i v e b a s i s . " * 
The p r i n c i p l e was l a t e r modified to read: 
"The party seeks to maintain f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s 
with a l l other nations and to work f o r a c l o s e rapproche-
ment wi t h a l l our small neighbouring s t a t e s on a f e d e r a l 
b a s i s . " 2 
Although Stamboliski never denied the Bulgarian n a t i o n a l i t y of 
the Macedonians and although he never h i d h i s antipathy towards 
the extremist Serbian elements i n Yugoslavia, he argued p u b l i c l y 
t h a t only through f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h her S l a v neighbour, 
1. L.S. S t a v r i a n o s , Balkan Federation. A H i s t o r y of the 
Movement towards Balkan Unity i n Modern Times, Northampton, 
Mass., 1944, p. 209. 2. T . I . Geshkoff, Balkan Union. 
A Boad to Peace i n South-Eastern Europe, New York, 1940, p. 55. 
From Paragraph 28,of the National Peasant Party Programme. 
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could the Macedonian question be s e t t l e d . I n innumerable 
speeches, Stamboliski urged rapprochement w i t h S e r b i a and the 
u n i f i c a t i o n of a l l S l a v s i n the peninsula i n t o one great f e d e r -
ated s t a t e . This would be the f i r s t step to a Balkan F e d e r a t i o n . 
And t h i s Balkan Federation would i n turn be the f i r s t step to 
u n i t i n g a l l Agrarian nations i n t o a v a s t supra-national Green 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l . ^ I n t h i s matter, Stamboliski had great confidence 
i n the Croats. He believed that i f the Agrarian-minded Croatian 
Peasant Party, l e d by Stephen Radio*, came to power, then there 
was an immediate prospect of clo s e r e l a t i o n s between the two 
4 
c o u n t r i e s . Writing to Obov, one of h i s m i n i s t e r s , he s t a t e d 
t h a t he hoped to see "an i n t e g r a l , democratic and p a c i f i c 
5 
Yugoslavia, extending from Mount 'friglav to the Black Sea". 
Stamboliski did not immediately become Prime M i n i s t e r . 
Following h i s proclamation of a r e p u b l i c a t Radomir, orders 
were i s s u e d f o r h i s a r r e s t but, s h o r t l y afterwards, a general 
amnesty was granted, and Sta m b o l i s k i , who i n the meantime had 
been i n hiding, e v e n t u a l l y became a m i n i s t e r i n the r e c o n s t r u c t -
ed Cabinet.** This c o a l i t i o n government, l e d by Todorov - a 
cl o s e f r i e n d of the pre-war Premier Gueshoff - l a s t e d from 
November 1918 u n t i l the e l e c t i o n s of August 17i 1919. The 
e l e c t i o n s produced no c l e a r - c u t m a j o r i t y ^ and the Prime M i n i s t e r , 
who not only disapproved of the terms of the Peace Treaty, but 
3. S t a v r i a n o s , op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 
4. N. Buxton, "The Balkans Today", Nineteenth Century, XC, 
(August 1921), pp. 333-5. 5. J . Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, 
London, 1939, p. 142. Mount T r i g l a v i s i n S l o v e n i a . 6. May 1919. 
7. J . Buchan ( E d ) , B u l g a r i a and Roumania; The Nations of 
Today S e r i e s . London, 1924, give s t h e f i g u r e s : 
Agrarians 86 (198,444 v o t e s ) N a t i o n a l i s t s 19 (54 ,556) 
Communists 47 (118,671 " ) Oanevists 8 (36,$66) 
S o c i a l Democrats 38 (82,826 " ) R a d i c a l s 8 (33,343) 
Democrats 28 ( 65,267 " ) Ra d o s l a v o v i s t s 3 ( 4 2 , ^ 4 ) 
Others - (8,462 v o t e s ) . 
(52) 
found that h i s constituency was no longer part of B u l g a r i a , 
resigned, Stamboliski vas chosen as h i s successor and formed 
h i s f i r s t c abinet on October 6. 
I n h i s e a r l y months of o f f i c e , S t a m b o l i s k i f a c e d the over-
whelming e f f e c t s of B u l g a r i a ' s defeat; the l o s s of her r i c h e s t 
a g r i c u l t u r a l area i n the Dobrudja, the heavy burden of r e p a r a t -
Q 
ions and an unprecedented r i s e i n the cost of l i v i n g . T h i s 
a l l l e d to great d i s c o n t e n t . A two-month r a i l s t r i k e began 
at the end of December 1919 and l a s t e d u n t i l the s t r i k e r s ' 
funds were exhausted. I n the meantime, Stamboliski armed the 
peasants and endeavoured to run the r a i l w a y s with the a i d of 
troops. When he had succeeded i n breaking the s t r i k e , he 
ordered f r e s h e l e c t i o n s to be held on March 28, 1920, hoping 
that t h i s would secure a ma j o r i t y for the Agrarian party i n 
the Sobranje. Despite i n t i m i d a t i o n , h i s party obtained only 
Q 
38% of the v o t e s . Stamboliski refused to accept the e l e c t o r a l 
d e c i s i o n as binding and proceeded to i n v a l i d a t e enough Oppos-
i t i o n mandates to secure a ma j o r i t y of two i n the Sobranje. 
This a c t i o n , which was by no means uncommon i n the Balkans, 
aroused such i n d i g n a t i o n , t h a t the I n t e r - A l l i e d Control 
Commission i n S o f i a threatened Yugoslav m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
S t a m b o l i s k i ' 8 opponents, dreading any f u r t h e r reduction i n 
t h e i r country's s i z e and independence, gave way. 
Af t e r the 1920 e l e c t i o n s , Kosta Todorov was appointed 
Under-Secretary of Foreign A f f a i r s . Stamboliski himself held 
the post of Foreign M i n i s t e r but Todorov was able to run 
8. Buchan, pp. c i t . . p. 152. Taking 100 as an index-figure 
for 1914, the index had r i s e n to 1754 by 1919 and reached 2577 
by January 1920. 
9. I b i d . . p. 153. R e s u l t s given as: 
Agrarians 346,949 votes R a d o s l a v o v i s t s 57,096 votes 
Communists 181, 525 votes S o c i a l Democrats 55,017 " 
Democrats 97,581 " Danevists 52,722 " 
N a t i o n a l i s t s 60,992 " R a d i c a l s 41,770 " 
(53) 
B u l g a r i a ' s f o r e i g n o f f i c e without much i n t e r f e r e n c e . The 
conduct of the e l e c t i o n s had already caused f r i c t i o n w i t h 
the A l l i e s and Todorov a l s o encountered great d i f f i c u l t i e s ! 
" I n my new p o s i t i o n , I understood f o r the f i r s t 
time the i m p l i c a t i o n s of B u l g a r i a ' s defeat. S e v e r a l 
governments had re-opened t h e i r l e g a t i o n s i n S o f i a , 
others s t i l l had temporary missions there. Almost 
every day, A l l i e d diplomats came to me w i t h impossible 
demands, u s u a l l y presented as ultimatums. They i n t e r f e r e d 
scandalously with i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and intervened on 
behalf of Bulgarian s u b j e c t s engaged with them i n 
contraband trade and s p e c u l a t i o n . The army of occupation 
behaved w i t h the utmost decorum but the diplomatic 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s acted l i k e proconsuls When they 
applied pressure, I reminded them tha t although B u l g a r i a 
had signed severe peace termB, i t had not granted the 
A l l i e s e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l r i g h t s . " 
I n t h i s unfortunate predicament, S t a m b o l i s k i ' s government 
sought to e s t a b l i s h b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Y u g o s l a v i a and with 
the r e s t of Europe. Other powers, expecting that t h e i r exper-
iences would turn them a g a i n s t Yugoslavia, hoped to p r o f i t 
by the s i t u a t i o n . I n June 1920, Baron A l i o t t i , the I t a l i a n 
envoy, c a l l e d on Todorov for a c o n f i d e n t i a l t a l k . He began 
by e x p l a i n i n g that I t a l y f e l t d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and with a l l the s p e c i a l 
favours t h a t B r i t a i n , France and the United S t a t e s were grant-
ing to the Serbs. He spoke at length on I t a l y ' s r i g h t to 
Daimatia and s t a t e d that Bulgarian and I t a l i a n i n t e r e s t s now 
coincided. The I t a l i a n government, he s a i d , recognized 
B u l g a r i a ' s claim to Macedonia. Todorov expressed h i s s u r p r i s e 
at t h i s remark and pointed out t h a t at the Peace Conference, 
I t a l y had agreed to B u l g a r i a l o s i n g not only Macedonia but a l s o 
10. K. Todorov, Balkan F i r e b r a n d . The Autobiography of a 
Rebel, S o l d i e r and Stateman, Chicago, 1943, p. 135. 
(54) 
Thrace and the Dobrudja. Todorov reported A l i o t t i ' s r e p l y : 
" I t a l y vaa i n no p o s i t i o n to r e s i s t the w i l l of 
Clemenceau. But now we must look ahead. An understanding 
between I t a l y and B u l g a r i a would serve the i n t e r e s t s of 
both". 
Todorov asked, "What do you suggest?" 
The Baron rose. " I n the name of my government", he 
intoned, " I propose a s e c r e t m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e for the 
purpose of r e t u r n i n g to I t a l y the A d r i a t i c provinces 
which are h i s t o r i c a l l y hers and f o r the r e t u r n of 
Macedonia to B u l g a r i a . " * * 
Todorov sent A l i o t t i to see S t a m b o l i s k i . He knew that Baron 
A l i o t t i ' s proposal was repugnant to everything i n which 
Stamboliski believed but diplomatic courtesy n e c e s s i t a t e d a 
meeting. Todorov observed t h a t : 
"the Peasant leader had a c l e a r l y defined f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y , the keystone of which was the c l o s e s t p o s s i b l e 
understanding with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and S l o v -
enes, with a view to u l t i m a t e Balkan s o l i d a r i t y . H is 
aim was a Yugoslav-Bulgarian union w i t h i n a f r e e Balkan 
f e d e r a t i o n . " * ^ 
I t i s noteworthy th a t Baron A l i o t t i ' s proposal came 
two years before Mussolini assumed power. Twice more, the 
prospect of an I t a l o - B u l g a r i a n a l l i a n c e a g a i n s t Y u g o s l a v i a 
was r a i s e d , once by Count Aldrovandi, A l i o t t i ' s s uccessor, 
and again at the 1922 Genoa Conference. On each occasion, 
Stamboliski r e j e c t e d i t . * ' A few years l a t e r , Todorov met 
Signor N i t t i , the I t a l i a n Prime M i n i s t e r a t t h i s time, who 
had l e f t h i s country a f t e r M u s s o l i n i ' s March on Rome, and. 
asked him whether Baron A l i o t t i ' s proposal had represented 
the wishes of h i s government. Signor N i t t i t o l d him that 
11. I b i d . . pp. 137-38. 12. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
13. K. Todorov, "The Macedonian Organization, Yesterday 
and Today."Foreign A f f a i r s . V I , ( A p r i l 1928), pp. 478-82. 
(55) 
" f o r years, a permanent c l i q u e i n s i d e the I t a l i a n Foreign 
O f f i c e had been pursuing i t s o b j e c t i v e s w i t h l i t t l e regard 
14 
to government p o l i c y . " 
I n October 1920, following h i s work at the Foreign O f f i c e , 
Todorov was appointed as Bulgarian M i n i s t e r i n Belgrade. The 
appointment was i n keeping with S t a m b o l i s k i ' s d e s i r e f o r a 
c l o s e r Yugoslav-Bulgarian understanding and Todorov's i n s t r u c t -
ions were "to work p e r s i s t e n t l y for good r e l a t i o n s between the 
15 
two c o u n t r i e s . " His mission required great t a c t and diplomacy 
for although Vesnic" and Trumbic, Yugoslavia's Prime and Foreign 
M i n i s t e r s , r e c e i v e d him c o r d i a l l y , the Press was extremely 
h o s t i l e and the s t o r i e s of wartime a t r o c i t i e s once more 
f i l l e d t h e i r columns. S h o r t l y a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l , Y u g o s l a v i a 
o f f i c i a l l y r a t i f i e d the Treaty of N e u i l l y and Todorov was i n 
the Skupstina to observe the r a t i f i c a t i o n . One of the Yugoslav 
deputies, Toma Popovic, whose constituency had been occupied 
by B u l g a r i a during the war, turned to the diplomatic g a l l e r y 
and shoutedx 
"The presence of a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the people 
who were murdering Serbian c i t i z e n s a short time ago 
i s an i n s u l t to t h i s House. I think he should be shot 
down i n the s t r e e t . " * * * 
Although Vesnic promptly disavowed the speaker and apologized 
f o r the i n s u l t to B u l g a r i a , i t was t h i s a t t i t u d e which was, 
with some j u s t i f i c a t i o n , p r evalent i n Y u g o s l a v i a and w i t h 
which S t a m b o l i s k i ' s new-policy had to contend. As Todorov s a i d 
l a t e r , "working with our Balkan neighbours for a l a s t i n g 
17 
peace or even a temporary one, was an u p h i l l s t r u g g l e . " 
I n December 1920, Stamboliski v i s i t e d Rome, P a r i s and 
14. K. Todorov, Balkan Firebrand, op. c i t . . p. 138. N i t t i 
resigned the I t a l i a n Premiership f o r the t h i r d time on June 
6, 1920. 15., I b i d . , p. 140. 
16. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 17. I b i d . , p. 143. 
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London " t o break the i c e hemming i n B u l g a r i a " . His v i s i t put 
an end to B u l g a r i a ' s i s o l a t i o n and i t was n o t i c e a b l e that the 
p o l i c y of the Agrarian government was t h e r e a f t e r i n l i n e w i t h 
the Western democracies. I n P a r i s , Stamboliski had conversations 
w i t h French l e a d e r s and proposed t h a t B u l g a r i a enter the League 
18 
of Nations i n the autumn of 1921. I n t h i s s p i r i t , he t r a v e l l e d 
to Prague and summoned the Bulgarian envoys i n Belgrade, 
B e r l i n , Vienna and Budapest.He t o l d them that two of them, the 
envoyB i n B e r l i n and Budapest, had expressed a n t i - A l l i e d and 
p r o - r e v i s i o n i s t views during h i s v i s i t to the West and dismissed 
19 
the p a i r on the spot. Whilst he was i n Prague, Masaryk 
gave a dinner i n h i s honour a t the Hradcany C a s t l e . I n the 
course of the meal, Masaryk advised him to reach an understand-
ing w ith Yugoslavia and promised th a t h i s country would use i t s 
20 
i n f l u e n c e i n Belgrade to help B u l g a r i a ' s case. His advice 
was endorsed by Benes.Upon h i s r e t u r n to S o f i a , Stamboliski 
declared! 
"We'll break down Belgrade's h o s t i l i t y by demonstrat-
ing our good f a i t h . The course of events w i l l show the 
Yugoslavs that my p o l i c y i s not only u s e f u l to them 
21 
but a v i t a l n e c e s s i t y . " 
I n the meantime, there had been a major p o l i t i c a l upheaval 
i n Yugoslavia. The e l e c t i o n s for a C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly vere 
held on November 28, 1920 and r e s u l t e d i n a vide v a r i e t y of 
s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s , r epresenting the many d i s p a r a t e elements i n 
22 
the Kingdom. The R a d i c a l s and the Democrats, v i t h the help 
of the Moslems and e i g h t deputies from the s m a l l e r p a r t i e s , 
18. B u l g a r i a j o i n e d the League i n September 1921. 
19. Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 142. 20. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
21. 1 bid., p. 145. 
22. ilie r e s u l t s were: .Croatian Peasants 50 Communists 58 
Democrats 92 
R a d i c a l s 91 
Slovene People's Party 27 
Moslems 32 
Others 69 
(57) 
succeeded i n obtaining a ma j o r i t y i n the Skupstina. Faced with 
the prospect of t h i s new Assembly and the i n e v i t a b l e problems 
of a c o a l i t i o n government, Vesnic resigned. His place was taken 
by the p a t r i a r c h of Serbian p o l i t i c s , Nicholas P a s i c , now i n 
h i s s e v e n t y - s i x t h year, without doubt the nation's g r e a t e s t 
and most able statesman and diplomat. With considerable o s c i l l -
a t i o n s i n popularity, s u r v i v a l s a f t e r numerous parliamentary 
defeats and a s e r i e s of Cabinet c r i s e s , P a s i c was to remain 
Prime M i n i s t e r of Yugoslavia u n t i l J u l y 1924. 
P a s i c was a keen, p r a c t i c a l man of few words who had had 
close r e l a t i o n s with B u l g a r i a i n the past. I n 1883, he had 
f l e d S e r b i a and worked i n the Bulgarian M i n i s t r y of P u b l i c 
Works during h i s e x i l e . He had advocated a c l o s e f r i e n d s h i p 
between S e r b i a and B u l g a r i a and had v i g o r o u s l y opposed the 
1885 war. L a t e r , he signed the 1912 Serbo-Bulgarian t r e a t y , 
v * 
c r e a t i n g the Second Balkan League. When P a s i c returned from 
P a r i s to be Prime M i n i s t e r again, he met Todorov and they 
d i s c u s s e d future Yugoslav-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s . P a s i c s a i d i 
" a l l my enemies a t t a c k me f o r i t . I haven't 
changed much i n that r e s p e c t ; but i t i s s t i l l too soon 
23 
f o r c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s . We must be p a t i e n t . " 
Although P a s i c appeared to be reasonable and well-disposed 
towards S t a m b o l i s k i ' s p o l i c y , Todorov detected an undertone of 
stubbornness. Was t h i s a t t i t u d e r e f l e c t e d by the younger 
generation? I n an audience w i t h Prince Alexander s h o r t l y 
before King Peter's death, Todorov s o l i c i t e d the Regent's views 
on Yugoslav-Bulgarian c o l l a b o r a t i o n . He records t h a t Alexander 
asked him: 
"What does P a s i c t h i n k ? " 
I n r e p l y to my d e s c r i p t i o n , he s a i d , " P a s i c has done 
a great deal f or the country but he i s an old man now." 
I detected a note of i r r i t a t i o n . When we parted, Alexander 
s a i d , "You may count upon my help i n your mission. And I'm 23. Todorov, op. c i t . , p. 144.
(58) 
24 
not saying t h i s out of mere diplomatic p o l i t e n e s s . " 
This conversation between the Prince Regent and Todorov was 
the beginning of a c l o s e f r i e n d s h i p which l a s t e d long a f t e r 
Todorov's e x i l e from B u l g a r i a and continued r i g h t up to the 
time of King Alexander's death i n 1934. 
Unfortunately, t h i s p o l i c y of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and rapproche-
ment propounded by Stamboliski and Todorov, did not represent 
the views of the whole Bulgarian population. Indeed, there 
was already a s i z e a b l e opposition d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t them. The 
e f f o r t s of the Agrarian l e a d e r s to c o l l a b o r a t e w i t h Yugoslavia 
were l a b e l l e d as "treasonable" by a l l Opposition p a r t i e s , ; a n d 
right-wing c r i t i c s accused the government of s a c r i f i c i n g the 
na t i o n a l i n t e r e s t and even claimed t h a t they would destroy 
the p o l i t i c a l independence of the Bulgarian-nation i n t h e i r 
25 
d e s i r e f o r the ultimate union of the two c o u n t r i e s . I n t h i s , 
the right-wing, c r i t i c s found t h a t they had the support of 
King B o r i s who had genuine f e a r s for the future of his. dynasty 
and a c t i v e l y opposed anything which might d e t r a c t from h i s 
own or h i s country's s o v r e i g n t y . ^ 
A l l t h i s opposition was encouraged by the I t a l i a n Foreign 
O f f i c e . From the day t h a t Stamboliski turned down Baron 
A l i o t t i ' s o f f e r of a s e c r e t m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e a g a i n s t Y u goslavia, 
the I t a l i a n s s e t out to destroy him. T h e i r Press c o n s t a n t l y 
accused him of accepting bribes from the Serbsand p r a i s e d the 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization as being the r e a l 
27 
Bulgarian p a t r i o t s . The I t a l i a n s made a great c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to the success of IMRO. They r e a l i z e d t h a t the Organization 
would provoke animosity between Y u g o s l a v i a and B u l g a r i a and 
that t h i s would undermine the keystone of Sta m b o l i s k i ' s 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . At the same time, the Organization could be 
used to cause i n t e r n a l unrest and co-operate w i t h the ex-Army 
o f f i c e r s and those right-wing elements which were anxious to 
24. I b i d . , pp. 144-45. 26. Swire, op. c i t . , p. 23. 
25. I b i d . . p. 150 27, Todorov, op. c i t . . p.151. 
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destroy the Peasant Leader. To t h i s end, a branch of the 
Banco d ' l t a l i a vas opened i n S o f i a . The Bank paid oat l a r g e 
sums to Opposition lawyers for " l e g a l s e r v i c e s " . Large amounts 
of t h i s money paid to Opposition f i g u r e s vent d i r e c t l y to IMBO, 
enabling them to finance wide-scale t e r r o r i s t operations and 
buy better weapons. The records of the Banco d ' l t a l i a show 
that w i t h i n a few months of i t s a r r i v a l , i t had a l r e ady spent 
28 
8,000,000 l e v a on " l e g a l s e r v i c e s " . 
When IMR0 was r e v i v e d by Alexandrov i n March 1920, he 
secured the immediate support of those young army o f f i c e r s 
deprived of s t a t u s and prospects, and a l s o of those who vere 
wanted by Yugoslavia for v a r crimes or d e s e r t i o n . But these 
vere by no means h i s only supporters. A l l who were d i s s a t i s -
f i e d w i t h S t a m b o l i s k i ' s Agrarian regime, a l l who were d i s t u r b e d 
by the rapprochement w i t h Y u g o s l a v i a and a l l who vere unable 
to regard the Treaty of N e u i l l y as binding on t h e i r country,, 
gave a c t i v e or t a c i t support to the Organization. When the v a r 
ended, the army u n i t s a t K u s t e n d i l , Nevrokop and P e t r i c h made 
over t h e i r arms to the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s and these came i n t o the 
29 
Organization's possession. With f i n a n c i a l a i d from Opposition 
l e a d e r s ^ and a l s o from I t a l i a n sources, the movement gained 
power and p r e s t i g e . 
IMBO operations i n South S e r b i a (Macedonia) began i n May 
• i 
1920. Most of the armed c o m i t a d j i s came from c e n t r e s a t P e t r i c h , 
Gorna Djoumaia and K u s t e n d i l , but some of the groups vent to 
A l b a n i a and attacked south-western Y u g o s l a v i a from t h e i r base 
at P o d g r a d e t s . ^ From July-November 1920, Alexandrov roamed 
through E a s t e r n Macedonia, i n one place speaking of union with 
B u l g a r i a , i n another promising l o c a l autonomy. Throughout the 
28. I b i d . . i o c . c i t . 
29. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 144. 30. I b i d . , p. 145. 
31. At t h i s time, Greek and Yugoslav troops were occupying 
A l b a n i a and the atmosphere between Albanian l e a d e r s i n T i r a n a 
and the Yugoslav government was understandably cool* 
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area, he organized a co u r i e r system and appointed B p e c i a l 
voivodes to denounce people who dared t o be f r i e n d l y or 
co-operate w i t h the Yugoslav a u t h o r i t i e s . Alexandrov found 
t h a t t h e r e was so much misgovernmenl, b r u t a l i t y and c o r r u p t i o n 
by Yugoslav o f f i c i a l s i n these d i f f i c u l t post-war years, t h a t 
there were many discontented men w i l l i n g t o work f o r him. 
The people of South Serbia were so a f r a i d t h a t the Bulgarians 
might r e t u r n and so g r e a t l y feared r e p r i s a l s by Alexandrov's 
men t h a t they often,obeyed them f o r safety's sake. They 
supplied food f o r h i s bands, paid taxes to h i s Organization and 
made no complaint to the a u t h o r i t i e s f o r fear of the death 
32 
and d e s t r u c t i o n w i t h which the bands had threatened them. 
At t h i s time, the Yugoslav p o l i c e were very weak i n the area 
and these t h r e a t s were o f t e n c a r r i e d out, houses being burnt 
33 
and men murdered w i t h increased frequency. The Yugoslav 
government put a pr i c e of 250 ,000 dinars on Alexandrov's 
head. 3 4 
Almost a l l the c o m i t a d j i s captured i n the period 1919-22 
35 
wore Bulgarian Army c l o t h i n g . This changed i n 1922 when they 
s t a r t e d to appear i n d i f f e r e n t c l o t h i n g , i n c l u d i n g Yugoslav 
uniforms i l l e g a l l y manufactured by the f a c t o r y of army c l o t h 
at Gabrovo i n Bulgaria. A great pa r t of t h e i r munitions and 
bombs came from Ivanov Bros., an arms dealer whose stores 
were s i t u a t e d i n Louisa Street i n So f i a , near the Sveta Nedelja 
37 
cathedral. I t i s important to understand t h a t the t e r r o r i s t s , 
3 2 . Swire, op. c i t . , p. 147. 
33. Dr. ft.A. Reiss, The Comitad.ji Question i n Southern Serbia 
London, 1924, pp. 129 -56 , l i s t s no fewer than 293 t e r r o r i s t 
i n c i d e n t s i n the period 1919 -23. Dr. Reiss stresses t h a t $he 
l i s t i s by no means complete. 3 4 . Swire, op. c i t . , l o c . c i t 
35. Reiss, op. c i t . , pp.70-83. 36 . I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
37. I b i d , pp. 84-5. When Bulgaria's war m a t e r i a l was sold f o r 
scrap, enough arms to equip 8 d i v i s i o n s was bought op by bogus 
dealers who sold the r i f l e s and ammunition on £he open market, 
w h i l s t the heavy munitions were stored i n mountain s h e l t e r s . 
(61) 
t h e i r arms and a l l t h e i r c l o t h i n g a l l came from Bulgaria 
f o r one of Bulgaria's oft-repeated assertions i n the period 
1921-34 was t h a t the troubles i n South Serbia were caused by 
the l o c a l population. 
I n October 1920, an Immigrants Congress was held i n 
Sofia. I t elected a regular Committee under Karandjoulov. 
The meeting urged a union between a l l those h o s t i l e to 
Yugo-Slav u n i f i c a t i o n . The Committee also i n t e n s i f i e d i t s 
propaganda abroad and flooded the d a i l y press, e s p e c i a l l y 
c e r t a i n reviews, w i t h a r t i c l e s designed to prove the "Bulgarian 
character of Macedonia."^ At the Congress, there had been much 
t a l k of Macedonian autonomy and an Association f o r Macedonian 
Independence was set up i n Home. A l l t h i s sounded very d e t e r -
mined and c l e a r - c u t , but Karandjoulov admitted to the B r i t i s h 
M i l i t a r y Attache' t h a t he would sooner cut h i s a r t e r i e s than 
39 
p e t i t i o n f o r Macedonian autonomy. 
I n November 1921, Frotogerov and Athanassov, both leading 
IMfiO leaders, signed a protocol i n Albania, pledging themselves 
to create a Federal Macedonia on Swiss l i n e s w i t h cantons 
r u l e d by the dominant race i n each l o c a l area. When t h i s had 
been done, Macedonia would be free to decide her own destiny. 
Protogerov had always favoured a f e d e r a l s o l u t i o n and when 
an Immigrants' Congress had been c a l l e d to discuss the p r o t o c o l , 
40 
t h e i r representatives voted 160-40 i n favour of the plan. 
Following the p r o t o c o l , Protogerov and Athanassov negotiated 
w i t h leading Albanian f i g u r e s . The r e s u l t of t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s 
was a convention which declared t h a t i f t h e i r j o i n t e f f o r t s 
succeeded, the Kosovo d i s t r i c t should be annexed to Albania, 
41 
w h i l s t Macedonia became autonomous. However, e a r l y i n 1922, 
Alexandrov repudiated the Albanian pro t o c o l and Protogerov, 
who had no desire to quarrel w i t h Alexandrov, repudiated i t too. 
58 . Keiss, op. c i t . , p. 34 . 40. I b i d , pp. 149-50. . 
39. Swire, op. c i t . , p. 147. 41. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
42. I u i d . , l o c . c i t . 
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Following t h e i r t a l k s i n Albania, Athanassov and 
Protogerov went to Rome. There they met a representative of 
the I t a l i a n Foreign O f f i c e who, i n the course of discussion, 
urged them to arrange f o r the assassination of King Alexander, 
saying t h a t t h i s might lead to the " d i s r u p t i o n " of Yugoslavia, 
which i n t u r n would provide the Macedonians w i t h t h e i r oppor-
t u n i t y . Athanassov i s reported t o have r e j e c t e d the idea out 
of hand f o r the adverse p u b l i c i t y i t would cause. He suggested 
t h a t i f there were to be an assassination, the I t a l i a n s should 
43 
do i t themselves. 
Thus, i n an i n d i r e c t and subtle manner, the I t a l i a n Foreign 
O f f i c e f ostered the growth and ambitions of the most potent 
source of discord between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Todorov 
Baid t h a t : 
"they d i d everything they could to undermine 
Stamboliski's p o l i c y of rapprochement, f o r every time 
1 d e l i v e r e d assurances of good f a i t h , the question came 
back: 'Then why do you permit these Macedonian outrages 
44 
on our t e r r i t o r y ? ' " 
At a time when Stamboliski was t r y i n g to create a b e t t e r 
understanding w i t h Yugoslavia, the Agrarian government was 
n a t u r a l l y u n w i l l i n g to accept r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r IMRO's 
behaviour. Dr. Reiss has described t h e i r r e a c t i o n : 
"Once the com i t a d j i s had resumed t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s 
a f t e r the war, the Yugoslav government made representations 
to Sofia. The Bulgarian government r e p l i e d evasively; 
at one moment, they cast blame on the population of 
South Serbia i t s e l f , at another they declared t h a t , owing 
to the small number of troops l e f t t o them by the Treaty 
of N e u i l l y , they were unable to prevent bands of co m i t a d j i s 
crossing the f r o n t i e r . When Belgrade became more i n s i s t e n t , 
Sofia r e t a l i a t e d by exhuming the famous " m i n o r i t i e s " clause 
i n favour of the c o m i t a d j i s . This argument was, however, 43. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 44. Todorov, op. c i t . , p . l 
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repulsed by a formal decision of the League of Nations, 
r e l e g a t i n g the c o m i t a d j i question together w i t h t h a t of 
m i n o r i t i e s , to d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s between the countries 
45 
concerned." 
The Yugoslav r e a c t i o n to IMKO r a i d s and the attendant 
murder, arson and blackmail was to conclude t r e a t i e s w i t h 46 47 Czechoslovakia and Rumania, c r e a t i n g the L i t t l e Entente 
which was widely p u b l i c i z e d as a bulwark of s e c u r i t y i n Central 
and Eastern Europe. The st r e n g t h of the L i t t l e Entente l a y 
i n i t s p r o v i s i o n f o r common a c t i o n at the League of Nations 
and i n i t s aim to achieve peace, s e c u r i t y and p r o s p e r i t y at 
a time when the world was fac i n g economic and p o l i t i c a l unrest. 
The Entente's great f a u l t was t h a t i t was inward-looking and 
di d not foresee the e f f e c t s of a Fascist I t a l y , an avaricious 
Russia or a Nazi Germany - and no provisions were made f o r 
such e v e n t u a l i t i e s . 
But i n 1921-2, the c r e a t i o n of the L i t t l e Entente made 
48 
an enormous impact upon Central and Eastern Europe. Stambol-
i s k i was alarmed by the adverse e f f e c t s t h a t IMRO's subversive 
operations were having on h i s attempts to improve Yugoslav-
Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s . E a r l y i n 1921, a newspaper had been set 
up i n Sofia t o exp l a i n government p o l i c i e s to the people. 
Todorov had been the chi e f e d i t o r i a l w r i t e r and t r a v e l l e d 
r e g u l a r l y back and f o r t h between Sofia and Belgrade. But the 
newspaper's c i s c u l a t i o n was small and made l i t t l e or ne impact 
upon those Stamboliski was most anxious t o convert to h i s 
49 
p o l i c y . Following the conclusion of the t r e a t i e s e s t a b l i s h i n g 
the L i t t l e Entente, Stamboliski decided to take vigorous p r a c t i c a l 45. Reiss, op. c i t . , pp. 34-5. 
46. August 14, 1920. See N.J. Padelford, Peace i n the Balkans. 
New York, 1935, pp. 180-1 f o r d e t a i l s of the t r e a t y . 
47. June 7, 1921. See Padelford, pp. 182-3, f o r d e t a i l s of 
the t r e a t y . 48. Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 141. 
49. I b i d . , p. 149. 
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a c t i o n to suppress the Macedonian Organization. I n J u l y 1921, 
Alexander Dimitrov, one of h i s closest .and l o y a l i s t colleagues, 
vas appointed Bulgarian M i n i s t e r of War. Before t a k i n g up h i s 
post, Dimitrov v i s i t e d Belgrade to see Pasic and l e a r n from 
him d i r e c t l y what he considered t o be the main obstacles to a 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian understanding. Pasic's response was somewhat 
r e t i c e n t and he t o l d Dimitrov t h a t i t vas d i f f i c u l t t o t a l k 
about an understanding when "every day our borders are v i o l a t e d 
50 
and our s o l d i e r s k i l l e d . " Dimitrov promised t h a t he would go 
back to Sofia and put an end to IMfiO outrages. Upon h i s r e t u r n , 
he i n i t i a t e d a series of d r a s t i c measures. One of h i s t r u s t e d 
f r i e n d s , Koslovsky, was appointed p r e f e c t of p o l i c e i n the 
Pe t r i c h d i s t r i c t which was the nerve centre of IMBO operations. 
Then the command of garrisons was revised to make sure t h a t 
m i l i t a r y commanders were l o y a l to the government's orders. 
At the same time, the o v e r a l l command f o r f r o n t i e r posts was 
a l t e r e d , t h i s to prevent f u r t h e r l a x behaviour on the part of 
the border guards who tended to regard the c o m i t a d j i r a i d s as 
a p a t r i o t i c gesture. Dimitrov also ordered the whole western 
border area to be cleared of co m i t a d j i s and sent troops t o 
round up known t e r r o r i s t s and move them to eastern Bulgaria. 
F i n a l l y , he ordered the a r r e s t of Alexandrov and Protogerov, 
but the orders came too l a t e ; the two IMBO leaders had already 
f l e d t h e i r country f o r Vienna. 
Dimitrov's a c t i o n produced a v i o l e n t , counter-reaction. 
I t was widely rumoured t h a t Dimitrov had "sold Bulgaria t o 
Pasic''* and a series of t e r r o r i s t attacks were made, culminating 
i n the death of Koslovsky, who was shot i n October 1921. At the 
same time, IMRO leaders p r i v a t e l y threatened the M i n i s t e r of 
the I n t e r i o r , Tomov, w i t h a s i m i l a r f a t e i f he d i d not give 
them h i s a l l e g i a n c e . He succumbed to t h e i r t h r e a t s and t r i e d 
52 
to discourage Dimitrov from h i s repressive measures. Dimitrov 50 . I b i d . , p. 151. 
5 1 . Swire, op. c i t . . p. 149. 
5 2 . Todorov, op. c i t . . pp. 155 -56 . 
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ignored h i s advice and continued w i t h h i s p o l i c i e s , despite 
the knowledge t h a t IMHO had passed a death sentence on him. 
IMRO d i d not long delay; on November 2 1 , 1 9 2 1 , Dimitrov was 
assassinated. 
Within eighteen months of i t s r e v i v a l , the Macedonian 
Organization had proved i t s e l f as d e s t r u c t i v e as i t s pre-war 
counterpart. With the b e n e f i t of I t a l i a n f i n a n c i a l a i d and the 
w i l l i n g support of the p o l i t i c a l Opposition i n Sofia, i t had 
e f f e c t i v e l y undermined Stamboliski's p o l i c y and c a r r i e d the 
war i n t o Yugoslav t e r r i t o r y . The Organization had k i l l e d those 
who were o f f i c i a l l y employed to destroy i t and caused statesmen 
i n Belgrade t o doubt the a u t h o r i t y and assurances of the 
Agrarian government. This was agreeable t o the I t a l i a n Foreign 
51 
O f f i c e , the Consulta and other n a t i o n a l i s t c i r c l e s i n Rome, 
but i t was by no means t h e i r only weapon. There was a f u r t h e r , 
u s e f u l wedge to d r i v e between the two South Slav nations; the 
question of Bulgarian r e p a r a t i o n s . 
The aim of Stamboliski'a government was t o f u l f i l , as f a r 
as possible, the o b l i g a t i o n s l a i d upon t h e i r country by the 
Treaty of N e u i l l y . The conditions of the Treaty were complied 
w i t h as regards evacuation of t e r r i t o r y , r e s t o r a t i o n of prop-
e r t y and the sale of arms; by September 1 9 2 1 , Bulgaria had 
paid over £ 3 £ m i l l i o n s f o r the upkeep of the I n t e r - A l l i e d 
troops and commissions established on Bulgarian t e r r i t o r y . 
54 
The t o t a l Reparation debt to be paid was £90 m i l l i o n s but 
the annual budget of the st a t e amounted to only £ 1 5 0 m i l l i o n s 
and i n the budget estimates of March 1 9 2 1 , there was a d e f i c i t 
of £11 m i l l i o n s . I n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the Bulgarian government 
was unable t o pay the £7 m i l l i o n s which were due i n 1921 and 
55 
was granted a moratorium u n t i l March 1922 . 
5 3 . I b i d . , p. 143. 
54 . Buchan, op. c i t . . p. 164. This debt was u l t i m a t e l y 
reduced to £ 2 2 m i l l i o n s , repayable over a period of s i x t y years. 
5 5 . Todorov, op. c i t . , p. 152 . 
( 6 6 ) 
However, Opposition deputies, hoping t o d i s c r e d i t 
Stamboliski and overthrow the Agrarian government, produced 
a r e p o r t claiming to show t h a t Bulgaria could a f f o r d t o pay 
her debt. The r e p o r t was qu i t e f a l s e and the deputies themselves 
knew t h a t the country could not pay, but they took the r e p o r t 
to Prince L i v i o Borghese, the I t a l i a n representative of the 
Reparation Committee i n Sofia. Borghese, who was no f r i e n d of 
Stamboliski and had p u b l i c l y condemned Dimitrov's attempts 
to suppress IMRO, sent the r e p o r t to h i s superiors i n Rome 
56 
who took the matter up i n Par i s . On August 2 1 , 1 9 2 1 , the 
Reparation Commission i n Paris revoked the moratorium and 
demanded the immediate payment of t h a t year's instalment. 
Stamboliski i n v e s t i g a t e d the matter and when he discovered 
t h a t Borghese was involved, he made a pr o t e s t t o Paris against 
members of the Commission i n t e r f e r i n g i n Bulgaria's i n t e r n a l 
57 
a f f a i r s . Todorov himself was sent to Paris to ex p l a i n the 
nature and extent of I t a l i a n i n f l u e n c e i n Bulgaria. A f t e r 
t a l k s w i t h M. Dupuis, the French representative on the 
Reparation Commission, and M. B e r t h e l o t , who was i n touch w i t h 
i n f l u e n t i a l sectors of the French Press, Todorov had a p r i v a t e 
discussion w i t h M. M i l l e r a n d , the French President. M i l l e r a n d 
CO 
was known t o be a great f r i e n d of the Serbs and Todorov knew 
from past experience t h a t the French government favoured 
59 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian c o l l a b o r a t i o n . I n the course of h i s 
discussion, Todorov informed M i l l e r a n d of the way I t a l y was 
using the Reparation issue to prevent an understanding between 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. M i l l e r a n d r e p l i e d t h a t the Commission 
was a f r a i d t o make any concession on reparations f o r Bulgaria 
since t h i s would e s t a b l i s h a precedent f o r Germany. Todorov 
pointed out t h a t A u s t r i a had had her debts cancelled but the 
French President f e l t t h a t B u l g a r i a was more prosperous than 
A u s t r i a . Todorov made i t clear t h a t i f the reparations were 56 . I b i d . , p. 153 . 
57 . I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
58. I b i d . , p. 154. 
5 9 . I b i d . , p. 143 
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demanded at t h i s j u n c t u r e , then Bulgaria's f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
towards Yugoslavia, which depended on t h i s d e l i c a t e economic 
p o s i t i o n , would c o l l a p s e . ^ 0 Following h i s v i s i t , Bulgarian 
reparations were postponed u n t i l June 1922 and I t a l i a n i n t r i g -
ues temporarily f o i l e d . 
I n March 1922, the Bulgarian government had another 
budgetary d e f i c i t - t h i s time, of S.y% m i l l i o n s - and asked 
the Reparation Commission to grant a f u r t h e r moratorium on 
her debt. The I n t e r - A l l i e d Commission i n Sofia informed the 
Bulgarian government t h a t a moratorium could only be granted 
on the c o n d i t i o n t h a t Bulgaria surrendered c o n t r o l of her 
customs, her sta t e mines and her e n t i r e f i s c a l system. These 
cond i t i o n s , demanded by a body c o n s i s t i n g p r i m a r i l y of I t a l -
ians, seemed tantamount to a surrender of n a t i o n a l sovreignty 
and when a t o p - l e v e l Bulgarian delegation - i n c l u d i n g Stam-
b o l i s k i and Todorov - went to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Economic 
Conference i n Genoa i n A p r i l 1922, they r a i s e d strong o b j e c t i o n s 
to the demands which had been made upon t h e i r country.*** The 
Conference was l a r g e l y a f a i l u r e because each country was 
out simply to seek a s o l u t i o n t o i t s own problem and Bulgaria 
was no exception. 
At the Genoa Conference, I t a l y made one f u r t h e r b i d t o 
secure economic advantages from Bulgaria's f i n a n c i a l misfortune* 
I t a l y , who was the major source of Bulgaria's i m p o r t s , w a s 
also due to receive 40$ of the t o t a l r e p a r a t i o n debt paid by 
Bulgaria.** 3 S h o r t l y before the Genoa Conference, B r i t a i n had 
60. I b i d . . p. 154. 61. Buchan, op. c i t . , p. 160. 
6 2 . I b i d . . p. 181. Three p r i n c i p a l o r i g i n s of Bulgaria's 
imports (given i n thousands of leva) were as f o l l o w s t 
63> A l l o c a t i o n of Bulgarian reparations were: I t a l y , 40#; 
B r i t a i n 20jej France, 20^; the other Balkan s t a t e s , 20^. 
I t a l y 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
1919 
345.893 
146,995 
104,849 
1920 
624 ,697 
408 ,466 
311,207 
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entrusted her 20Jb share of Bulgarian reparations to I t a l y , 
thus g i v i n g her a 60Jfc claim. Leading f i g u r e s i n the I t a l i a n F 
Foreign O f f i c e r e a l i z e d t h a t t h i s could help them to o b t a i n 
economic domination over Bulgaria, such as they l a t e r obtained 
over Albania. During the Conference, Todorov was approached 
by Count T o s t i d i Valminuta, an I t a l i a n delegate, who t o l d 
him t h a t the f a t e of Bulgaria's reparations now depended on 
I t a l y . I t a l y was favourably disposed towards Bulgaria - indeed, 
a l l I t a l i a n s loved the country - and they would be w i l l i n g to 
"v. 
accept a concession of the vast but unexploited R i l a f o r e s t 
64 
i n l i e u of her reparations payments. 
Nothing came of t h i s proposal but i t serves to demonstrate 
the nature and o b j e c t i v e s of I t a l i a n p o l i c y i n the period, 
1919~23. I t a l y wished to achieve t e r r i t o r i a l expansion i n 
the Balkans - p a r t i c u l a r l y along the A d r i a t i c coast - but t h i s 
desire was blocked by the new and independent Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia. I f I t a l y were to succeed i n her ambitions, i t 
could only be at the expense of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes. The I t a l i a n Foreign O f f i c e t h e r e f o r e embarked on 
a p o l i c y designed to weaken Yugoslavia from w i t h i n and from 
w i t h o u t . Bulgaria was a n a t u r a l a l l y f o r I t a l y ; she was poor, 
weak and embittered by the Peace. Treaty; a l l her r i c h e s t lands 
had been annexed by her neighbours and she was burdened w i t h 
heavy reparations which she could not pay. Yet she refused to 
co-operate w i t h I t a l y and the o f f e r of a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e was 
r e j e c t e d . The Peasant leader, Stamboliski, had set himself the 
task of b r i n g i n g Yugoslavia and Bulgaria together i n a s i n g l e 
South Slav state which would present an even greater obstacle 
to I t a l i a n expansion. Through reparations, through the subver-
sive a c t i v i t i e s of IMRO and w i t h the co-operation of those 
Bulgarians most w i l l i n g to co-operate w i t h her, I t a l y sought 
to destroy Stamboliski and h i s p o l i c i e s . F o r , i f Stamboliski 
were overthrown, then the whole p o l i c y of rapp rochement would 
6 4 . Todorov, op. c i t . . pp. 1 6 0 - 2 . 
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collapse and Bulgaria and even more susceptible to 
I t a l i a n i n f l u e n c e . 
( 7 0 ) 
Chapter 4. 
Troubled Waters. 
( 7 1 ) 
When Todorov,returned from the Genoa Conference, he 
received a cool reception i n Belgrade. For several weeks, there 
had been clashes between the co m i t a d j i s and the Yugoslav forces 
i n South Serbia, and the unrest seemed to be growing. The use 
of t e r r o r i s m and t h r e a t s had already brought IMBO great d i v i -
dends, f o r now "the Macedonian peasant was no longer sure 
t h a t the enemy of today might not become the master of tommorrow!! 
Such a sta t e of mind gave i n t i m i d a t i o n a clear f i e l d . Yugoslav 
barracks were attacked by snipers, mail services were disrupted 
and the sub-prefect of Berovo and h i s w i f e were shot. Elsewhere 
there were minor skirmishes. Todorov's r e t u r n from Genoa 
coincided w i t h the death of a gendamerie captain and twelve 
s o l d i e r s . They had been k i l l e d by one of the most notorious 
c o m i t a d j i bands, led by Jovan B r i o , and on the st r e n g t h of t h l B , 
2 
m a r t i a l law was proclaimed i n South Serbia. Todorov r e a l i z e d 
t h a t the trend of events was l i k e l y to create a serious clash 
between the two countries and so he sent a long ciphered 
telegram to Stamboliaki, t e l l i n g him of the mood i n Belgrade 
and the need f o r immediate ac t i o n t o h a l t IMBO's operations.^ 
Stamboliski, who b i t t e r l y r e g r e t t e d the death of Dimitrov, 
agreed t h a t f i r m measures were necessary and gave h i s M i n i s t e r 
i n Belgrade a carte blanche f o r any proposals he might make to 
the Yugoslav government. Heartened by h i s Prime M i n i s t e r ' s 
1. Dr. fl.A. Beiss, The Comitad.ji Question i n Southern Serbia. 
London, 1924, pp» 86-88. 
2. J. Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, London, 1939. p. 151. 
3. K, Todorov, Balkan Firebrand,The Autobiography of a Rebel. 
Soldier and Statesman. Chicago, 1943* p. 166. 
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support. Todorov wrote to Dr. Nincic, the Yugoslav Foreign 
M i n i s t e r , suggesting a j o i n t defence force of Bulgarian and 
4 
Yugoslav o f f i c i a l s t o man the f r o n t i e r . He proposed t h a t the 
two sides should be l i n k e d by telephone and should contact 
each other i f any co m i t a d j i band attempted to cross the 
f r o n t i e r . I f a group of comitadjis crossed the border and the 
Bulgarian post f a i l e d to n o t i f y the Yugoslav p a t r o l , the l o c a l 
1 5 Bulgarian commander would be held responsible. The plan was 
by no means fo o l p r o o f but i t was a d i s t i n c t improvement upon 
the e x i s t i n g arrangements which were lax and i n e f f i c i e n t . On 
the f o l l o w i n g day, Todorov sent N i n e i 6 a f u r t h e r note, proposing 
a conference between the two f r o n t i e r commands. But he received 
6 
no r e p l y to e i t h e r note. 
On June 8, 1922, a r o y a l wedding took place i n Belgrade, 
King Alexander marrying the Rumanian Princess Marie. Many of 
Europe's leading r o y a l personages were present, i n c l u d i n g the 
monarchs of a l l the Balkan c o u n t r i e s , w i t h the exception of 
Bulgaria. King Boris had not l e f t h i s country since h i s accession 
i n 1918 and he appointed Todorov as h i s personal representative 
at the wedding. So conspicious an absence could not but 
emphasize Bulgaria's i s o l a t i o n . King Alexander was p l a i n l y 
exasperated. Todorov records t h a t when he handed over King 
Boris's l e t t e r , which contained "appropriate f e l i c i t a t i o n s " , 
Alexander gave vent to h i s f e e l i n g s : 
" T e l l King Boris," he responded a n g r i l y , I won't 
t o l e r a t e acts of ba n d i t r y against my f r o n t i e r any longer." 
" I s h a l l convey your Majesty's words to my sovreign," 
Todorov r e p l i e d , " b u t I have the honour to advise you t h a t 
I have already t r a n s m i t t e d a note to your Foreign M i n i s t e r 
4# I b i d . . l o c . c i t . The proposals were made on May 19, 1922. 
5 . L.S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation. A H i s t o r y of the Move-
ment towards Balkan Unity i n Modern Times, Northampton, Mass., 
1944, p. 211. 
6. Todorov., op. c i t . . l o c , c i t . 
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suggesting a plan t o cor r e c t the s i t u a t i o n . " 
The King d i d not appear to hear me. His eyes flashed 
w i t h i n d i g n a t i o n . "My patience i s exhausted/' he s a i d . ^ 
Todorov d i d not immediately perceive the s i g n i f i c a n c e of 
the King's outburst u n t i l several days l a t e r when he was informed 
by Sofia t h a t the Bulgarian M i n i s t e r i n Bucharest had been 
handed a j o i n t ultimatum by Ion Duea - the Rumanian Foreign 
M i n i s t e r . The ultimatum was issued i n the name of Rumania, 
Yugoslavia and Greece and demanded t h a t i f Bulgaria d i d not 
destroy a l l organizations d i r e c t e d against the s e c u r i t y of her 
neighbours and also give a s a t i s f a c t o r y r e p l y t o t h i s e f f e c t , 
then the three states would take upon themselves the task of 
g 
r e s t o r i n g order i n the Balkans. This was a clear i n d i c a t i o n 
t h a t Bulgaria's three neighbours were considering a j o i n t 
undertaking which might w e l l include an invasion of Bulgaria 
and possibly the occupation of p a r t of her t e r r i t o r y . 
Both Stamboliski and King Boris were alarmed by the 
ultimatum. Stamboliaki t o l d the King t h a t v i f there were an 
invasion, he would resign h i s Premiership and lead the peasant 
q 
resistance. This however proved unnecessary, f o r Todorov 
suggested t h a t , since Bulgaria was now a member of the League 
of Nations, she should adopt A r t i c l e 2 of the League Covenant 
and appeal against the ultimatum. The grounds f o r t h e i r appeal 
vrere t h a t the j o i n t ultimatum i n d i c a t e d the existence of a 
secret t r e a t y d i r e c t e d against Bulgaria, a t r e a t y h o s t i l e t o 
the very s p i r i t and l e t t e r of the Covenant.**' An appeal was 
made to the League Council who announced t h a t they would 
examine the case i n London i n J u l y . This gave Bulgaria one 
month's breathing space since the matter was nov sub .judice. 
Todorov returned t o Sofia at the end of June and handed i n 
hi s r e s i g n a t i o n as M i n i s t e r i n Belgrade, b e l i e v i n g t h a t whatever 
was the decision of the League Council, h i s mission to Yugoslavia 
7 . I b i d . . p. 167. 9. Swire, op. c i t . , l o c . c i t . 
8. I b i d . . p. 168. 10. Todorov, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 
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had f a i l e d . * * 
On h i s r e t u r n , he found h i s Prime M i n i s t e r a worried man. 
Bulgaria's diplomatic i s o l a t i o n and the prospect of invasion 
had shown him the poor s t a t e of h i s country's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
But i n t e r n a l l y matters were even less s a t i s f a c t o r y . A f t e r the 
assassination of Bi m i t r o v , Tomov, the former M i n i s t e r of the 
I n t e r i o r who had been persuaded to work w i t h IMRO, became 
M i n i s t e r of War. Whilst g i v i n g the impression of being h o s t i l e 
to the Organization, he continued to work s e c r e t l y w i t h them. 
Stamboliski was aware of h i s behaviour but was unable to break 
w i t h him f o r fear of s p l i t t i n g and weakening the Agrarian p a r t y . 
Outside the Sobranje, Stamboliaki was faced w i t h a vigorous 
and h o s t i l e Press campaign which dwelt w i t h r e l i s h upon h i s 
personal v i c e s . These attacks were not e n t i r e l y unfounded. 
Perhaps the only comforting news i n t h i s d i f f i c u l t period was 
-the message from the Reparation Commission which had recommended 
13 
a f u r t h e r moratorium on Bulgaria's debts u n t i l March 1923 . 
Having resigned h i s post i n Belgrade, Todorov was appointed 
c h i e f of the Bulgarian delegation to the J u l y meeting of the 
League Council i n London, at which Bulgarian objections to the 
ultimatum would be heard. Todorov t o l d the League Council 
about IMRO a c t i v i t i e s i n Bulgaria and how they had k i l l e d 
Dimitrov. He r e a d i l y admitted t h a t the comi t a d j i s had made 
rai d s i n t o Yugoslavia and said t h a t Pasic was qui t e r i g h t t o 
demand t h a t the r a i d s be stopped. He pointed out t h a t he had 
already made proposals on t h i s matter to Or. Nincic but had 
had no r e p l y . I n conclusion, he contested the r i g h t of Greece 
or Rumania to i n t e r f e r e w i t h the matter since i t concerned only 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Council had no op t i o n but to 
accept the j u s t i c e of the Bulgarian appeal. T i t u l e s c u , the 
Rumanian re p r e s e n t a t i v e , made a c o n c i l i a t o r y speech and the 
Council suggested t h a t a d i r e c t settlement along the l i n e s 
1 1 . I b i d , p. 169. 1 2 . I b i d , l o c . c i t . 
13 . I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
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suggetsed by Todorov i n May, should be negotiated between 
the two governments concerned. On August 18, 1922, a p r e l i m i n a r y 
14 
prot o c o l was signed to t h i s e f f e c t . 
Before h i s r e t u r n to Sofia, Todorov received a telegram 
from Stamboliski asking him to go to Prague to see Dr. Bones', 
the Czech Foreign M i n i s t e r , and seek h i s help i n g e t t i n g a 
r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h Yugoslavia. Bones' promised Bulgaria h i s 
15 
help and Todorov returned home having s u c c e s s f u l l y accomplished 
h i s mission but no longer holding any p a r t i c u l a r diplomatic post. 
I n August 1922, Stamboliski i n v i t e d him to lead the Bulgarian 
delegation to the League of Nations and he accepted. A l l h i s 
work to achieve a modus v i v e n d i between the two South Slav 
nations seemed to have come to an impasse, but at Geneva he found 
t h a t there had been a good deal of backstairs diplomacy. Bones' 
had spoken to Dr. Nincic about him and Nincic came to see 
Todorov and made a personal request t h a t he would r e t u r n to h i s 
post i n Belgrade! 
v s 
"When Stamboliski comes to Geneva," Nincic t o l d him, 
" I ' l l ask him to keep you i n Belgrade. I t ' s not only my 
personal wish but t h a t of His Majesty King Alexander."^ 
I n response to t h i s r o y a l i n v i t a t i o n , Todorov withdrew h i s 
r e s i g n a t i o n and returned to h i s post i n Belgrade. He found t h a t 
during h i s absence there had been a thaw i n the Yugoslav 
' a t t i t u d e . Some p o l i t i c a l leaders had begun to consider the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of a rapprochement w i t h Bulgaria*^ and the idea 
of a f e d e r a t i o n was once more i n the a i r - even i f only to curb 
Serbian hegemony w i t h i n the new Yugoslav Kingdom. Father Korosec, 
14. I b i d . , p. 170. 
1 5 . I b i d . , p. 171. 1 6 . I b i d . , p. 173 . 
17 . L. Kezman, C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Neutral Republic of Croatia, 
P i t t s b u r g , 1923, reports t h a t at t h i s time both the Agrarian and 
Communist p a r t i e s favoured a closer r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Bulgaria. 
(Kezman was Secretary-General of the Yugoslav Agrarian Party 
from 1 9 1 9 - 2 7 ) . 
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a Roman Catholic p r i e s t and leader of the Slovene People's 
Party, wrote i n hia party's o f f i c i a l organ, Novi Eaa: 
"The most s a l i e n t question now f a c i n g our state i s 
t h a t of our r e l a t i o n s w i t h Bulgaria, because the Bulgarians 
belong to the n a t i o n a l u n i t y of the South Slav s t a t e s . 
Without Bulgaria, we s h a l l pursue only a great c h a u v i n i s t i c 
p o l i c y which w i l l sooner or l a t e r lead us to i s o l a t i o n 
and catastrophe. That p o l i c y , espoused by the supporters 
of great Serbian dreams, i s the r e a l obstacle to the 
c r e a t i o n of a strong and u n i t e d Jugoslavia. A l l Jugoslav 
people, independent of the Belgrade p o l i t i c i a n s , are 
thoroughly convinced t h a t the s e c u r i t y of our f u t u r e 
existence as a State demands Union w i t h Bulgaria, a l l the 
more since the Bulgarian n a t i o n today i s f u l l y prepared 
and q u a l i f i e d f o r i t . We know t h a t t h i s question, l e f t 
f o r s o l u t i o n to the Belgrade race alone, w i l l never 
bring about our c o n s o l i d a t i o n w i t h the brave Bulgarian 
people. On t h a t account, the whole Slovene and Croatian 
p eople s h o u l d i n s c r i b e t h i s demand upon i t s programme and 
s h o u l d never r e s t u n t i l i t has been r e a l i z e d . The f u t u r e 
Jugoslavia of Serbs, Bulgarians, Croats and Slovenes w i l l 
be the strongest s t a t e i n Southern Europe. I t w i l l prove 
a great guarantee f o r the c u l t u r a l development of Southern 
JugoSlavdom and one of the strong c i t a d e l s f o r w o r l d peaee." 
Although Korosec's views were coloured by the i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l 
tensions i n Yugoslavia, he was not a l t o g e t h e r u n j u s t i f i e d i n 
blaming the Belgrade p o l i t i c i a n s f o r not s e i z i n g the o p p o r t u n i t y 
which Stamboliski presented. I n the summer of 1922, Stamboliski 
suggested the establishment of a customs union between Bulgaria 
and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. But the Serbian 
p o l i t i c i a n s i n p a r t i c u l a r were so a f r a i d t h a t such a union mihht 
deprive them of t h e i r supremacy i n a Yugoslav f e d e r a t i o n t h a t 
18. Quoted by C. Stephanove, " D r i f t i n g towards a Jugoslav 
Federation", Current I i i s t o r y . XV, ( 1 9 2 2 ) , p. 937 . 
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they spurned the idea. 
Stamboliski*s p o l i c y of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Yugoslavia, 
together w i t h h i s constant i n a b i l i t y to produce any p o s i t i v e 
rapprochement made him a t a r g e t f o r wide-ranging attacks by 
h i s opponents. At the same time t h a t Stamboliski was attending 
the League of Nations i n September 1922, there was an IMBO 
r e v o l t at Trnovo. Stamboliski had known t h a t the Opposition 
were planning a meeting at Trnovo f o r September 17 and also 
t h a t the l o c a l Agrarian p a r t y had ordered a counter-demonstration 
at the same time and place. Before going abroad, he had banned 
both meetings but Baiko Daskalov, one of h i s M i n i s t e r s , decided 
20 
t h a t i t would cause less t r o u b l e to l e t them take place. 
There were v i o l e n t scenes at Trnovo and Athanas Bourov, one 
of the chief Opposition f i g u r e s declared "We must a n n i h i l a t e 
21 
the Agrarian c r i m i n a l s " . Tomov, the M i n i s t e r of War, who 
was playing a double r o l e i n t h i s event, proceeded to a r r e s t 
Opposition leaders and, disobeying Stamboliski 1s telegraphed 
orders to release them, threatened a referendum to decide 
22 
t h e i r f a t e . Such a c t i o n , although e a s i l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to an 
over-zealous o f f i c i a l d o m , was c a l c u l a t e d to arouse f u r t h e r 
opposition against the Agrarian leaders. I n October, as a 
demonstration of l o y a l t y to the Government, the pro- Stamboliski 
Orange Guards came en masse to Sofia. They were an u n d i s c i p l i n e d 
body composed mainly of peasants and soon got out of hand, 
p i l l a g i n g , robbing, and burning down the Radical Club. They 
sniped at the houses of Opposition leaders, danced i n the 
19. T . I . Geshkoff, Balkan Union. A Road to Peace i n South-
eastern Europe. New York, 1940, p. 61. 
20. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 154. 21. I b i d . . p. 153. 
2 2 . lodorov, op. c i t . . p. 172. See also J. Buchan (Ed), 
Bulgaria and Romania. The Nations of Today Series, London, 
1924, p. 162 . The Opposition f i g u r e s arrested included Danev, 
Malinov and lodorov (the Prime M i n i s t e r from 1918-19 - not the 
M i n i s t e r i n Belgrade). 
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23 
s t r e e t s and were involved i n numerous p u b l i c brawls. 
The demonstration d i d not help the r e p u t a t i o n of the Agrarian 
Party. By November, IMRO had openly embarked upon g u e r r i l l a 
warfare against the government i t s e l f and Stamboliski was 
24 
obliged to leave the Lausanne Conference to q u e l l the unrest. 
Despite t h e i r r e p u t a t i o n , he decided to organize the Orange 
s 25 
Guard a peasant m i l i t i a which could defend the regime. 
Such a force was desperately needed. On December 6 , 
Alexandrov's supporters took c o n t r o l of the town of Kustendil 
by force and there were rumours i n Sofia t h a t a r e v o l t against 
the Government was imminent. Loyal government troops were sent 
to Kustendil and Tomov ordered the insurgents to leave the 
town. Alexandrov's supporters demanded t h a t pro-IMRO o f f i c i a l s 
should be appointed i n the P e t r i c h D i s t r i c t or they would march 
on the c a p i t a l . Tomov gave way to t h e i r demands and the insurgents 
surrendered c o n t r o l of the town.2** His a c t i o n , which was taken 
i n Stamboliski 1s absence and r e l u c t a n t l y endorsed by the 
Government to maintain i t s small m a j o r i t y i n the Sobranje, 
gave IMBO a c o n t r o l l i n g influence i n south-west Bulgaria which 
i t r e t ained u n t i l 1934. Within a few months, the Organization 
was l e v y i n g i t s own taxes and e n r o l l i n g a l l men of a m i l i t a r y 
age. Soon i t possessed i t s own m i l i t i a , which consisted of 
8,000 men. Todorov suggested t h a t Stamboliski should overhaul 
hi s Cabinet, proclaim m a r t i a l law, mobilize and arm the 
27 
peasants and a r r e s t a l l u n r e l i a b l e o f f i c e r s , but Stamboliski, 
confident t h a t a rapprochement w i t h Yugoslavia would soon be 
made which would put an end t o a l l these disturbances, d i d not 
take any immediate a c t i o n . 
Stamboliski believed t h a t events i n I t a l y , where Mussolini 
2 3 . Swire, op. cit«, p. 154. 
24. Todorov, op. c i t . , p. 179* The Lausanne Conference l a s t e d 
from December 1922-February 1923. 
2 5 . Swire, op. c i t . , l o c . c i t . 2 6 . I b i d . , pp. 152-53. 
2 7 . Todorov, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 
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had r e c e n t l y come to power, would bring the two South Slav 
nations even more s w i f t l y together. Before h i s march on Rome, 
Mussolini declared: "Fascism should becomethe watchful guardian 
28 
of our f o r e i g n p o l i c y , " and, i n Yugoslavia, memories of 
D'Annunzio's 1919 attack on Fiuiae returned. C e r t a i n l y , the 
appearance of Mussolini made l i t t l e d i f f e r e n c e t o I t a l i a n 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Soon a f t e r t a k i n g up o f f i c e , he stated h i s 
i n t e n t i o n of seeking a reparations' settlement and, e a r l y i n 
1923i through Prince L i v i o Borghese, he demanded t h a t Bulgaria 
pay her rep a r a t i o n debt. I f the Bulgarian government d i d not 
pay, he would introduce sanctions against the country and 
he c i t e d the recent French occupation of the Ruhr as an 
example of what could happen to a country which defaulted i n 
i t s payments. Mussolini hoped t h a t Yugoslavia would co-operate 
w i t h I t a l y i n imposing sanctions on Bulgaria and proposed t h a t 
Yugoslavia should seize her neighbour^ customs and occupy the 
29 
Pernik c o a l f i e l d s . * Had Yugoslavia responded to Mussolini's 
suggestion, a l l Stamboliski's work would have been i n v a i n and 
both countries would have l o s t more than they would have gained. 
But Stamboliski believed t h a t the Yugoslav leaders now saw the 
wisdom of h i s p o l i c y . When he went to Belgrade i n November, 
he had lengthy t a l k s w i t h Pasic and Dr, Ni n c i c . fie also had 
an audience w i t h King Alexander. The King and he had got on 
w e l l together and Alexander even teased him about h i s republican 
outlook. But the importance of the meeting l a y i n a remark 
by the Kingi " I believe," he said, " t h a t an a l l i a n c e between 
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us i s now possible." 
Stamboliski and Todorov discussed Mussolini's demands and 
when Todorov returned from h i s consultations i n S o f i a , he 
pointed out to the Yugoslav government t h a t i f they y i e l d e d t o 
Mussol i n i , only 5% of the reparations would go to Yugoslavia. 
Therefore, the only b e n e f i c i a r y of Mussolini's p o l i c y would be 
28. C. Hibbert, Benito Mussolini, London, 1962, p. 9 0 . 
2 9 . Todorov, op. c i t . . pp. 182-83. 3 0 . I b i d . , p. 173 . 
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I t a l y h e r s e l f , since she would get 40$ of the reparations 
and destroy the prospect of good r e l a t i o n s between Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia. Todorov suggested t h a t Mussolini's demands 
might w e l l have been made to impede a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between 
them. The Yugoslav leaders agreed w i t h t h i s view and Pas'ic 
and Nincic' assured him t h a t t h e i r troops would not be used 
against Bulgaria. They promised to seek s i m i l a r assurances 
from Rumania. When, i n March 1923, the Reparation Commission 
gave way t s I t a l i a n pressure and ordered Bulgaria's neighbours 
to seize her customs and mines, Yugoslavia and Rumania refused. 
I n the l i g h t of subsequent events and of accusations of 
Yugoslavian m i l i t a r y aggression, i t i s important to remember 
t h a t at t h i s moment i n 1923 when m i l i t a r y a c t i o n was l e g a l l y 
sanctioned, Yugoslavia made no move against Bulgaria. 
One of the r e s u l t s of Mussolini's p o l i c y was to show the 
urgent need of a Bulgaro-Yugoslav a l l i a n c e f o r the mutual 
p r o t e c t i o n of the two Balkan states and the eventual s o l i d a r i t y 
of the whole peninsula against Fascist aggression. The Yugoslav 
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government expressed i t s w i l l i n g n e s s to negotiate and the 
f i r s t step was c l e a r l y an e a r l y settlement of the border problems* 
Both governments agreed to hold a Conference at Nis* a t which 
m i l i t a r y and p o l i c e a u t h o r i t i e s from both countries could work 
out measures to safeguard t h e i r common f r o n t i e r from IMRO 
a c t i v i t i e s o 
The Nis Conference, which began, i n March 1923, l a s t e d f o r 
a month. Yugoslavia was represented by M. Lazic, the d i r e c t o r 
of the p o l i c e department of the M i n i s t r y of the I n t e r i o r , 
Colonel R i s t i c , Commandant of the Skopje gendamerie and M. M i l l i e , 
the Secretary of the Yugoslav l e g a t i o n i n S o f i a . Bulgaria too 
had three representatives; Colonel Neukpv from the Bulgarian 
M i n i s t r y of the I n t e r i o r , Colonel Davidov, Commandant of the 
f r o n t i e r troops and Colonel Petrov, formerly m i l i t a r y attache 
at P aris. The Conference agreed to a series of comprehensive 
3 1 . I b i d . , pp. 183-84. 3 2 . I b i d . , p. 182. 
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measures to improve border c o n t r o l on both sides of the 
f r o n t i e r . Dr. Beiss has given a summary of the decisions which 
were made at Ni^» 
"Along the f r o n t i e r to a depth of 100 metres on 
each side, a l l f o r e s t s w i l l be cleared and the f r e e space 
planted w i t h low-growing p l a n t s . The Yugoslav and Bulgarian 
f r o n t i e r p a t r o l s i n d i f f i c u l t country may use routes t h a t 
i n places cross the f r o n t i e r . Springs on both B i d e s may 
be used by the f r o n t i e r guards of both c o u n t r i e s . L i a i s o n 
w i l l be maintained between the o f f i c e r s and p a t r o l s of 
the two States. The Bulgarian government w i l l complete 
the o r g a nization of i t s a u t h o r i t i e s i n the d i s t r i c t s of 
P e t r i c h , Kustendil and Gorna Djoumaia. To t h i s end, i t 
w i l l t r a n s f e r from the f r o n t i e r and neighbouring regions 
a l l o f f i c i a l s compromised i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the comit-
a d j i s . I t w i l l also remove from the f r o n t i e r a l l refugees 
and deserters from the Yugoslav Army. I n general, i t 
w i l l use every means t o prevent the formation of bands 
and t h e i r passage over the f r o n t i e r . I t w i l l prevent 
propaganda i n t h e i r favour. I t undertakes to consider any 
person who takes p a r t i n the o r g a n i z a t i o n and a c t i o n of 
the c o m i t a d j i s , or who abets the l a t t e r i n any way what-
soever, thus i n v o l v i n g State r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , as f a l l i n g 
under the p e n a l t i e s of the c r i m i n a l law. Both p a r t i e s 
make a r e c i p r o c a l agreement f o r the e x t r a d i t i o n of 
c r i m i n a l s . The Yugoslav government w i l l take i n t o consider-
a t i o n a request made by the Bulgarian Commission f o r 
amnesty f o r the refugees. Refugees can r e t u r n and the 
Yugoslav government w i l l f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r r e t u r n . A f u r t h e r 
Commission w i l l discuss the measures to prevent propaganda 
and the formation of bands. This second Commission w i l l 
meet at Sofia. 
I t i s noteworthy t h a t at the Nis Conference, the Bulgarian 
3 3 . Beiss, op. c i t . , pp. 3 7 - 3 8 . 
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delegates f o r m a l l y admitted t h a t the c o m i t a d j i bands were 
34 formed on Bulgarian t e r r i t o r y and crossed i n t o Yugoslavia. 
v 
The decisions of the Nis Conference were signed by the two 
delegations on A p r i l 25 , and r a t i f i e d by the Bulgarian 
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government. I t was agreed t h a t the decisions would come 
i n t o force on May 12 , 1 9 2 3 , ^ but the coup d'etat i n Bulgaria 
and the overthrow of Stamboliski came so q u i c k l y a f t e r the 
r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Nis agreement t h a t the decisions made 
were never c a r r i e d out and the Second Conference at Sofia 
37 
never took place. 
V 
The Nis Conference can r i g h t l y be regarded as the h i g h -
water mark i n Yugoslav-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s i n the period 
1918-41. Never again d i d the prospect of a rapprochement seem 
so close, nor the desire f o r f r i e n d s h i p so great. The b i t t e r n e s s 
of war had been erased - at l e a s t from the diplomatic memory -
and the Agrarian p o l i c y of goodwill and c o n c i l i a t i o n had -paved 
v 
the way f o r a genuine settlement. At the time of the Nis 
agreement, Stamboliski t o l d a f r i e n d : 
H I only need a few more years to break down a l l 
the e x i s t i n g b a r r i e r s between the Serbs and ourselves. 
Believe me, i n due course, there w i l l be no f r o n t i e r s 
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between the two States....." 
On h i s way to a League meeting i n Geneva i n May 1923» Todorov 
met Nincic and arranged plans f o r a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e between 
t h e i r two c o u n t r i e s . I t was proposed t h a t the plans be kept 
secret so as to prevent any h o s t i l e r e a c t i o n from I t a l y . 
Two o f f i c i a l s , Colonel Neukov from Bulgaria and General Pesic 
of Yugoslavia were appointed to work out the d e t a i l s and i t 
was agreed t h a t when the a l l i a n c e was concluded, Yugoslavia 
would ask France to allow m i l i t a r y equipment t o be despatched 
to Bulgaria under the guise of supplies f o r the Yugoslav 
3 4 . Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 158 -59 . 3 6 . Swire, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 
3 5 . Beiss, op. c i t . . l o c . o i t . 3 7 . Reiss, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 
3 8 . M. Padev, Escape from the Balkans. London, 1943t P« 6 8 . 
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arsenal. But events i n Bulgaria destroyed the prospect 
v 
of an a l l i a n c e and, l i k e the decisions at Nis, no p r a c t i c a l 
steps were ever taken. 
When, i n January, i t was known t h a t Stamboliski had agreed 
w i t h Yugoslavia to take j o i n t a c t i o n against the c o m i t a d j i s , 
IMRO made plans to wreck the chances of an agreement by 
provoking the Yugoslavs to r e p r i s a l s which would cause anger i n 
Sofia. On January 16 , a major attack was made on the Macedonian 
v i l l a g e of Kadrifakovo. I n the a t t a c k , 17 of the population 
were bayonetted to death and s i x others s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d . 
Houses and stables were burnt and l i v e s t o c k d r i v e n away, the 
41 
t o t a l damage being assessed at 188 ,585 d i n a r s . Later, during 
the Conference i t s e l f , another major r a i d was made, t h i s time 
upon the v i l l a g e of Dolani. A sub-prefect and seven policemen 
were k i l l e d and Yugoslav troops pursued the c o m i t a d j i s to 
Garvan and shelled t h e i r emplacement. I n t h i s i n c i d e n t , twenty-
e i g h t Bulgarian t e r r o r i s t s were k i l l e d . As IMRO had hoped, the 
event provoked a large demonstration i n Sofia w i t h f i e r y 
speeches, black banners and demonstrators denouncing Yugoslavia 
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and demanding Macedonian autonomy. 
On March 17 , 1923, Stamboliski proclaimed m a r t i a l law 
i n the P e t r i c h d i s t r i c t . This belated attempt t o r e s t o r e the 
a u t h o r i t y of the Bulgarian government d i d not please the Organ-
i z a t i o n . Alexandrov, who had returned to Bulgaria despite the 
order f o r h i s a r r e s t , declared the D i s t r i c t autonomous and 
threatened a l l h i s opponents w i t h death. An assassin was sent 
to Sofia to k i l l Stamboliski but the man was caught and the 
conspiracy discovered. House-to-house searches were organized 
i n Sofia and the leaders of the Macedonian Immigrants were 
in t e r n e d . These measures were h i g h l y successful except i n the 
P e t r i c h D i s t r i c t where l o y a l troops were r e p e l l e d by IMRO's 
3 9 . Todorov, op. c i t . , p. 187. See also Stavrianos, op. c i t . , 
p„ 2 1 1 . 40. Swire, op. c i t . , l o c . c i t . 
41. Reiss, op. c i t . , pp. 1 0 5 - 6 . 42. Swire, op. c i t . , p. 158. 
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p r i v a t e m i l i t i a . ^ 
I n March, Stamboliski decided t o repeat the e l e c t o r a l 
manoeuvre he had used i n 1920 to secure a greater m a j o r i t y 
f o r the Agrarian party i n the Sobranje. He believed t h a t the 
rapprochement w i t h Yugoslavia and the change to p r o p o r t i o n a l 
representation would work i n h i s favour. The r e s u l t s 
c e r t a i n l y v i n d i c a t e d h i s optimism, f o r i n the e l e c t i o n s which 
were held on A p r i l 22, 1923, the Agrarians gained 212 of the 
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245 parliamentary seats. Such a success was not obtained 
without the use of unscrupulous methods by determined govern-
ment supporters. The Agrarian p a r t y of 1923 vas u n d i s c i p l i n e d , 
c o r r u p t i o n was r i f e , c r i t i c i s m was not t o l e r a t e d and many 
o f f i c i a l posts were held by peasants some of whom were 
45 
incompetent and some even i l l i t e r a t e . Nevertheless, the 
el e c t i o n s showed an increase i n popular support f o r Stamboliski. 
A f t e r the e l e c t i o n s , he was v i r t u a l l y d i c t a t o r of Bulgaria. 
Rather unwisely, he allowed rumours to c i r c u l a t e t h a t the 
"Tzartcheto" would now be deprived of some of h i s prerogatives 
and there was speculation whether he would now declare Bulgaria 
v i • 46 a r e p u b l i c . 
For a l l those who were opposed to Stamboliski, the 
el e c t i o n s were the deciding f a c t o r . There was no chance of 
defeating the Agrarian leader i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l manner 
since he had the massive and i n a l i e n a b l e support of the 
peasantry. The only a l t e r n a t i v e was a coup d i e t a t . 
Flans f o r the overthrow of the government had been 
continuing f o r some time. There had been the Trnovo a f f a i r 
i n September 1922 and the seizure of Kustendil i n December. 
Two months l a t e r , there was open opposition to Stamboliski 
43. I b i d . , p. 159 . 
44. I b i d . , p. 156. The r e s u l t s were; Agrarians 212 
Communists 16 
Others 1 7 . 
45. I b i d . , l o c , c i t . 46. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
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from w i t h i n h i s own Cabinet and Tomov was somewhat b e l a t e d l y 
47 
dismissed. Early i n 1923, there had been plans t o make an 
immediate attack on the government but on January 15, s i x 
days before the coup was due to take place, Stamboliski 
v i s i t e d the Sofia M i l i t a r y Club. Here he met Colonel Ivan 
Volkov, one of the leading conspirators and head of the Map 
D i v i s i o n i n the Bulgarian War O f f i c e . When introduced t o him, 
Stamboliski i s reported to have said "So you are the Colonel 
48 
Volkov who wants t o overthrow me!" A f t e r t h i B , the January 
coup came to noyhing. On February 4, a bomb was thrown i n t o 
the box at the National Theatre where Stamboliski and f i v e 
M i n i s t e r s were s i t t i n g , The M i n i s t e r s l e f t the box before 
the explosion and the King, who was s i t t i n g i n a box opposite, 
49 
congratulated h i s Prime M i n i s t e r on h i s escape. Six days 
l a t e r , the National Theatre was burnt t o the ground. I t vas 
discovered t h a t Tomov, the ex-Minister of War, and two conspir-
ators had been p l o t t i n g a second coup and the burning of the 
Theatre was to be the sig n a l f o r the operation. I t has been 
said t h a t King Boris disapproved of Tomov1s a c t i v i t i e s - or, 
at l e a s t , p r e f e r r e d Stamboliski to him - and, before the coup 
was launched, summoned Stamboliski to the palace and warned him 
50 
of what was afoo t . I n March, the Soviet Red Cross was allowed 
to set up an o f f i c e i n Sofia f o r the r e p a t r i a t i o n of those who 
genuinely wished to r e t u r n t o Russia. 4,000 took advantage of 
the o f f e r but the remaining 36,000 misconstrued Stamboliski•s 
a c t i o n . They believed t h a t he was int e n d i n g to e s t a b l i s h 
diplomatic r e l a t i o n s w i t h Russia and was "hand i n glove" w i t h 
the Bolsheviks. They immediately entered i n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s 
w i t h the Opposition and promised t o r a i s e several regiments, 
i n the event of there being a coup or r e v o l u t i o n against 
S t a m b o l i s k i . 5 1 
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Two days a f t e r the e l e c t i o n , Alexander Tsankov, a 
52 
professor of P o l i t i c a l Economy at Sofia U n i v e r s i t y , had 
a p r i v a t e discussion w i t h Dimo Kazazov - a S o c i a l i s t j o u r n a l i s t 
who had great influence w i t h the Sofia Press. Tsankov had 
formerly been a s o c i a l i s t who supported the idea of a 
Balkan confederation under the aegis of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. By t h i s time, he was a determined opponent of the Prime 
M i n i s t e r and the p o l i c i e s he stood f o r . Now, w i t h the Macedonian 
Organization, the Opposition leaders, dismissed Agrarian 
m i n i s t e r s , White Russians and opponents of the pro-Yugoslav 
p o l i c y , a " M i l i t a r y League" had been set Up. The only common 
object of the League was the overthrow of Stamboliski and 
Tsankov asked Kazazov whether he would j o i n the conspiracy. 
Kazazov thought the matter over f o r a f o r t n i g h t and j o i n e d 
53 
the League on May 8. Other f i g u r e s , who were l a t e r t o play 
an important p a r t i n Bulgarian h i s t o r y , also took p a r t i n the 
coup - Colonel Volkov, Kimon Gheorgiev, Damian Velchev and 
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Ivan Mihailov. Mihailov, a 27 year o l d Macedonian, was the 
main contact between IMRO and the conspirators i n Sofia. The 
Macedonian Organization had passed i t s death sentence on Stambol-
55 
i s k i on March 3> but Alexandrov was anxious t o delay the 
coup u n t i l J u l y when the peasants would be g e t t i n g i n t h e i r 
harvest. Mihailov, however, d i d not take much no t i c e of 
Alexandrov's opinion and began to h i r e men to take p a r t i n 56 ' the conspiracy. On June 5» i t was decided t h a t the coup d'etat 
52. Tsankov was born at Orehovo i n 1879. He was educated i n 
Germany and remained pro-German throughout the inter-war period, 
53 . Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 159 -60 . 54. Mihailov was born at 
Shtip i n 1896. He was educated at Salonika and also at the Serbian 
High School at Skopje. During the Bulgarian occupation, he was 
a t a x a t i o n c l e r k at Shtip. He j o i n e d IMRO i n 1920. 
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57 would take place four days l a t e r - on June 9 . 
A f t e r a l l the signs of recent months, Stamboliski was 
f u l l y avare of the impending coup. Indeed, he i s reported to 
CO 
have had premonitions of h i s assassination. Muraviev, h i s 
nephew knew of a l l the preparations and even the names of 
59 
some of the conspirators, but d i d nothing. I n A p r i l , a 
Colonel Lichev of the Sofia Garrison came to Todorov to t e l l 
him of the conspiracy t h a t was being formed. Lichev t o l d 
Todorov t h a t i f he was given a u t h o r i t y he could crush i t and 
together they went to see Muraviev. The l a t t e r l i s t e n e d to 
them but s t i l l d i d n o t h i n g . ^ I t would have been easy to have 
proclaimed m a r t i a l law but even t h i s was neglected. One w r i t e r , 
who examined the background of the events of June 1923» stated 
"Criminal negligence was the Government's undoing. 1 1 ^ 
On June 1 , Stamboliski r e t i r e d t o h i s farm at Slavovitsa 
to prepare changes i n the c o n s t i t u t i o n . I t seems l i k e l y t h a t 
these changes d i d involve some reduction i n ro y a l prerogative 
and King Boris v i s i t e d him at h i s farm on June 7 . ^ 2 No record 
of t h i s meeting e x i s t s . Two days l a t e r , e a r l y i n the morning 
of June 9, the coup d'etat took place. The Agrarian m i n i s t e r s 
who were i n the c a p i t a l were a r r e s t e d ^ and, a f t e r s i x hours 
of i n d e c i s i o n , King Boris agreed to make Professor Tsankov 
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Prime M i n i s t e r of a new government. At Slav o v i t s a , the 
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Orange Guards put up a strong resistance to the u n i t s sent 
to capture Stainboliski but he vas caught on June 13* On the 
f o l l o w i n g day, he was taken back to h i s home a t Slavo v i t s a 
and mude to dig his grave. His ears were then cut o f f and 
v 65 also the hands which signed the Nis Convention." F i n a l l y , 
Stamboliski was shot and h i s body dismembered. 
The death of Stamboliski i s one of the most t r a g i c 
events i n Bulgarian h i s t o r y . At a time when so much was being 
achieved, the p r i n c i p a l a r c h i t e c t of the South Slav f r i e n d s h i p 
was destroyed and h i s government overthrown. Although the pro-
Yugoslavian p o l i c y was only one of the causes of the coup d'etat, 
i t vas t h i s which had most embittered the Macedonian Organization. 
IMRO had been one of the most powerful elements i n the conspiracy, 
and i n the post-Agrarian Bulgaria, i t exercised a power and 
influence out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n t o i t s s i z e . No longer was 
i t subject to the government i n Sofia; no longer was i t const-
rained by the Nis agreement. With Stamboliski gone, the whole 
process of rapprochement came to an end. The South Slav cause 
had l o s t one of i t s greatest advocates and gained a "martyr". 
65. I b i d . , pp. 167-68. 
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The F r o n t i e r Question. 
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The Great Powers regarded the coup d'etat as an i n t e r n a l 
question and f e l t t h a t since King Boris had recognized the 
Tsankov a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the l a t t e r must be considered the 
le g a l government of Bulgaria. Towards Yugoslavia, Tsankov shoved 
an i n i t i a l desire t o continue Stamboliski's p o l i c y of c o n c i l -
i a t i o n . Several Macedonian newspapers were tem p o r a r i l y suspended 
and diplomatic r e l a t i o n s between the two countries were 
restored on June 2 9 . 1 Nevertheless] 
"The new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n became very f r i e n d l y w i t h 
IMBO. The Macedonians breathed w i t h r e l i e f . The new 
Cabinet p r a c t i c a l l y ceded the P e t r i c h d i s t r i c t to IMRO 
and the eleven parliamentary votes which represented the 
d i s t r i c t went s o l i d l y behind the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n 
other words, the new government and the Macedonians 
t a c i t l y co-operated and everyone seemed to be s a t i s f i e d , 
everyone t h a t i s , except the Agrarians, the emigres, the 
Communista, the Serbs, the Greeks, France, Czechoslovakia, 
2 
Roumania, and a few others." 
Following the coup the headquarters of IMBO a t Sofia were 
the premises of the Macedonia-Adrianople Volunteers. The Volunteers, 
most of whom were already members of the Organization, were 
os t e n s i b l y an association f o r veteran s o l d i e r s but were i n f a c t 
the young o f f i c e r s and N.C.O.s of the "Volunteer D i v i s i o n " , 
which had been p a r t i c u l a r l y notorious i n Serbia during the 
1 . J. Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, London, 1939, p. 174. 
2 . S. Christowe, Heroes and Assassins. London, 1935* PP« 1 6 2 - 3 . 
Although on the whole Christove w r i t e s s e r i o u s l y , he occasionally 
puts over h i s point w i t h some humour. Throughout h i s book, 
his sympathies remain w i t h the Macedonian Organization. 
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war. By having t h e i r headquarters a t t h i s o f f i v e i n the very 
heart of Sofia, Mihailov and Alexandrov vere assured of being 
i n constant touch w i t h Colonel Volkov, who nov became M i n i s t e r 
of War. I n J u l y 1923,government representatives and some of 
Alexandrov's senior l i e u t e n a n t s met at a secret conference 
to plan f u t u r e IMBO operations i n Southern Serbia. To finance 
these operations, the Government provided the Organisation w i t h 
30 m i l l i o n leva. 
During June, Brio and other c o m i t a d j i leaders once more 
crossed the border i n t o Yugoslavia and resumed t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 
During the summer, there was asteep increase i n the number of 
i n c i d e n t s . On June 20 , 113 co m i t a d j i s attacked a platoon of 
62 p o l i c e and k i l l e d 15 of them. I n September, the mayor of 
Radja (near Gevgheli) was hung and bayonetted, and i n the 
v i l l a g e of Svadoritse, a Moslem was hung w i t h a n o t i c e attached 
to h i s body, sayingi "So p e r i s h a l l t r a i t o r s t o the Bulgarian 
5 
organization i n Macedonia." The examples are l e g i o n . 
S h o r t l y a f t e r the coup d'etat, Todorov vas approached by 
Colonel Kalfov, the nev Bulgarian f o r e i g n m i n i s t e r , who o f f e r e d 
3 . Swire, op. c i t . , pp. 169-71. I n Bulgaria, many " s p o r t i n g 
and c u l t u r a l organizations" were set up as a cover f o r para-
m i l i t a r y formations. For instance, i n a country of few b i c y c l e s , 
there was an 18,000 strong C y c l i s t ' s Association and a Hunter*s 
Association w i t h 55*000 members. I n June 1927, f o l l o w i n g 
s u r r e p t i t i o u s rearmament by Volkov, the Entente Representatives 
of the L i q u i d a t i o n Board, stated t h a t Bulgaria vas evading the 
m i l i t a r y clauses of the Treaty of N e u i l l y and had never annulled 
the s t a t u t e enacting compulsory m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e . Despite t h i s , 
G. Desbons, La Bulgarie apres l e T r a i t / de N e u i l l y , P a r i s , 
1930, p. 248, s t a t e s : "To be honest, Bulgaria has respected 
the Treaty of N e u i l l y . Being a new n a t i o n , a peasant n a t i o n , she 
i s not m i l i t a r i s t and lacks the m i l i t a r y s p i r i t . She detests the 
m i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n . " 4. Swire, i b i d . , p. 174. 5. R.A. Reiss, 
The Comitad.ji Question i n Southern Serbia, London, 1924, pp. 105-8. 
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him the post of Minister Plenipotentiary i n Paris, with especial 
reference to propaganda i n Yugoslavia and France.** Ka}fov t o l d 
the former Minister i n Belgrade that Yugoslav-Bulgarian 
relations had been getting too close of late and he would 
prefer to see a more p r o - I t a l i a n policy. Todorov refused the 7 
offer and joined Gbov and Daskalov who had formed a Revolution-
ary Committee i n Prague to work against the "Bulgarian Dictator-
g 
ship." Ever since the coup there had been large numbers of 
refugees crossing from Bulgaria into Yugoslavia and Daskalov 
suggested that Todorov go back to Belgrade and make arrangements 
with the Yugoslav government for t h e i r food and shelter. 
Todorov agreed to do t h i s and went to Belgrade, where he 
received great sympathy from p o l i t i c a l leaders. The l a t t e r were 
reca l l i n g Stamboliski's words i n 1915 and his unrelenting 
e f f o r t s to bring the two South Slav nations together. King 
Alexander, with whom he had an audience, declared that he was 
sorry that the moment of success for t h e i r work had been 
forestalled,, Moreover, Pasic t o l d him that the peasantry would 
one day reverse the decision.^ After seeing the King and Pasic, 
Todorov busied himself with arranging refugee camps and organ-
izing the exiles - many/ of whom were members of the Agrarian and 
Communist parties - into a f i g h t i n g force, 4,000 strong. Companies 
of exiles were then placed near the f r o n t i e r so that t h e i r 
6. On the eve of the coup, Nikola Milev had been chosen as 
prospective foreign minister by the conspirators but because of 
his overt IMB0 connections and the effect t h i s might have on Yugo-
slavia, Kalfov was chosen instead. Milev became head of IMBO's 
Committee for P o l i t i c s and Propaganda. He was shot, February 13,1925. 
7. &. Todorov, Balkan Firebrand, The Autobiography of a Reb-
e l , Soldier and Statesman, Chicago, 1943» pp. 194-95. Kalfov 
t r i e d to blackmail Todorov into accepting the post by detaining 
his wife i n Sofia. 8. I b i d . , p. 197. Daskalov was k i l l e d 
by IMRO i n Prague on August 27, 1923, 9. I b i g . . p. 194. 
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couriers could pass into Bulgaria, deing the work of the 
Revolutionary Committee. Each company was superintended by a 
m i l i t a r y commander d i r e c t l y under Todorov's c o n t r o l . ^ 
Within Bulgaria, the nev government foresaw the possib-
i l i t y of a peasant revolt and decided to take the i n i t i a t i v e . 
I n the second week of September, 3,000 Army o f f i c e r s and IMRO 
leaders attended a Congress near B i l a . The meeting and the 
sentiments expressed gave the impression that a serious 
clash between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was being planned. The 
Yugoslav government, hearing of the Congress, promptly concent-
rated large numbers of troops on the border to r e s i s t any 
incursion.** But i n fact the Congress was merely a cover for 
the attack which the Tsankov government waB about to launch 
on the enemies of the regime. This began on September 12. 
Claiming that the Communists had planned a revolution for 
mid-September, Professor Tsankov ordered the arrest of large 
numbers of Agrarians, Communists and other supporters of 
Stamboliski. The arrests provoked a violent reaction, as had 
been expected. On September 20, the Communists r e t a l i a t e d with 
a major re v o l t . The lack of planning or co-ordination i n t h e i r 
uprising would seem to gainsay the t r u t h of any conspiracy, for 
12 
the rebels had no r i f l e s , a r t i l l e r y or machine guns. They 
did not even have the support of the Agrarians, who refrained 
from taking up arms u n t i l September 23.*' By then, the r i s i n g 
had spread over most of north-west Bulgaria and Volkov 
proclaimed martial law. Macedonian bands roamed the countryside, 
reservists were mobilized and the White Russians were given 
arms. Within a week these forces had overcome a l l organized 
resistance and Dimitrov and Kolarov with 2,000 armed peasants 
f l e d to Belgrade where they joined forces with the Revolutionary 
14 
Committee. Following the uprising, a b i t t e r c i v i l war raged 
10. I b i d . , p. 197. 11. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 174. 
12. I b i d . . p. 175. 13. I b i d . . loc. c i t . 
14. Todorov, op. c i t . , pp. 196-97. 
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w i t h i n Bulgaria and many a t r o c i t i e s were reported. The t o t a l 
number k i l l e d has never been established bat estimates have 
15 
ranged from 10-20,000. Many ministers i n the Sofia 
government were h o r r i f i e d by the outrages and two resigned. 
Nevertheless, the Tsanlcov government had achieved i t s goal; 
peasant resistance to the regime had been ruthlessly suppressed 
and i n the elections held on November 18, 1923» Tsankov's 
Coalition party, "The Democratic Entente", von 199 out of the 
16 
247 seats i n the Sobranje. 
With such a government i n power i n Sofia, i t was inevitable 
that relations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria should rapidly 
deteriorate. I n November 1923* a Yugoslav delegation came to 
Sofia to arrange for the repa t r i a t i o n of those Macedonians 
who had not been connected with the Revolutionary Organization. 
This had been one of the agreements made by the delegates at 
Nis. These negotiations were resented i n Sofia and a physical 
attack was made on the Yugoslav m i l i t a r y attache and his 
orderly. The Yugoslav government demanded an apology. Bulgaria 
apologized with reluctance but said that the assailants could 
17 
not be found. After the Yugoslav delegation had returned 'u 
to Belgrade, Tsankov declared i n a speech: "Macedonia has the 
r i g h t to l i b e r t y and jus t i c e We demand what belongs to us 
His speech evoked protests from Greece and Yugoslavia and Tsankov 
hurriedly explained that his speech had been wrongly transmitted. 
Belgrade was not very impressed by his excuses since Alexandrov, 
s t i l l wanted for war-crimes i n Serbia, was l i v i n g f r e e l y i n 
19 
Sofia and was even reported to be conferring with King Boris. 
Early i n 1924, following a rumour that Alexandrov was 
15. I b i d . , p. 197* Todorov states that 17,000 died; Swire, 
op. c i t . . p. 176-77, suggests 10-17,000; S.G. Evans, A Short 
History of Bulgaria. London, 1960, p. 161, estimates 20,000 k i l l e d . 
16. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 177. 18. Swire, op. c i t . . p.179* 
17. fieiss, op. c i t . , pp. 39-40, 19. I b i d . . loc. c i t . 
18 
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concentrating 10,000 men for a great offensive i n A p r i l and 
following two more attacks on the Yugoslav M i l i t a r y attache', 
the Yugoslav authorities began to take stronger defensive 
measures i n South Serbia. Frontier villages were armed against 
the raiders and more police.were drafted into the region. 
An ex-comitadji leader defected to Yugoslavia and gave useful 
2 
advice on how to organize the f r o n t i e r against enemy incursions. 
Abroad, the Belgrade government made i t known that i f Bulgaria 
continued to harbour revolutionary bands on her t e r r i t o r y , i t 
disclaimed a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the consequences. The 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the Yugoslav attitude was clear. Between 
1919-1934, there were 467 major outrages i n South Serbia 
21 
involving the deaths of 706 Yugoslav o f f i c i a l s and c i v i l i a n s . 
Furthermore, the whole process of daily l i f e was disrupted i n 
Yugoslav Macedonia: 
"Alexandrov made a good job of organizing his 
border d i s t r i c t s . He had established a courier servicee 
and issued stamps bearing either his head or a map of 
Macedonia. Quite often, peasants were inveigled into 
paying tax and those who disobeyed or complained to the 
Yugoslav authorities were l i k e l y to f i n d t h e i r houses on 
f i r e or else they disappeared. Corpses by the wayside 
warned the truculent. A woman's body, hanging from a tree, 
a s l i p of paper pinned to i t readings 'We have k i l l e d 
you by order of the great Alexandrov because you disobeyed 
the Organization* - such sights struck t e r r o r . I n three 
years, raiders murdered 100 people i n the Strumica d i s t r i c t 
alone. Sometimes, Macedonian o f f i c i a l s i n Yugoslav service 
20. I b i d . , p. 180. 
21, jbid«, p. 43. The s t a t i s t i c s were as follows: 
1923 - 51 outrages. I926 - not available. 
1924 - 74 outrages 1927 - 6 l outrages. 
1925 - 55 outrages. 1928 - 10 outrages. 
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were threatened or bribed into collaboration and were 
put at the head of local organizations, which well-to-do 
peasants often joined to save t h e i r riches and liv e s 
22 
from the bands." 
One Macedonian, a grocer, t o l d Dr. Reiss: " I f we t e l l the 
authorities, we r i s k being k i l l e d by the Bulgarsi i f we don't 
23 
t e l l them, we r i s k going to prison." Many chose the l a t t e r 
course. When, la t e r i n the year, Dr. Reiss wrote his study of 
the comitadji question i n Southern Serbia, he observed that: 
"Up to the present time, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes has been long-suffering for the sake of peace. 
However, since the a c t i v i t i e s of the comitadjis i n South 
Serbia amounts not only to a breach of the Treaty of 
Neuilly but rather an act of war, nobody can deny the 
Kingdom the r i g h t to reply to th i s act of war by an act 
which suffices to put a stop to i t . The Bulgarian government 
pretend that they cannot prevent the comitadjis from 
crossing the f r o n t i e r because, as they say, they have not 
enough soldiers. However, the active comitadjis, i e . those 
who cross the f r o n t i e r , are estimated to be 5-7,000 i n 
number. Bulgaria with her army was able to overcome the 
partisans of Stamboliski, who were at least 200,000 i n 
number; how i s i t that she cannot s e t t l e with 5-7,000 
24 
comitadjis? The fact i s that she does not want to." 
But the revival of IMB0 a c t i v i t y after the 1923 coup 
25 
produced such a strong reaction that there was a serious 
convulsion w i t h i n the Organization i t s e l f . The concentration of 
22. I b i d . , p. 171. 
23. Reiss, op. c i t . . p. 123. 24. I b i d . , pp. 127-28. 
25. The Yugoslavs moved troops up to the border after the 
rumours of Alexandrov's attack. At the same time, IMR0 was busily 
collecting funds and even American citizens of Macedonian o r i g i n 
were bullied for money u n t i l the U.S.A. threatened to break o f f 
diplomatic relations. 
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Yugoslav troops i n Southern Serbia and the arming of Macedonian 
peasants to r e s i s t the comitadji bands, had made the prospect 
of a Bulgarian " l i b e r a t i o n " of Macedonia somewhat u n r e a l i s t i c . 
IMRO looked for fresh support and, i n October 1923, Alexandrov 
hinted that he had a few surprises i n store for the Yugoslav 
g o v e r n m e n t P r i n c i p a l among these was an alliance with the 
Communist Party. 
After the uprising of September 1923 and i t s severe 
a t r o c i t i e s , the Russian leaders of the Communist movement 
decided that a genuine Communist revolution i n Bulgaria -
the most suitable place i n the Balkans - could not succeed i f 
was opposed by IMRO. During the winter months of 1923-24, there 
27 
were conversations between the two sides, Alexandrov realized 
that both they and the Communists were opposed to the Triune 
Kingdom and remembered that, i n the 1920 Yugoslav elections, 
there had been massive support for the Communist candidates i n 
28 
Southern Serbia. Protogerov, who had had fresh thoughts 
about the objectives of the Organization, was disturbed by the 
collaboration between IMRO and Volkov during the September 
revo l t . He f e l t that IMRO's resources had been exploited and 
declared that the Organization must remain independent. Common 
29 
interest drew the two sides together. 
I n March 1924, Alexandrov and Protogerov went to Vienna 
and conferred with representatives of the Third I n t e r n a t i o n a l . ' 0 
On A p r i l 29, as a result of t h e i r discussions, Chaoulev, Proto-
gerov and Alexandrov signed a "Declaration of Policy", pledging 
themselves to work for an autonomous Macedonia wit h i n a Balkan 
26. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 180. 27. Christowe, op. c i t . . p. 175. 
28. See above, chapter 3* p. 56. The Communists secured 58 
of the 419 seats i n the Constituent Assembly. Following a bomb 
attack on Prince ( l a t e r King] Alexander and the subsequent ass-
assination on July 21, 1921 of Draskovic, the Minister of the 
I n t e r i o r , the Communist party were banned and remained so u n t i l 1941. 
29. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 184. 30. Christowe, op. c i t . , pp. 176-8. 
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31 Federation. This did not mean any respite for the Yugoslav 
government. Indeed, the declaration committed the Macedonian 
Organization to collaborate with other European revolutionary 
movements and to re s i s t the " i m p e r i a l i s t designs" of the Greek, 
Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments on Macedonia. A "Manifesto 
to the Macedonian Nation," embodying these decisions, was 
signed on May 5, 1924 and appeared i n the f i r s t edition of 
Federation balkanique - a new magazine sponsored j o i n t l y by 
"52 
IMBO and the Communists - on July 22, 1924. 
When the Manifesto which urged a federal solution to 
Macedonia appeared i n p r i n t , there was something approaching 
panic i n Bulgarian o f f i c i a l quarters. Newspapers publishing 
the Manifesto were confiscated and government troops i n the 
Petrich d i s t r i c t were re-inforced. Jfciring June and July, several 
supporters of the Manifesto suffered sudden and mysterious 
33 
deaths. Alexandrov, naturally disturbed by the loss of some 
of his closest colleagues, announced that he would i n s t i t u t e 
investigations into t h e i r deaths at the 6th. General Congress 
of the Organization to be held at Lopovo on September 1. 
However, on the eve of the Congress, whilst he was oil the way 
to Lepovo, Alexandrov was shot by "unknown assassins". When 
the news of his death was released on September 16, i t was 
34 
stated that he had been k i l l e d at "Yugoslav i n s t i g a t i o n . " 
The fact that the principal beneficiary of Alexandrov•e death 
was Ivan Mihailov would seem to cast some doubt on th i s a l l e g -
ation. For the next ten years, Mihailov excused much of his 
feuding i n Bulgaria by declaring that he was "pursuing and 
35 
punishing Alexandrov 1s murderers." But these feuds amounted 
to nothing less than a thorough purge of a l l those who believed 
31. Swire, op. c i t . . loc. c i t . 
32. L. S. Stavrianos, Balkan Federation. . A History of the 
Movement towards Balkan Unity i n Modern Times. Northampton, 
Mass., 1944, p. 218. 33. Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 186-87. 
34. Christove, op. c i t . , pp. 180-88. 35. Swire, op. c i t . p. 188. 
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i n a federal solution f or Macedonia, the 6ommuniste included. 
On September 12, at Gorna Djoumaia, many key supporters of 
the Vienna Manifesto were massacred and the hunt for the rest 
continued for several months. Chaoulev, one of the architects 
of the Vienna Manifesto, declared that i t was the Bulgar-ian 
Government that had instigated t h i s purge of iMRO's fe d e r a l i s t 
supporters.*^ His allegation has never been denied. On Decem-
ber 23, 1924, Chaoulev was shot i n Milan. Hi6 assassin, t r i e d 
by an I t a l i a n Court, i n A p r i l 1926, was a c q u i t t e d . " 
The Revolutionary Committee i n Prague and Belgrade were 
ready to take advantage of th i s unrest. The September revolt 
had increased the number of armed exiles to over 6,000. Most 
of these men had b i t t e r memories and were determined to seek 
vengeance on the regime which they abhorred. Between October 
1923 and A p r i l 1925, there were at least 32 raids by these 
exiles and, as from June 1924, Zemledelsko Zname. an o f f i c i a l 
publication of the Agrarian party was published i n Belgrade 
38 
urging revolution i n Bulgaria. Imitating IMRO and with the 
connivance of $he local Yugoslav authorities, the exiles crossed 
into Bulgaria to provoke unrest and spread propaganda against 
the Tsankov government. The raids were contrary to Todorov's 
v * 
wishes for they brought cautionary warnings from Nincic, 
36. I b i d . , p. 192. Peter Chaoulev was a member of IMRO's 
Action Committee, tie was also one of those wanted by the Yugo-
slav government for war crimes. I n the f i r s t l i s t pf 1,662, 
he had been no. 1369; on the l i s t of 500, no. 409. He was 
accused of executions, flogging and pillage at Buchie. Cf. 
Reiss, op. c i t . . pp. 41-45. 
37. Chaoulev1s assassin, Stefan Dimitrov, l e f t Bulgaria i n 
September 1924. The verdict of the I t a l i a n Court acquitted him 
because "he k i l l e d a Communist by order of IMRO under the 
menace of death i f he f a i l e d , " Dimitrov returned to Sofia i n 
triumph. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 192. 
38. C.J. Logio, Bulgaria, Past and Present, Manchester, 1936, 
p # 453. 
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Yugoslavians Foreign Minister, and also impeded the surpnise 
39 
insurrection for vhich Todorov was working. Unfortunately, 
the Revolutionary Committee was by no means united and two 
former Agrarian Ministers, Athanassov and Stoyanov, who had 
escaped from prison i n August 1924 and f l e d to Belgrade, 
divulged the Committee's plans to Genov, a Communist agent. 
This led to Communist preparations i n Bulgaria designed to 
produce an uprising before the Agrarian-planned conspiracy 
40 
could take place. But neither these preparations nor the 
Agrarian conspiracy were wholly under way when three major 
events took place i n Bulgaria. 
The f i r s t , on A p r i l 14, 1925, was an attack on King BoriB. 
I t was not deliberately directed against the King. Todorov 
reported that a peasant group led by Tumangelov, which had 
been engaged i n g u e r i l l a warfare with Volkov's troops for 
two years, were on t h e i r way out of Bulgaria. Before crossing 
the f r o n t i e r , they saw a car of armed men t r a v e l l i n g along the 
41 
road and made a sup e r f i c i a l attack upon i t . The attack, 
however, made a profound impression upon King Boris who was 
t r a v e l l i n g i n the car. On the same day, General Konstantin 
Gheorgiev, Chief of M i l i t a r y Justice i n Bulgaria, was assass-
inated i n Sofia. Two days l a t e r , a funeral service was held i n 
his honour i n the Sveta Nedelja Cathedral. During the service, 
a bomb exploded i n the cathedral, s i l l i n g 128 and i n j u r i n g 
several hundred. Among the dead were the Mayor of Sofia, 
42 
fourteen generals and the 6hief of Police. There was an 
immediate public outcry and the Communist Party were blamed 
for the explosion. Although the incident may have been of 
Communist i n s t i g a t i o n , i t has been suggested that the Cathedral 
Bomb p l o t was i n fact an e a r l i e r version of the Reichstag f i r e 
39. Todorov, op. c i t . , p. 218. The Bulgarian government put 
a 2 m i l l i o n leva ransom on Todorov's head. 
40. I b i d . , p. 220 41. I b i d . , p. 222. 
42. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 198. 
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and that General Volkov, the Minister for War, was responsible 
43 
for i t . Whether or not t h i s true, the incident provided him 
with an excellent opportunity to suppress a l l opposition to the 
regime. Martial law was proclaimed, large numbers of Agrarians 
44 
and Communists were arrested and 300 condemned to death. 
These three events proved extremely fortunate for the regime 
since they disrupted plans f o r the Agrarian and Communist 
insurrections and the purge of Agrarian sympathizers was so 
thorough that the Revolutionary Committee l o s t many of i t s 
internal contacts within Bulgaria and the Committee was formally 
45 
dissolved i n May 1925. 
Whatever the personal position of General Volkov, the 
attitude of the Tsankov government towards the post-Alexandrov 
IMRO was one of anxiety. During the winter of 1924-25, there 
were no fewer than 200 p o l i t i c a l murders i n Bulgaria and the 
Cathedral incident had caused alsrm w i t h i n the Army cadre. 
There was mutiny i n a f r o n t i e r garrison and t a l k of a mass IMRO 
attack on Tsaribrod, which provoked a severe warning from 
46 
Yugoslavia. Then, i n October 1925, IMRO operations provoked 
the Greek government to send troops into the Petrich d i s t r i c t . 
Bulgaria appealed to the League of Nations. The League t o l d 
the Greek forces not to intervene and ordered them to withdraw 
t h e i r forces. A League Commission under Sir Horace BumboId 
found that Greece had violated the League Covenant and the 
Athens government was obliged to pay Bulgaria 30 m i l l i o n leva 
47 
as compensation. A scheme for the League's supervision of the 
43. I b i d . , p. 199. 
44. I b i d . . loc. c i t . A series of 81 t r i a l s were held. Apart 
from the condemned, a further 611 were imprisoned. 
45. Todorov, op. c i t . . pp. 223-24. Nevertheless, i n March 1926, 
Obov, Todorov, Athanassov and Stoyanov were t r i e d i n t h e i r 
absence. They were charged with organizing bands against the 
Tsankov regime and were condemned to death by hanging. 
46. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 198. 47. £45,000 (at 1924-5 values). 
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Graeco-Bulgarian f r o n t i e r was Bet up but th i s did not apply 
to the Yugoslav-Bulgarian f r o n t i e r where there had been many 
more i n c i d e n t s . ^ Tsankov and Kalfov, who feared that Yugo-
49 z slavia might follow Greece's example, and overthrow the regime, 
decided to improve relatione,; Already, there had been some 
contact. Professor Tsankov had v i s i t e d Belgrade i n December 
50 
1924 and Kalfov i n Hay 1925. I n September 1925, Tsankov met 
Pasic i n Geneva, after making some gestures of goodwill including 
the arrest of several agitators and the dismissal of two d i s t r i c t 
51 
governors for belonging to IHRO. I n December, there were 
rumours i n Sofia that Tsankov was piatoning a customs union with 
Yugoslavia. At the same time, Kalfov declared that the Bulg-
arian people as a whole desired friendship w i t h Yugoslavia. 
"Belgrade," he said,"has understood us and that i s enough for 
us." 5 2 
This abrupt change i n the policy of the Bulgarian government 
produced an immediate reaction. Both King Boris and General 
Volkov d i s l i k e d the now outlook and the King had private 
53 
consultations with Andrew Liapchev, a p r o - I t a l i a n p o l i t i c i a n 
Within a f o r t n i g h t , there was strong agitation against Professor 
Tsankov and he was publicly blamed for a l l the repressive 
48. Swire, op. c i t . , pp. 201-3* The Greek troops occupied 
the Petrich d i s t r i c t f o r 8 days, from October 21 and 29. 
Previously, relations between Greece and Bulgaria had been 
comparatively good. Kalfov and P o l i t i s had signed a Convention 
for the Protection of the minorities of both countries on 
March 24, 1924. However, t h i s treaty was never r a t i f i e d . Cf. 
A. Toshev, The Bulgarian-Serbian Dispute, Sofia, 1932, pp. 74-75. 
49. Worries that Yugoslavia might follow Greece's example were 
caused by the Yugoslav-Greek Treaty of Friendship which was 
signed on August 17* 1926, which was very much i n the ai? at 
t h i s time. 50. I n subsequent months a t r a n s i t protocol and 
a property agreement were signed. 51. Swire, op. c i t . p. 203. 
52. I b i d , loc. c i t . 53. I b i d . , pp. 203-4. 
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measures of the past three years. On January 3» 1926, i n a 
packed meeting of the Sobranje, he vas defeated and handed 
54 
his resignation to the King. His successor vas Liapchev, 
with Athanas Bourov as his foreign minister. Volkov remained 
Minister of War but Liapchev took personal control of the 
Ministry of the I n t e r i o r . 
Just as the destruction of Stamboliski had encouraged 
IMRO, so the rise of Mihailov and the downfall of Isankov 
increased the strength and effective capacity of the Organiz-
ation. A sympathizer of the movement has w r i t t e n : 
"After hihailov had settled his scores with the 
Communists and 'Federalists', he proceeded to show revol-
utionary l i f e i n the Serb and Greek parts of Macedonia. 
Tsankov's government had been supplanted by a c o a l i t i o n 
government headed by the Macedonian, Andrew Liapchev. 
Liapchev's government lasted a long time and was distingu-
ished for i t s patronage and tolerance of the Macedonians. 
Under his regime, the Macedonians ran amok i n Bulgaria 
and Bulgarian Macedonia. At times i t was hard to t e l l j u s t 
who had the power i n Bulgaria, the o f f i e i a l government 
or the Macedonians. As for the Petrich department, one 
may say without stretching the t r u t h that i t existed as 
a t i n y Macedonian state, independent i n practice i f not 
55 
on paper." 
Mihailov's succession to Alexandrov was not confirmed u n t i l 
the Revolutionary Congress held i n February 1925. At t h i s 
Congress, the d i s t r i c t s of Petrich and Skop.je were placed under 56 ~ his control. The I t a l i a n government were pleased by the change 
54. Cf. Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 225, who states that Tsankov 
was forced to resign at p i s t o l point at a banquet on December 31» 
1925, after King Boris had pub l i c l y asked for his resignation. 
The two reports are not incompatible. After his resignation, 
Tsankov became President of the Sobranje. 
55. Christowe, op. c i t . . pp. 204-5. 56. Swire, op. c i t . pp.193-4. 
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i n the Organization's leadership and, i n the autumn of 1925, 
they handed Maum Tomalevski 2,000,000 l i r a to finance future 
IHRO operations. Shortly after t h i s , a fierce Press campaign 
was launched i n Sofia against "our bloody neighbours" and 
57 
there were rumours of increased outrages. 
Mihailov's accession to pover vas marked by a s i g n i f i c a n t 
change i n the methods of terrorism. Whereas the previous pract-
ice had been to send large bands of comitadjis, hihailov 
organized small groups of 4-5 men to prowl through Macedonia. 
Yet t h i s i t s e l f was i n e f f e c t i v e , for the incidents were so small 
that they never reached the columns of the foreign press. 
Nevertheless: 
"Arsenals were destroyed and bombs thrown into cafes 
patronized by police and army o f f i c e r s . Bridges were blown 
up and i t became dangerous to travel on the Orient Express 
i n the summer months of August and September. 
"Under Mihailov's chieftanship, IME0 became more and 
more a t e r r o r i s t i c society. Every time a major act of 
terrorism was committed by the comitadjis i n Macedonia, 
Belgrade threatened to invade Bulgaria. And Belgrade would 
not have hesitated to do so but for the state of European 
. p o l i t i c s . Mussolini was ready to attack Yugoslavia should 
CO 
presume to go rough-riding through the Balkans." 
I t i s noticeable that when Bulgaria was engaged i n delicate negot-
iations abroad - such as the 1926 Refugee Settlement or when 
Liapchev was t r y i n g to obtain the S t a b i l i z a t i o n Loan from the 
League's financial committee i n 1928 - there was a marked decrease 
59 
i n IMRO's a c t i v i t i e s i n Yugoslavia. 
King Boris, who had not l e f t Bulgaria since 1918, took 
advantage of the s t a b i l i t y of the new Liapchev government to 
57* I b i d , p. 203. Tomalevski, an IMR0 supporter of Protogerov, 
was murdered on December 3» 1930. See below, ch. 7. 
58. Christowe, op. c i t . . pp. 206-7. 
59. Swire, op. c i t . , p. 206. 
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make a lengthy v i s i t to Western Europe. I n 1926, he vent to 
Switzerland and attended the League of Nations. Following t h i s , 
he went to Coburg to see his father, ex-King Ferdinand, and 
spent a few days with his s i s t e r at Wurtemburg.^° In 1927, he 
travelled abroad again and v i s i t e d a f r i e n d , who l i v e d i n 
Zurich. She wrote: 
"tie works l i k e a convict, struggling continually 
under the menace of p o l i t i c a l conspiracies, of criminal 
attacks, of personal danger. Ee believes that six i n d i v i d -
uals paid by Moscow, Prague and Belgrade have been ordered 
to k i l l him before August 30." 6 l 
This fear of attack, although understandable i n a Balkan monarch, 
seems, i n King Boris, to have become obsessive. His biographer 
has stated that! 
"When his secretaries showed him a r t i c l e s about 
himself i n the newspapers, he simply asked them what had 
been w r i t t e n about him. I f the a r t i c l e s were kindly or 
f l a t t e r i n g towards him, he did not read them and discouraged 
anyone from ta l k i n g to him about them. But those which were, 
by contrast, directed against him, which contained criticisms 
62 
or were inspired by malevolence retained a l l his attention" 
After his v i s i t to Switzerland i n 1927, he went on to France 
and saw M. Doumergue, the French President, and also had a private 
discussion with M.Poinoare. He enjoyed his stay i n Paris but 
for an a r t i c l e i n L'Humanite. which was e n t i t l e d "Le Tsar 
Sanglant" These v i s i t s abroad became annual periods of 
refreshment but many jou r n a l i s t s saw them as f l i g h t s from 
Bulgaria to avoid assassination. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that on his 
v i s i t B to the West, he was followed by a great flood of telegrams 
and business, sent on to him from Sofia. This would indicate 
60. N.P. Nikolaev, La destinee tragique d'un r o i . Uppsala, 
1952, pp. 51-52. 61. I b i d . . p. 52. See above, 
chapter 2, p. 29. 62. I b i d . , p. 206. (Comment by Nikolaev). 
63. I b i d . , p. 52. 
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that King Boris was by no means isolated from events i n 
Bulgaria and that, i n the period 1925-30, he was very much 
64 
involved i n the workings of his state. 
On the other hand, i t muBt be recognized that-the 
Bulgarian government were by no means masters of t h e i r own 
house. Christowe, who f i r s t v i s i t e d Bulgaria i n 1927, gave an 
alarming picture of Macedonian influence! 
"The position of the Macedonians i n Sofia i s analog-
ous to that of the Jews i n New York City. They are the 
backbone of the professional, economic, social, p o l i t i c a l 
and c u l t u r a l l i f e of the c a p i t a l . The foremost person i n 
any f i e l d i s l i k e l y to be Macedonian, or at least part 
Macedonian. I n 1928, nine of the eleven Bulgarian Minister 
Plenipotentiaries i n foreign capitals were Macedonians. 
And the Prime Minister i s one too. Macedonians i n Bulgaria 
are united i n a national organization i n Sofia - the 
Macedonian National Committee. A f f i l i a t e d and other Mace-
donian organizations t o t a l 600 i n number and wherever 
65 
there was a Macedonian organization, there was IMEO." 
After the 1926 Treaty of Tirana and I t a l i a n domination of 
Albania, relations between Rome and Belgrade once more became 
c p o l . ^ IMRO leaders held a conference i n Rome^ and the constant 
64. I b i d . , pp. 53-54. I t i s noteworthy that both Schaufelberger 
and Nikolaev omit the p o l i t i c a l background, of the period from 
1923 to 1930, comment b r i e f l y on his v i s i t s abroad and make 
unfounded references to the love and respect shewn f o t him by 
his people. 
65. Christowe, op. c i t . . pp. 262-63. 
66. Stavrianos, op. c i t . . p.227. When France signed her t r e a t i e 
of friendship with Rumania (June 10, 1926) and Yugoslavia 
(November 11, 192?) I t a l y had no option but to befriend the 
"r e v i s i o n i s t " 6 t a t e s i f she were to maintain a foothold i n the 
Balkans. 67* Swire, op. c i t . . p. 207. 
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succession of outrages, murders and sabotage continued. Bombs 
vere l e f t , i n hotels at Kocane, Gevgheli and Stromica; trains 
and m i l i t a r y depots vere attacked, public buildings bombed 
68 
and the railways mined. An old Macedonian chief, Todor 
Panitza, who now enjoyed Yugoslav citizenship, was shot i n a 
Vienna theatre by Mentcha Karnitcheva, a young Macedonian 
69 
g i r l who l a t e r became Mihailov's wife. I n September 1927, 
two t e r r o r i s t s , sent to blow up the Yugoslav consulate at 
70 
Salonika, were caught by the Greek police and, on October 5, 
a Serbian general, Mihajlo Kovacevic, was shot at his home i n 
S h t i p . 7 1 
V s 
The death of General Eovacevic prompted foreign intervention. 
Both B r i t a i n and France sent notes to Sofia urging the d i s s o l -
72 
ution of IMRO. A similar request had been made by Rumania 
i n August 1926 but Bulgaria had replied that she could not guard 
her f r o n t i e r s unless she increased her army, adding that since 
IMRO exiBted only i n Yugoslavia, Bulgaria could not possibly 73 v / control i t . However, after the death of Kovacevic and the 
notes from B r i t a i n and France, the Bulgarian government did take 
note of the Yugoslav threatB of invasion and proclaimed martial 
74 
law i n the Petrich and Kustendil d i s t r i c t s on October 10, 1927. 
This had l i t t l e impact upon Mihailov and the Macedonian Organ-
izat i o n for Volkov was responsible for administering the martial 
lav and, whilst he was i n power, Mihailov was perfectly safe. 
To show Bulgaria's s i n c e r i t y , a house-to-house search was made 
68. I b i d . , pp. 201-8. 
69. Christowe, op. c i t . . pp. 199-202. Mentcha was Imprisoned 
i n Austria but l a t e r released because of i l l - h e a l t h . 
70. Swire, op. c i t . . loc. c i t 
71. Christowe, op. c i t . . p. 207 and Svire, op. c i t . . p. 208. 
His. assassins, Hippocrate Razvigorov and 2 accomplices, were 
caught i n a cave and shot. 72. I b i d . . loc. c i t . 
73. Swire, op. c i t . . loc. c i t . 74. The Bulgarians said that 
they only did t h i s to prove t h e i r s i n c e r i t y . 
(108) 
i n Kustendil but t h i s was merely a convenient o p p o r t u n i t y 
75 
to r o o t out a f u r t h e r number of Mihailov's opponents. 
The Yugoslav government, r e a l i z i n g t h a t these measures 
would have no l a s t i n g e f f e c t upon IMRO, decided to b u i l d an 
unbroken system of f r o n t i e r defence. 524 kilometres long, 
s t r e t c h i n g from the Dragoman Pass, near Tsaribrod, t o the Greek 
f r o n t i e r , along the e n t i r e l e n g t h of t h e i r border v i t h B u lgaria. 
The "Black F r o n t i e r " , as i t was c a l l e d , consisted of the most 
elaborate defences. F i r s t l y a rov of white pyramids marking 
the f r o n t i e r , then a sto u t thorn fence w i t h barbed-wire 
entanglements behind i t i 
"At places, the barbed wire entanglements are ten 
f e e t deep. Next to the wirework there are rows of ditches 
( c a l l e d 'wolves 1 chasms' by the c o m i t a d j i s ) . To prevent 
c u t t i n g the wire w i t h pincers, there i s a system of e l e c t r i c 
alarms connecting the wire jungle w i t h the blockhouses. 
The l a t t e r are v e r i t a b l e f o r t r e s s e s of cement and i r o n . 
Some of them have high towers l i k e battlements upon which 
stand ' a e r i a l observers'. Between these f r o n t i e r c i t a d e l s , 
there are small huts shaped l i k e bee-hives and b u i l t of 
stone and mud, f o r the intermediary ground guards. Behind 
the boundary f o r a distance of several miles, there are 
76 
four more l i n e s of defence at regul a r i n t e r v a l s . " 
These concrete blockhouses were s i t u a t e d at % mile i n t e r v a l s 
and proved an almost i n v i n c i b l e obstacle t o a l l but the most 
daring i n t r u d e r s . 
While the F r o n t i e r was being constructed, several f u r t h e r 
outrages occured, some of which give us an i n s i g h t i n t o the 
eth i c s and methods of the Macedonian Organization. The f i r s t 
of these occured a t Shtip on October 31* 1927, twenty-six days 
v • 
a f t e r the death of General Kovacevic. The i n c i d e n t concerned 
75. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 207. 
76. Christowe, op. c i t . . pp. 208-9. By c o n t r a s t , he described 
the Bulgarian f r o n t i e r posts as "mere whitewashed shacks". 
(109) 
Mihailov's brother and f a t h e r , who were shot i n the main 
s t r e e t of t h e i r home town. I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t Mihailov's 
r e l a t i o n s had remained i n Southern S e r b i a and that the two men 
were on good terms with the l o c a l p o l i c e - i n f a c t , they had 
j u s t spent the evening i n a cafe' w i t h them. Nevertheless, 
Mihailov s i n g l e d out "King Alexander and h i s White Hand Soc i e t y " 
77 
as responsible f or the crime. I t i s s t i l l u n c e r t a i n who 
a c t u a l l y committed the murder. The Yugoslav a u t h o r i t i e s blamed 
the l o c a l population who were t r y i n g to avenge themselves f or 
the comitadji r a i d s . But one w r i t e r has suggested th a t Mihailov 
himself ordered their,, deaths i n order to obtain a genuine 
78 
grievance a g a i n s t the Yugoslav government. Such a p o s s i b i l i t y 
cannot be r u l e d out. 
Another outrage centred around a woman named Mara Buneva, 
who had s e t up a hat shop i n Skopje. Born i n Tetovo, Mara had 
been a member of the Exarchate Church and married a Bulgarian 
o f f i c e r . Approached by M i h a i l o v i s t s , she returned to Yugoslavia, 
where she soon acquired a wide c i r c l e of f r i e n d s , i n c l u d i n g 
P r e l i c , the vice-governor of Skopje, who had been the prosecution 
lawyer i n a t r i a l i n v o l v i n g IMRO i n June 1927* On January 13* 
1928, Mara met P r e l i c on the bridge over the Vardar, shot the 
lawyer and then shot h e r s e l f . Such was the l o y a l t y that IMRO 
commanded. As a t r i b u t e , a s t r e e t i n S o f i a was named a f t e r her 
and her p o r t r a i t was c a r r i e d through the s t r e e t s i n sober 
79 
procession. 
77. When, during the F i r s t World War, the Black Hand s o c i e t y 
•J , 
(see chapter 8, note 9) was suspected of republicanism, Z i v k o v i c , 
one of Alexander's t r u s t e d f r i e n d s , founded a p r o - r o y a l i s t 
s o c i e t y , known as the "White Hand''. From 1921 - 2 9 , Z i v k o v i c was 
Commander of the 18,000 strong palace guard. He e x e r c i s e d a 
strong i n f l u e n c e behind the scenes and became Prime M i n i s t e r of 
Yugos l a v i a i n January 1929* 
78. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 208. 
79. I b i d . . pp. 209-10 and Christowe, op. c i t . , p. 207. 
(110) 
I n A p r i l 1928, s h o r t l y a f t e r Mara*a death, there were 
severe earthquakes i n B u l g a r i a , which wrecked the town of 
Plovdiv and many v i l l a g e s i n southern B u l g a r i a , causing g r e a t 
l o s s of l i f e . Y u g o s l a v i a promptly re-opened her f r o n t i e r and 
80 
supplied 3,000,000 d i n a r s i n a i d . Mihailov was disappointed 
by such magnanimity and decided to engineer another daring 
outrage. This was the r a t h e r curious Lazic-Momtchilov a f f a i r 
which took place i n J u l y 1928 and f o r which there are two v e r s i o n s . 
The f i r s t view, from the IMR0 standpoint, was t h a t L a z i c , 
the c h i e f of Yugoslav National Defence a t the M i n i s t r y of the 
I n t e r i o r , sent Ivan Momtchilov to B u l g a r i a to a s s a s s i n a t e Mihailov. 
Momtchilov went to Mihailov and t o l d him'that he had been sent 
to k i l l him. Hearing t h i s , Mihailov decided to turn the opport-
u n i t y to h i s advantage. He sent Momtchilov back to Belgrade 
with orders to k i l l L a z i c and arranged f o r a mock b a t t l e to 
take place and rumours to reach Belgrade th a t Mihailov had been 
k i l l e d . Momtchilov would then be r e c e i v e d by L a z i c and would 
81 
shoot him dead. A complicated p l o t l The other, and probably 
more r e l i a b l e account, comes from L a z i c h i m s e l f . He t o l d Swire 
that Momtchilov had r e c e i v e d an urgent command from Mihailov 
to go to Belgrade and shoot him ( L a z i c ) . I n r e t u r n f o r t h i s , 
Momtchilov's mother who l i v e d i n B u l g a r i a , would r e c e i v e 300,000 
l e v a s . Whatever the true s t o r y , i t i s a f a c t that on J u l y 1 2 , 
1928, Momtchilov went to see L a z i c . He handed him a p e t i t i o n 
82 
to read and w h i l s t L a z i c was reading i t , he shot him. four times. 
A f t e r these major i n c i d e n t s , which were widely reported i n 
the Western P r e s s , B r i t i s h and French m i n i s t e r s i n S o f i a dem-
anded the d i s s o l u t i o n of IMR0, pointing out t h a t s i n c e the 
80. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 211. 
81. Christowe, op. c i t . , pp. 223-27. 
82. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 210. A f t e r shooting L a z i c , Momtchilov 
committed s u i c i d e . L a z i c , s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d , d i d not die and 
survived to become Yugoslav M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r i n 1935. 
( I l l ) 
movement was divided, i t was no longer as i n v i n c i b l e as 
B u l g a r i a claimed. J Liapchev resented t h e i r demands and 
declared t h i s to be an "unwarrantable i n t e r f e r e n c e i n B u l g a r i a ' s 
84 
i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s " * Nevertheless, the progress of•the ( S t a b i l -
i z a t i o n Loan through the League's f i n a n c i a l committee<had to 
be considered, and so s e v e r a l of Mihailov's opponents were 
imprisoned and the Organization's a c t i v i t i e s c u r t a i l e d f o r the 
time being. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to observe t h a t I t a l y d i s s o c i a t e d 
h e r s e l f from the Anglo-French p r o t e s t , d e c l a r i n g that "the 
Bulgarian government w i l l take, of i t s own i n i t i a t i v e , a l l 
measures which the s i t u a t i o n demands." 
A c e r t a i n amount of Italo-IMRO c o l l u s i o n i s evident a t t h i s 
time, f or the L a z i c outrage and the Anglo-French p r o t e s t 
coincided with one of Mihailov's most despicable v i c t o r i e s -
the death of General Alexander Protogerov. 8^ 
R e l a t i o n s between Mihailov and Protogerov had worsened over 
the past few months. I n 1927» Protogerov went to I t a l y to 
d i s c u s s future developments i n Macedonia. During h i s d i s c u s s i o n s , 
Mussolini had promised t h a t I t a l y would support a Macedonian 
i n s u r r e c t i o n even to the extent of sending m i l i t a r y a i d through 
Alb a n i a . However, he proposed th a t when Macedonia was thus 
" l i b e r a t e d " , i t should, l i k e A l b a n i a , become an independent 
87 
s t a t e under I t a l i a n c o n t r o l . W h i l s t i n Rome, Protogerov a l s o 
l e a r n t t h a t Mussolini had given King Zog assurances t h a t , i n 
the event of a Yugoslavian c o l l a p s e , A l b a n i a would be given a 
common border with B u l g a r i a . This could only be a t the expense 
8 3 . At t h i s time, a r i f t was growing between the M i h a i l o v i s t s 
and the P r o t o g e r o v i s t s , See below. 
84. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 2 1 1 . 8 5 . I b i d . , p. 2 1 9 . 
8 6 . Protogerov was one of those wanted by Yugo s l a v i a f o r war 
crimes under A r t i c l e 118 of the Treaty of fteuilly. On the l i s t 
of 1 , 6 6 2 , he was no. 1 , 1 2 0 and on the l i s t of 5 0 0 , no. 3 3 5 . He 
was accused of v a r i o u s massacres i n c l u d i n g one a t S h t i p . Cf. 
a l s o Heisa, op. c i t . , pp. 41-45. 8 7 . Todorov, op. c i t . , p. 2 2 6 . 
(112) 
88 of Macedonia. Protogerov returned to Sofia., d i s i l l u s i o n e d 
and h i g h l y indignant. With sudden c l a r i t y , he perceived the 
d i r e c t i o n i n which IMRO was moving, and the l i k e l y outcome 
of i t s operations. He r e a l i z e d t h a t only by f r i e n d s h i p w i t h 
Y u g o s l a v i a could there be any genuine plans for Macedonian 
89 
autonomy. Mihailov, who had paid a s e c r e t v i s i t to Rome i n 
December 1 9 2 7 , heard of Protogerov's a t t i t u d e to M u s s o l i n i ' s 
proposals and, on h i s r e t u r n , postponed the Seventh R e v o l u t i o n -
ary Congress (planned for February 1928) and made attempts to 
90 
expel Protogerov from the Organization's C e n t r a l Committee. 
I n the meantime, Protogerov made contact w i t h the. Yugoslav 
M i n i s t e r i n S o f i a , and plans were l a i d f o r coming to an 
understanding over the Macedonian i s s u e . The f i n a l d e t a i l s f o r 
t h i s were due to be made on J u l y 8, 1928. But l a t e on the 
91 
night of J u l y 7» Protogerov was shot. Mihailov admitted f u l l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the. a s s a s s i n a t i o n and the reasons f o r h i s 
92 
d e c i s i o n were pr i n t e d i n most S o f i a newspapers. By Proto-
gerov's death, Mihailov gained an almost complete c o n t r o l over 
the Macedonian Organization and while he remained i n charge of 
IMRO operations, the future of Yugoslav-Bulgarian r e l a t i n n s 
was very bleak. 
88. Swire, op. c i t . , pp. 214 - 1 5 . 
89.Otherwise Macedonia would be p a r t i t i o n e d , one part going 
to Albania, the other to B u l g a r i a . • 
90. Swire, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 
9 1 . I b i d . , p. 212. 
92. Christowe, op. c i t . , p. 238. 
Chapter 6 . 
The E r a of the Conferences. 
(114) 
The death of General Protogerov made a profound impression 
upon the i n t e r n a l events of Bulgaria. By admitting h i s r e s -
p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the assassination, Mihailov g r e a t l y weakened 
the p o s i t i o n of IMRO. Protogerov'8 supporters, now led by 
Poro Shandanov,^ l o f t the Organization and made a number of 
unsuccessful attempts to oust Mihailov. Thore was a minor 
r e v o l t against him i n the P a t r i c h d i s t r i c t and a spate of 
2 
t o r r o r i s m continued through the summer months. 
This fouding d i d not commond l t s o i f to oouio llulgarian 
loaders, p a r t i c u l a r l y thooo i n charge of tho Army, who knew 
t h a t Mihtiilov'o a c t i v i t i e s had tho t a c i t support of tho War 
M i n i s t e r , lionoral Volliov. Thoir oppooitioii to tho p o l i t i c a l 
roglino had boon growing oiuoo January 1928 whon a now magazine, 
/ypno. had boon launched.' I to alma worn throol'oldi tho r o o t -
o r a t i o n o f popular uovornmnnt, a moro t o i o r u n t f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
and proper govurumoi ital c o n t r o l o f tho I'otrioh d l n t r l o t . 
Kliuon (llioorjilov, u p a r t i c i p a n t i n tho 19^3 uoun, l o f t the 
Movurnniont and beoaino ono o f tho moat prominent "Zvonaro", 
aa moinbora of tho now group woro o a l l o d . Muiiiluii Volohov, 
another of tho 19^3 oonoplrutors and ono of tho d i a g r u n t l o d 
1. Poro Shandauov, born i n 1893 at u h r i d , van an old IMItO 
inoiubor, who hud p a r t i c i p a t e d i n niuiiy o f tho oomitudji exped-
i t i o n s i n t o South Serbia i n tho 1920B. by 1 9 3 3 , Shandunov hud 
como to favour a union of tho South Slavs i n u s i n g l e s t a t e . 
Mihailov'e supporters dubbed h i a fo l l o w e r s as "Serbian spies, 
h i r e l i n g s of Uolgrado." 
2. J. Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, London, 1939, pp. 218-20. 
3 . Tho E d i t o r of Zveno was Oimo Kazuzov. See above, p. 3 6 . 
4. Swiro, op. c i t . . pp. 211-12. 
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Army l e a d e r s , took advantage of the s i t u a t i o n to issue, a 
strong p r o t e s t a g a i n s t General Volkov , demanding that King 
B o r i s d i s m i s s him. 
They were not alone i n t h e i r p r o t e s t . Athanas Bourov, 
the Foreign M i n i s t e r , had a l s o decided t h a t the time had come 
for him to go, and p u b l i c l y d e c lared t h a t he had thwarted a l l 
measures taken by the Cabinet a g a i n s t IMBO and t h a t there 
could be no improvement w h i l s t he remained t h e r e . ^ But King 
Boris was determined to defy the Opposition. Speaking a t a c e r -
emony to commemorate the b a t t l e of the Shipka Pass, he warned 
7 
h i s o f f i c e r s to avoid " p e r n i c i o u s i n f l u e n c e s " . S h o r t l y a f t e r -
wards, on September 3, Velchev was dismissed from ..his Army 
post, i n j u s t i f y i n g h i s a c t i o n , Volkov d e c l a r e d t h a t h i s 
Q 
orders came "from above". T h i s was a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n t h a t 
Volkov had the support of King B o r i s . Two days l a t e r , f o l lowing 
the r e s i g n a t i o n of two other m i n i s t e r s who objected to Volkov's 
presence, Liapchev tendered h i s own r e s i g n a t i o n to the King. 
Boris refused to see Volkov dismissed, and i n s i s t e d on 
Liapchev's reforming h i s Cabinet and r e t a i n i n g the s e r v i c e s of 
Q 
h i s deeply compromised M i n i s t e r of War. 
I n Yugoslavia, there had been s i m i l a r t u r m o i l . The long 
drawn out b i t t e r n e s s between the Serbian and Croatian parts 
of the Kingdom reached i t s climax i n June 1928 when a Monte-
negrin deputy shot and k i l l e d Stephen Radic' and two other 
5. I b i d . . pp. 218-20. Velchev was at t h i s time Commandant 
of the Army Cadet school i n S o f i a . 6. I b i d . . p. 219. 
7. August 26, 1928. I b i d . . p. 220. 8. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
9* When Volkov was e v e n t u a l l y moved from the War M i n i s t r y , 
he was appointed Bulgarian M i n i s t e r i a Rome- a s i n g u l a r l y happy 
choice, 10. Along w i t h .Stephen Radic, B a s s a r i c e k and 
Pavle Radic were a l s o shot. Punisa R a c i c , the R a d i c a l deputy 
from Montenegro, was t r i e d on nay 27, 1929, found g u i l t y and 
sentenced to twenty years imprisonment with hard labour. 
( 1 1 6 ) 
Croatian l e a d e r s i n the S k u p s t i n a . 1 0 The event l e d to r i o t i n g 
i n Zagreb and, f o r s i x months, the p o s s i b i l i t y of c i v i l war 
and the d i v i s i o n of the Kingdom i n t o two p a r t s seemed almost 
i n e v i t a b l e . But on January 6 , 1929* King Alexander proclaimed 
a r o y a l d i c t a t o r s h i p , lie had watched the course of events with 
growing alarm and decided t h a t the death of Radio" symbolized 
the f a i l u r e of parliamentary democracy to overcome extreme 
n a t i o n a l i s m . D e s c r i b i n g the impact of d i c t a t o r s h i p , one w r i t e r 
commented: 
"For f i v e y ears Alexander undertook the sol e respon-
s i b i l i t y f o r d i r e c t i n g the d e s t i n i e s of Yugo s l a v i a . The 
task was one which he had assumed s o l e l y from a s t e r n 
sense of duty when confronted w i t h the complete deadlock 
which parliamentary i n s t i t u t i o n s i n h i s country had reached. 
Once he had put h i s hand to the plough i t was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of the man and the Serb i n him t h a t he did not look back 
but would face h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s to the pro j e c t e d end. 
At f i r s t , questions of i n t e r n a l government wholly absorbed 
h i s a t t e n t i o n However, s i n c e h i s i n t e r e s t has turned 
to the i n t e r n a t i o n a l sphere, King Alexander has shown 
himself capable of i n i t i a t i v e and v i s i o n . " * * 
With the d e s t i n y of Yugoslavia now i n the hands of a man 
so determined to prevent the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of n a t i o n a l u n i t y , 
i t was perhaps i n e v i t a b l e t h a t h i s regime should evoke h o s t i l i t y 
from a l l those who were anxious to see the end of the "Yugoslav 
mosaic." Among the Croatian s e p a r a t i s t s were a s e c r e t s o c i e t y , 
x >* 12 the Ustase, and i t s l e a d e r , Dr. Ante P a v e l i c . Both IMHO and 
1 1 . A. Londres, Terror i n the BalkanB. London, 1935* p. 2 2 6 . 
The passage above i s part of the appendix to Londres*8 work, 
added by the t r a n s l a t o r , L, Zari n e , who was S e c r e t a r y to the 
Russian l e g a t i o n i n S e r b i a from 1 9 1 2 - 1 6 . 
1 2 . Dr. P a v e l i c , a lawyer, was formerly a member of the 
Croatian Peasant Party i n the Skupstina. He l e f t Y u goslavia f o r 
I t a l y on January 9 , 1 9 2 9 . At Borgotaro, he s e t up a t r a i n i n g 
( 1 1 7 ) 
the Ustase wished to see the collapse of the Yugoslav 
Kingdom and Dr, Pavelic, who had l e f t Zagreb soon a f t e r 
the proclamation of the d i c t a t o r s h i p , was quick to come to 
an understanding w i t h the Macedonian Organization. I n A p r i l 
1 9 2 9 , he v i s i t e d Sofia and was given a tremendous ovation by 
the Macedonian "emigrants", lie was ceremonially received, a 
f e a s t was given i n h i s honour by the Bulgarian National Committee 
and h i s v i s i t was made the occasion of vigorous anti-Yugoslav 
a r t i c l e s i n the Sofia Press. Before leaving Hulgaeia, Pavelic 
went down to the P e t r i c h d i s t r i c t and met Mihailov. Together 
they worked out plans f o r combatting Alexander's "Sorbomania" 
and published an agreement f o r j o i n t lMRO-UBtas'e t e r r o r i s t 
a c t i v i t i e s to " l i b e r a t e " Croatia and Macedonia. The agreement 
provoked a a t o m Yugoslav p r o t e s t . ' 
Shortly a f t e r the c r e a t i o n of tho royal d i c t a t o r s h i p , 
Todorov had a p r i v a t e meeting w i t h iving Alexander. Uo t o l d tho 
King t h a t Volkov and Mihailov hud convinced King Boris t h a t 
thoy woro p r o t e c t i n g him against u p l o t by tho Yugoslav govern-
ment: 
"Lust Biimmor", ho informed him, "Mihailov' a gang k i l l e d 
(continued from the previous page) 
camp f o r Ustas t e r r o r i s t s and t h i s was supplemented l a t e r i n 
1929 by another camp at Yanka Pusta, i n Hungary. 
13> S. Christowe, lie roe a and Assassins. London, 1 9 3 5 , pp. 
210-lG. Swire t e l l s a d e l i g h t f u l s t o r y of another v i s i t o r to 
Sofia, t h i s timo i n June 1931* Claiming to represent the Ustas'e, 
a man named Pero Gruber was given a greet reception on h i s 
a r r i v a l . Immigrant g i r l s were sent w i t h bouquets of flowers to 
meet him at tho s t a t i o n , he was introduced to 1MR0 leaders, 
shown t h e i r arms stores, received by Bourov, the Foreign M i n i s t e r , 
and presented w i t h an album autographed by h i s e n t h u s i a s t i c 
hosts. Swire reports t h a t he t o l d an e x c e l l e n t s t o r y to the 
Belgrade p o l i c e and Press on h i s r e t u r n ! Op. c i t . , p. 249. 
( 1 1 8 ) 
one of our men and threw h i s corpse in t o the garden of 
the King's summer palace at V r a n i a with a note s t a t i n g t h a t 
the murdered man had come to the palace to k i l l King B o r i s . 
At about the same time, Stoicho Mushanov, a deputy, who 
was i n the delegation to the League of Nations returned 
from Geneva with a 'document' on the s t a t i o n e r y of the 
Yugoslav M i n i s t e r i a l Council purporting to show that the 
Yugoslav Cabinet had decided to k i l l King B o r i s . Vhe thing 
was forged, of course, i n the o f f i c e of 'La Macedoine' i n 
Geneva. 
"Does B o r i s r e a l l y b e l i e v e such rubbish?" Alexander 
had asked. 
"I'm a f r a i d he does," s a i d Todorov."Ever s i n c e they 
shot at him i n 1 9 2 5 , he's been convinced t h a t the refugees 
are p l o t t i n g with the Serbs to k i l l him!" 
Alexander commented that he was astounded t h a t King 
B o r i s could a c t u a l l y b e l i e v e that the Yugoslav government 
were p l o t t i n g to k i l l him. " I am a s o l d i e r , " he s a i d , "and 
at the same time a King. I would never permit anything so 
shameful." 
Todorov observed th a t I t a l y was behind a l l Balkan i n t r i g u e s and 
15 
King Alexander agreed. 
One of the f i r s t achievements of the new r o y a l government 
1 4 . La Macedoine was an IM110 p u b l i c a t i o n , produced i n Geneva. 
1 5 . K. Todorov, Balkan F i r e b r a n d . The Autobiography of a 
Rebel. S o l d i e r and Statesman. Chicago, 1943t PP« 2 3 I - 3 2 . I n 
support of King B o r i s ' s f e a r s , i t i s worth noting t h a t i n J a n -
uary 1 9 3 0 , two ex-deputies of the Skupstina and a one-time 
mayor of Skopje, who had defected to B u l g a r i a , presented a 
p e t i t i o n a t Geneva on behalf of the "oppressed Bulgarians i n 
Macedonia". I n the course of t h i s , t h e y . s t a t e d t h a t King Alex-
ader had asked them to arrange f o r the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of King 
B o r i s . Swire, op. c i t . . p. 2 0 9 . Their statement was quite untrue. 
(119) 
was the opening of ne g o t i a t i o n s with B u l g a r i a over the f r o n t i e r 
question. The n e g o t i a t i o n s , which s t a r t e d i n March 19^9* centred 
upon such problems as the l i q u i d a t i o n of p r o p e r t i e s d i v i d e d by 
the f r o n t i e r , the withdrawl of immigrants from f r o n t i e r zones 
and the c r e a t i o n of a Permanent Mixed Commission to i n v e s t i g a t e 
and s e t t l e i n c i d e n t s o c c u r r i n g along the b o r d e r . D e t a i l e d 
d i s c u s s i o n s l a s t e d for a year. Bourov, who conducted the 
Bulgarian delegation, was regarded with d i s f a v o u r by I t a l y and 
P i a c e n t i n i , the I t a l i a n M i n i s t e r i n S o f i a , arranged for a S o f i a 
newspaper to p u b l i s h an a r t i c l e urging the Bulgarian people to 
disavow t h e i r Foreign M i n i s t e r ' s Francophile p o l i c y . P i a c e n t i n i ' s 
a c t i o n went beyond the l i m i t s of diplomatic l i b e r t y and he was 
r e c a l l e d . But Mussolini announced t h a t "the sympathies and 
f u l l support of I t a l y remain i n v a r i a b l y f a i t h f u l to the Bulg-
17 
a r i a n people." Despite I t a l y ' s a t t i t u d e , the n e g o t i a t i o n s 
were completed and the P i r o t Convention was e v e n t u a l l y r a t i f i e d 
on February 14, 1930. 
W h i l s t the Convention was being d i s c u s s e d , the f r o n t i e r 
between Yugoslavia and B u l g a r i a was re-opened, and Mihailov's 
Organization took advantage of t h i s concession to redouble 
t h e i r e f f o r t s on South S e r b i a . T r a i n s and r a i l w a y l i n e s were 
bombed, shots were exchanged between the two border p a t r o l s 
and a Yugoslav Moslem was r i d d l e d w i t h b u l l e t s by a s s a s s i n s 
d i s g u i s e d as Moslem women. I n November 1929, p a r t of the Orient 
Express was d e r a i l e d near T s a r i b r o d and f u r t h e r a t t a c k s a g a i n s t 
the t r a i n were f o r e s t a l l e d by prompt a c t i o n on the part of the 
Yugoslav p a t r o l s . 
The Bulgarian government i n v a r i a b l y denied t h a t the r a i d e r s 
16. L.S. S t a v r i a n o s , Balkan Federation. A HaBtory of the 
Movement towards Balkan Unity i n Modern Times, Northampton, Mass, 
1944, p. 228.. • 1 7 . Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 2 2 5-26 
18. I b i d . . p. 224. 
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ever crossed from Bulgarian t e r r i t o r y and claimed t h a t the 
outrages were caused by "oppressed Macedonians". At the same 
time, the Bulgarian Press published s t o r i e s of persecution 
19 
and murder i n the "West F r o n t i e r T e r r i t o r y , " The magazine, 
"Near East", backed up the Bulgarian case by s t a t i n g t h a t the 
outrages proved the discontent of the f r o n t i e r populations 
and observed t h a t t h i s discontent "must sooner or., l a t e r rouse 
pu b l i c opinion i n Europe" - to r e c t i f y the f r o n t i e r s i n B u l g a r i a 1 
20 
favour. 
I n view of the a t t i t u d e of the "Near East" magazine, i t i s 
worth remembering t h a t the Macedonian Organization and the 
Bulgarian Supr-emists attached a great importance to the Anglo-
American Press, b e l i e v i n g t h a t by c o n t i n u a l l y s t r e s s i n g the 
j u s t i c e of the Bulgarian case i n i t s columns, they could secure 
support f o r a r e v i s i o n of the terms of the peace settlement. 
J. Swire, to whom reference has constantly been made i n t h i s 
work, was Reuter's correspondent i n Sofia from October 1932 
t i l l December 1935* He commented: 
"For years, B r i t i s h and American newspapers have 
been represented i n Bulgaria by Bulgarians or f o r e i g n e r s 
who, depending f o r p r o s p e r i t y upon o f f i c i a l or 1MR0 
g o o d w i l l , e i t h e r dared not or cared not to send news of 
which the a u t h o r i t i e s d i s approved. My good f r i e n d , the 
Hungarian Press attache', who boasted of h i s f r i e n d s h i p 
w i t h M ihailov, represented one B r i t i s h newsagency; another 
was served by a Supremist o f f i c i a l ; a t h i r d shared the 
house of the Press D i r e c t o r . The D i r e c t o r of Bulagence 
(the Bulgarian Foreign O f f i c e Press Bureau) represented 
a large American newsagency. Small wonder the Anglo-
21 
American p u b l i c thought Bulgaria was a model democracy!" 
19. The Bulgarian term f o r Yugoslav t e r r i t o r y around Tsaribrod 
and Bosilgrad. 2 0 . Near East and I n d i a . XXXVII, 
( 1 9 3 0 ) , p. 311• A r t i c l e on Macedonian outrages. 
2 1 . Swire, op. c i t . , p. 324. I n p o i n t of f a c t , i n the 1927 
( 1 2 1 ) 
Swire at f i r s t accepted the o f f i c i a l view but the events of 
1929-33 q u i c k l y d i s i l l u s i o n e d him. 
I n September 1929t Dr. Bajdarov, a' veteran supporter of 
1HR0 and a h i g h l y placed member of the Bulgarian National 
Committee, was assassinated, f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of a 
pamphlet i n which he stated t h a t the t e r r o r i s m i n the P e t r i c h 
d i s t r i c t was worse than anything happening i n Southern Serbia. 
I n the correspondence l e f t by Bajdarov, d e t a i l s were found of 
a plan to k i l l Damian Velchev, the ex-Army ch i e f and now leader 
of a group known as the " O f f i c e r s ' League". An unsuccessful 
attack was made on Velchev on October 21 and one of the 
conspirators was discovered to be a c e r t a i n Lieutenant-Colonel 
Porkov, the D i r e c t o r of I n t e l l i g e n c e at the War O f f i c e . On 
the f o l l o w i n g day, Velchev wrote an open l e t t e r to the Press 
and to the War O f f i c e , p u b l i c l y accusing Volkov of using 
2 
members of Mihailov's Organization to get r i d of h i s opponents. 
I n March 1930, Porkov brought a l i b e l a c t i o n against Velchev 
2 
f o r h i s a l l e g a t i o n s , but was unable to prove h i s own innocence. 
This i n c i d e n t i s but a small example of the chaos and 
24 
anarchy which e x i s t e d w i t h i n Bulgaria at t h i s time. During 
1929, there were 28 murders and I 3 8 attempted assassinations. 
25 
By A p r i l 1930, 53 had died, a number of the deputies i n the 
(continued from the previous page) 
e l e c t i o n s , Liapchev, the Prime M i n i s t e r , had gained I 6 3 deputies 
i n the Sobranje w i t h 495*000 votes, whereas the Opposition, 
under Malinov, had elected only 86 deputies, despite t h e i r 
higher t o t a l of the ele c t o r a t e ( 5 5 6 , 0 0 0 v o t e s ) . 
2 2 . I b i d . . pp. 2 2 6 - 2 9 . 2 3 . I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
24. The. biggest scandal of the 1929-33 period was the 
Marinopolski a f f a i r , which has been c a l l e d the "Dreyfus Case of 
Bulgaria". However, t h i s Velchev i n c i d e n t i s important f o r i t 
shows a l i t t l e of the character and nature of the p r o - I t a l i a n , 
pro-Macedonian group i n Bulgaria, which Velchev was l a t e r to 
t r y to overthrow. 2 5 . Swire, op. c i t . , p. 2 2 9 . 
( 1 2 2 ) 
Sobranje were being i n t i m i d a t e d , h o s t i l e j o u r n a l i s t s were 
shot and judges subjected to t h r e a t s . ^ Assassins were only 
found g u i l t y a f t e r long and profound heartsearching and i t 
i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o observe t h a t , a f t e r a l i t t l e of t h i s 
27 
"heartsearching", the pu b l i c prosecutor "committed s u i c i d e " . 
No r e a l attempt was made to enforce p u b l i c order. During a 
reception towards the end of 1 9 3 0 , King Boris t o l d a Bulgarian 
named Koulichev t h a t he r e g r e t t e d the constant disputes i n v o l -
v i n g Macedonians. Koulichev r e t o r t e d t h a t he and h i s f r i e n d s 
only wanted the Government to apply the laws, whereupon the 
King said t h a t h i s Government had always f e l t t h a t they should 
28 
not i n t e r f e r e i n Macedonian a f f a i r s . 
Soon a f t e r the P i r o t Convention had been r a t i f i e d i n 
February 1 9 3 0 , IMRO increased i t s a c t i v i t i e s i n Southern Serbia. 
On March 3 , a bomb was thrown i n t o a cafe a t P i r o t , k i l l i n g 
or wounding twenty-seven people. A s i m i l a r attack was made at 
Strumica, k i l l i n g f i f t e e n more. On March 2 9 , a bomb exploded 
i n the War O f f i c e i n Belgrade. The outrages continued. Mihailov 
p u b l i c l y admitted r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r them i n the IMRO newspaper, 
"Freedom or Death", and prophesied the imminent d e s t r u c t i o n of 
the Skupstina. The Yugoslav M i n i s t e r i n Sofia protested against 
t h i s f l a g r a n t attempt t o destroy the work of the P i r o t Convention. 
B r i t a i n and France supported the Yugoslav p r o t e s t and the Mixed 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian F r o n t i e r Commission, faced w i t h the i r r e f u t -
able evidence t h a t the t e r r o r i s t s came from Bulgaria, signed 
a p r o t o c o l c a l l i n g on the Bulgarian government to take a c t i o n . 
The protocol caused controversy i n Sofia. Both Bourov and Tsankov 
demanded t h a t Liapchev should make some e f f e c t i v e response, 
but the Prime M i n i s t e r was u n w i l l i n g to take a c t i o n against the 
Organization. Tsankov withdrew M B 3 5 deputies from the Govern-
2 6 . The most l i v e l y and r e a l i s t i c account of the scene i n 
Bulgaria i s given by A l b e r t Londres, op. c i t . , pp. 7 - 1 0 2 . 
2 7 . Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 2 3 0 - 3 1 . 
28. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
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ment and only by c e r t a i n dubious concessions being granted -
such as the banning of Protogerovist newspapers ( which had 
condemned the outrages) and the internment of several Proto-
g e r o v i s t supporters - was the Cabinet c r i s i s solved. During t h i s 
u n c e r t a i n t y , Mihailov paid a h u r r i e d v i s i t to Home; on h i s 
v- 29 
r e t u r n , there was a f u r t h e r bomb attack on Nis s t a t i o n . 
Despite the violence and b i t t e r n e s s of Mihailov's r e a c t i o n 
to the signing of the f r o n t i e r agreement w i t h Yugoslavia, the . 
P i r o t Convention does to. some extent symbolize the more t o l e r a n t 
and c o n s t r u c t i v e a t t i t u d e of some Balkan statesmen at t h i s time. 
As e a r l y as 1 9 2 6 , a Yugoslav'named Georgevic had s t a r t e d a 
newspaper campaign i n favour of a Balkan Customs Union. I n 1928, 
he had founded the "Inter-Balkan Association f o r Peace and 
Prosperity" and, i n June 1 9 2 9 . the Association sent a c i r c u l a r 
to European statesmen, urging an economic union as a prelude 
to p o l i t i c a l rapprochement.^ Many s o c i e t i e s , established i n 
memory of Stamboliski i n numerous European c a p i t a l s , were also 
working f o r the furtherance of South Slav u n i t y . I n 1 9 3 0 , a l l 
these s o c i e t i e s wete u n i t e d i n t o the "Ligue pour le rapproche-
ment des Serbes et des Bulgares. 1 1 
These developments, i n themselves small and i n s i g n i f i c a n t , 
helped to prepare the ground f o r the Balkan Conferences and made 
an e f f e c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to the movement towards confederation 
i n the peninsula. Three other f a c t o r s were involved; the Locarno 
agreements i n Western Europe i n 1 9 2 5 - 6 , the world economic 
depression and the need to group the Agrarian nations of Eastern 
2 9 . I b i d . , pp. 226 and 2 3 1 . 
3 0 . Stavrianos, op. c i t . , p. 224. 
3 1 . D. Stranjakovic, Oeuvre dn rapprochement et de 1'union 
des Serbes et des Bulgares dans l e passe, Pa r i s , 1 9 3 0 * P« 1 . 
Societies f o r South Slav u n i t y were established i n Belgrade, 
Prague, Vienna, B e r l i n , Munich, P a r i s , Geneva, Toulouse and 
L e i p z i g . The work by Stranjakovic was the only published work 
of the League's Committee. 
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32 Europe i n t o a more e f f e c t i v e bargaining u n i t . Gradually, 
a number of inter-Balkan agreements were made. I n 1928, Rumania 
and Greece negotiated a t r e a t y of non-aggression and a r b i t r a t i o n ; 
i n 1929» Yugoslavia and Rumania signed a general act of c o n c i l -
i a t i o n , a r b i t r a t i o n and j u d i c i a l settlement; i n the same year, 
Greece and Yugoslavia came to an understanding about Salonika 
and, by October 1930, f r i e n d s h i p between Greece and Turkey had 
developed to the extent of a t r e a t y of n e u t r a l i t y , c o n c i l i a t i o n , 
a r b i t r a t i o n and f r i e n d s h i p . 
The actual i n i t i a t i v e f o r c a l l i n g a Conference was made by 
Alexander Papanastassiou at the 27th. Universal Congress of 
34 
Peace which was held i n Athens between October 6 and 10, 1929* 
On October 9* at the plenary session of the Congress, Papanast-
assiou presented a r e s o l u t i o n s t i p u l a t i n g the necessity f o r 
annual Balkan Conferences to study a l l matters of common i n t e r e s t 
to the Balkan peoples, and suggested t h a t the I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
35 
Bureau of Peace should c a l l such a meeting. On May 12, 1930* 
the Bureau issued i n v i t a t i o n s t» a Conference which would be 
held i n Athens i n October 1930. By the end of June, a l l the 
Balkan states had s i g n i f i e d t h e i r approval of the purpose of 
J 36. the Conference and expressed t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s to send delegates. 
32. During August 1930, e i g h t Agrarian states ( i n c l u d i n g 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria) had aet to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
forming a Customs Union which would then be able to present a 
s o l i d Agrarian f r o n t to the i n d u s t r i a l nations of Western Europe. 
33« See also Appendix D. f o r commercial t r e a t i e s from 1926-34. 
34. For proceedings, see XXVIIeme Congres de l a paix. Athenes, 
6-10. octobre 1929. Documents o f f i c i e l s . Athens, 1931. For a 
summary see M.J. Padelford, Peace i n the Balkans, New York, 1935» 
pp. 9-H. 35. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . See also, A.P. Papanastassiou,. 
Vers 1'union balkanique. Paris, 1934, p. 11. 
36. R.J* Kerner and II.N. Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the 
Balkan Entente 1930-35. Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a , 1936, p. 26. The aut-
hors note t h a t Kirov, the Bulgarian delegate, received the idea 
w i t h favour. 
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The object of the meeting was c l e a r l y s tated i n A r t i c l e 1 
of the "Statutes of the Balkan Conference": 
"The Balkan Conference w i l l endeavour to c o n t r i b u t e 
to the rapprochement and c o l l a b o r a t i o n of the Balkan 
peoples i n t h e i r economic, s o c i a l , i n t e l l e c t u a l and 
p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s i n order to d i r e c t t h i s rapprochement 
u l t i m a t e l y towards the union of the Balkan states (Albania, 
37 
Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia).". 
The Athens meeting, which began on October 5, was attended by 
150 delegates and observers from the s i x Balkan co u n t r i e s . 
Although the Conference was only s e m i - o f f i c i a l i n character, 
many of those present r e a l i z e d t h a t i f a Balkan f e d e r a t i o n could 
be established, great economic and p o l i t i c a l b e n e f i t s would 
f o l l o w . A g r i c u l t u r e , i n d u s t r y and commerce would prosper and 
having a t o t a l population of 60 m i l l i o n s and a land area of 
600,000 square miles ( i n c l u d i n g Turkey's A s i a t i c l a n d s ) , the 
new Union would be i n i t s e l f a Great Power. Thus, a t t h i s f i r s t 
Conference, the delegates set up an organism which would serve 
the idea of a Balkan Union. Six commissions ( i n c l u d i n g a p o l i t i c a l 
commission) were set up to discuus various aspects of f e d e r a t i o n 
and t h e i r members were entrusted w i t h the task of producing 
some concrete, workable proposals upon which Balkan co-operation 
•zg 
could grow. The. f i n a l meeting of the Conference was held on 
October I3f i n the theatr e at Delphi which had been the scene 
of the Amphictyonic League i n c l a s s i c a l times; the choice of 
such a h i s t o r i c spot f o r the l a s t session no doubt r e f l e c t e d 
the hopes and wishes of those who wanted to see the c r e a t i o n of 
a genuine confederation. 
But, from the s t a r t , the v i s i o n a r y i d e a l foundered on the 
37. Bulgarian National Group, Bulgaria and the Balkan Problems. 
Sofia, 1934, p. 40. 
38. For proceedings, see I e r e Conference balkanique. Athenes, 
5-12, octobre 1930. Documents o f f i c i e l s , Athens 1931. For a 
summary, see Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . pp. 30-41, and 
Padelford, op. c i t . , pp. 11-22. 
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p r a c t i c a l problem of n a t i o n a l m i n o r i t i e s . Only a week before 
the Conference opened, the Bulgarian delegation announced t h a t 
since the m i n o r i t i e s ' problem was not on the agenda, they 
would not attend. Papanastassiou pointed out t h a t the Conference 
was dealing w i t h no more than the general p r i n c i p l e s of organ-
i z a t i o n . He added t h a t , although the question of m i n o r i t i e s 
might be discussed " i n p r i n c i p l e " , the Conference "must be 
prudent and await the c r e a t i o n of a f r i e n d l y s p i r i t 1 ! before 
ent e r i n g upon such dangerous ground. His r e p l y did.,not a l t o g e t h e r 
s a t i s f y the Bulgarian delegation but, on the eve of the Conf-
39 
erence, they decided to attend. 
Nevertheless, the damage was done. I n both the 1930 and 
1931 Conferences, the Bulgarians demanded t h a t the meeting 
should consider the status and r i g h t s of the Macedonian Slavs, 
despite the f a c t t h a t the Conferences were never intended to 
solve acknowledged d i f f e r e n c e s , but r a t h e r to develop common 
grounds f o r agreement. One of the Yugoslav delegation, M. Topalovic, 
r e a l i z e d t h a t i f the long-standing Yugoslav-Bulgarian controversy 
was going to be brought up at these meetings, the whole idea 
of Balkan f e d e r a t i o n would be destroyed. M. Topalovic addressed 
some strong words to the Bulgarian delegation: 
"Let us say f r a n k l y to Bulgarian p u b l i c opinion 
t h a t only through p o l i t i c a l understanding and c o l l a b o r a t i o n 
can they win the sympathy which w i l l help them out of 
t h e i r present d i f f i c u l t i e s . " Be concluded by urging h i s 
Bulgarian f r i e n d s " t o p a r t i c i p a t e l o y a l l y and w i t h o u t 
40 
r e s e r v a t i o n i n the concert of the Balkan peoples." 
King Boris, however, had no desire to reach a settlement 
w i t h h i s Balkan neighbours. E i t h e r by coincidence or design, h i s 
b e t r o t h a l to Princess Giovanna d i Savoia of I t a l y , which had 
been discussed i n the world press f o r almost .two years, was 
o f f i c i a l l y announced i n Borne on the eve of the opening meeting 39. Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t e 
40. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
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41 of the F i r s t Balkan Conference. Three weeks l a t e r , the couple 
were married at A s s i s t , and returned to Bulgaria on October 31. 
Their r e t u r n aroused great enthusiasm and a leading a r t i c l e i n 
Naroden Glas. declared: 
"We believe t h a t our Queen w i l l b r i n g about peace 
and p r o s p e r i t y to our country and also freedom to our 
42 
co-nationals under f o r e i g n yoke." 
I t was reasonably suspected t h a t King Boris might have entered 
i n t o a secret a l l i a n c e w i t h I t a l y , thus making Bulgaria as 
43 
much an I t a l i a n p r o t e c t o r a t e as Albania. These apprehensions 
were given credence by the utterances of high Bulgarian d i g n i t -
a r i e s . An example was given i n Zorat 
"The Bulgarian National Church i s praying to 
Almighty (iod to consolidate the n a t i v e dynasty as a 
44 
precious pledge f o r our n a t i o n a l u n i f i c a t i o n . " 
But no a l l i a n c e was made. King Boris's biographer, w r i t i n g w i t h 
41. T . I . Geshkoff, Balkan Union. A Road to Peace i n South-
Eaatern Europe. New York, 1940, p. 204. Cf. N.F. Nikolaev, 
La destinee tragique d'un r o i , Uppsala, 1952, p. 56 which denies 
t h a t the choice of date had any p o l i t i c a l m o v i t a t i o n . 
42. Naroden Glas. November 21, 1930. Quoted by Geshkoff, op. 
c i t . , l o c . c i t . 
43. Suspicions had been r a i s e d by I t a l y ' s being given free 
access to the p o r t of Varna i n March 1930 and also the complete 
monopoly i n the motor market, which was conceded i n May. 
I t a l y ' s domination of Albania had begun w i t h the signing of 
a f i n a n c i a l agreement on March 15, 1925. On November 27, 1926, 
the Treaty of Tirana converted the country i n t o an I t a l i a n p r o t -
e c t o r a t e . On November 22, 1927, a 20 year defensive m i l i t a r y 
a l l i a n c e was signed, and, on December 1, 1928, Albania became 
a Kingdom though s t i l l under I t a l i a n p r o t e c t i o n . 
S i m i l a r developments i n Bulgaria seemed more than l i k e l y . 
44. Archbishop Neophite i n Zora. November 2, 1930. Quoted by 
GeBhkoff, op. c i t . , l o c . c i t . 
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the b e n e f i t of h i n d s i g h t , stated t h a t the King 
"had no i n t e n t i o n whatsoever of st e e r i n g h i s 
barge i n the wake of the I t a l i a n ship of s t a t e , He t o l d 
both h i s f a t h e r - i n - l a w and Mussolini t h a t he would not 
45 
welcome I t a l i a n influence i n the Balkans." 
Another of King Boris's acquaintances has said t h a t even i n the 
ea r l y t h i r t i e s , h i s i d e a l was to make Bulgaria a Balkan Switz-
46 
erland. The v e r a c i t y of such a remark i s open to considerable 
doubt f o r the same w r i t e r adds: 
"The three Balkan Kings worked w i s e l y f o r a 
rapprochement which was desirable and advantageous 
47 
to t h e i r peoples. I n t h i s , Boris. I l l took the i n i t i a t i v e . " 
I n t h i s era of the Conferences, there i s no evidence whatsoever 
to show t h a t King Boris had any desire to come to an agreement 
w i t h h i s neighbours, lie maintained h i s p r o - I t a l i a n p o l i c y , he 
t o l e r a t e d a government unrepresentative of the m a j o r i t y of h i s 
people and protected men l i k e Volkov, under whose t u t e l a g e , the 
Macedonian Organization continued tp f l o u r i s h . 
S h o r t l y a f t e r the ro y a l marriage, a new society was formed 
i n Sofia. I t was c a l l e d Revizi.ja (Revision), and the manifesto 
issued by the soc i e t y , made t h e i r object q u i t e c l e a r : 
"Revision of the peace t r e a t i e s w i l l be conceded 
but i t must be demanded. Germany and Hungary have begun 
a peaceful campaign f o r r e v i s i o n of t r e a t i e s . We must do 
the same. T r a i t o r s to t h e i r own country are those Bulgar-
ians who are keeping mute. Let us demand and impose . . . „48 revisionism. 
This resolute demand d i d not make the task of the Bulgarian 
delegation at the Conferences any easier. At the Council 
Meeting held i n Salonika i n January 1931 i M. Kirov demanded 
t h a t the m i n o r i t y problem be brought up once more. Papanastassiou 
anxious to avoid overt controversy, suggested t h a t the m i n o r i t i e s 
45. Nikolaev, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 46. I b i d . . p. 58,. 
47. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 48. Geshkoff, op. c i t . . p. 190. 
(129) 
problem should be discussed i n connection v i t h the study on the 
a p p l i c a t i o n of t r e a t i e s . M. Kirov agreed to t h i s but government 
opinion i n S ofia f e l t he had been, too c o n c i l i a t o r y and M. 
Sakazov was appointed as the new leader of the Bulgarian 
49 
delegation. 
This s t e r n a t t i t u d e on the p a r t of the Sofia government 
was l a r g e l y influenced by i n t e r n a l events w i t h i n Bulgaria. 
Through the w i n t e r months of 1930-1, the Prime M i n i s t e r , Andrew 
Liapchev, fought a l o s i n g b a t t l e to maintain p o l i t i c a l power. 
Eventually he conceded defeat and, on A p r i l 20, handed h i s 
r e s i g n a t i o n to the King. Boris i n v i t e d Malinov, the Opposition 
leader, to form a c o a l i t i o n government but Malinov could 
not meet the demands of Liapchev, Tsankov and Bourov. He 
therefor e suggested a Democrat-Agrarian c o a l i t i o n or a r e s t o r -
a t i o n of the Liapchev government. King Boris had no desire 
to see the r e t u r n of the Agrarians and r e c a l l e d Liapchev. The 
l a t t e r strengthened h i s government by i n c l u d i n g Radoslavov 
and other veteran p o l i t i c i a n s , who represented the most extreme 
50 
n a t i o n a l i s t s w i t h i n Bulgaria. Malinov j o i n e d forces w i t h 
the Agrarian and L i b e r a l deputies and forced the government 
i n t o e l e c t i o n s on June 21, 1931• The e l e c t i o n s r e s u l t e d i n 
a crushing defeat f o r Liapchev and a sizeable m a j o r i t y f o r 
Malinov, who now became Prime M i n i s t e r . ^ 
The change of government i n Bulgaria evoked a c e r t a i n 
optimism i n Belgrade, f o r the Agrarian p a r t y , which had 
t r a d i t i o n a l l y favoured strong l i n k s w i t h Yugoslavia, now formed 
49* Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . pp. 45-48. For proceedings 
of the Council Meeting, see Padelford, op. c i t . , pp. 23-27. 
30. See above, chapter 2, note 10. Shortly a f t e r the war, 
Radoslavov was t r i e d ( " i n contumaciam") f o r h i s actions i n the 
war. He was condemned to l i f e l o n g imprisonment ( i n h i s absence) 
but was allowed to r e t u r n to Bulgaria i n 1929 and resume a f u l l 
p o l i t i c a l l i f e . 
51. Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 241-42. 
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52 a s u b s t a n t i a l p a r t of the government p a r t y . M. Topalovic, 
who had spoken so f o r c i b l y to the Bulgarian delegation at 
the F i r s t Balkan Conference, f e l t t h a t the new government 
i n Sofia should make a clean break w i t h the past and e s t a b l i s h 
the c l osest of r e l a t i o n s w i t h Yugoslavia. He wrote: 
"There i s no other road f o r the Bulgarian people 
but to renounce every r a c i a l blindness and to proceed 
towards the r e a l i z a t i o n of two great new purposes: the 
formation of an i n t e g r a l Yugoslavian Union and then the 
formation of a Union w i t h the other Balkan people. Only 
i n t h i s way could a l l the c o n f l i c t s be e l i m i n a t e d and 
a l l the true i n t e r e s t s be s a t i s f i e d . 
"The Union of the Yugoslav races i s a great r e v o l u t -
ionary act. I t i s not yet f i n i s h e d . I t s t i l l f i n d s i t s e l f 
i n the process of i t s development. I t w i l l only end when 
the Bulgarians j o i n up w i t h Yugoslavia No conferences 
on m i n o r i t i e s , no s o l u t i o n s from I n t e r n a t i o n a l Forums 
could change the present s i t u a t i o n . I f , however, the 
Bulgarians want to be s a t i s f i e d i n respect to t h e i r t e r r i t -
o r i a l a s p i r a t i o n s , as w e l l as i n t h e i r n a t i o n a l a s p i r a t i o n s , 
there i s only one road open to them - to j o i n the Yugoslavian 
Union. There mainly l i e s the great meaning of t h i s Union. 
Only t h i s could d e f i n i t e l y erase and l i q u i d a t e a l l our o l d 
53 
disputes and dry up the blood shedded i n the past." ' 
Had H. Topalovic been addressing the parliamentary deputies 
52.The r e s u l t of the 1931 e l e c t i o n s was as f o l l o w s : -
Hational Bloc Agrarians 72. Liapchev 67. 
(Malinov) Democrats 43 . I LP (Communists) 31* 
L i b e r a l s 30. Radoslavovists 11. 
Radicals 7. Macedonians 8. 
Total 152. S o c i a l i s t s 5. 
53. A. Toshev, The Bulgarian-Serbian Dispute, Sofia, 1932, 
pp. 83-85. Toshev's book was w r i t t e n as a r e p l y to Topalovic's 
book "For the Balkan Agreement", Zagreb, 1931* whence the q u o t a t i o n . 
(131) 
of 19^2-23, he would no doubt have found whole-hearted agreement 
with h i s views. But the Agrarian party of 1931 bore l i t t l e 
resemblance to the party which Stamboliski had l e d . Soon a f t e r 
t h e i r e l e c t o r a l v i c t o r y , two Agrarian l e a d e r s , Gitchev, and h i s 
nephew, V i r g i l Dimov, met Mihailov a t the flila monastery and 
54 
negotiated a s e c r e t understanding with him. Mihailov had 
been g r e a t l y peturbed by the c o l l a p s e of the Liapchev government 
which had protected the Macedonian Organization s i n c e 1926. 
When the e l e c t i o n s were c a l l e d , he t r a v e l l e d to Rome to confer 
55 
with Volkov and I t a l i a n l e a d e r s as to what steps he should take. 
On h i s r e t u r n , he made t h i s s e c r e t understanding w i t h Gitchev 
and Dimov and l a t e r consolidated t h i s i n a formal agreement. 
The terms of t h i s agreement, which were sc r u p u l o u s l y observed 
by both s i d e s , can be summed up as f o l l o w s : 
"The Agrarian l e a d e r s would oppose entente with 
Yugoslavia so long as Supremist claims were u n r e a l i z e d ; 
they would follow I t a l y i n for e i g n p o l i c y , demand t r e a t y 
r e v i s i o n , defend Mihailov's o r g a n i z a t i o n and uphold i t s 
a u t h o r i t y i n the P e t r i c h department. I n r e t u r n , Mihailov's 
men would pr o t e c t the Agrarian l e a d e r s ; Mihailov's Macedon-
ia n deputies would support them; they would r e c e i v e s u b s i d i e s 
from a " f o r e i g n power" and former Agrarian l e a d e r s would 
be prevented from challenging the l e a d e r s h i p of the Agrarian 
p a r t y . " 5 6 
54. Swire, op. c i t . , pp. 242-43* 55. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
56. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . Swire s t a t e s that t h i s agreement, of 
which he give s a summary, was made pu b l i c i n 1933 and was con-
firmed by experienced observers. Up to t h i s point, the rank 
and f i l e Agrarians had been unaware of i t s e x i s t e n c e . Todorov, 
s t i l l l i v i n g i n e x i l e i n Belgrade, could not adhere even to the 
proclaimed p r i n c i p l e s of the Agrarian party and founded h i s own 
'Alexander Stamboliski Peasant Union' to keep true to Sta m b o l i s k i ' s 
p o l i c i e s . K. Todorov, Balkan F i r e b r a n d . The Autobiography of 
A Rebel. S o l d i e r and Statesman. Chicago, 1943* p. 241. 
(132) 
Apart from t h i s secret agreement, the p o s s i b i l i t y of any 
rapprochement v i t h Yugoslavia was rendered h i g h l y u n l i k e l y 
by the presence of the former M i n i s t e r of War and Chief of 
57 
S t a f f , who were r e t a i n e d , upon the advice of King Doris. 
Feeling t h a t the change of government made l i t t l e or no 
di f f e r e n c e to the p o s i t i o n of the Macedonain Organization and 
confident of Agrarian support i n the Cabinet, Mihailov resumed 
t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s . There had been a l u l l i n operations 
since October 1930, but now the outrages increased r a p i d l y i n 
number. During J u l y , there was a spate .of.incidents i n the 
eg 
West F r o n t i e r T e r r i t o r y , where, i t was said, the Yugoslavs 
59 
had k i l l e d 274 Bulgarians since 1921. Later i n the month, 
Sofia newspapers announced t h a t the bridges on the r a i l w a y l i n e 
between Nis and Skopje had been destroyed. But such re p o r t s were 
premature f o r the t e r r o r i s t s sent t o destroy them were k i l l e d 
before they reached t h e i r d e s t i n a t i o n . The Yugoslav government 
decided t h a t i t had a chance of proving t h a t the comitadjia 
came from Bulgaria and were not, as was constantly claimed, 
"oppressed Macedonians". The Yugoslav l e g a t i o n i n Sofia showed 
Malinov evidence found on the dead men, which proved they had 
come from Bulgaria, and demanded t h a t he should take steps to 
suppress Mihailov's Organization. But Malinov had n e i t h e r the 
courage nor the power to act. On October 12, 1931i a f t e r only 
four months as Prime M i n i s t e r , he resigned from o f f i c e " f o r reasons 
of h e a l t h " . He was succeeded by Mushanov, who had always been 
amongst the' most I t a l o p h i l e of Bulgarian p o l i t i c i a n s . ^ 
57. Swire, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 58. See above, note 19. 
59. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 252. Operations i n the West F r o n t i e r 
T e r r i t o r y were d i r e c t e d by a former teacher i n Tsaribrod, 
Ivan Gioshev. Gioshev had l e f t Tsaribrod i n 1919 and was p u t 
i n charge of these operations i n 1931. This section of IMRO 
had a special newspaper, Vrtop, to t e l l of i t s e x p l o i t s . 
60. I b i d . . p. 253. 
(133) 
This increase i n t e r r o r i s m was one of the subjects brought 
up at the Second Balkan Conference which met at I s t a n b u l 
between October 20 and 26, 1931* At the very f i r s t plenary 
session of the Conference, the question of m i n o r i t i e s was raised, 
Both Albania and Bulgaria demanded a f u l l e r examination of the 
problem and Andrei Toshev, one of the Bulgarian delegation, 
claimed t h a t "the f i r s t great obstacle which obstructs our 
roads i s the question of m i n o r i t i e s Without having s e t t l e d 
" 6 l 
i t f i r s t , we do not see how we can go f u r t h e r . I n r e p l y , 
M. Georgevic, of the Yugoslav group, stated t h a t h i s delegation 
d i d not believe i t was possible to reach any p o l i t i c a l underst-
anding as long as any s t a t e , e i t h e r by i t s e l f or through organ-
i z a t i o n s which i t t o l e r a t e d , i n t e r f e r e d i n the " i n t e r n a l l i f e 
of neighbour states f o r the purpose of preventing t h e i r consol-
i d a t i o n . " Hi. Georgevic added t h a t i t was impossible t o b u i l d a 
Union as long as some states were a l l i e d w i t h "extra-Balkan 
states having designs of conquest or tendencies towards colon-
i z a t i o n i n the Balkan countries and whose own t e r r i t o r y or 
whose own forces and i n s t i t u t i o n s were to be u t i l i z e d against 
62 
one or several Balkan s t a t e s . " This outspoken summary of 
Yugoslav fears w i t h regard to I t a l y and Bulgaria caused v i o l e n t 
controversy at the Conference and most of the other problems 
before the meeting were shelved to the various committees 
f o r consideration at the Third Conference to be held i n October 
1 9 3 2 . 6 3 
Two Balkan Conferences had now been held, one i n Athens, 
the other i n I s t a n b u l . The meetings 1remained w i t h i n the realm 
of p r i v a t e i n i t i a t i v e and, though the governments looked w i t h 
61. Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . , p. 52. 62. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
63. For proceedings at I s t a n b u l , see Heme Conference 
balkaniqge ( Istanbul-Ankara^ 19-26, octobre 1931). Documents 
o f f i c i e l s . premiere p a r t i e . ( I s t a n b u l , 1932). For a summary, 
see Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . pp. 50-64 and Padelford, op. 
c i t . . pp. 28-35. 
(134) 
apparent benevolence on the i d e a l i s t i c labours of t h e i r n a t i o n a l s , 
they d i d almost nothing towards g i v i n g the r e s o l u t i o n s of the 
Conferences the force of law. I n Bulgaria, the anniversary 
of the signing of the Treaty of N e u i l l y - always a time f o r 
organized demonstrations and mourning borders upon edges of 
the newspapers - was the occasion of even more v i o l e n t a g i t a t i o n 
f o r t r e a t y r e v i s i o n , which included the stoning of the Yugoslav 
64 
l e g a t i o n i n Sofia. At the same time, the Albanian Conference 
Group o f f i c i a l l y recognized the existence of a Bulgarian 
m i n o r i t y i n eastern Albania, thereby implying t h a t the Slavs 
l i v i n g between the Albanian and Bulgarian f r o n t i e r s were also 
65 
Bulgars. I n November, Mushanov v i s i t e d I t a l y . On h i s r e t u r n , 
he was reported to have said t h a t Bulgaria "supported by I t a l y , 
w i l l continue her peaceful p o l i c y . " ^ 
On A p r i l 17, Mihailov held h i s Eighth Revolutionary Congress 
near K u s t e n d i l . At the Congress, the idea of Balkan Federation 
was repudiated and f u r t h e r c o m i t a d j i operations i n Southern 
Serbia were proposed. The delegates at the Congress declaimed 
a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r any i n t e r n a t i o n a l complications which 
might ensue, maintaining t h a t the Great Powers had never 
67 
" l i b e r a t e d " Macedonia. Such an excuse d i d not commend i t s e l f 
to the Belgrade government, which faced an unending series of 
outrages and border i n c i d e n t s . Despite the existence of the 
Mixed Commission, set up under the P i r o t Convention, the Bulg-
a r i a n Premier, Mushanov, u s u a l l y found some p l a u s i b l e excuse 
to prevent the Commission i n v e s t i g a t i n g them. I n October 1932, 
Yugoslav delegates a t Geneva Bought the support of B r i t a i n and 
France f o r the p r o j e c t of a demarche against Bulgaria a t the 
League of Nations. They believed t h a t the now proven existence 
of IMRfl on Bulgarian s o i l would enable them to appeal on the 
basis of A r t i c l e s 11 and 12 of the League Covenant. B r i t a i n 
and France gave the Yugoslav delegation no encouragement and 
64. Swire, op. c i t . , p. 254. 66, I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
65. I b i d . , p. 253. 67. I b i d . , p. 249. 
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when the p r o j e c t was o f f i c i a l l y announced, they n o t i f i e d 
Belgrade t h a t they had no i n t e n t i o n of r a i s i n g so d e l i c a t e 
a subject which would only embitter i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . 
Mushanov, f o r h i s p a r t , declared p u b l i c l y t h a t since Bulgaria 
"has taken and w i l l continue to take the most energetic measures 
and i n view of her goodwill and incontestable l o y a l t y 
recourse to Geneva would not promote Bulgarian-Yugoslav f r i e n d -
69 
ship." Confronted by t h i s Anglo-French r e b u f f , Yugoslavia 
renounced the projected demarche and merely withdrew c e r t a i n 
r a i l w a y concessions which Bulgarian exporters had long enjoyed. 
I t i s perhaps hardly s u r p r i s i n g t h a t from the p o i n t of 
70 
view of Balkan co-operation, the T h i r d Conference, held i n 
Bucharest between October 22 and 29, 1932, should have been a 
f a i l u r e . At the p r e l i m i n a r y Council meeting, held on October 21, 
the Bulgarian delegation presented a l e t t e r , announcing w i t h 
r e g r e t t h a t Bulgaria must withdraw from the Conference. The 
reason f o r t h i s was t h a t the problem of m i n o r i t i e s and j u r i d i c i a l 
e q u a l i t y of s t a t e s , which the Bulgarian group had placed a t the 
f o r e f r o n t of questions to be considered, had not been solved 
i n the i n t e r v a l since the l a s t meeting. They asserted the o l d 
argument t h a t a " m i n o r i t i e s " settlement should precede any 
71 
t a l k about f e d e r a t i o n . During the two opening days of the 
Conference, when the d r a f t of a Balkan Pact was being discussed, 
the Bulgarian delegation attempted t o seek an adjournment of 
72 
the whole Conference u n t i l the f o l l o w i n g s p r i n g . They d i d not 
68. Londres, op. c i t . . p. 180. The p r o j e c t e d demarche. 
followed a memorandum sent by the Yugoslav government to Mushanov, 
e a r l y i n October 1932, l i s t i n g no fewer than 11 outrages by 
t e r r o r i s t s from Bulgaria i n a s i n g l e month. Mushanov denied t h a t 
Bulgaria was responsible. 69. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 254. 
70. For proceedings at Bucharest, see I l l e m e Conference 
balkanique (Bucarest. 22-29. octobre 1932) Documents o f f i c i e l a . 
Bucharest, 1933. For a summary, see Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . 
pp. 73-90 and Padelford, op. c i t . . pp. 42-65. 
71. Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . p. 76. 72. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
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Bucceed. The delegates,,who were anxious t o see the Pact 
become a p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y , suggested t h a t the contentious 
m i n o r i t y question be s e t t l e d by d i r e c t b i - l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s 
73 
between the n a t i o n a l groups themselves. Having seen the Con-
ference r e j e c t t h e i r proposal, and having received a telephone 
c a l l , o s t e n s i b l y from the Bulgarian National Committee, the 
74 
Bulgarian delegates l e f t Bucharest and returned home. 
A f t e r t h e i r departure, the Conference proceeded to discuss 
the proposed Balkan Pact and f i n a l l y adopted the d r a f t s e t t l e -
ment. For the f i r s t time i n Balkan h i s t o r y , representatives 
of the Balkan peoples - though not o f f i c i a l government repres-
e n t a t i v e s - had adopted a p o l i t i c a l agreement which was to 
govern the Balkan states i n t h e i r mutual r e l a t i o n s . Although 
t h i s appeared to be a great achievement, i t was r e a l l y a hollow 
v i c t o r y . Bulgaria had d e l i b e r a t e l y withdrawn from the Conferences 
i n a b r t t e r and r e s e n t f u l mood; her leaders had no desire t o 
associate themselves w i t h a Balkan Pact and the d i v i s i o n between 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which had l a s t e d since 1923« remained 
unresolved. 
73. Stavrianos, op. c i t . . pp. 235-36. Also Papanastassiou, 
op. c i t . . p. 102. 
74. Geshkoff, op. c i t . . p. 102, states t h a t the telephone 
c a l l d i d i n f a c t come from the Bulgarian M i n i s t e r of Foreign 
A f f a i r s and not the National Committee. 
Chapter 7. 
Balkan Entente or 
Bulgarian I s o l a t i o n ?. 
(138) 
The era of the Conferences marked a cle a r t u r n i n g - p o i n t 
i n the t r o u b l e d world of Balkan p o l i t i c s . I t had shown t h a t , 
despite a l l the b i t t e r n e s s and rancour which continued to 
surround Yugoslav-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s , the common need f o r 
s e c u r i t y and co-operation could b r i n g both nations together 
w i t h i n a sin g l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l gathering. Now the peoples of 
the peninsula were faced w i t h the question! "Could or would 
the Balkan states resolve t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s and work f o r a 
genuine Entente? Or would they prefer i s o l a t i o n ? " Once again, 
the eyes of Balkan statesmen turned to Bulgaria. 
Within Bulgaria there had been f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l unrest, 
and Mushanov, hoping to d i v i d e and defeat h i s opponents, 
granted an amnesty to the Agrarians e x i l e d abroad - i n c l u d i n g 
Todorov, Obov and Stoyanov. This was on January 6, 1933* but 
Todorov d i d not r e t u r n u n t i l March 3 because he had doubts 
about the s i n c e r i t y of the Bulgarian government. The r e t u r n of 
the e x i l e s occasioned w i l d demonstrations against the "Serbian 
spies", f o r Todorov and Obov were widely regarded as paid 
agents of Yugoslavia bent on s e l l i n g t h e i r country's freedom. 
Mushanov's hopes were r e a l i z e d , f o r Todorov promptly launched 
an energetic campaign against the government and succeeded i n 
d i v i d i n g the l o y a l t i e s of the Agrarian pa r t y . The newspapers 
of which he became e d i t o r promised f o r e i g n loans f o r the 
2 
peasants and urged the necessity f o r an a l l i a n c e w i t h Yugoslavia. 
The Macedonian Organization was p a r t i c u l a r l y incensed by 
Todorov's campaign and he was described as a "Trojan horse 
1. J. Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, London, 1939, p. 238. 
2. A. Londres, Terror i n the Balkans, London, 1935* pp» 205-06. 
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sent by King Alexander to seize Bulgaria from w i t h i n . " ^ 
E a r l i e r i n the year, on February 12, 1933, the Macedonian 
Organization, under the auspices of the Immigrants' Conference, 
held a Congress a t Gorna Djoumaia which was attended by 
delegates from a l l over Bulgaria, The gathering was condoned 
by the government who gave the delegates 75% reduction on t h e i r 
4 
rai l w a y fares and sta t e o f f i c i a l s holidays w i t h pay! Ten 
thousand were present a t the Conference, i n c l u d i n g Swire, 
Reuter's correspondent i n Sofia. I t was opened by a service 
conducted by the Bishop of Nevrokop and attended by t h i r t y - s i x 
p r i e s t s . A f t e r t h i s , ajnessage from Mihailov was read to the 
delegates: "Against the Yugoslav government, we can speak only 
i n the language of r i f l e s and bombs. The struggle w i l l continue 
w i t h f i r e and blood." Following t h i s message, Marko Dosen, a 
Croat member of the Ustase, expelled from Yugoslavia i n 1929, 
read a message from Dr. Pavelic, the leader of the Ustase, 
urging the break-up of the "Yugoslav mosaic". I n conclusion, 
Dr. Tatarchev read the substance of a p e t i t i o n he had lodged 
at Geneva concerning Yugoslav misdeeds. During the banquet 
which rounded o f f the Conference, Kondov, the chairman of the 
Bulgarian National Committee, declared t h a t the Bulgarian 
Army was "ready to l i b e r a t e Macedonia f o r the t h i r d time" when 
the o p p o r t u n i t y arose. His remark, Swire noted, was greeted 
5 
wi t h loud applause. 
Certain Sofia newspapers began a v i o l e n t r e v i s i o n i s t 
a g i t a t i o n timed to co-incide w i t h the Conference, and the 
National Committee placarded the c a p i t a l w i t h notices urging 
the immigrants to prepare themselves f o r Yugoslavia's d i s i n t -
e g r a t i o n , f o r the hour of l i b e r a t i o n was at hand. At the same 
3. K. Todorov, Balkan Firebrand, The Autobiography of a Rebel, 
Soldier and Statesman. Chicago, 1943, p. 243. Todorov's campaign 
was supported by the Protogerovists under Shandanov. 
4. P . P i p i n e l i s , C a i t i f f Bulgaria. London, 1944, p. 57. 
5. Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 264-65. 
(uo) 
time, c e r t a i n lMflO leaders (but not M i h a i l o v ) announced t h a t 
i f Macedonia vas not " l i b e r a t e d " w i t h i n two years, they 
would provoke another European war. 
I n Belgrade, there was sudden panic. Rumours were abraad 
t h a t Bulgaria and I t a l y were about to launch a j o i n t attack 
on Yugoslavia. On February 1 6 , i n answer to Bulgarian and 
g 
German revanchism. the L i t t l e Entente reorganized i t s e l f and, 
on February 27, the Belgrade government warned Bulgaria t h a t , 
since the state a u t h o r i t i e s had shown such i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e 
s o l i d a r i t y w i t h the r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s at Gorna Djoumaia and 
openly applauded w a r - l i k e acts, the Sofia government would be 
9 
held responsible f o r any f u t u r e outrages. 
A f t e r t h i B s t e r n warning, the s i t u a t i o n quietened down and, 
i n A p r i l 1933» f r i e n d l y gestures were made by both sides. 
The most important of these was the v i s i t of Nikola V e l i m i r o v i c , 
the Bishop of Ohrid, and the Yugoslav section of the "Union f o r 
Peace and Friendship through the Churches." The v i s i t was des-
igned to show the Bulgarian people t h a t conditions i n Yugoslav 
Macedonia were by no means as bad as they were belietoed to be, 
and, i n the course of t h e i r v i s i t , they held out the hope t h a t 
an exchange v i s i t could be made so t h a t each side could see 
what the other was r e a l l y l i k e . The Bishop's v i s i t was v i t i a t e d 
by the discovery of an IMHO attempt to blow up the SkupYtina, 
and f u r t h e r developments i n the r e l a t i o n s between Yugoslavia 
and Bulgaria, prevented the r e t u r n v i s i t ever being made.^ 
6 . I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 7. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
8 . N.J. Padelford, Peace i n the Balkans. New York, 1 9 3 5 « P P I 
190 -93. 9 . Swire, op. c i t . , p. 2 6 6 . Along w i t h 
t h i s warning, an u n o f f i c i a l h i n t was dropped t h a t , i f Hushanov 
could not c o n t r o l the t e r r o r i s t s himself, Yugoslavia and her 
a l l i e s would w i l l i n g l y place t h e i r own troops at King Boris's 
disposal. 
1 0 . Londres, op. c i t . . pp. 2 0 9 - 1 2 . The serious attempt to blow 
up the Skupstina was discovered e a r l y i n May 1 9 3 3 * 
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Seen i n a wider context, the month of A p r i l heralded the 
f i r s t preparations f o r a Balkan a l l i a n c e . Todorov went to 
Rumania and saw Radulescu who t o l d him t h a t n e g o t i a t i o n s 
f o r an a l l i a n c e were already t a k i n g place and d i r e c t c o n s u l t * 
ations w i t h the Bulgarian government would take place at "the 
proper time".** From Bucharest, Todorov went to Yugoslavia 
where he had t a l k s w i t h King Alexander, lie reported t h a t the 
King had said to him: 
"I've already begun t a l k s w i t h Roumania, Turkey 
and Greece but a Balkan a l l i a n c e w i t h s u t Bulgaria i s 
worthless. Both s t r a t e g i c a l l y and f o r the q u a l i t y of 
her s o l d i e r s , Bulgaria i s e s s e n t i a l f o r a powerful 
Balkan a l l i a n c e . " 
"Why don't you t r y to meet King Boris?" asked Todorov. 
"lie doesn't t r u s t me," r e p l i e d the King. "He t h i n k s 
I*m h i s enemy." 
Todorov t o l d him t h a t he was sure t h a t i n one conv-
e r s a t i o n , Alexander could convince Boris t h a t h i s fears 
12 
were groundless. 
These n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r an a l l i a n c e r e f l e c t the growing d e s i r e , 
i n the spring of 1933i tor Balkan s o l i d a r i t y and the desire to 
see Bulgaria brought w i t h i n the framework of an Entente.Even 
at t h i s stage, the issue was c l e a r l y one of Entente or I s o l a t i o n 
f o r a four-power pact was signed by France, B r i t a i n , I t a l y and 
Germany on June 7. I n S o f i a , there were fears t h a t a Franco-
I t a l i a n rapprochement would deprive Bulgaria of her only 
t r u s t w o r t h y a l l y . 
These apprehensions had a s a l u t a r y e f f e c t upon Bulgarian 
opinion. I t was noticeable t h a t , during 1933. the scale of 
13 
t e r r o r i s m against Yugoslavia was considerably diminished. 
By c o n t r a s t , t e r r o r i s m i n Bulgaria increased as IMRO t r i e d to 
stem the r i s i n g t i d e i n favour of f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Yugoslavia. 11. Todorov, op. c i t . . pp. 250-51. 12. I b i d . . l o c . c i t 
13. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 255. 
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Whereas, i n 1932, there had been 45 murderous attacks (mainly 
i n S o f i a ) r e s u l t i n g i n 36 deaths, during the f i r s t s i x months 
of 1933 there were no fever than 38 a t t a c k s , r e s u l t i n g i n 
the deaths of 49 people. On June 22, a member of the O f f i c e r s ' 
League went to King Boris and t o l d him t h a t he was morally r e s -
ponsible f o r the assassinations. His d e c l a r a t i o n made King 
Boris and Mushanov suspect t h a t a coup d'etat was being prepared. 
So, on June 23, the Sobranje passed l e g i s l a t i o n to reduce the 
scale of t e r r o r i s m . As a consequence, on the' n i g h t of June 24-39 
troops made a house-to house search through Sofia. This was 
'designed' to purge the c a p i t a l of t e r r o r i s t s and confiscate 
any arms found to be i n i l l e g a l possession. As a demonstration 
of m i l i t a r y e f f i c i e n c y and thoroughness i t vas f a u l t l e s s , but 
i t vas quit e unproductive, f o r the m a j o r i t y of the t e r r o r i s t s 
had been warned beforehand and had taken temporary leave of 
•* r l * the c i t y ! 
i f the Macedonian Organization was unpopular at home:, i t 
vas an even greater l i a b i l i t y abroad. On May 24, 1933* the 
Soviet Union published d e t a i l s of the pacts of non-aggression 
15 
i t vas soon to make w i t h Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. 
Within these pacts, the d e f i n i t i o n of an aggressor resembled 
the d e f i n i t i o n contained i n the "Convention d e f i n i n g the 
Aggressor", signed i n London on J u l y 3, 1933• l n the Convention, 
A r t i c l e 5 ran as f o l l o w s : 
"Aid to armed bands formed on the t e r r i t o r y of 
a sta t e and invading the t e r r i t o r y of another s t a t e or 
the r e f u s a l , despite the demands on the p a r t of the s t a t e 
submitted to atta c k , to take a l l possible measures on it's 
own t e r r i t o r y t o deprive the said bands of any a i d or 
p r o t e c t i o n . 
14. I b i d . , pp. 268-70. See also L.S. Stavrianos, Balkan Feder-
a t i o n . A H i s t o r y of the Movement tovards Balkan Unity i n Modern 
Times. Northampton, Mass., 1944, p. 238. 
15. Stavrianos, i b i d . . p. 237. 
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This, of course, applied d i r e c t l y to Bulgaria.,and since 
the Convention of J u l y 3 was signed by Rumania, Greece, Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, i t was clear 
t h a t Bulgaria was completely i s o l a t e d and alone i n her r e v i s -
i o n i s t aims i n the Balkan peninsula. She was surrounded by a 
large number of powerful countries a c t i v e l y determined to 
r e s i s t her i n t e n t i o n s . Many Bulgarians urged Mushanov to sign 
the Convention too but he made a number of excuses and vent 
17 
f o r a b r i e f h o l i d a y w i t h the I t a l i a n M i n i s t e r i n Sofia. 
I t a l y was n a t u r a l l y r e l u c t a n t to see any change i n the Bulgarian 
a t t i t u d e and I t a l i a n decorations were l a v i s h l y conferred upon 
cabinet m i n i s t e r s and other d i g n i t a r i e s . A P o l i t i s r e p o r t e r 
observed t h a t the I t a l i a n M i n i s t e r i n Sofia was almost always 
18 
i n the company of Prime M i n i s t e r Mushanov. 
But even i f the Prime M i n i s t e r remained unmoved by Bulgaria's 
growing i s o l a t i o n , King Boris was aware of i t s dangers. On the 
same day as the Convention was signed i n London,he unexpectedly 
went abroad. Bulgaria's o f f i c i a l j o u r n a l announced on J u l y 4 
t h a t he had departed f o r an "unknown d e s t i n a t i o n " , but i t was 
19 
i n f a c t an extended tour of the c a p i t a l s of Western Europe. 
A f t e r a b r i e f h oliday i n Geneva where he had conversations w i t h 
20 
several high d i g n i t a r i e s at the League of Nations, he moved 
to S t u t t g a r t . A few days l a t e r , Malinov, now President of the 
Sobranje, t o l d the Press: "The time has a r r i v e d ' f o r a d e f i n i t e 
16. R.J.Kerner and II.N. lloward, The Balkan Conferences and 
the Balkan Entente 1930-35. Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a , 1936, pp. 117-9. 
17. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 273. 
18. P o l i t i s . May 24, 1933. Quoted by T . I . Geshkoff, Balkan 
Union. A Road to Peace i n Sonth-Eastern Europe, New York, 1940, 
p. 207. 
19- Geshkoff, i b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
20. N.P. Nikolaev, La destinee tragique d'un r o i . Uppsala, 
1952, pp. 64-65. 
(144) 
o r i e n t a t i o n of B u l g a r i a ' s foreign p o l i c y B u l g a r i a should 
now see which were her f r i e n d s and which her p r o t e c t o r s 
The King, when abroad, would f i n d , as always, the means of 
21 
being u s e f u l to h i s people." 
I t was a curious r e l e a s e to the P r e s s but, i n the circum-
stances, understandably o p t i m i s t i c . King B o r i s made great 
e f f o r t s to be " u s e f u l to h i s people" but no one, not even I t a l y 
(now preparing s e c r e t l y f o r her A b y s s i n i a n campaign), was w i l l i n g 
to support Bulgarian adventures. As the summer months passed, 
Boris r e a l i z e d that he would have to y i e l d to the growing 
movement f o r f r i e n d s h i p with Y u g o s l a v i a . Moreover, he was worried 
l e s t the O f f i c e r s ' League should e f f e c t a coup d'etat i n h i s 
absence and place Damian Velchev i n power (rumours to t h i s 
22 
e f f e c t had reached him from S o f i a ) . So, a f t e r f r u i t l e s s v i s i t s 
23 
to Home, Geneva, P a r i s , London and B e r l i n , he became f i n a l l y 
convinced th a t h i s country's p o l i c y of "splendid i s o l a t i o n " waB 
both dangerous and wrong. On h i s way home, he arranged f o r h i s 
t r a i n to stop a t Belgrade and at the s t a t i o n there, he had an 
informal meeting with King Alexander of Yugoslavia. 
T h i s meeting was of the g r e a t e s t s i g n i f i c a n c e , f o r B o r i s 
had shunned a l l personal contact, had not attended Alexander's 
marriage and had even suspected th a t h i s neighbour might be 
24 
p l o t t i n g h i s death. T h i s meeting, which took place on Sept-
ember 17, 1933* marked an abrupt change i n o f f i c i a l r e l a t i o n s 
between the two c o u n t r i e s . I t was very much a personal d e c i s i o n 
by King B o r i s for h i s meeting was quite unexpected and caused 
21. Near E a s t and I n d i a , X L I I , (1933)# P. 659. 
22. Swire, op. c i t . , p. 273. 
23. Documents on German Foreign P o l i c y . 1918-45, S e r i e s C, 
London 1949cc ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as G.D.). I I , no. 22. 
Rumelin, German M i n i s t e r i n S o f i a , r e p o r t s B o r i s ' s v i s i t to 
the European c a p i t a l s and the r e c e p t i o n he r e c e i v e d t h e r e i n ; 
see a l s o Geshkoff, op. c i t . , p. 209. 
24. Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 232. 
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consternation i n the Bulgarian press which had already prepared 
25 
indignant d i a t r i b e s concerning Yugoslav d i s c o u r t e s y . 
As the time for the annual Balkan Conference drew nearer, 
there were h u r r i e d last-minute e f f o r t s to secure some measure 
of rapprochement. The matter was d i s c u s s e d at the L i t t l e Entente 
Conference, held a t S i n a i a i n the l a t t e r p art of September. 2^ 
King Alexander attended the Conference and, a f t e r spending 
some time with King C a r o l , he s a i l e d from Constanza to Varna 
27 
i n the Yugoslav destroyer "Dubrovnik". Here he was welcomed 
by King Bo r i s , tjueen Ioanna and members of the Bulgarian govern-
ment. 
L i k e the meeting a t Belgrade s t a t i o n l e s s than three weeks 
before, t h i s meeting a t the Euxinograd Palace on October 5 was 
an extremely important moment i n r e l a t i o n s between the two South 
S l a v n a t i o n s . "That, i t seemed to me," s a i d Todorov l a t e r , "was 
28 
the turning-point i n the post-war h i s t o r y of the Balkans." Even 
Mushanov, whose s i n c e r i t y on t h i s a c c a s i o n must be doubted, dec-
l a r e d to the p r e s s : "We must consider t h a t t h i s v i s i t w i l l 
advance the d e s i r e d rapprochement between the two S l a v peoples." 
But, although i t was an important event, when the whole 
period of b i t t e r n e s s and rancour could have been swept away 
and the foundations of Balkan s o l i d a r i t y l a i d , i t proved quite 
i n e f f e c t u a l as can be seen from the report of a conversation 
which Todorov had with the Yugoslav King s h o r t l y a f t e r h i s r e t u r n 
from Euxinograd: 
"Alexander t o l d me th a t he had o f f e r e d King B o r i s 
the prospects of an a l l i a n c e with B u l g a r i a . 
'Unfortunately,' B o r i s had r e p l i e d , 'the Macedonians 
are very strong i n my country. T h e y ' l l k i l l anyone who makes 
25. Londres, op. c i t . , p. 216. 
26. Swire, op, c i t . . p. 275. 
27. (Corner and Howard, op. c i t . . p. 121. 
28. Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 251. 
29. Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 
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an a l l i a n c e w i t h Yugoslavia." 
' I warned him,' continued Alexander, 'that Roumania 
and Turkey were i n s i s t i n g on the immediate conclusion of 
a Balkan Pact and t h a t I d i d n ' t want to sign i t u n t i l I ' d 
e 
done ev r y t h i n g possible to bring i n Bulgaria.' 
'That's nothing,' Boris had t o l d Alexander. ' I f i t ' s 
necessary, sign the Pact.' Apparently, Boris reconsidered 
h i s view and a few minutes l a t e r s a i d , 'Yes, you'd b e t t e r 
w a i t . ' 
Todorov then asked Alexander, 'What about the r e s u l t s 
of your t a l k ? ' 
'So f a r , none,' the King r e p l i e d - and then added 
sadly, 'I'm a f r a i d we s h a l l j u s t have to conclude the Pact 
w i t h o u t B u l g a r i a . ' " ^ 
Nevertheless, T i t u l e s c u made another v i s i t - t h i s time on 
behalf of Rumania - on October 12-13. He reported: "Bulgaria 
refuses to j o i n the Pact because she s t i l l does not accept the 
Treaty of N e u i l l y or recognize the Btatus quo."^* 
Some of the r e v i s i o n i s t states were made r a t h e r anxious by 
the a t t e n t i o n lavished on Bulgaria by her neighbours and by the 
prospects of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian detente. On October 26, the 
Hungarian Prime M i n i s t e r , Gombos, and h i s Foreign M i n i s t e r , 
de Kanya, descended on Sofia where they received an e n t h u s i a s t i c 
32 
welcome. Their v i s i t was the occasion of t o r c h l i g h t demonstrat-
ions of b e l l i c o s i t y towards Yugoslavia, and Mushanov p u b l i c l y 
33 
spoke of "our l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s - m i n o r i t y r i g h t s . " * ^ The Near 
East magazine reported: 
"Considerable alarm was aroused i n those c i r c l e s i n 
Belgrade where the prospect, of Bulgarian f r i e n d s h i p i s 
welcomed, when i t was seen what a warm welcome the Hungarian 
30. Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 252. Cf. also P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . . p. 
31. Stavrianos, op. c i t . . pp. 2 3 8 - 3 9 . 
32. Geshkoff, op. c i t . . p. 210. 
33. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 275. 
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p o l i t i c i a n s received i n Sofia I t i s f e l t i n Yugoslavia 
t h a t the Hungarians are holding out such g l o v i n g o f f e r s 
to tempt Bulgaria away from f r i e n d s h i p w i t h Yugoslavia 
and Roumania, and win her again to the Italo-Hungarian 
34 
bloc of r e v i s i o n i s t s . " ' ' 
On October 3 1 , i n a f i n a l e f f o r t t o secure Bulgaria's 
adhesion to a Balkan a l l i a n c e , Boris and King Carol, accompanied 
by t h e i r m i n i s t e r s , met at Rustchuk on the River Danube. T i t u l -
escu agian proposed t h a t Bulgaria j o i n a Balkan Pact. Mushanov 
refused but suggested a pact of non-aggression between t h e i r two 
cou n t r i e s . I f such a b i l a t e r a l agreement had been e f f e c t e d , i t 
would have thwarted the "mutual guarantee" clause of the Pact 
35 
which wa6 the foundation stone of the whole Entente. 
v 
S h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s , King Alexander c a l l e d Todorov to His. 
Todorov r e p o r t s t h a t he found the King i n a considerable s t a t e 
of a g i t a t i o n : 
'"France,"he said, "demands a Balkan Pact at once. 
T i t u l e s c u also i n s i s t s . The Turks and Greeks are i n a hurry. 
I'm holding i t up but t h a t breeds d i s t r u s t , e s p e c i a l l y 
amongst the Greeks and Roumanians, who are already d i s t u r b e d 
by my meeting w i t h King B o r i s . They're a f r a i d 1 might make 
an a l l i a n c e w i t h B u l g a r i a which might be d i r e c t e d against 
the Greeks. I can't w a i t any longer." 
Knowing t h a t a Balkan Pact withou t Bulgaria might 
e a s i l y t u r n i n t o a Balkan Pact against Bulgaria, I remarked, 
" I t would be a p i t y i f the conclusion of a Pact now were 
to cut short progress towards a Yugoslav-Bulgarian under-
standing." 
" I myself would p r e f e r an a l l i a n c e w i t h B u l g a r i a to 
any kind of Balkan Pact," said Alexander, "but I can't hold 
them any longer." 
I suggested t h a t Alexander might gain time by i m i t a t i n g 
3 4 . Near East and I n d i a . X L I I , ( 1 9 3 3 ) » p. 9 2 6 . 
3 5 . P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . , p. 3 . 
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the Greeks' recent attempt to come to an understanding 
w i t h the I t a l i a n s . I continued, " I f you made one of the 
conditions of the Balkan Pact t h a t a l l s i g n a t o r i e s should 
recognize the s o l i d a r i t y of the Balkan states agianst 
any great power which might attack any of them. Since 
t h i s c o n d i t i o n could be p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d against I t a l y , 
Greece would be r e l u c t a n t t o sign. Yet wi t h o u t i t , the 
Balkan Pact would count f o r very l i t t l e . " 
"You are r i g h t , " said the King. 
"Why don't you use the normal diplomatic channels 
f o r t h i s matter?" 
"Because 1 want no documents on t h i s , " said the King. 
"My proposal i s o r a l . I n the event of an a l l i a n c e , I am 
prepared to r e t u r n Xsaribrod and Bosilgrad to Bulgaria." 
"May 1 t e l l t h a t to the Bulgarian envoy?" I asked. 
A f t e r a pause - "Yes," said Alexander, " u n o f f i c i a l l y . " ' 
When he returned to Belgrade, lodorov went s t r a i g h t to the 
Bulgarian Legation and t o l d Kiosseivanov, then the Bulgarian 
envoy, of h i s t a l k w i t h Alexander and asked him to advise S o f i a , 
i n the s t r i c t e s t confidence, of the Yugoslav proposal. K i o s s e i -
vanov promised to do so, de c l a r i n g t h a t he believed deeply i n 
a fiulgaro-Yugoslav a l l i a n c e . Todorov also t o l d Penchev who, 
i n t u r n r e f e r r e d i t to Mushanov. Penchev d i d not hold out much 
chance of success. " I t ' s no use," he t o l d Todorov; "That man 
(Mushanov) refuses t o take anything s e r i o u s l y . " 
A f t e r a l l the events of the summer, the Fourth Balkan Conf-
•xo 
erence was somewhat of an a n t i - c l i m a x . The Balkan Pact, proposed 
36. Todorov, op. c i t . , pp. 252-53. This; o f f e r to r e t u r n 
Tsaribrod and Bosilgrad was confirmed i n the New York Times. 
October 11, 1934, p. 3. 37. I b i d . . Loc c i t . 
38. For proceedings, see IVerne Conference balkanique (Salonique 
5-12 novembre 1933) Documents o f f i c i e l s . Athens 1934. For a sum-
mary, see Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . p p . 97-113 And Padelford, 
op. c i t . . pp. 78-89. 
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39 at the l a s t Conference had now been taken up by the govern-
ments themselves and the whole question of Balkan co-operation 
and u n i t y had become a matter f o r statesmen r a t h e r than f o r 
the independent i n i t i a t i v e of Conference delegates. Scheduled 
to meet i n Belgrade i n September 1933t i t had been postponed 
40 
u n t i l Hovember and the venue changed to Salonika. The 
Bulgarian delegation had not mellowed since the l a s t Conference 
and M. Sakazov declared t h a t h i s delegation had only returned 
on the c o n d i t i o n t h a t a l l d i f f e r e n c e s which prevent 
41 
rapprochement among the Balkan peoples be examined." Following 
the now customary re-statement of the Bulgarian p o s i t i o n , he 
touched upon Mushanov's Rustchuk proposals, s t a t i n g h i s govern-; 
ment's preference f o r b i l a t e r a l pacts because " i n c e r t a i n respects, 
a l l the Balkan states are not equal. So long as t h i s i s t r u e , 
42 
we cannot adhere to the Balkan Pact." 
The ye.ar of 1933 was more than u s u a l l y f r e e from t e r r o r i s t 
a c t i v i t y but, i n the l a t e summer and autumn, the Yugoslav 
p a t r o l s reported t h a t they had f r u s t r a t e d f i f t e e n attempts to 
cross the f r o n t i e r . There was a bomb attack on the Orient Express, 
two i n c i d e n t s of bombs i n cafes at Gevgheli and r a i l w a y t r a c k 
blown up. Over the f r o n t i e r at Tsaribrod, a b e l l t o l l e d d a i l y 
to remind "Bulgarians beyond the f r o n t i e r t h a t the day of t h e i r 
43 
freedom approaches." 
So, despite Boris's l i m i t e d e f f o r t s to secure a rapproche-
ment, i t was clear t h a t the I t a l o p h i l e s and IMRO sympathizers 
s t i l l occupied p o s i t i o n s of power. Swire suggests t h a t Boris 
knew t h a t Mussolini's Abyssinian plans precluded any m i l i t a r y 
44 
venture i n the Balkans. Thus h i s p o l i c y was designed to thwart 
39. For the d e t a i l s of the advance d r a f t of the Balkan Pact 
adopted at the Third Conference, see Padelford, op. c i t . . Appen-
dix 1, pp. 155-65. 40. Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . p. 95. 
41. I b i d . . p. 97. 43. Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 273-5. 
42. I b i d . , p. 101. 44. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
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• i 
the Pact w h i l s t f o r e s t a l l i n g a Bulgarian r e v o l t (such as the 
Zveno group might organize against the p r o - I t a l i a n s ) by 
personally leading a r e c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y w i t h Bulgaria's 
neighbours. However, he was c a r e f u l to keep f r i e n s h i p f o r 
Yugoslavia w i t h i n the bounds of " c o r r e c t " r e l a t i o n s . 
S t i l l a c t i n g w i t h i n the bounds of c o r r e c t r e l a t i o n s , Boris 
v i s i t e d Belgrade on December 10, 1 9 3 3 , accompanied by h i s Queen 
and Mushanov. At a banquet given f o r him during h i s three-day 
sta t e v i s i t , Alexander, g i v i n g the t o a s t , declared: 
" I t i s only a p o l i c y of peace and c o n s o l i d a t i o n of 
the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n which can t r u l y ensure the complete 
s e c u r i t y and b e t t e r f u t u r e f o r our peoples." 
Boris, i n h i s r e p l y , endorsed the " p o l i c y of peace" but s i g n i f -
4 5 
i c a n t l y omitted any reference to the " e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n " . 
A f t e r the v i s i t was over, Todorov asked the Yugoslav King how 
the encounter had gone. Alexander r e p l i e d t h a t "while the 
4 6 
meeting was c o r d i a l , no agreement had been reached," 
So there was disappointment i n Belgrade. I n Rome, too, there 
was concern. Not because Bulgaria had r e j e c t e d the chance of 
j o i n i n g a Balkan a l l i a n c e - t h i s was p r e d i c t a b l e - but because 
Boris's v i s i t to Belgrade( and a subsequent v i s i t to Rumania 
i n January 1 9 3 4 ) might herald a long-term re-alignment i n h i s 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . But i t was now p a t e n t l y clear t h a t Bulgaria -
a t l e a s t under Mushanov's government - had chosen the path of 
i s o l a t i o n . I n February 1 9 3 4 , the I t a l i a n Press p u b l i c l y informed 
the Bulgarian people t h a t they "could count on continued I t a l i a n 
4 7 * support." Late i n 1 9 3 3 , Mussolini permitted Dr. Pavelic to 
send two Ustase t e r r o r i s t s to k i l l King Alexander w h i l s t he 
was i n Zagreb. The conspirators were so overwhelmed by the 
reception accorded to the tfing and Queen, t h a t they made no move. 
4 5 . L'echo de Belgrade. December 2 0 , 1933. Quoted by Geshkoff, 
op. c i t . , p. 211.Cf. also Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . , pp. 123-4. 
4 6 . Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 253. 
4 7 . Stavrianos, op. c i t . . p. 237. 
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Later, the p l o t was discovered and they were arrested. When 
Alexander heard of i t , he commented: " I t ' s c lear t h a t Mussol-
"48 
i n i wants to k i l l me and w i l l stop at nothing. There could 
scarcely have been a more t r a g i c a l l y prophetic utterance. 
49 
the Balkan. Pact, which was drawn up i n Belgrade and 
signed f i v e days l a t e r i n Athens on February 9t 1934, provided 
f o r a mutual guarantee of f r o n t i e r s by the four s i g n a t o r i e s -
Greece, -Turkey, Rumania and Yugoslavia. The Pact was not 
intended as an of f e n s i v e weapon but merely as an instrument of 
c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y f o r the Balkan s t a t e s , upon which a more 
stable and u n i t a r y f e d e r a t i o n could be b u i l t . Two po i n t s stood 
out; one was t h a t the s i g n a t o r i e s would s e t t l e t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s 
d i p l o m a t i c a l l y , and the other was the assumption t h a t Balkan 
f r o n t i e r s would remain unchanged. This r u l e d out any chance of 
t r e a t y r e v i s i o n and was one of the three o b j e c t i o n s which Bulg-
a r i a r a i s e d against the t r e a t y . The other two were the p r o v i s i o n 
of clauses r e l a t i n g to non-aggression ( i r r e l e v a n t , they believed, 
because the Balkan states had signed the Briand-Kellog Pact of 
August 1928) and the agreement whereby disputes would go before 
the Permanent C o n c i l i a t o r y Balkan Committee, whose i m p a r t i a l i t y 
50 
Bulgaria doubted. I n an o f f i c i a l Bulgarian p u b l i c a t i o n , i t 
was s t a t e d : 
"(We) accept, i n p r i n c i p l e , the Balkan Pact under 
the r e s e r v a t i o n t h a t , to Bulgaria, w i l l be recognized the 
r i g h t of e q u a l i t y i n her r e l a t i o n s w i t h the remaining 
Balkan states and t h a t the clauses f o r the m i n o r i t i e s , 
provided by the t r e a t i e s , be applied i n respect of the 
49. Stavrianos, op. c i t . . pp. 239-41. Also Padelford, op. c i t . 
pp. 90-137 and 186-87* D e t a i l s of diplomacy culminating i n the 
Balkan Entente are given i n Geshkoff, op. c i t . . pp. 203-22 and 
Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . pp. 116-38. 
50. Bulgarian National Group, Bulgaria and the Balkan Problems 
Sofi a , 1934, pp. 43-53. 
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51 Bulgarian m i n o r i t i e s ; " 
and added t h a t only when clauses,guaranteeing the Bulgarian 
m i n o r i t i e s a complete j u d i c i a l , moral and c u l t u r a l p r o t e c t i o n , . 
were recognized, could Bulgaria become an element f o r peace 
52 
and c u l t u r a l co-operation. 
On the eve of the i n i t i a l l i n g of the Pact, the four 
Balkan states sent i d e n t i c a l l e t t e r s to Kiosseivanov, proposing 
53 
a non-aggression pact w i t h each of the four s i g n a t o r i e s . But 
no o f f i c i a l r e p l y was ever received to these l e t t e r s and Mushanov, 
speaking to the Foreign A f f a i r s Committee of the Sobranje, said 
t h a t Bulgaria could never adhere to the Pact because i t v i o l a t e d 
54 
the p r ovisions of A r t i c l e 19 of the League Covenant. 
But the spark of hope t h a t some rapprochement might be 
achieved never died. E a r l y i n A p r i l 1934, J e v t i c , Yugoslavia's 
Foreign M i n i s t e r had a p r i v a t e meeting w i t h Mushanov who was 
passing through Belgrade. Mushanov had met Barthou, the French 
Foreign M i n i s t e r , and promised him t h a t , although Bulgaria would 
never sign the Pact, everything would be done to b r i n g about 
55 
the establishment of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s ' w i t h Yugoslavia. Later 
i n the month, J e v t i c c a l l e d i n at Sofia, on h i s r e t u r n from 
Ankara, and t o l d the j o u r n a l i s t s t h a t " a l l questions between 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria can be s e t t l e d . For t h i s purpose, only 
56 * 
goodwill i s necessary." On May 7, J e v t i c made an o f f i c i a l 
v i s i t to Sofia " t o have conversations r e l a t i v e to the settlement 
57 
of Yugoslav-Bulgarian differences."*^ I n the event, only minor 
items such as passport c o n t r o l s were discussed and J e v t i c ' s 
51. I b i d . . pp. 41-42. 53. P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . . p. 6. 
52. I b i d , , p. 55. 54. Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . p. 
55. I b i d . , pp. 138-39. Cf. also ti.D.. I I , no. 291. King 
Boris to von Neurath, B e r l i n , February 28, 1934. Boris o u t l i n i n g 
h i s views on the Balkan Pact, stated h i s desire to "avoid the 
impression t h a t Bulgaria wanted to remain the e t e r n a l t r o u b l e -
maker i n the Balkans" and expressed h i s w i l l i n g n e s s to e f f e c t a gradual r e c o n c i l i a t i o n w i t h Yugoslavia. 56. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 57* I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
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renewed proposal of a non-aggression pact was ignored. 
Nevertheless, great e f f o r t s were made to present a favourable 
impression. Streets were decked w i t h f l a g s and a special rec-
eption held. However, during the r e c e p t i o n , the e l e c t r i c i t y 
was cut and the banquet plunged i n t o darkness f o r 45 minutes. 
Although the power f a i l u r e was blamed on an i t i n e r a n t cat, i t 
seems t h a t i t was due to some small measure of human i n t e r v e n t i o n 
f o r the cut occurred p u n c t u a l l y at the stroke of midnight. 
J e v t i c assured Swire t h a t i f r e l a t i o n s improved, IMRO would 
disappear. 
I t s end was near. Ever since February 1, when Mihailov 
threatened to resume "the campaign f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of Mace-
donia i n bondage, i n the only possible way", there had been a 
number of f r o n t i e r i n c i d e n t s and several t e r r o r i s t s were shot 
59 
by Yugoslav p a t r o l s . But i t was the swan-song of the Organiz-
a t i o n . Stojan Christowe, who was v i s i t i n g S o f i a at about the 
same time as J e v t i c , had an audience w i t h King Boris on May 9s 
"1 took occasion to touch upon the subject of the 
rapprochement w i t h Yugoslavia by merely remarking how 
pleasant i t was to hear the Slav speech upon crossing 
i n t o Yugoslavia a f t e r t r a v e r s i n g Germany and A u s t r i a . . . . . 
Boris's cheeks and brows almost touched i n forming h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c smile as he expressed h i s earnest hope 
t h a t soon an understanding might be reached w i t h Yugoslavia. 
I could see the w r i t i n g on the w a l l f o r the Macedonians."^ 0 
Five days l a t e r , Mushanov, who had v i s i t e d B e r l i n e a r l i e r 
i n the month and arranged f o r General Goering to v i s i t S o f i a , 
o f f e r e d h i s r e s i g n a t i o n , The continuing wave of t e r r o r i s m had 
caused considerable p o l i t i c a l unrest and the Bulgarian c a p i t a l 
was r i f e w i t h rumours and counter-rumours. Mushanov had even 
t r i e d t o get Todorov to j o i n the government but Todorov demanded 
58. Swire, op. c i t . . pp.276-77 
59. I b i d . , p. 277. 
60. S. Christowe, lieroe3 and Assassins, London, 1935, p. 270. 
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economic reforms and an a l l i a n c e w i t h Yugoslavia and these 
Mushanov vould never a c c e p t . ^ I n response to a personal 
request of King Boris, he sold i e r e d on, t r y i n g to form a nev 
cabinet u n t i l , on the n i g h t of Hay 19, 1934, the coup d'etat 
took place. 
The conp d'etat vas engineered by Kimon Gheorgiev and 
Damian Velchev, members of the Zveno group. P a r t i c i p a n t s i n 
the 1923 coup, the Zvenars had deserted Tsankov because of the 
rei g n of t e r r o r and h i s p r o - I t a l i a n p a l i c y . They vere opposed 
to IMBO and wanted a rapprochement w i t h Yugoslavia. One of the 
f i r s t acts of the nev government vas to r e c a l l M. Constantin 
Batalou, the M i n i s t e r i n P a r i s , and appoint him Foreign M i n i s t e r ^ 2 
This was seen as an encouraging sign i n Belgrade and by May 24 
a commercial t r e a t y had been signed between the two co u n t r i e s . 
The coup d'etat was bloodless and the Mayor of Pa r i s , who 
was i n Sofia at the time, described i t as the most "elegant 
• 64 coup d'etat he had ever known. But i t vas an enormous h u m i l i a t -
65 
ion f o r King Boris, whom many Zvenars believed responsible 
f o r the i n t e r n a l unrest and the mismanagement of the country's 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The nev government set up an a u t h o r i t a r i a n regime, 
suspended the C o n s t i t u t i o n , proscribed the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s 
and outlawed IMRO. Todorov was opposed to t h i s suppression of 
c i v i c l i b e r t i e s , attacked the Zvenars i n h i s newspapers ana was 
again expelled from B u l g a r i a . ^ lie returned to Belgrade. 
Shortly a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l , he was received i n audience by 
King Alexander who asked him about recent developments: 
"Can the new government be t r u s t e d w i t h regard t o 
an a l l i a n c e ? " he asked. 
61. For the domestic unrest i n Bulgaria p r i o n to the coup 
see Swire, op. c i t . , p. 278 and Todorov, p. 255. 
62. Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . p. 139. 
63. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 64. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 282. 
65. Nikolaev, op. c i t . , pp. 72-74. 
66. Todorov, op. c i t . , p. 255. 
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"Completely," I r e p l i e d . "They're honest men. 
However, they can't l a s t very long." 
"Why?" asked the King. 
"Because they have the support of n e i t h e r the King 
nor the people. Only p a r t of the Army i s w i t h them.It'a 
possible t o be w i t h the King against the people or w i t h 
the people and against the King but not against both w h i l s t 
the King remains i n power." 
Alexander frowned. "What about the King's p o s i t i o n ? 
I shouldn't l i k e anything to happen to him e s p e c i a l l y since 
the Gheorgiev government has announced i t s desire f o r an 
understanding w i t h us. King Boris might t h i n k me a p a r t y 
to some move against h i m . " ^ 
Meanwhile, the Gheorgiev government was proceeding w i t h 
i t s outlawing of IMRO, both f o r the sake of i n t e r n a l peace and 
i n order t o create a b e t t e r understanding w i t h Yugoslavia. 
Christowe, a sympathizer of IMRO, noted t h a t , whereas i n 1928 
i t had been anhonour to be on i n t i m a t e terms w i t h the Macedonians, 
now the people sneeringly r e f e r r e d t o them as "chicagski gang. 
68 
s t e r i " . At the.time of the coup, Christowe was i n the P e t r i c h 
d i s t r i c t and described the measures taken by the new government 
to destroy the Organization: 
"Immediately upon r e c e i p t of the news of the happen 
ings i n Sof i a , the co m i t a d j i s went i n t o h i d i n g I 
remained there f o r nearly a month By the middle of 
June, when I l e f t , the l i t t l e Macedonian "empire" had been 
ransacked by the Army. IMRO put up no res i s t a n c e . The Army 
made a thorough j o b of i t . I t hauled out from the v i l l a g e s 
cartloads of r i f l e s , c a r t r i d g e s , machine guns and sub-machine 
guns, bombs, r e v o l v e r s , f l i n t l o c k s and even 'buzdugans' 
and other ancient firearms from Turkish times. From an 
• I 
o l d graveyard, 1 saw the troops c a r t out three loads of 
6 7 . I b i d . . pp. 255-56. 
68. Christowe, op. c i t . , p. 266. 
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carbines and s e v e r a l cases of c a r t r i d g e s dug out from 
69 
what vere supposed to be graves." 
I n a l l , 10 ,938 r i f l e s , 7 ,767 grenades, 47 machine guns 
and 701 ,388 rounds of ammunition were s e i z e d and 300 t e r r o r i s t s 
i n t e r n e d . ^ I n August, a l l members of the Bulgarian National 
Committee vere interned - the p o l i c e claiming possession of 
compromising documents proving 'once again" t h a t the Committee 
was'co n t r o l l e d by the d i s s o l v e d and i l l e g a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . * ^ 
There were a number of reasons why IMHO c o l l a p s e d so 
suddenly and completely. F i r s t l y , the Organization had l o s t 
i t s o r i g i n a l appeal; i n s t e a d of being a p a t r i o t i c s o c i e t y 
working f o r Macedonian autonomy or even for annexation to 
B u l g a r i a , i t had become a t e r r o r i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n , causing 
more t e r r o r and f e a r w i t h i n B u l g a r i a than abroad. Because 
of t h i s , the p r e v i o u s l y monolithic Organization had become 
divi d e d i n t o warring f a c t i o n s whose feuding aroused p u b l i c 
contempt. For the f i r s t time s i n c e 1923* B u l g a r i a had a 
government which was determined to suppress IMRO and r e s t o r e 
order w i t h i n the P e t r i c h department. L i k e a l l b u l l i e s , when 
faced w i t h determined opposition, the Organization made no 
r e s i s t a n c e and allowed i t e l f to be completely disarmed. So, 
w i t h i n three months, the redoutable IMRO, which had i n t i m i d a t e d 
Bulgarian p o l i t i c i a n s and t e r r o r i z e d Y u g o s l a v i a f o r f i f t e e n 
y e a r s , c o l l a p s e d without even a whimper, and the way was open 
for a Yugoslav-Bulgarian rapprochement. 
The Gheorgiev government never e n t e r t a i n e d the notion of 
South S l a v f e d e r a t i o n . Neither country was ready f o r i t but 
f r i e n d s h i p brought the p o s s i b i l i t y n e a r e r . Velchev himself 
believed t h a t a rapprochement between the two c o u n t r i e s would 
72 
c l o s e the Balkans to any i n t r i g u e by the Great Powers. As a 
f r i e n d l y gesture, M. Oimo Kazazov, another 1923 c o n s p i r a t o r and 69. I b i d . , pp. 2 7 3 - 7 5 . 
7 0 . Swire, op. c i t . . p. 286. 
7 1 . I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
7 2 . I b i d . , p. 2 9 5 . 
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f o r long the President of the Buigaro-Yugoslav A s s o c i a t i o n 
73 
i n S o f i a , was appointed to Belgrade. On September 17 , 1934, 
King Alexander and Queen Marie v i s i t e d S o f i a accompanied by 
J e v t i c . The Yugoslav King r e c e i v e d a great welcome. IMRO no 
longer e x i s t e d , s e v e r a l thousand e x t r e m i s t s had been e x p e l l e d 
from the c i t y and the Gheorgiev government was eager f o r an 
a l l i a n c e . Alexander, whose v i s i t had generated a r e a l enthusiasm, 
returned to Belgrade i n high s p i r i t s . I t was h i s l a s t triumph. 
Within three weeks he was dead. 
Following h i s s u c e s s f u l v i s i t to B u l g a r i a , Alexander 
t r a v e l l e d to France to complete the f i n a l l i n k of the a l l i a n c e 
f o r which he had been working. Before he l e f t Belgrade, he t o l d 
Todorov: " I look forward to much good from my t r i p to P a r i s i n 
74 
the way of s t a b i l i z i n g the European s i t u a t i o n . " On October 
9 , 1934, s h o r t l y a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l at M a r s e i l l e s , Alexander 
and the French Foreign M i n i s t e r , Barthou, who was with him, 
were shot. Following h i s a t t a c k , the a s s a s s i n shot h i m s e l f . 
I t has been the considered view of some w r i t e r s to a t t r i b -
ute the a s s a s s i n a t i o n of Alexander and Barthou to the I t a l i a n 
y 
and Hungarian governments' sponsorship of the Ustase o r g a n i z a t -
ion. T h i s view i s i n d i s p u t a b l e but i t would be u n j u s t to 
75 
exonerate B u l g a r i a . I n 1932, "Freedom or Death"., the o f f i c i a l 
p u b l i c a t i o n of IMRO, declared th a t Alexander was " a b l o o d t h i r s t y 
76 
a s s a s s i n whose death was not f a r o f f . " Besides, the a c t u a l 
a s s a s s i n was a Bulgarian. 
Kalemen, the f i r s t name of the a s s a s s i n to be published, 
was i n f a c t a cover name f o r Vlado Chernozemsky, which was i t s e l f 
77 
an a l i a s f o r h i s r e a l name - V e l i k o Dimitrov. Since h i s t o r i a n s 
7 3 . LondreB, op. c i t . pp. 2 3 6 - 3 7 . 7 4 . Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 2 5 7 . 
75- Cf. Lord Avon, The Eden Memoirs; Facing the D i c t a t o r s , 
London, 1962, pp. 1 0 8 - 1 1 . Lord Avon d i s c u s s e s I t a l i a n and Hung-
a r i a n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y but makes no mention of B u l g a r i a a t a l l . 
7 6 . Swire, op. c i t . , p. 2 8 6 . 
77* I b i d . . PP« 3 3 - 3 7 . 
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have normally r e f e r r e d to him as Chernozemsky, i t v i l l be 
convenient to continue t h e i r p r a c t i c e . He v a s born i n 1899 
and had been an agent of the Bulgarian War O f f i c e . During the 
F i r s t World War, he had served the Bulgarians extremely w e l l 
during t h e i r occupation of Southern S e r b i a and when he f l e d 
to S o f i a a t the end of the war, he came under the i n f l u e n c e 
78 
of Mihailov. I n September 1924, he murdered Oimov, a Communist 
deputy, and i n December 1930, he k i l l e d Tomalevski, a veteran 
79 
supporter of the Macedonian Organization. For these o f f e n c e s , 
Chernozemsky was sentenced to death y e t , each time, i t was h i s 
a l i a s t h a t died and he was r e l e a s e d . Todorov f e e l s that for 
Chernozemsky to have been r e l e a s e d , he must have found p r o t e c t -
ion i n some powerful o f f i c i a l quarter i n B u l g a r i a and he s t a t e s 
t h a t he has i t on the a u t h o r i t y of a high o f f i c i a l i n the Zveno 
p o l i c e force t h a t the two r e l e a s e s were made on the personal 
orders of King B o r i s . Now t h i s seems questionable, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i f we consider the source of the information, but i t i s a f a c t 
t h a t a f t e r h i s second r e l e a s e , Chernozemsky became King B o r i s ' s 
80 
chauffeur f o r a short w h i l e . Todorov s t a t e s t h a t when, on 
J u l y 15, 1932, he l e f t B u l g a r i a to work w i t h Dr. P a v e l i e and 
the Ustase, he must have had the consent of King B o r i s . And, 
81 • 
i f so, B o r i s must have had some i d e a of h i s i n t e n t i o n s . 
This a c c u s a t i o n i s i n t e r e s t i n g , for the peace makers at 
Geneva (and p a r t i c u l a r l y S i r Anthony Eden) were anxious to 
prevent a war between Yug o s l a v i a and Italy-Hungary. B u l g a r i a , 
because of her pro-Yugoslav Zveno government, was almost t o t a l l y 
v 
absolved of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and the Ustase, with t h e i r t r a i n i n g 
camps at Yanka Pusta and Borgotaro, were regarded as the bete 
78. Christowe, op. c i t . . p. 218. 79. I b i d . . pp. 217-8. 
80. Todorov, op. c i t . , pp. 261-62. One of h i s nicknames was 
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82 noire of the a f f a i r . However, the connection's between the 
Ustase and IMRO, between I t a l y and the Mushanov government, 
and between Italy-Hungary and Dr. F a v e l i c l e a d one to b e l i e v e 
t h a t there were aome i n B u l g a r i a who were by no means exempt 
8*3 
from r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the a s s a s s i n a t i o n . C e r t a i n l y , King 
B o r i s took advantage of Alexander's death. Within s i x months, 
the Gheorgiev government was overthrown ( a r o y a l nominee becom-
ing Prime M i n i s t e r ) , the old b i t t e r n e s s returned and a huge 
memorial s e r v i c e was held i n S o f i a f o r Chernozemsky. The s e r v i c e 
was attended by 500 of h i s a d m i r e r s . 8 * 
I t appears t h a t Y u g o s l a v i a was cognizant of the background 
of the a s s a s s i n a t i o n , f o r J e v t i c t o l d Swire th a t Velchev's coup 
d'etat had undoubtedly averted a European war: 
"Had Gheorgiev's government not suppressed the t e r r o r i s t s 
i n B u l g a r i a before Alexander's death, nothing would have 
r e s t r a i n e d the i n f u r i a t e d Yugoslav army from marching on 
S o f i a i n r e t r i b u t i o n . " 8 ^ 
C l e a r l y , the old cause of enmity had been removed; but what of 
the f u t u r e ? L a i r d Archer, an u n o f f i c i a l American observer i n the 
v 
Balkans, spoke to a Serbian o f f i c e r a t H i s : 
"Be t o l d me t h a t the Army i s convinced that the a s s a s s -
i n a t i o n was arranged by Germany because the Conference which 
the filing was on h i s way to attend, would have forged a r.ing 
"86 
of s t e e l about the growing power of the Reich . 
Whether Germany was or was not involved i n the a s s a s s i n a t i o n 
i s an extremely complex question but the opinion of the Serbian 
o f f i c e r was i n d i c a t i v e of what the next stage i n Yugoslav-Bulg-
a r i a n r e l a t i o n s was to be. Once Alexander had been a s s a s s i n a t e d , 
B u l g a r i a n i s o l a t i o n i s m returned and German i n f l u e n c e reigned 
supreme. 
83. P a v e l i c ' s agent i n the U.S.A. p u b l i c l y prophesied the King's 
death 2 days before the event} Swire, op. c i t . , p. 2 9 1 . 
84. I b i d . , p. 292. 85. I b i d . , p. 37. 
86. L. Archer, Balkan J o u r n a l . New York, 1944, p. 1 6 . 
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Chanter 8. 
The I n f l u e n c e of Germany 
(161) 
I n the death of King Alexander, the Balkans l o s t a r u l e r 
of strong c h a r a c t e r and a statesman of great a b i l i t y . Alexander 
had seen the need f o r Balkan s o l i d a r i t y , not only as an o b s t a c l e 
to German expansion* but a l s o as the key to the future w e l l -
being of the peoples of the p e n i n s u l a . Although he had been 
one of the major a r c h i t e c t s of the Balkan Pact, he would have 
p r e f e r r e d to secure a much c l o s e r understanding w i t h B u l g a r i a , 
whose i s o l a t i o n represented a dangerous vacuum a t the very 
heart of Balkan a f f a i r s . To t h i s end, he had been prepared to 
make s u b s t a n t i a l concessions i n c l u d i n g some of the t e r r i t o r i a l 
gains acquired by h i s country at the Treaty of N e u i l l y . I n the 
f i n a l months of h i s l i f e , Alexander jeopardized the whole 
future of Balkan s o l i d a r i t y by f o r c i n g the Entente powers to 
2 
postpone the F i f t h Balkan Conference i n d e f i n i t e l y w h i l s t he 
t r i e d to secure a stronger personal rapport w i t h King B o r i s . 
But h i s e f f o r t s were i n v a i n . 
Peter, Alexander's son and h e i r , was s t i l l a minor and 
the d i r e c t i o n of Yugoslav a f f a i r s passed i n t o the hands of a 
Regency, headed by the l a t e King's cousin, P r i n c e P a u l . P r i n c e 
Paul, regarding himself as a t r u s t e e of the Crown u n t i l the 
King came of age,'' d i d not f e e l able to make any t e r r i t o r i a l 
concessions to B u l g a r i a although he was convinced of the 
1. The attempted German coup i n A u s t r i a , which l e d to the 
death of Dr. D o l l f u s s , took place on J u l y 2 5 , 1934. 
2 . R.J. Kerner and M.N.. Howard, The Balkan Conferences .and 
the Balkan Entente 1930-35, Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a , 1936, pp. 
134-8 and 157. 3> Documents on German Foreign P o l i c y 1918-45. 
S e r i e s U, London, 1949,cc. ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as G.D). VI, no 
673. 
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importance of i n c l u d i n g B u l g a r i a i n any movement f o r Balkan 
4 
u n i t y . Furthermore, he had great doubts about King B o r i s ' s 
5 
s i n c e r i t y and regarded him as quite untrustworthy. P r i n c e 
Paul, t h e r e f o r e , made no f r e s h i n i t i a t i v e s to i n c r e a s e South 
S l a v ami$y and King B o r i s , for h i s p a r t , f e l t , no d e s i r e or 
o b l i g a t i o n to continue with the p o l i c y of rapprochement which 
Alexander had promoted during the previous year. 
King B o r i s , i t was c l e a r , was h o s t i l e to any c l o s e r 
understanding with Yugoslavia. During the v i s i t of the Yugoslav 
Sokols to S o f i a i n J u l y 1935 - a quite u n p o l i t i c a l occasion 
which aroused great p u b l i c enthusiasm- in. the c a p i t a l - King 
B o r i s avoided the ceremonies a l t o g e t h e r , although he was the 
head of the e q u i v a l e n t Bulgarian movement. The scenes which 
attended the v i s i t showed t h a t a t a popular l e v e l there was a 
great warmth o£ f e e l i n g between the two South S l a v peoples; 
but the King wished f r a t e r n i z a t i o n to be r e s t r a i n e d and the 
d a i l y papers gave a pale and d i l u t e d account of -the event.^ 
The l e a d e r s of the pro-Yugoslav movement i n B u l g a r i a 
were the Zveno government which had been i n power s i n c e the 
coup d'etat of Hay 1934. Gheorgiev and Velchev were opposed 
to any kind of f e d e r a t i o n but were wholehearted supporters 
of i n c r e a s e d f r i e n d s h i p between the two c o u n t r i e s . This was 
emphasized by the Yugoslav Pravda which wrote t h a t the Yugo-
s l a v s p i r i t , f o r so long suppressed, was now " r a i s i n g to f i r s t 
7 
place Yugo-Slav n a t i o n a l i t y i n s t e a d of Bulgarian n a t i o n a l i s m . " 
Once Alexander was dead, t h i s feature of the Zveno government 
proved i n t o l e r a b l e to King B o r i s , lie had never l i k e d Gheorgiev 
and Velchev and, s i n c e the l a t t e r was c l e a r l y determined to 
4. Documents on B r i t i s h Foreign P o l i c y . 1919-39. T h i r d 
S e r i e s , London, 1949cc ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as B.D.). VI, 
ao. 534 . 5 . I b i d . , no. 393 . 
6 . J . Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, London, 1939* pp... 23-24. 
7 . I b i d . , p. 293. 
8. I b i d . , pp. 2 9 7 - 3 0 2 . 
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g 
c u r b and r e d u c e r o y a l power, the B u l g a r i a n K i n g d e c i d e d 
to s e ek t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e Z v e n a r s and r e p l a c e them w i t h 
a p r e m i e r and p o l i c y of h i s own c h o i c e . 
E v e n b e f o r e t h e a s s a s s i n a t i o n o f K i n g A l e x a n d e r upon 
the s t r e e t s o f M a r s e i l l e s , the f u t u r e o f t h e p r o - Y u g o s l a v 
Zveno government was i n j e o p a r d y . I n B e l g r a d e , S w i r e was t o l d 
on good a u t h o r i t y t h a t when K i n g A l e x a n d e r v i s i t e d S o f i a i n 
September 1934, K i n g B o r i s p o i n t e d out V e l c h e v d u r i n g a 
r e c e p t i o n and w h i s p e r e d "Here comes our A p i s " - r e f e r r i n g to 
t h e i l l u s t r i o u s C o l o n e l D r a g u t i n D i m i t r i j e v i c who had been 
Q 
e x e c u t e d a t S a l o n i k a i n 1917• On the n e x t day, B o r i s s u d d e n l y 
a s k e d A l e x a n d e r ! 
"Mow d i d you g o t r i d of y o u r A p i s ? " 
A l e x a n d e r r e p l i e d t h a t n o t he but a r e s p o n s i b l e 
government bad r o p r o s a e d D i r o i t r i j o v i c and h i s f r i e n d s . 
A l oxandor n f t o r w a r d s t o l d h i s f r i o n d s : " K i n g U o r i s 
us It oil me f o r a f o r m u l a whoroby lie c o u l d g o t r i d of 
Volohuv. Volohuv had h o t t o r beware 1 " * ^ 
On J a n u a r y iI 2 , 1933, n r o y a l coup d ' e t a t o c c u r rod i n 
Hulfjrfiria and tho (jovurtimotit of tihoorjriov and Volchov was 
a u p p l a n t o d by t h a t of a r o y a l nominee, l i o n o r n l Z l a t o v . Many 
f a o t o r a o o n t r l uutori to t h i n coup but tho moat prominent 
rouuona f o r tlio ohungo were tho Zvono p o l i c y o f f r i o n d a h i p 
w i t h Y u g o s l a v i a and tho e o - c a l l o d " r e p u b l i c a n s c u r u " w h i c h hud 
9. U i m i t r i j o v i c ( A p i a ) was the o r g u n i z o r of tho 1903 
R e g i c i d e and tho g u i d i n g l i g h t buhind tho U j o d l n j o n j o i l l Smrt 
(Union or Uoath) uiovoment. Known to l u t o r g e n e r a t i o n s an the 
" b l a c k Hand", the movement waa r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the d o a t h of 
F r a n z F o r d i n a n d a t S a r a j e v o and was s u s p e c t e d of i n t r i g u e s 
u g a i u s t P r i n c e A l o x u n d e r and the S e r b i a n g o v o r u m e n t - i n - e x i l e 
i n l y i 6 . Dinii t r i j e v i c d i e d p r o t e s t i n g h i s i n n o c e n c e . A t a 
r e - h e a r i n g of t h e t r i a l i n l 9 5 3 i he was h e l d to have boen 
u n j u s t l y e x e c u t e d . 
10. S w i r e , op. c i t . . p. 296 . 
(164) 
been r a i s e d by Uheorgiev's plan to model the new Bulgarian 
c o n s t i t u t i o n on Portugese l i n e s , taking power from the King 
and g i v i n g i t te a m i n i s t e r i a l c o u n c i l . * Although i t was 
c l e a r t h a t a r o y a l d i c t a t o r s h i p had been e s t a b l i s h e d , the 
r e s t o r a t i o n of r o y a l power i n government and f o r e i g n p o l i c y 
was not immediately apparent. Nor was there any overnight 
change i n Bulgarian p o l i c y towards Yug o s l a v i a . I n a c a r e f u l l y 
prepared report d e s c r i b i n g the background to the coup, broadcast 
by the radio s e r v i c e s of both c o u n t r i e s on February 24, Z l a t e v 
12 
made favourable r e f e r e n c e s to "our brother Yugoslav nation." 
But General Z l a t e v did not remain long i n o f f i c e . On 
A p r i l 18, 1935, he was dismissed by King B o r i s and h i s place 
was taken by Andrei Toshev, a septuagenarian and formerly one 
of King Ferdinand's c l o s e s t a d v i s e r s , lie was known to be pro-
German i n outlook and p r i o r to the outbreak of the F i r s t World 
War, he had been Bulgarian M i n i s t e r i n Vienna. Since 1918, he 
had been c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the National Committee and 
had proved to be one of the most i n t r a n s i g e n t members of the 
13 
Bulgarian delegation at the Balkan Conferences. His appoint-
ment came at a time when Professor Tsankov - now leader on* the 
nascent Bulgarian National S o c i a l i s t P arty - was i s s u i n g f i e r y 
proclamations and threatening to overthrow the Z l a t e v govern-
14 
ment with a view to taking power h i m s e l f . The choice of Toshev 
was c l e a r l y a blow to a l l hopes of a rapprochement between 
the two c o u n t r i e s f o r , i n 1932, he had w r i t t e n a v i o l e n t l y 
15 
anti-Yugoslav book i n E n g l i s h and h i s p o l i c y i n e v i t a b l y 
1 1 . K. Todorov, Balkan F i r e b r a n d . The Autobiography of a 
Rebel. S o l d i e r and Statesman. Chicago, 1943, p. 264. 
12. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 303* 
13. I b i d . . pp. 3 0 6 - 0 7 . Cf. a l s o Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 2 6 5 . 
14. I b i d . , pp. 304-05. 
15. A. Toshev, The Bulgarian-Serbian Dispute, S o f i a , 1932 . 
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favoured a pro-German o r i e n t a t i o n . His Foreign M i n i s t e r was 
16 
Kiosseivanov, formerly Bulgarian envoy i n Belgrade. 
No sooner had the new government taken o f f i c e than 
Goering a r r i v e d from Germany for a three day s t a y . His v i s i t , 
l a s t i n g from May 25-28 1935 was nominally p a r t of the honeymoon 
which followed h i s marriage to Emmy Sonnemann i n A p r i l , but 
s i n c e he was accompanied by P r i n c e P h i l i p of Hesse and a 
number of high-ranking o f f i c i a l s , i t was c l e a r l y a v i s i t of 
some s i g n i f i c a n c e . During h i s stay, Goering had long t a l k s w ith 
King B o r i s , h i s brother, C y r i l , and the new Prime M i n i s t e r . 
I n the course of these d i s c u s s i o n s - conducted i n the p r i v a c y 
of the r o y a l hunting lodge - Goering made a c a t e g o r i c a l 
d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t "Germany would never demand B u l g a r i a ' s p a r t -
17 
i c i p a t i o n i n any war whatsoever." I n exchange f o r t h i s , 
B u l g a r i a s t a t e d her w i l l i n g n e s s to order arms from Germany 
and i n June 1955, Dr. Schacht, P r e s i d e n t of the Reichsbank, 
v i s i t e d S o f i a to d i s c u s s future economic r e l a t i o n s between 
t h e i r two c o u n t r i e s . 
The growth of economic c o l l a b o r a t i o n with Germany l e d to 
a d e c l i n e of I t a l i a n i n f l u e n c e i n B u l g a r i a . I t was noticed 
tha t B u l g a r i a j o i n e d w i t h Y u g o s l a v i a and the other Balkan 
18 
s t a t e s i n applying the League sanctions a g a i n s t I t a l y . (What 
was not immediately discovered was t h a t Hungary bought up the 
sanctioned exports and r e s o l d them to I t a l y ) . O v e r the 
whole peninsula, the export-import r e s t r i c t i o n s upon trade 
with I t a l y presented an open i n v i t a t i o n to commercial i n t e r e s t s 
i n B e r l i n . The Balkan n a t i o n s , possessing s i m i l a r products, s o l d 
1 6 . B i s appointment to Belgrade was p r i o r to the coup of 
May 1934, when he was r e c a l l e d . 
1 7 . N.P. NIkolaev, L a destinee tragique d'un r o i , Uppsala, 
1952, p. I 6 5 . See a l s o pp. 80-81. 
18. L. Archer, Balkan J o u r n a l , New York, 1944, p. 28. 
1 9 . Swire, op. c i t . , p. 329 . 
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20 l i t t l e to each other and the Western c o u n t r i e s had no great 
need for Yugoslav or Bulgarian exports. Consequently, the 
market vas vide open f o r Germany, who proceeded to take a 
larg e percentage of Yugoslav exports (mainly c e r e a l s and wheat) 
i n exchange f o r a high quota of German imports (chemical prod-
u c t s , machinery and medical s u p p l i e s ) . By 1936, almost 50$ of 
Yugoslavia's e x t e r n a l commerce was with Germany. B u l g a r i a , too, 
although a much poorer country, soon found that some 42$ of 
21 
her e x t e r n a l trade was going the same way. By the beginning 
22 
of 1938, t h i s percentage had r i s e n to 60$ . 
The appointment of Toshev as Prime M i n i s t e r was followed 
by i n t e r n a l changes w i t h i n B u l g a r i a i t s e l f . I n S o f i a , the houses 
of those known to be " a n t i - M i h a i l o s i s t " were searched and many 
of Mihailov's supporters were s e t f r e e . The P e t r i c h department, 
dismantled i n June 1934, was allowed to recover i t s former 
s t a t u s and Volkov returned to B u l g a r i a from I t a l y and was 
o f f i c i a l l y r e c e i v e d by King B o r i s . I n the meantime, there was 
a purge of Velchev's f o l l o w e r s and a Supremist Macedonian, Simon 
23 
Hadev, was sent to be Bulgarian M i n i s t e r i n London. On June 
29 , King B o r i s passed a decree-law, banning a l l " p o l i t i c a l 
p a r t i e s , groups, c u r r e n t s , movements, c i r c l e s and c e l l s . " 
Velchev, who was rumoured to be planning a p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e 
between the L i b e r a l and Agrarian p a r t i e s , was advised to leave 
the country and departed for Belgrade w i t h h i s government's 
consent. W h i l s t abroad, he was a guest of Colonel Panic, the 
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t of-the Bulgaro-Yugoslav a s s o c i a t i o n and a c l o s e 
2 0 . Kerner and Howard, op. c i t . . p. 23 , give the following 
rough estimates o f f Balkan trade: 
I n t e r - B a l k a n to C e n t r a l Europe To W. Europe. 
B u l g a r i a . 12$ 45 . 6 $ 30js> 
Yugoslavia. 8$ 56fc 2b.8> 
2 1 . M.Padev, Escape from the Balkans, London, 1943i pp. 9 7 - 8 . 
2 2 . G J ) . , V, no. 167 . 
2 3 . Swire, op. c i t . . p. 309 . 
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24 f r i e n d of Dr, Mac'ek, the C r o a t i a n l e a d e r . 
These a c t i o n s i n B u l g a r i a provoked growing u n r e s t . 
E l e c t i o n s which were due to be held, were postponed t i l l 
" e a r l y next year" and there was mounting d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with 
the Prime M i n i s t e r . During September, General Zaimov, I n s p e c t o r 
of A r t i l l e r y and P r e s i d e n t of the M i l i t a r y League, began to 
negotiate for the formation of a popular National Bloc 
r e p r e s e n t i n g a l l moderate p o l i t i c a l elements, w i t h a view to 
forming a genuinely r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government. But, because of 
the June decree-law banning a l l p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s , Zaimov' 
found himself i n a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e there 
was a p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the M i l i t a r y League i t s e l f would be 
d i v i d e d on the i s s u e . By the end of September, the s i t u a t i o n 
had s u f f i c i e n t l y d e t e r i o r a t e d w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t Velchev's 
f r i e n d s urged him to r e t u r n , hoping t h i s would u n i t e the League 
and give i t a chance of s u c c e s s . The i n v i t a t i o n c oincided w i t h 
renewed t a l k of republicanism and Toshev l e t i t be known that 
he was t h i n k i n g of asking the Yugoslav government to i n t e r n 
25 
Velchev i n t h e i r country. Within B u l g a r i a , m a r t i a l law was 
proclaimed and a l l army leave was c a n c e l l e d . 
On October 2, Velchev returned to B u l g a r i a and was a r r e s t e d 
at S l i v n i t s a . His capture was accompanied by widespread a r r e s t s 
- the o f f i c i a l f i g u r e being put a t 2 1 5 . I t was widely reported 
t h a t Velchev had c o l l a b o r a t e d w i t h Kosta Todorov and members 
of the Yugoslav government and had drawn up applot which 
involved plans f o r the murder of King B o r i s , Queen Ioanna, 
the government m i n i s t e r s and a number of o f f i c e r s and l e a d i n g 
c i v i l i a n s . One of those a r r e s t e d a t t h i s time was t o l d t h a t 
"Velchev has crossed the f r o n t i e r with Kosta Todorov and 
50 ,000 Serbian d i n a r s . " The i m p l i c a t i o n of c o m p l i c i t y w i t h 
Velchev i n such a p l o t so angered the Yugoslav government t h a t 
24. I b i d . , pp. 310-11 
25. I b i d . . pp. 314 - 1 5 . Cf. w i t h Nikolaev, op. c i t . . pp. 81-2 
f o r the r o y a l i s t viewpoint. 2 6 . I b i d . . p. 3 1 6 . 
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the B u lgarian government, was obliged to deny the a l l e g a t i o n . 
A Western diplomat observed to Swire: "Toahev wishes to r e v e r t 
27 
to the old p o l i c y of the M i h a i l o v i s t s to whom he belonged." 
The t r i a l of Velchev, which l a s t e d two months, began i n 
S o f i a on December 18, 1935• The proceedings were held 'in camera* 
and among the prosecution and defence w i t n e s s e s were to be 
found many leading B u l g a r i a n f i g u r e s - i n c l u d i n g Tsankov, 
Z l a t e v and Gheorgiev. With the exception of a piece of hearsay 
from one wit n e s s , that Velchev had wanted an " I n t e g r a l Y u g o s l a v i a 
28 
under King Peter" - a statement which amounted to no more 
than a personal opinion - no evidence whatsoever was published 
to prove the g u i l t of the accused or to confirm the e x i s t e n c e 
of an a n t i - r o y a l i s t conspiracy hatched by Velchev i n Belgrade. 
This connection w i t h Y u g o s l a v i a and Velchev's well-known 
d e s i r e to e s t a b l i s h bet.ter r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s , 
made the outcome of h i s t r i a l a delicate, diplomatic problem. 
For, although the German government, King B o r i s and Toshev 
were a l l anxious to get r i d of Velchev, i t was feared t h a t the 
removal of so prominent a f i g u r e would s e r i o u s l y endanger the 
p o l i c y of b i l a t e r a l amity between Y u g o s l a v i a and B u l g a r i a , by 
which Germany hoped to undermine Balkan s o l i d a r i t y i n the 
p e n i n s u l a . However, the problem was e a s i l y solved. S t o j a d i n o v i c , 
the Prime M i n i s t e r of Yugoslavia, who was e q u a l l y i n t e r e s t e d 
i n promoting b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany, suppressed a l l 
d e t a i l s of the t r i a l and i t s proceedings i n the Yugoslav news-
papers. Following t h i s encouraging s i g n , King B o r i s paid an 
29 
unexpected three-day v i s i t to Belgrade and reached an under-
standing with S t o j a d i n o v i c t h a t even i f Velchev were condemned 
to death, the rapprochement which Germany wished to see between 
the two kingdoms would continue. Three days l a t e r , on February 
2 7 . I b i d . , p. 314. 
28. I b i d . . p. 3 2 2 . T h i s hearsay was presented by Kojoukharov 
(deputy leader of the Bu l g a r i a n National S o c i a l i s t P a r t y ) . 
2 9 . February 16-19* 1936. 
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22, 1936, Velchev was sentenced to death by hanging, a 
v e r d i c t which was postponed a f t e r vigorous opposition i n 
England, Yugoslavia and B u l g a r i a i t s e l f . On March 20, the 
Bulgarian P u b l i c Prosecutor admitted th a t there had been 
grave i r r e g u l a r i t i e s a t the t r i a l hut four days l a t e r , King 
B o r i s confirmed the v e r d i c t and s a i d that Velchev would be 
executed w i t h i n twenty-four hours. His announcement evoked 
widespread disapproval and, on March 28, " f o r reasons of s t a t e " , 
' 30 
the sentence was commuted to one of l i f e - l o n g imprisonment. 
One r e s u l t of the s e r i o u s p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s which had surrounded 
Velchev'a a r r e s t and t r i a l was the r e s i g n a t i o n of Toshev on 
November 2 3 , 1935 . His successor was Kiosseivanov who, l i k e 
h i s predecessor, was a r o y a l nominee. Baskolnikov, the S o v i e t 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n B u l g a r i a , d escribed him as " a s o f t p i l l o w 
31 
on which King B o r i s f i n d s i t convenient to s l e e p . " ^ When he 
became Prime M i n i s t e r , Kiosseivanov r e t a i n e d the p o r t f o l i o f o r 
f o r e i g n a f f a i r s and remained i n r o y a l favour u n t i l February 
1940. 
From the time of the Velchev t r i a l , when the f i r s t inroads 
were being made, the scope of German i n f l u e n c e and German 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n B u l g a r i a and Y u g o s l a v i a s w i f t l y i n c r e a s e d . 
During a tour of A u s t r i a i n 1936, Todorov met one of h i s Bulg-
a r i a n acquaintances named S t o y i l o v . He reported t h a t S t o y i l o v 
asked him: 
"Are you s t i l l i n favour of an a l l i a n c e between 
B u l g a r i a and Yugoslavia?" 
"As always," Todorov had r e p l i e d . 
"Well," declared S t o y i l o v triumphantly, "so i s 
Germany. Goebbels t o l d me so. You can continue to work 
for the a l l i a n c e and d i r e c t propaganda i n both c o u n t r i e s , 
32 
i n B u l g a r i a and Yugoslavia." 
30. Swire, op. c i t . . pp. 316-24, d e s c r i b e s the t r i a l and the 
extent of the p u b l i c outcry a g a i n s t Velchev's sentence. 
3 1 . Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 2 7 4 . 3 2 . I b i d . . p. 2 7 3 . 
( 1 7 0 ) 
S t o y i l o v even agreed to arrange f o r Todorov's expulsion to 
be l i f t e d f or t h i s pirpose. But Todorov refused and when he 
returned to Yugoslavia, he t r a v e l l e d around the country 
d e l i v e r i n g a l e c t u r e , " H i t l e r and the S l a v s " . He continued 
tc 
33 
doinh. t h i s u n t i l S t o j a d i n o v i c forbade him o conduct any 
f u r t h e r p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n Y u g o s l a v i a . 
Dr. Milan S t o j a d i n o v i c , whom King B o r i s regarded as 
34 
"the a b l e s t statesman i n Yugoslavia", was Prime M i n i s t e r 
from June 1935 u n t i l February 1939• He had c l o s e f i n a n c i a l 
35 
t i e s w ith Germany and responded warmly to the German i n i t i a t -
i v e f o r a rapprochement. S t o j a d i n o v i c r e a l i z e d t h a t Yugoslavia's 
c h i e f danger was I t a l y and f e l t t h a t a resumption of I t a l i a n 
i n t r i g u e i n the Balkans upon the conclusion of h o s t i l i t i e s i n 
A b y s s i n i a was a very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y . But he was a l s o aware 
that the Balkan Entente made no p r o v i s i o n f o r Yugoslavia's 
defence i n the event of an I t a l i a n a t t a c k . He b e l i e v e d t h a t 
Y u g o s l a v i a had to make other arrangements and f o r t h i s reason 
he welcomed the support of Germany and was w i l l i n g to seek a 
c l o s e r understanding w i t h B u l g a r i a . I n e v i t a b l y , the power of 
the Entente was weakened, and the New York Times noted the 
diminishing value of the 1934 Pact: 
"Yugoslavia's i n t e r e s t i n the Pact i n the future 
w i l l be s m a l l , for the r e s e r v a t i o n s now made, abandon 
her to I t a l i a n aggression. As the Pact stands, i t i s 
l i t t l e more than an a l l i a n c e a g a i n s t B u l g a r i a . The. move-
ment f o r a rapprochement between Yug o s l a v i a and B u l g a r i a 
i s c o n s t a n t l y growing i n t h i s c o u n t r y . " ( i . e . Y u g o s l a v i a ) ^ 
3 3 . I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
3 4 . G.D.. V I , no. 6 7 3 . 
35* Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 2 7 1 . Before h i s Premiership, S t o j " 
adinovic had been a banker i n Belgrade and a l s o M i n i s t e r of 
Finance. I n both these r o l e s , he had acquired wide-ranging 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l connections. 
3 6 . New York Times. May 7» 1936 . 
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Dr. S t o j a d i n o v i c recognized the f a i l i n g s of the Pact and, 
at the p r i c e of s a c r i f i c i n g Balkan s o l i d a r i t y and i n the 
face of strong opposition, abandoned the t r a d i t i o n a l pro-
French p o l i c y which had been pursued by King Alexander and 
decided to come to terms with B u l g a r i a - and I J t a l y . ^ 
I n December 1936, S t o j a d i n o v i c informed the Balkan Entente 
that h i s country was going to s i g n a separate pact with Bulg-
a r i a . His d e c i s i o n was a major blow to the Entente for the 
t e x t of the 1934 Pact s t a t e d t h a t none of the s i g n a t o r i e s 
should open n e g o t i a t i o n s with other nations without the know-
ledge and consent of t h e i r c o - s i g n a t o r i e s . S t o j a d i n o v i c • s 
plan evoked a l i v e l y opposition from the other three s t a t e s 
but such was the weakness of the Entente th a t they could do 
nothing at a l l to stop him. 
On January 24, 1937, a Pact of " E t e r n a l F r i e n d s h i p and 
I n v i o l a b l e Peace" was signed between Yugoslavia and B u l g a r i a 
i n Belgrade. The terms of the t r e a t y - s u r e l y one of the s h o r t e s t 
ever made - ran thus: 
" A r t i c l e 1 . There s h a l l be i n v i o l a b l e peace and 
s i n c e r e and e t e r n a l f r i e n d s h i p between the Yugoslav 
Kingdom and the Bulgarian Kingdom. 
A r t i c l e 2. The present t r e a t y s h a l l be r a t i f i e d 
and the instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n exchanged as soon 
39 
as p o s s i b l e . " 
S i r Edward Boyle, commenting on the Pact, observed: 
3 7 . L.S. S t a v r i a n o s , Balkan Federation. A H i s t o r y of the 
Movement towards Balkan Unity i n Modern Times, Northampton, 
Mass., 1944, p. 246 . 
3 8 . P. P i p i n e l i s , C a i t i f f B u l g a r i a . London, 1944, p. 4 . 
39 . Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , South E a s t e r n 
Europe. A P o l i t i c a l and Economic Survey, London, 1939» p« 4 0 . 
The instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n were exchanged a t the Bulgarian 
l e g a t i o n on the following day. 
(172) 
" I n the t r e a t y there i s no mention of Macedonia, 
or of what Dr. Stojadinovic has c a l l e d 'Bulgarian m i n o r i t -
i e s ' But because the question i s not r e f e r r e d to i n 
the Treaty, i t would be r i d i c u l o u s to i n f e r t h a t i t was 
not very much i n the minds of the n e g o t i a t o r s on e i t h e r 
side As to Macedonia, the Press, l i k e the Treaty 
40 
i t s e l f , remains s i l e n t . " 
There can be no doubt t h a t , whatever i t s f a i l i n g s , the 
Pact of January 1937 was popular and was warmly welcomed i n 
both Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. One w r i t e r declared t h a t "even 
hospitable Belgrade surpassed i t s e l f i n the welcome i t gave 
41 
to the Bulgarian Premier," and another hoped t h a t i t might 
"open a new chapter not merely f o r the two powers 
p r i m a r i l y concerned but f o r a l l the Balkan peoples. I n 
both countries the Treaty has been received w i t h immense 
enthusiasm, though i t i s r i g h t to remember t h a t i n no 
Balkan state i s there at present free expression of 
opinion. For a l l t h a t , nobody can read the reports of the 
ceremony which attended the signature of the t r e a t y and 
the scenes i n the s t r e e t s , both i n Belgrade and So f i a , 
without being convinced t h a t the t r e a t y has behind i t i n 
42 
both countries an enormous mass of popular approval." 
Whatever the p o p u l a r i t y accorded to the t r e a t y , the cost was 
considerable. Not only d i d i t mark the f i r s t fundemental r i f t 
i n the Balkan Entente but i t also broke the b a r r i e r of c o l l e c t i v e 
43 
s e c u r i t y i n the Balkans. I t ignored the c r u c i a l question of 
Bulgaria's f r o n t i e r s and ignored her r e l a t i o n s h i p to the Balkan 
Entente. This meant t h a t while Yugoslavia expressed a w i l l i n g n e s s 
to l i v e p eacefully w i t h Bulgaria, King Boris's government could 
40. S i r Edward Boyle,"Towards Balkan UnityJ Contemporary 
Review CLI ( A p r i l 1937), pp. 406-7. 
41. H..D.Harrison, The Soul of Yugoslavia, London, 1941, p. 242. 
42. Boyle, op. c i t . . p. 405. 
43. GQD., V, no. 158. 
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continue to work f o r an overthrow of the status quo and r e t a i n 
t h e i r r e v i s i o n i s t hopes. Above a l l , i t represented a great 
success f o r German diplomacy, under whose aegis i t had been 
i t \ 
45 
44 
i n i t i a t e d . As such, i t was warmly welcomed by Germany,Hungary 
and the pro-Axis press. 
46 
Having severely weakened the power of the Entente, the 
Germans concentrated t h e i r main p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the 
Balkans upon Bulgaria. Todorov, who was o f f i c i a l l y permitted 
to r e t u r n to Bulgaria i n December 1936, met S t o y i l o v i n S o fia 
e a r l y i n 1937• He asked hints 
"Are the Germans spending a l o t of money i n Bulgaria?" 
"Enormous sums," r e p l i e d S t o y i l o v . "Nearly a l l the 
large newspapers are i n t h e i r hands. Zora. Utro and 
Dnevnik get t h e i r newsprint f r e e from Germany and several 
m i l l i o n leva a year go to the managers of those papers 
f o r t h e i r personal expenses. German agents are i n every 
47 
p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , paid according t o t h e i r importance." 
Todorov l a t e r discovered t h a t the cost of maintaining the 
German propaganda campaign came from the payment f o r Bulgarian 
imports from Germany, 10% of each payment being paid i n l o c a l 
currency to a German agency i n S o f i a . As has been noted, the 
value of Bulgaro-German trade s t e a d i l y increased i n the period 
1935-39 and the funds at the disposal of the propaganda agency 
48 
amounted to some 150-200 m i l l i o n l eva a year. 
During the period f o l l o w i n g the conclusion of the Yugoslav-
Bulgarian Pact, great emphasis was placed upon Bulgaria's 
desire f o r peace and her determination to remain n e u t r a l . A 
44. Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , op. c i t . , l o c . c i t . 
45* P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . , p. 5 . 
46 . The power of the Entente was f u r t h e r weakened by the 
Italo-Yugoslav Pact of Friendship which was signed on March 
25 , 1937. 
47 . Todorov, op. c i t . , pp. 275-76. 
48. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . ( £6-8 m i l l i o n s a t 1938-9 v a l u e s ) . 
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p i c t u r e of t h i s period i s given by L a i r d Archer who reported 
from Sofia t h a t there vas 
"not much f e e l i n g of approaching var here. I 
understand t h a t the 'land army* by which Bulgaria has 
kept up the t r a i n i n g of her youth i n s u b s t i t u t e f o r 
the former c o n s c r i p t i o n forbidden by the 'peace t r e a t y 1 , 
i s d r i l l i n g a l l over the country, using spades and 
p i t c h f o r k s f o r weapons. The M i n i s t e r of War i s n e g o t i a t -
49 
ing w i t h H i t l e r f o r German arnaments." 
However, Swire's experience of Bulgaria's m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n was 
somewhat d i f f e r e n t . S h o r t l y before h i s expulsion from Bulgaria, 
he was awoken by 40 tanks rumbling through the s t r e e t s of Sofia 
by n i g h t - t h i s although Bulgaria was not supposed to possess 
50 
any tanks1 I n June 1937, Baron von Neurath, the then German 
Foreign M i n i s t e r , v i s i t e d Sofia and assured the Bulgarian 
government " t h a t Germany would respect Bulgaria's l e g i t i m a t e 
51 
desires, i n whatever circumstances presented themselves." 
This assurance was repeated by Goering to Gounev, the Bulgarian 
f i n a n c i a l agent i n B e r l i n , i n October 1937* when the l a t t e r 
t o l d Goering t h a t h i s country intended to remain n e u t r a l 
52 
i n the event of any f u t u r e c o n f l i c t . 
And yet the question must be asked: "How genuine was t h i s 
n e u t r a l i t y ? " King B o r i s , who exerted a permanent in f l u e n c e on 
the d i r e c t i o n of Bulgarian f o r e i g n p o l i c y , t o l d Clodius, the 
Deputy D i r e c t o r of the German Economic P o l i c y Department, t h a t : 
"he knew t h a t Bulgaria must always remain at 
Germany's side and t h a t Bulgaria's n a t i o n a l hopes could 
only be f u l f i l l e d , i f indeed at a l l , w i t h the a i d of 
Germany and the Fuhrer. He would also not f o r g e t t h a t 
the l i b e r a t i o n of Bulgaria from the m i l i t a r y shackles 
49* L. Archer, Balkan Journal. New York, 1944, p. 51. 
50. Swire, op. c i t . . p. 308. 
51. Nikolaev, op. c i t . . p. 165. 
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of the Treaty of N e u i l l y would not have been possible 
* 53 without the successes achieved by the Fuhrer " 
There can be no doubt t h a t t h i s c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h Germany 
was motivated simply by expediency. I t was a p o l i c y of greedy 
54 
opportunism. The Germans knew t h i s and took advantage of i t . 
A l a t e r w r i t e r , f o r two years Sofia correspondent of "The Times", 
summed up the a t t i t u d e of the Bulgarian King i n a more succint 
and humourous fashion: 
"Boris i s i n no way p r o - B r i t i s h . Neither has he 
ever been pro-German i n any sense but t a c t i c a l l y . And 
when h i s hopes of r e t a i n i n g h i s throne depend on i t , 
he w i l l again pose as p r o - B r i t i s h . He: has always been 
55 
and only been 'pro-Boris'!" 
I t was i n t h i s s p i r i t t h a t Bulgaria conducted her pre-war p o l i c y 
of n e u t r a l i t y . On h i s r e t u r n from a v i s i t t o London i n November 
1937f he c a l l e d i n to see a f r i e n d i n Switzerland who r e c a l l e d 
t h a t 
"the King was pale, t h i n , t i r e d and very nervous. 
He t o l d me of the conversations he had had w i t h the 
English and French p o l i t i c a l leaders, lie had made an a l l - o u t 
e f f o r t to persuade them of Bulgaria's good i n t e n t i o n s , , 
of t h e i r simple desire to l i v e a t peace, i n a sincere 
n e u t r a l i t y , w i t h o u t a t t a c h i n g themselves to any Axis 
( a l l i a n c e ) . 
" I n h i s journeys through Europe, the King of Bulgaria 
d i d not neglect Germany} indeed he could not neglect i t . 
Assuredly, he nourished not the s l i g h t e s t sympathy f o r 
H i t l e r , but. he was too i n t e l l i g e n t not to see t h a t the 
Reich was r a p i d l y becoming a power w i t h which one had to 
reckon, which could f u r n i s h , i n the near f u t u r e , a support 
and source of help to Bulgaria, about which the Western 
5 3 . GjJD., V I , no. 673 . 
5 4 . G^)., V, no. 2 7 4 . 
5 5 . Padev, op. c i t . . pp. 7 5 - 7 6 . 
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statesmen cared l i t t l e , although they showed themselves 
56 
favourable towards i t s King." 
But although Boris may have "nourished not the s l i g h t e s t 
sympathy f o r l i i t l e r " , there appears to be ample j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
f o r b e l i e v i n g t h a t there was a d i r e c t c o m p l i c i t y between the 
two men. Todorov reported t h a t King Boris paid several v i s i t s 
to B e r l i n on the p r e t e x t of v i s i t i n g h i s f a t h e r , ex-King 
Ferdinand, but on each occasion had met H i t l e r q u i e t l y , ' w i t h o u t 
pomp or o f f i c i a l n o t i c e . Ten days before the Ans'ch'luss, Boris 
t r a n s f e r r e d h i s f a v o u r i t e m i n i s t e r , Parvan Draganov, from 
Vienna to B e r l i n , r e p l a c i n g him w i t h Peter Neikov, a diplomat 
he was known to d i s l i k e h e a r t i l y . "Toanyone who knew the King's 
character," stated Todorov, " t h i s was evidence t h a t Boris was 
57 
forewarned of Austria's impending annexation." I t i s also 
s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t Boris was i n B e r l i n on September 24, 1938 
eg 
during the Munich n e g o t i a t i o n s over Czechoslovakia and again 
i n March 1939i j u s t before the rump s t a t e was incorporated i n t o 
the T h i r d R e i c h . 5 9 
During the spring of 1938, the Bulgarian government entered 
i n t o armament n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h Germany. On February 1, Clodius 
reported t h a t the King had p r i v a t e l y informed Goering of h i s 
government's i n t e n t i o n to embark upon a large arms programme as 
soon as p o s s i b l e . ^ Although the m i l i t a r y clauses of N e u i l l y 
were s t i l l i n existence, the Bulgarian government sought the 
immediate d e l i v e r y of a number of heavy weapons. The cost of 
t h i s re-armament was beyond Bulgaria's immediate resources and 
much of the n e g o t i a t i o n s centred upon how long i t would be before 
56. Nikolaev, op. c i t . , pp. 82-84. 
57. Todorov, op. c i t . . p. 288. 
58. GJ)., V I , no. 320. W h i l s t i n B e r l i n , he had t a l k s w i t h 
Bibpentrop. 59. G.D. V, no. 312. 
60. I b i d . , no. I 6 7 . Bulgaria hoped f o r a programme costing 
£100 m i l l i o n KM ( £&£ m i l l i o n s a t 1938-9 values) w i t h repayment 
over 10-15 years. 
(177) 
the c r e d i t could be repaid. The German agencies i n t e r e s t e d i n 
the economic aspect of the t r a n s a c t i o n , as w e l l as Goering 
himself, f e l t t h a t a t r a n s a c t i o n of t h i s scale was out of.t h e 
question on purely f i n a n c i a l grounds*** but Clodius declared 
t h a t " i t would be p o l i t i c a l l y i n d e f e n s i b l e to allow the negot-
i a t i o n s to collapse."^^ On. March 12, on the eve of the Anschluss, 
a secret arms proto c o l between Germany and Bulgaria was signed 
fit 
i n B e r l i n . 3 I n t h i s p r o t o c o l , signed as German troops were 
crossing i n t o A u s t r i a , the Germans agreed to provide Bulgaria 
y. 64 
w i t h war m a t e r i e l to the value of 30 m i l l i o n RM i n exchange 
f o r which they received s u b s t a n t i a l mining concessions i n 
Bulgaria. ,^  
By the end of May 1938, Rumelin, the German M i n i s t e r i n 
Sofia, was able to r e p o r t : "Bulgaria's a t t i t u d e can be considered 
e n t i r e l y f r i e n d l y towards us." I n h i s memorandum, he noted t h a t 
i n the May c r i s i s over Czechoslovakia, Germany's; p o l i t i c a l 
ascendancy had awakened strong sympathies and admiration. He 
also believed t h a t German m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h had l e f t a deep 
impression upon Bulgaria and t h a t t h i s i n t u r n had revived hopes 
65 
of t r e a t y r e v i s i o n i n the Balkans. 
Although at t h i s time r e l a t i o n s between the two South Slav 
states remained good,^- w i t h o f f i c i a l speeches de s c r i b i n g t h e i r 
67 
f r i e n d s h i p as " c o r d i a l and eager" and Boris s t a t i n g t h a t there 
was every reason f o r supporting S t o j a d i n o v i c , ^ 8 - the other 
Balkan states were becoming alarmed by the example Germany was 
s e t t i n g i n Central Europe. They feared t h a t once force was seen 
61. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
62 . G.D., V, no. 175. 
6 3 . I b i d . , no. 181. 
64. £2£ m i l l i o n s ( at 1938-9 v a l u e s ) . 
65 . G.D., V, no. 206. 
66. I b i d . , no. 162. 
67. P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . , p. 7. 
68. G.D.. V, no. 210. 
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to be the prelude to t r e a t y r e v i s i o n , Bulgaria would embark 
69 
upon a s i m i l a r p o l i c y . This l e d to t a l k s between Bulgaria 
and the Balkan Entente. Following these, General Metaxas as 
President of the Entente Council signed a Treaty of Friendship 
and Non-aggression w i t h Bulgaria at Salonika, on J u l y 31» 
1938. I n the Salonika Pact, Bulgaria promised not to change 
her e x i s t i n g boundaries by force but to submit a l l disputes 
w i t h her neighbours to a r b i t r a t i o n and a j u d i c i a l settlement. 
I n exchange f o r t h i s promise, the Entente Powers agreed t h a t 
Bulgaria should be allowed to re-arm and decided t h a t the clauses 
of the Convention of Lausanne p r o v i d i n g f o r the d e - m i l i t a r i z a t i o n 
70 * 
of Bulgaria's f r o n t i e r s should lapse. S t o j a d i n o v i c , who had 
been the f i r s t to weaken the Balkan Entente by h i s Yugoslav-
Bulgarian Treaty of 1937, claimed t h a t the Salonika Pact was 
i n f a c t h i s own personal achievement.^ 
The Munich c r i s i s and the bloodless p a r t i t i o n of Czecho-
slov a k i a had a profound e f f e c t upon the Balkan s t a t e s . S i r 
Anthony Eden has observed t h a t the argument f o r Chamberlain's 
Munich p o l i c y " r e s t s on the dangerous assumptions t h a t demands 
f o r s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , whatever t h e i r source, should override 
accepted i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundaries and t h a t the t h r e a t of force 
72 
should excuse a f a i l u r e to f u l f i l i n t e r n a t i o n a l engagements." 
The p o l i c y of French and B r i t i s h leaders at Munich gave a 
carte blanche to a l l those other states w i t h i r r e d e n t i s t 
ambitions. I n Bulgaria, the pro-German enthusiasm aroused by 
the May c r i s i s returned, and w i t h i t , a vigorous r e v i v a l i n 
69. Stavrianos, op. c i t . . p. 249. At about t h i s time, L i t v i n o v , 
the Soviet Foreign Commissar, urged Bulgaria to j o i n the 
Balkan Entente. His suggestion evoked no response, Cf. G.D., 
V, no. 206. 
70 . Documents on I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . Pre-war Series I . 
London, 1938, pp. 287-88. 71 . G. P.. V, no. 216. 
72 . Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs; The Reckoning. London, 
1965. p. 30. 
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r e v i s i o n i s t a g i t a t i o n . I n Sof i a , there were w i l d rumours of 
immediate t e r r i t o r i a l concessions to induce Bulgaria t o 
73 
enter the Balkan Entente, and even Kiosseivanov's p o l i c y 
74 
of moderation and n e u t r a l i t y came under heavy attack. On 
October 3 1 , 1938, the Foreign M i n i s t e r s of the two countries 
met at Nis to discuss the p o s s i b i l i t y of f r o n t i e r changes 
but the Yugoslavs were not, at t h a t moment, prepared to make 
75 
the s l i g h t e s t concession. 
Four days l a t e r , Draganov, now Bulgarian M i n i s t e r i n 
B e r l i n , brought up the question of "Bulgarian a s p i r a t i o n s i n 
the Dobrudja and also v i s - a - v i s Yugoslavia." Although he 
stated t h a t h i s government was " i n t e n t only upon r e c e i v i n g 
adequate p r o t e c t i o n f o r her m i n o r i t i e s " , Draganov went on to 
speculate about the most opportune moment to put forward 
Bulgaria's r e v i s i o n i s t claims. Weizs&cker, the German State 
Secretary to whom he spoke, remarked t h a t the season f o r war 
was now over f o r t h a t year. Draganov promptly declared t h a t , 
despite the contagious e f f e c t s of the Czechoslovak i n c i d e n t , 
hi s country had no i n t e n t i o n of f o r c i n g her r e v i s i o n i s t claims 
but was merely wishing t o t a l k over the problem w i t h her f r i e n d s ? ^ 
7 3 . S i r Edward Boyle, "Bulgaria 1939", Contemporary Beview, 
CLV ( A p r i l 1939) pp. 4 1 3 - 4 . 
7 4 . New York Times. November 29 , 1938 . The rumours and t h r e a t 
to Kiosseivanov's p o s i t i o n coincided w i t h r e v i s i o n i s t speculation 
i n the So f i a Press. Cf. GJ)., V, no. 2 5 1 . 
7 5 . During the summer, there had been a great demand f o r a 
r e t u r n to a democratic c o n s t i t u t i o n . As i n Bulgaria, e l e c t i o n s 
were due and i n the Yugoslav e l e c t i o n s of December 1938 , S t o j -
adinovic's p a r t y , the J.R.Z., secured a narrow v i c t o r y , g a i n i n g 
54.4J& of the p o l l . Serbian d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n f i g u r e d prominently 
i n the e l e c t i o n . 
76. Memorandum by Weizsacker, November 3 , 1938. G.D.. V, no. 2 4 0 . 
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Draganov's conversation w i t h Weizsacker, coming so soon a f t e r the 
Munich Agreement, makes i t c l ear t h a t Bulgaria hoped to p r o f i t 
from Germany's diplomatic v i c t o r y , and secure German support 
to resolve her ovn " l e g i t i m a t e grievances." I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t 
these demands vere repeated by Draganov on September 11, 1939* 
March 23 , 1940 and June 18, 1940 - on each occasion when the 
78 
German diplomatic and m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n seemed strong. 
Thus- the Munich autumn drew to a close. German i n f l u e n c e , 
which at the time of King Alexander's death had been n e g l i g i b l e , 
was now a l l - p e r v a d i n g . Yugoslavia, under the i n c r e a s i n g l y d o u b t f u l 
leadership of S t o j a d i n o v i c , no longer looked to the Western 
democracies f o r guidance and followed an ever more pro-Axis 
p o l i c y . Bulgaria, sensing t h a t the i n i t i a t i v e now l a y w i t h H i t l e r , 
c o n f i d e n t l y looked forward to t e r r i t o r i a l changes which would 
destroy the i n i q u i t i e s of H e u i l l y . Europe waited. The Balkans 
waited. And Yugoslav-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s , which f o r f i v e years 
had enjoyed an uneasy peace, hovered u n c e r t a i n l y upon events 
which were not of t h e i r own making. 
78. Cf. Memorandum by Weizsacker, June 18, 1940. G.D.. IX, 
no. 478. 
Chapter 9. 
(181) 
The Destruction of Relations. 
(182) 
E a r l y i n 1939» there were p o l i t i c a l changes i n Yugoslavia. 
S t o j a d i n o v i c , who had done so much to br i n g h i s country closer 
to I t a l y and Germany but who was suspected of designs against 
the Crown, was dismissed and h i s place taken by the former 
M i n i s t e r of Social Security - D r a g i l a Cvetkovic.* Stojadinovic•s 
dismissal n a t u r a l l y came as a great disappointment to H i t l e r , 
2 * Mussolini - and King Boris. But Cincar-Markovic, who became 
the new Foreign M i n i s t e r , had been Yugoslavia's ambassador i n 
B e r l i n since H i t l e r came to power and was on good terms w i t h 
most of the German leaders. Upon h i s appointment, he hastened 
to assure Yugoslavia's neighbours t h a t although there had been 
a change of Prime M i n i s t e r , there would be no change i n h i s 
country's f o r e i g n p o l i c y . 
Throughout the wi n t e r months of l938 - 3 9 t there had been 
ne g o t i a t i o n s between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria w i t h a view to 
achieving a genuine border settlement, but the discussions 
came to nothing and Kiosseivanov l o s t p restige at home, p a r t i c -
u l a r l y since he had been to Yugoslavia twice but the former 
Yugoslav Prime M i n i s t e r had never made h i s " f r e q u e n t l y announced 
r e t u r n v i s i t to S o f i a . T h u s there was complete stalemate. 
1. The choice of Cvetkovic was determined by i n t e r n a l consid-
e r a t i o n s . He was i n favour of a s o l u t i o n to the p r o t r a c t e d 
Serb-Croat problem and was i n close contact w i t h Dr. Macek, 
the Croat leader. 
2. Documents on German Foreign P o l i c y , 1918-45, Series D, 
London l949cc(Her.eafter r e f e r r e d to as G.D.). V I , no. 673. Cf 
also, Ciano's D i a r i e s . 1939-43. London, 1947» pp. 22-24. 
3. G.D., V, no. 274. 
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Following the I t a l i a n attack on Albania i n A p r i l 1939, the 
B r i t i s h government made a serious attempt to construct a Balkan 
bloc capable of r e s i s t i n g f u r t h e r Axis i n t r u s i o n s . The B r i t i s h 
M i n i s t e r , S i r Hugh Knatchbull-Hugeseen, urged the Turkish 
government to b r i n g Bulgaria i n t o the Balkan Entente. He believed 
t h a t they could do t h i s by g e t t i n g Rumania to reconsider the 
Dobrudja question. Although t h i s appeal held some promise, 
Gafencu, the Rumanian Foreign M i n i s t e r , would do no more 'than 
consult w i t h Belgrade. I f Yugoslavia refused to- give up 
t e r r i t o r y to Bulgaria, he pointed out, there would be l i t t l e 
value i n Rumania's doing so alone. Rumania's i n q u i r i e s met w i t h 
l i t t l e success. During Gafencu's v i s i t to London.from A p r i l 23 -6 , 
he reported t h a t Prince Paul had stated t h a t "Bulgaria- was 
unsafe." lie had also added t h a t he saw no reason to change h i s 
opinion of King Boris's lack of s i n c e r i t y and was astonished 
t h a t His Majesty's Government should p i n t h e i r f a i t h on King 
5 
Boris a f t e r t h e i r experience of 1914 . The B r i t i s h government 
took no f r e s h i n i t i a t i v e but, l a t e i n 1939» Mr. Rendel, the 
B r i t i s h M i n i s t e r i n S o f i a , suggested a Balkan N e u t r a l i t y Pact. 
But h i s suggestion met w i t h l i t t l e response.^ 
Following the events of A p r i l 1939f there was renewed 
a g i t a t i o n f o r t r e a t y r e v i s i o n i n Bulgaria. I n a r e p o r t to the 
Foreign A f f a i r s Committee of the Sobranje, Kiosseivanov, f o r 
the f i r s t time, declared openly and unambiguously t h a t Bulgaria 
aspired to the r e s t o r a t i o n of the f r o n t i e r s of 1913* This 
d e c l a r a t i o n was repeated a l i t t l e l a t e r i n even more cogent 
7 
form i n an i n t e r v i e w given by Kiosseivanov to the "Paris-Soir". 
At the same time, there were f r e s h pleas to Germany to support 
4. Documents on B r i t i s h . Foreign Policy. 1919-39 . T h i r d Series, 
London, 19$9cc ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as B.D.). V, nos. 62 , 63 , 
278 and 297 . 5 . I b i d . . no. 2 8 5 . 
6. S i r George Rendel, The Sword and the Olive. Recollections 
of Diplomacy and the Foreign Service 1913-54 . London, 1957» pp I 6 5 - 6 . 
7 . P. P i p i n e l i s , Such are the Bulgars, London, 1942, p. 5 . 
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Bulgarian n a t i o n a l demands and the former German M i n i s t e r , 
Hume1in, was replaced by von Kichthofen. 
9 
The cause of t h i s resurgence i n Bulgarian hopes was 
undoubtedly the secret Bulgarian-German arms p r o t o c o l which 
was signed i n B e r l i n on A p r i l 21, 1939* During the previous 
autumn, the Bulgarian government had made i t clear t h a t they 
would l i k e to purchase f u r t h e r war-materiel - mainly ammunition -
costing some 45 m i l l i o n RM.^ The A p r i l p r o t o c o l agreed to t h i s l * 
On June 24 1939, another secret p r o t o c o l , r e g u l a t i n g the supply 
of a i r c r a f t and of ex-Czechoslovak (and ex-Austrian) munitions 
to Bulgaria, was signed by Draganov and Clodius i n B e r l i n . The 
cost of t h i s p r o t o c o l (the t h i r d since May 1938) was 39 m i l l i o n 
12 
RM. By now, the g r a n t i n g of c r e d i t had ceased to be dependent 
13 
upon Bulgaria's a b i l i t y to pay, although Germany received v a l -
uable mineral concessions from the country. I t was a p o l i t i c a l 
question and the d e l i v e r y of supplies was held to be c o n d i t i o n a l 
upon "Bulgaria not wavering but unequivocally d e f i n i n g her 
p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s the Axis powers." 
At t h i s time, Yugoslavia was also o b t a i n i n g arms from 
Germany and a minature arms-race was b u i l d i n g up i n the penin-15 * sula. Cincar-Markovic had a meeting w i t h H i t l e r arid Ribbentrop 
on A p r i l 26 and was promised generous treatment i n the question 
of arms supplies. 1** However, the Germans took t h e i r time over 
the n e g o t i a t i o n s , and c r e d i t and d e l i v e r y were also made cond-
8. GjJ)., V I , no. 67 . 
9 . I b i d . . nos. 320 and 415. 
10. £3"? m i l l i o n s ( a t 1938-9 v a l u e s ) . For autumn proposals see 
G.D.. V, no. 250. 
11. GJ)., V I , no. 243. 
12. £3t m i l l i o n s ( a t 1938-9 v a l u e s ) . I b i d . . no. 566. Clodius 
was the deputy D i r e c t o r of the Economic P o l i c y Department of 
the German Foreign M i n i s t r y . See supra p. 174. 
13. G±D., v, no. 250. 15 . I b i d . , no. 245. 
14. GJ)., V I , no.476. 16. I b i d . . no. 271. 
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17 i t i o n a l upon Yugoslavia's p o l i t i c a l a t t i t u d e . 
E a r l y i n June, Prince Paul v i s i t e d B e r l i n , where i t was 
suggested t h a t he should withdraw h i s country from the Balkan 
18 
Pact. This suggestion preceded a month of determined Axis d i p -
19 
lomacy to wean Yugoslavia from the Balkan Entente. This 
pressure d i d not achieve the desired r e s u l t s . Yugoslavia 
continued to adhere to the Pact and i n s i s t e d t h a t her membership 
of the Entente provided the best guarantee f o r her independence 
20 
and n e u t r a l i t y and was a f a c t o r f o r peace in- the Balkans. 
On J u l y 4, Cincar-Markovic and Kiosseivanov met i n filed 
to discuss f u t u r e r e l a t i o n s between t h e i r two co u n t r i e s , i n 
view of the continued existence of the Balkan Pact and what 
would happen i f i t came to an end. Kiosseivanov l a t e r t o l d 
l l i c h t h o f e n , the new German M i n i s t e r , t h a t 
"Yugoslavia had explained her r e f u s a l to denounce 
the Balkan Pact by saying t h a t i t was b e t t e r t o be i n 
than out of the Pact i n order to keep watch on, and, i f 
need be, d i r e c t i t s development." 
The Bled discussions also touched on the p o s s i b i l i t y of a j o i n t 
p o l i c y of n e u t r a l i t y i n the event of pressure, by e i t h e r the 
Axis bloc or the Western democracies. They also considered 
how long the two countries could maintain t h e i r n e u t r a l i t y 
against outside pressure. The two men expressed the hope t h a t 
i f the two countries were obliged to give way, they would both 
enter the war upon the same side. Kiosseivanov declared t h a t 
Bulgaria would enter the war upon the side chosen by Yugoslavia. 
I n conclusion, they also discussed the p o s s i b i l i t y of f u r t h e r 
p o l i t i c a l , economic and m i l i t a r y co-operation between them -
17. I b i d . , no. 279. 
18. The state v i s i t l a s t e d from June 1-5 , 1939. I b i d . , no. 675 . 
19* £f. Weizsacker to Heeren, M i n i s t e r i n Belgrade, J u l y 1, 
1939, i b i d . , no. 598. 
20 . I b i d . . no. 637. 
21 . I b i d . . no. 689. 
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22 even to the p o i n t of a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . I n the words of 
the communique: 
"The two states agreed on a p o l i c y of economic 
co-operation and agreed t h a t a p o l i c y of independence 
and n e u t r a l i t y served both the i n t e r e s t s of the two 
countries and peace i n the Balkans and t h a t i t was necess-
ary t h a t both governments continue a p o l i c y of good 
2*5 
and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s toward a l l t h e i r neighbours." 
The. s i n c e r i t y of the Bulgarian Prime M i n i s t e r at these 
t a l k s i s open to grave doubt f o r when he saw H i t l e r on the 
f o l l o w i n g day: 
"Kiosseivanov corroborated the Fuhrer's view t h a t 
Bulgaria would not accept i n d e f i n i t e l y the i n j u s t i c e s of 
the Peace T r e a t i e s . But Bulgaria was weak, and withou t 
24 
force or the t h r e a t of f o r c e , nothing could be achieved," 
I n the course of these discussions, Kiosseivanov demanded the 
immediate loan of 2,000 machine guns, the prompt d e l i v e r y of 
30-40 tanks which had belonged to Czechoslovakia and a consid-
erable reduction i n the period before which Bulgaria would get 
25 
the a r t i l l e r y which she had ordered. On h i s r e t u r n from 
B e r l i n on J u l y 9, Kiosseivanov again v i s i t e d Bled, t h i s time 
to see Prince Paul. When one examines Kiosseivanov's a t t i t u d e 
i n Bled and h i s a t t i t u d e i n B e r l i n , and the apparent i n c o n s i s -
tency between them, i t i B d i f f i c u l t to escape the conclusion 
t h a t the Bulgarian Prime M i n i s t e r was a man, who was conscious 
22. J.B. Uoptner, Yugoslavia i n C r i s i s , 1954-41, Columbia, 
1962, p. 163, quotes Documenti o J u g o s l a v i j e , P a r i s , 1956, 
no. 8. The i t a l i c s are mine. 
23 . Hoptner, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . . quotes P o l i t i k a (Belgrade), 
J u l y 11, 1939. 
24. GjJ>., V I , no. 617. 
25. I b i d . , no. 659* I n a d d i t i o n to Kiosseivanov's demands 
and at the Fuhrer's special wish, Bulgaria was also given some 
of the most modern German howitzers. I b i d . . no.618. 
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t h a t he was f o l l o w i n g two contrary p o l i c i e s - one motivated 
by the t r a d i t i o n a l Bulgarian desire f o r t r e a t y r e v i s i o n and 
the other f o r an amicable settlement w i t h Yugoslavia . This* 
f o r him, was a r e a l dilemma. 
The same cannot be said f o r King Boris. As at the time 
of the Anschluss, the Munich Agreement and the f i n a l annexation 
of Czechoslovakia i n March, King Boris appears to have had 
p r i o r knowledge of H i t l e r ' s a t t a c k on Poland on September 1, 
1939. Speaking to Nikolaev on August 28, he said: 
"Our s i t u a t i o n i s such t h a t i t does not depend upon 
us to determine our conduct i n the course of events, which 
Are going to follow.Our aim w i l l be to hold ourselves on 
the s i d e l i n e s of the c o n f l i c t and i f possible to p r o f i t 
from i t by improving our very bad s i t u a t i o n . But being 
moderate i n our a s p i r a t i o n s , we must t h i n k f i r s t of a l l , 
how to 'pass the bridge guarded by the D e v i l ' - t h a t i s 
to say, how to safeguard our n e u t r a l i t y . " 2 ^ 
Although Bulgaria'ssympathies were mainly d i r e c t e d towards I t a l y 
and Germany, n e u t r a l i t y was the only course which Boris could 
adopt at t h a t time. Only two days before, he had received a 
r e p o r t t h a t N e v i l l e Henderson, the B r i t i s h Ambassador i n B e r l i n , 
had t o l d Madame Draganov, the w i f e of the Bulgarian M i n i s t e r , 
t h a t i f Bulgaria repeated the mistake she had made i n the 
27 
World War, she would be a n n i h i l a t e d . Besides, there was no 
f u l l agreement i n Sofia i t s e l f . King Boris was reported to 
have declared: 
"My generals are Germanophiles, my diplomats, Anglo-
p h i l e s ; the Queen i s I t a l o p h i l e and my people Russophile; 
28 
I alone am n e u t r a l i n Bulgaria." 
26. N. P. Nikolaev, La destine'e t r a g i que d 'an r o t , Uppsala, 
1952, p. 166. The reference to 'the bridge guarded by the D e v i l ' 
i s from an o l d Russian proverb. 
27. G.D.. V I I , no. 314. 
28. Nikolaev, op. c i t . . p. 169. 
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Unlike Yugoslavia, which declared her s t r i c t but benevolent 
2Q 
n e u t r a l i t y on September 1, Bulgaria waited u n t i l September 
30 
18 before committing h e r s e l f to. a s i m i l a r p o l i c y . On the 
previous day, Russian troops had entered Poland from the East 
and were moving to the demarcation l i n e agreed to i n the 
secret annexe to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact. I n 
Bulgarian eyes, H i t l e r had triumphed once.again; Poland was 
defeated and France and B r i t a i n , despite t h e i r d e c l a r a t i o n of 
war, had not r a i s e d a f i n g e r to help. 
The p o l i c y which p r e v a i l e d i n the Balkans i n these d i f f i c u l t 
times was not j u s t n e u t r a l i t y , but armed n e u t r a l i t y . Y u g o s l a v i a ' s 
m i l i t a r y machine, b u i l t up bp King Alexander, was i n f a i r l y 
good shape but Bulgaria, which had perforce been r e s t r i c t e d 
up to the time of the Salonika Pact, was now making great e f f o r t s 
to achieve p a r i t y w i t h her Balkan neighbours. Throughout 1939» 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n of new aerodromes was c a r r i e d out on an 
ex t r a o r d i n a r y large scale, i n obvious d i s p r o p o r t i o n to the 
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of Bulgarian aviation."'* The equipping of these 
a i r f i e l d s w i t h German machines was pushed forward i n a vigorous 
manner and the budget of the Bulgarian A i r M i n i s t r y increased 
w i t h astonishing r a p i d i t y f o r so poor a country. During 
August, telegrams passed back and f o r t h between Sofia and 
B e r l i n , and Bulgaria made urgent demands f o r the despatch of 
33 
1,000 heavy and 300 l i g h t machine guns. J The t r a n s p o r t a t i o n 
of these weapons and other munitions agreod to under the 
June 2k p r o t o c o l , encountered d i f f i c u l t i e s . On August 26, the 
29. GjJJ., V I I , no. 532. 30. GJ;., V l l l , no. 92. 
31. P i p i n o l i s , op. c i t . , p.7. 
32. 1'. P i p i n o l i s , C a i t i f f Bulgaria, London, 1944, p. 12. 
Tho budgot f o r the Bulgarian A i r M i n i s t r y was as f o l l o w s : -
1936 - 78 m i l l i o n leva ( £3 m i l l i o n s ) 
1939 - 304 " " ( £12 m i l l i o n s ) 
1940 - 397 " " (C15& m i l l i o n s ) 
33. Gf. G^.. V l l , uos. 1, 11 and 78. 
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Bulgarian General S t a f f l e a r n t t h a t the Yugoslav government had 
detained two ammunition t r a i n s bound for B u l g a r i a and t h e i r 
34 
r e l e a s e vas only achieved only by pressure from B e r l i n . ^ A 
f o r t n i g h t l a t e r , there were r e p o r t s t h a t the war m a t e r i e l t r a n s -
ported through Yu g o s l a v i a had been sabotaged en route, and King 
B o r i s intervened to suggest t h a t future arms consignments 
35 
should be re-routed through Rumania. The Bulgarian King was 
i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y strong p o s i t i o n a t that moment, for R u s s i a 
had proposed a mutual a s s i s t a n c e pact (or f a i l i n g t h a t a non-
aggression p a c t ) between t h e i r two c o u n t r i e s , and King B o r i s 
was able to say t h a t i f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t r a n s p o r t i n g arms 
to B u l g a r i a were not overcome, h i s government would be compelled 
to obtain s u p p l i e s from R u s s i a . Such a step was not l i k e l y to 
commend i t s e l f i n B e r l i n . ^ 
B u l g a r i a ' s neighbours, as ever, viewed these developments' 
w i t h alarm and t h e i r alarm l e d to a sudden r e v i v a l i n the 
importance of the Balkan Entente. On September 19 f Cincar-Markovi 
and Gafencu met to d i s c u s s ways of r e - i n f o r c i n g the Entente and 
to work out a s o l u t i o n to the Bulg a r i a n problem. I n these 
eleventh-hour d i s c u s s i o n s , they drew up three conditions to 
govern B u l g a r i a ' s t e r r i t o r i a l claims.: 
1) B u l g a r i a must f i r s t become part of the Balkan 
Entente and assume a l l the commitments and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
of a member s t a t e . 
2) Each member s t a t e of the Entente must contribute 
t e r r i t o r y to the Balkan community, w i t h which to s a t i s f y 
B u l g a r i a ' s demands. 
3) The Bu l g a r i a n government must put down a l l a g i t a t o r 
who would i n c r e a s e t e n s i o n s among the s t a t e s of the Entente? 
The four s t a t e s did not get down to s p e c i f i c p o ints - i n the 
34. I b i d . . no. 314. 36. Tbid.. no. 247. 
35. G.D.. V I I I , no. 229. 37. I b i d . , no. 229. 
38. G. Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, London, 
1945, p. 260. 
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question of t e r r i t o r i a l changes - u n t i l February 1940, 
when the Council of the Balkan Entente met i n Belgrade. There 
they decided to support a p o l i c y of peace, to remain on good 
terms v i t h t h e i r neighbours, to conclude agreements w i t h the 
remaining Balkan c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y commercial agreements, 
39 
and to extend the l i f e of the Pact f o r seven more y e a r s . 
A f t e r the; d e b i l i t a t i n g p o l i c y of the: previous four y e a r s , 
t h i s was an encouraging development. The- B u l g a r i a n government 
was kept acquainted w i t h the d e c i s i o n s of the Entente Council 
and a l s o with the proposal to grant them t e r r i t o r i a l c oncessions. 
Kiosseivanov, who although a r o y a l nominee and deeply committed 
to h i s country's pro-German p o l i c y , had never e n t i r e l y r e j e c t e d 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of f r i e n d s h i p with Y u g o s l a v i a . He r e a l i z e d t h a t 
i f the Balkan c o u n t r i e s were to r e t a i n t h e i r independence, they 
40 
must present a u n i t e d and f r i e n d l y f r o n t . To t h i s end, he took 
advantage of the t h i r d a n n i v e r s a r y of the Yugoslav-Bulgarian 
41 
Pact to make renewed d e c l a r a t i o n s of f r i e n d s h i p and peace. 
T u r k i s h l e a d e r s v i s i t e d S o f i a i n January 1940 and through them, 
and through channels i n Belgrade, he made i t c l e a r t h a t even 
a t t h i s l a t e j u n c t u r e , B u l g a r i a was prepared to drop her p o l i c y 
42 
of i s o l a t i o n and work f o r Balkan s o l i d a r i t y . On February 14, 
Kiosseivanov had an audience w i t h h i s King and - i n g r e a t 
s p i r i t s , i t i s reported - o u t l i n e d h i s plans for Balkan 
co-operation. On the f o l l o w i n g day, under the p r e t e x t of a 
p u r e l y domestic i s s u e , he was dismissed from o f f i c e and hopes 
43 
of Balkan s o l i d a r i t y receded once more. 
39. lloptner, op. c l t . . p. 165, quotes P o l i t i k a . (Belgrade) 
February 5» 1940. 
40. M. Padev, Escape from the Balkans. London, 1943, pp. 76-77. 
41. G.D.. V I I I , no. 564. 
42. P. P i p i n e l i s , C a i t i f f B u l g a r i a . London, 1944, p. 5. 
43. Padev, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . The domestic i s s u e was the 
d i s m i s s a l of the unpopular M i n i s t e r of the I n t e r i o r on the 
previous day. On February 14, Kiosseivanov presented the King w i t h a pro-forma r e s i g n a t i o n and submitted a new l i s t of m i n i s t e r s . 
(191) 
The r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Kiosseivanov's d i s m i s s a l and 
the c o l l a p s e of a nev and imaginative p o l i c y must be l a i d 
s q uarely upon King B o r i s . A w r i t e r sympathetic to the King, 
s t a t e d t h a t the causes of the d i s m i s s a l "are s t i l l obscure", 
s i n c e no reason vas ever given, e i t h e r i n the Sobranje or i n 
44 
the S o f i a P r e s s . But i t seems quite c l e a r t h a t the Prime 
M i n i s t e r ' s p o l i c y c l ashed w i t h the views of King B o r i s , who 
wished to have no dea l i n g s w i t h any member of the Entente. 
Kiosseivanov had been an able exponent of r o y a l p o l i c y f o r 
f i v e years and w h i l s t he was content to be the instrument of 
r o y a l power, he had been defended i n h i s p o s i t i o n - even i n 
45 
the face of German d i s a p p r o v a l . But the moment he began to 
question t h i s p o l i c y and venture upon a course- c o n t r a r y to 
th a t of the King, he was promptly dismissed. The event shows 
that King B o r i s had no r e a l d e s i r e f or t e r r i t o r i a l concessions, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i f t h i s involved membership of the Balkan Entente. 
King B o r i s was i n t e n t upon a n e u t r a l p o l i c y t h a t should become 
a pro-German p o l i c y a t the most favourable opportunity. Then 
and only then would B u l g a r i a ' s " l e g i t i m a t e g r i e v a n c e s " be r e s o l -
ved and her t e r r i t o r i a l a s p i r a t i o n s f u l f i l l e d . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t 
t h a t whereas Kiosseivanov had r e t a i n e d c o n t r o l of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s 
during h i s Premiership, the King, a f t e r h i s d i s m i s s a l , once 
more introduced the separate poBt of Foreign M i n i s t e r . K i o s s e i -
vanov's successor was Bogdan F i l o v , a P r o f e s s o r of Archaeology 
46 
who had l i t t l e knowledge or experience of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s . 
H i s Foreign M i n i s t e r , I v a n Popov, was content to be a r o y a l pawn 
( continued from the previous page). 
B o r i s , however, informed him t h a t he would accept h i s r e s i g n a t i o n 
and would i n future dispense w i t h h i s s e r v i c e s . T h i s was the same 
technique as had been used f o r the d i s m i s s a l of S t o j a d i n o v i c i n 
Yug o s l a v i a . Kiosseivanov became Bul g a r i a n M i n i s t e r i n Berne. 
44. Nikolaev, op. c i t . . p. 225. 45. G.D.. V, no. 2?4. 
46. F i l o v was an a u t h o r i t y on Bulgarian a n t i q u i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g 
e a r l y B i b l i c a l manuscripts. 
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and was soon assuring the German M i n i s t e r t h a t "Bulgaria 
47 
would continue to r e s i s t wooing by the Balkan League." 
Clodius and Richthofen, who had a two-hour meeting w i t h King 
Boris a f t e r these p o l i t i c a l changes had been made, observed: 
" I n Bulgaria too, developments tend more and more 
toward the King alone making decisions, a t any r a t e on m 
matters of f o r e i g n p o l i c y ; i t i B i n the l a s t r e s o r t only 
h i B opinion which counts. The: King proceeds from the ass-
umption t h a t now, as ever, Bulgaria can r e a l i z e her a s p i r -
ations only on Germany's side. Bulgaria i % however, BO weak 
m i l i t a r i l y t h a t she should remain n e u t r a l as long- as- p'ossibl 
The defeat of France and the Russian occupation of Bess-49 - ' arabia both brought f r e s h anxiety to the Entente powers but 
renewed hopes to the F i l o v government i n S o f i a . Later, on 
September 7t Rumania was obliged to surrender the Dobrudja to 
50 s Bulgaria. .Although Cincar-Markovic was alarmed l e s t Germany 
should force h i s country to make s i m i l a r concessions, King 
Boris regarded Yugoslavia's p o l i c y as dangerous and ambiguous 
and suspected t h a t they were encouraging Russian i n t e r v e n t i o n 
i n the Balkans as a counterweight to German in f l u e n c e i n Bulg-
51 
a r i a . But whatever the u n c e r t a i n t i e s of the period, Bulgaria 
d i d not h e s i t a t e to p r o f i t from the misfortunes of others. On 
June 18, Draganov presented himself a t the German Foreign O f f i c e 
w i t h " b l u n t r e v i s i o n i s t demands by h i s government" and expressed 
h i s hope t h a t the f a m i l i a r s l i g h t r e c t i f i c a t i o n s of the Bulgarian 
47. Popov to von Rivhthofen, May 4, 1940. G.D.. IX, no. 198. 
48. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 49. On June 22 and 27 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
50. This was done w i t h i n the framework of a diplomatic agree-
ment, which also included population t r a n s f e r s . The agreement 
was made at German i n s t i g a t i o n . On September 24, Kalfov, the 
former Bulgarian Foreign M i n i s t e r , t o l d the Sobranje t h a t they 
"should not r e s t on the l a u r e l s of Dobrudja" but "struggle to 
regain what h i s t o r i c a l l y belongs to (them); Obviously Mace-
donia. Quoted by P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . , p. 9. 5 1 . G,D., X, no. 53* 
(193) 
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-Yugoslavian f r o n t i e r would be conceded to Bulgaria. Both 
Weizsacker and Bibbentrop counselled patience and Popov 
promised t h a t "Bulgaria would avoid anything t h a t might d i s t u r b 
53 
German p o l i c y . " 
At a meeting at Fuschl on J u l y 27, 1940, H i t l e r assured 
F i l o v and Popov t h a t Germany would "most e n e r g e t i c a l l y support 
the demands of her Bulgarian companions-in-arms" and promised 
t h a t now France had been defeated, increasing stocks of war ' 54 ma t e r i e l would be a v a i l a b l e and would be supplied. Although 
at the time of the Fuschl meeting, a j o i n t German-Yugoslav 
committee was working to promote closer economic t i e s between 
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the two co u n t r i e s , i t i s clear t h a t H i t l e r had decided t h a t 
the time had come to encourage Bulgarian hopes. 
Throughout the Bummer, as German p o l i c y seemed everywhere 
v i c t o r i o u s and the defeat of B r i t a i n merely a matter of time, 
Bulgaria abandoned her caution. German s p e c i a l i s t s , estimated 
to number 10,000, poured i n t o Bulgaria under the guise of 
t o u r i s t s and took up key posts i n the economic and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
l i f e of the country. Closer trade l i n k s were established w i t h 
56 
Germany and a large p r o p o r t i o n of Bulgaria's a g r i c u l t u r a l 
57 
produce went there too. A German I n s t i t u t e was set up i n Sofia 
and i t s opening was the occasion of a strong German attack upon 
the Treaty of H e u i l l y . A new and vigorous propaganda campaign 
eg 
was launched from Sofia and provoked anger i n Belgrade. Heeren, 
the German M i n i s t e r , reported adversely upon 
52. G.D.. IX, no. 478. 54. I b i d . , no. 245. 
53. G.D.. X, no. 70. 55. GJ)., IX, no. 442. 
56. P i p i n e l i s , op. c i t . . pp.8-9. I n September, M. Zangoroff, 
a Bulgarian M i n i s t e r , went to see Funk, the Economics M i n i s t e r , 
i n B e r l i n . Later i n the same month, the Heichsmark became the 
o f f i c i a l c l e a r i n g currency i n Bulgaria. 
57. "Why Bulgaria went over?" New Statesman and Nation. . 
XXI, March 8, 1941, pp. 231-3, states t h a t by March 1941, 
80% of t h i s produce went to Germany. 58. G.D.. X I , no. 397. 
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"the provacative debate i n the Sobranje which i s 
causing the o l d , deep d i s t r u s t of Bulgaria to f l a r e up 
once more the determination to r e s i s t , i f necessary 
by force of arms, any t h r e a t from I t a l y and Bulgaria to 
v i t a l Yugoslav i n t e r e s t s has increased to an e x t r a o r d i n a r y 
59 
degree among the Serbian people and i n the Army." 
On September 27, 1940, Germany, I t a l y and Japan signed 
the T r i p a r t i t e Pact of p o l i t i c a l , d i plomatic and m i l i t a r y 
c o l l a b o r a t i o n . King Boris was i n v i t e d to sign i t but, i n a 
personal l e t t e r to H i t l e r , he stated t h a t although he wished 
to be "as u s e f u l as possible t o my country and to her f r i e n d , 
Greater Germany," he feared the r e a c t i o n of Bulgaria's neighbours 
p a r t i c u l a r l y since h i s kingdom's m i l i t a r y standing was s t i l l 
very p o o r , ^ However, i n November, Boris accompanied by h i s 
Foreign M i n i s t e r , Popov, went to discuss the T r i p a r t i t e Pact 
w i t h H i t l e r i n Be r l i n . * * 1 No record of t h a t conversation e x i s t s 
but, three days l a t e r , King Boris t o l d von Papen t h a t 
"by h i s q u i e t and unobtrusive c o l l a b o r a t i o n up to 
now, he had made the Bulgarian people pro-German w i t h o u t 
being aware of i t and w i t h o u t arousing the o p p o s i t i o n . 
That had not been possible even during the World War. 
The m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n probably would not r e q u i r e h i s 
o f f i c i a l accession to the T r i p a r t i t e Pact u n t i l next 
sp r i n g . " 
59. Yugoslav fears were ra i s e d by the Italo-Greek c o n f l i c t 
which broke out on October 28, 1940. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
60. Boris to H i t l e r , October 22, 1940, GJ3., X I , no. 217. 
61. November 18, 1940. Whether Boris was summoned to B e r l i n 
or went of h i s own v o l i t i o n has been disputed. Padev, op. c i t . , 
p. 93, favours the former; L. Archer, Balkan Journal. New York, 
1944, p. 140, favours the l a t t e r . 
62. Boris to Papen, November 21, 1940, G^ D., X I , no. 378. 
Von Papen, German M i n i s t e r i n Ankara, was one of King Boris's 
closest f r i e n d s . 
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• 6 i This view was repeated by the Bulgarian M i n i s t e r i n B e r l i n . 
He made i t c l e a r t h a t the delay was not caused by any change 
i n h i s government's p o l i c y : 
"Bulgaria had always stood by Germany and worked 
long f o r the idea of German-Bulgarian c o l l a b o r a t i o n . This 
desire d i d not date from yesterday. I n t h i s war. Bulgaria 
had not remained n e u t r a l . Only a few days ago visas were 
issued to 300 Germans who were commissioned to construct 
15 a i r observation s t a t i o n s i n Bulgaria. For a year now, 
three or four German radio s t a t i o n s have been operating 
i n B u l g a r i a . " ^ 
Although Bulgaria h e s i t a t e d to j o i n the Pact - not l e a s t because 
of recent troop concentrations along the Bulgarian f r o n t i e r -
Oraganov was anxious l e s t Germany should come t o some arrange-
ment w i t h Yugoslavia, which would e x t i n g u i s h a l l Bulgaria's 
r e v i s i o n i s t hopes i n Macedonia. A f t e r reminding the German 
leaders of the Macedonian Question and the " 1 ^ m i l l i o n Bulgarians, 
who could not simply be l e f t t h e r e " , he declared t h a t " i f Germany 
now a r r i v e d at an accord w i t h Yugoslavia, t h i s would undoubtedly 
arouse an unpleasant r e a c t i o n i n Bulgaria and he was a f r a i d t h a t 
f e e l i n g against Germany might ensue." H i t l e r was u n w i l l i n g t o 
enter i n t o the d e l i c a t e question of m i n o r i t y problems and 
closed the discussion, emphasizing t h a t i t was i n Bulgaria's 
65 
best i n t e r e s t s t o j o i n the T r i p a r t i t e Pact. 
Oraganov's fears were not alt o g e t h e r unfounded. German 
economic t i e s w i t h Yugoslavia were considerable and H i t l e r , 
Ribbentrop and Cincar-Markovic had had discussions i n B e r l i n 
on November 28. I n the course of conversation, the Yugoslav 
M i n i s t e r had shown himself f r i e n d l y towards Germany and agreed 
63. Conversation between H i t l e r and Draganov, November 23, 
1940. I b i d . , no. 384 
64. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . The i t a l i c s are mine. 
65. Conversation between H i t l e r and Oraganov, December 3t 
1940. I b i d . , no. 438. 
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t h a t " c e r t a i n Bulgarian demands had to be s a t i s f i e d . " ^ ^ 
H i t l e r , who was u n w i l l i n g t o accept r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
renewed Bulgarian r e v i s i o n i s m , pointed out t h a t the well-known 
67 
Bulgarian demands were i n f a c t being encouraged by Russia. 
This was a clever manoeuvre and H i t l e r ' s view was not e n t i r e l y 
w i t h o u t foundation, since the promise of the San Stefano bound-
ar i e s and support f o r a l l demands against Rumania, Greece and 
Yugoslavia had r e c e n t l y been made to the Bulgarian M i n i s t e r 
68 
i n Moscow. Upon the same day. as Boris v i s i t e d H i t l e r , Molotov 
had t o l d Stamenov t h a t 
"the f a t e of Bulgaria was of h i s t o r i c i n t e r e s t to 
the Soviet Government which, i n view of h i s t o r i c o b l i g -
- a t i o n s , desired a Btrong Bulgaria. I n the opinion of the 
Soviet Government, Bulgaria must achieve her n a t i o n a l goals 
against Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece. The Soviet Government 
was prepared to make a v a i l a b l e to Bulg a r i a any k i n d of 
n a t i o n a l assistance. 
Thus both Germany and the Soviat Union were prepared to destroy 
the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Yugoslavia, p r o v i d i n g t h a t Bulgaria 
would give her allegiance to one or other of these two great 
s t a t e s . 
I n S o f i a , the Russian i n i t i a t i v e - f o r i t was thought t h a t 
the Soviet Union was proposing a mutual assistance pact - was 
welcomed by a l l those who opposed the ever-increasing German 
in f l u e n c e . Resolutions were passed by numerous p o l i t i c a l groups 
and many of the deputies i n the Sobranje handed i n p e t i t i o n s 
70 
urging immediate acceptance of the Soviet proposals. But 
the Bulgarian government r e s i s t e d these Russian blandishments. 
They had agreed i n p r i n c i p l e t o adhere to the T r i p a r t i t e Pact^* 
66. I b i d . . no. 417. 67. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 
68. I b i d . . no. 378* The M i n i s t e r i n Moscow was Stamenov. 
69. I b i d . . no. 379. Cf. also l a t e r proposal, G.D.. X I I , no. 48. 
70. Padev, op. c i t . . pp. 130-31. 
7 1 . G.D., X I , no. 430. 
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and Alexander Sobolev, the R u s s i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , was t o l d 
t h a t B u l g a r i a had no d e s i r e to become involved i n c o n f l i c t s 
72 
between the g r e a t powers. 
I n December 1940, German m i l i t a r y v e h i c l e s moved i n t o 
B u l g a r i a from Rumania. The " t e c h n i c i a n s " were dressed i n blue 
o v e r a l l s and the wagons camouflaged as c i v i l i a n l o r r i e s . Once 
i n s i d e B u l g a r i a , the v e h i c l e s moved i n t o the mountains a c r o s s 
the f r o n t i e r from Yugoslavia - o s t e n s i b l y to organize a n t i -
7*3 
a i r c r a f t d i s p o s i t i o n s t h e r e . O t h e r s t a f f of the "Reconnaissance 
S t a f f S o f i a " were sent by the Wehrmacht. to prepare f u e l and 
supply depots, survey road and o p e r a t i o n a l conditions and 
74 
undertake b r i d g e - b u i l d i n g . The Yugoslav r e a c t i o n to t h i s 
steady i n f l u x of " t e c h n i c i a n s " and a d v i s e r s was h o s t i l e . Some 
75 
145,000 Yugoslav troops were deployed along the f r o n t i e r and 
the customary exchange of g r e e t i n g s between the tvo armies a t 
76 
the New Year did not take p l a c e . 
Further d i s c u s s i o n s about B u l g a r i a ' s adhesion to the 
T r i p a r t i t e Pact were held between H i t l e r and F i l o v a t the 
Obersalzberg on January 4, 1941. F i l o v s t i l l showed himself 
r e l u c t a n t to s i g n the Pact, even though H i t l e r assured him 
th a t there was now no danger to be feared from Yugoslavia, who 
•? 
was w i l l i n g to enter i n t o c l o s e r co-operation w i t h the R e i c h 
and would probably s i g n the Pact too. Such a prospect was unpal-
72. Nikolaev, op. c i t . . p. I69. When the Russian proposals 
were published by the B u l g a r i a n government i n January 1941, 
they had a v a l u a b l e propaganda e f f e c t , s i n c e they deterred 
Y u g o s l a v i a and other Balkan s t a t e s from making any approach to the 
S o v i e t Union. They a l s o conveyed the impression t h a t B u l g a r i a 
sought no t e r r i t o r i a l gains a t the expense of her neighbours. 
73. Padev, op. c i t . , pp. 85-86. 
74. G.D., X I , no. 556. I t i n c l u d e s the High Command's "German 
M i l i t a r y Preparations i n the Balkans" - i s s u e d on December 21, 1940. 
75. I b i d . . no. 713. 
76. I b i d . . no. 649. 
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atable to r o y a l nominees such as F i l o v and Draganov, who 
wished to secure German support f o r Bulgaria's t e r r i t o r i a l 
77 
a s p i r a t i o n s i n exchange f o r her adhesion t o the Pact. Some 
three weeks l a t e r , the Bulgarian General S t a f f suggested thajb 
accession to the Pact should be postponed t i l l the s t a r t of 
78 
m i l i t a r y operations. 
On March 1 , 1941, w i t h very l i t t l e heartsearching, Bulgaria 
signed the T r i p a r t i t e Pact. E a r l y the f o l l o w i n g morning, the 
German X I I Army crossed the border and moved i n t o p o s i t i o n s 
across the f r o n t i e r from Yugoslavia. The e n t r y of German troops 
provoked no p u b l i c r e a c t i o n . Yet an English p e r i o d i c a l commented: 
"so f a r as we understand Bulgarian sentiment, i t i s 
broadly Hussophile; there i s no enthusiasm f o r Germany 
or f o r Nazi ways of thought save among the o f f i c e r s of 
the Army and a small s e c t i o n of the w e a l t h i e r middle class 
I t i s f a i r l y c e r t a i n t h a t the m i n o r i t y i n the Sob-
ranje of one deputy i n seven which d i d dare to vote 
openly against adherence t o the Axis represented a much 
79 
l a r g e r mass of the e l e c t o r a t e . " 
Encompassed on three sides by Axis troops, the Yugoslav govern-
ment faced a diplomatic dilemma. Cvetkovic and Cincar-Markovic, 
who had v i s i t e d H i t l e r i n Salzburg on February 14, had been 
urged t o j o i n the Pact but had temporized. Now, on March 4 , 
Prince Paul himself went to Berchtesgaden to r e - s t a t e the 
Yugoslav predicament. H i t l e r magnanimously agreed t o waive the 
m i l i t a r y clauses i n exchange f o r Yugoslavia's diplomatic 
support. A f t e r lengthy t a l k s w i t h h i s Crown Council and despite 80 81 appeals by Eden and C h u r c h i l l , the Prince Regent decided to 
77. I b i d . , nos. 594 and 606. 78. I b i d . . no. 704. 
79. "Why Bulgaria went over", op. c i t . , p. 231 . 
80. E a r l of Avon, The Eden Memoirs; The Reckoning, London, 
1965, pp. 222-23 
81. W.S. C h u r c h i l l , The Second World War. I I I . The Grand 
A l l i a n c e , London, 1950, pp. 141 -2 . 
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give way. On March 25, 1941, at Vienna, to H i t l e r ' s great 
s a t i s f a c t i o n , Yugoslavia j o i n e d Bulgaria as a fellow-member 
82 
of the T r i p a r t i t e Pact. Two days l a t e r , there occurred the 
famous coup d'etat i n Belgrade. 
The overthrow of the Regency had been contemplated f o r 
some time but the o f f i c e r s responsible f o r the coup - B r i g a d i e r -
General Bora Mirkovic, Commander of the Yugoslav A i r Force, and 
General Dusan Simovic of the General S t a f f - had decided to w a i t 
u n t i l the government a c t u a l l y c a p i t u l a t e d to Germany before 
making any move. Their conspiracy r e f l e c t e d the mood of the 
Yugoslav people. A bad harvest, food r a t i o n i n g and i n d u s t r i a l 
b i t t e r n e s s had caused widespread unrest during 1940. I n October, 
various r e s t r i c t i o n s had been placed on the Jewish community 
and the German economic stranglehold increased. During the 
opening months of 1941 many m i l i t a r y f i g u r e s had been down-graded 
or dismissed and the p o l i t i c a l m o v i t a t i o n of a l l t h i s was 
p e r f e c t l y clear to those i n Belgrade. The Yugoslavians are a 
proud n a t i o n and t h i s erosion of sovreignty was keenly f e l t . 
When news of the signing of the Pact became p u b l i c knowledge, 
students,peasants, war veterans and r e l i g i o u s leaders demonstrated 
i n the s t r e e t s , p e t i t i o n s and prot e s t s flooded the r o y a l palace 
and s i n i s t e r t h r e a t s of assassination appeared on p u b l i c notices 
on the s t r e e t s of Belgrade. Because i t had wholehearted p u b l i c 
support, because i t was c a r e f u l l y planned and executed, by a 
handful of experts, because i t had m i l i t a r y approval and because 
n a t i o n a l honour was a t stake, the coup succeeded. The Cvetkovic. 
government was overthrown, the Regency abolished and there was 
83 
a widespread outburst of n a t i o n a l exhuberance. 
H i t l e r was astounded by the news but d i d not h e s i t a t e t o 
act. On the same day, March 27, he ordered t h a t Yugoslavia 
82. G_jD., X I I , no. 208. 
83. The best account of the coup i s given by Hopther, op. c i t . . 
pp. 221-265. 
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should be destroyed m i l i t a r i l y and also as a n a t i o n a l u n i t . 
Later i n the day, he saw Draganov and t o l d him t h a t " t h i s 
had s e t t l e d the question of Macedonia." 8^ Later, i n D i r e c t i v e 
No. 26, signed by the Fuhrer on A p r i l 3, i t was stated t h a t 
• "Bulgaria should get back Macedonia and i s 
ther e f o r e to be i n t e r e s t e d i n an attack i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n 
but w i t h o u t p a r t i c u l a r pressure being exerted from the 
German side. Furthermore, the Bulgarians w i l l be supported 
by a German armoured u n i t which w i l l provider the rear cover 
85 
against Turkey." 
The attack on Yugoslavia, which was conducted by the X I I 
Army Command i n Sof i a , began i n the e a r l y hours of A p r i l 6 
w i t h a massive German a i r bombardment, of Belgrade. S t r a t e g i c a l l y , 
Bulgaria was of great importance t o the German campaign. With 
the b e n e f i t of such short supply l i n e s , General L i s t was able 
to s t r i k e across c e n t r a l Yugoslavia from h i s bases i n Bulgaria 
and e n c i r c l e the Yugoslav armies i n the n o r t h . On the second 
day of the at t a c k , panzer d i v i s i o n s from south-east Bulgaria 
reached Skopje, c o n t r o l l i n g the Vardar v a l l e y . This advance cut 
the only Yugoslav l i n k s w i t h Greece and blocked the southern 
l i n e of r e t r e a t t o Salonika. I t i s tr u e t h a t even w i t h o u t the 
advantage of bases i n Bulgaria, the Germans, w i t h 31 d i v i s i o n s 
and 2 brigades, would s t i l l have i n f l i c t e d a heavy defeat on 
Yugoslavia, but had i t not been f o r Bulgaria's w i l l i n g complic-
i t y to allow German forces t o occupy and at t a c k from her t e r r i t o r y , 
the Yugoslavs would have been able t o r e s i s t f o r considerably 
longer and perhaps even have been able to r e t r e a t t o Salonika, 
preserving the most valuable p a r t of t h e i r army i n t a c t . As i t 
was, the campaign was b r i e f and on A p r i l 17, 1941, the Yugoslav 
86 
forces surrendered t o the German High Command. 
The question of whether Bulgarian troops took p a r t i n the 
attack on Yugoslavia i s s t i l l open to doubt. Von Papen, the 
84. I b i d . . no. 216. 85. I b i d . . no. 256. 
86. I b i d . . no. 3°4. 
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87 German M i n i s t e r i n Ankara, has stated t h a t they d i d p a r t i c i p a t e 
but, i n a speech to the Sobranje on A p r i l 8 and again i n a r e p l y 
to the Turkish government on A p r i l 10, i t was o f f i c i a l l y d e c l -
ared t h a t no Bulgarian forces had taken p a r t i n the German 
88 
operations against Yugoslavia. 
I t seems l i k e l y t h a t the o f f i c i a l statements were c o r r e c t . 
On A p r i l 9. Bichthofen reported t h a t F i l o v had o f f e r e d him 
89 
three Bulgarian d i v i s i o n s to take p a r t i n the campaign but, 
90 
on A p r i l 11, Draganov was s t i l l discussing the matter i n B e r l i n ; 
Ribbentrop suggested t h a t t h e i r use might be delayed f o r a few 
91 
days and o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s i n Sof i a , on l e a r n i n g t h i s , suspected 
92 
t h a t I t a l i a n i n f l u e n c e might be behind the delay. The suspicion 
became a c e r t a i n t y on A p r i l 16, when i t was reported t h a t I t a l i a n 
troops had entered Ohrid, The town was regarded i n Bulgaria as 
a n a t i o n a l shrine and the news induced great b i t t e r n e s s , <<eome 
of the p u b l i c blaming King Boris and h i s government f o r not 
93 
pressing Bulgaria's claims w i t h s u f f i c i e n t energy. Later i n 
the same day, i n response to a standing i n v i t a t i o n from H i t l e r , 
King Boris contacted the Gorman Foreign M i n i s t r y and arranged 
94 
f o r a p r i v a t e discussion between himself and H i t l e r on A p r i l 19* 
I n the meantime, Bulgaria broke o f f diplomatic r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
Yugoslavia ( A p r i l 16), the a r m i s t i c e was signed and Bulgarian 
87* F. von Papen, Memoirs. London, 1952, p. 473* 
88. G.D.. X I I , no. 302. For the Turks, the question was of 
more than t e c h n i c a l i n t e r e s t f o r , i f the Bulgarians had attacked 
Yugoslavia, the Turks were bound by the 1934 Pact t o come to her 
a i d . The Turkish Foreign M i n i s t e r i s reported to have said t h a t 
although he was convinced of the s i n c e r i t y of the Bulgarian 
statements, he was no longer sure t h a t they were masters of the 
s i t u a t i o n or of t h e i r decisions. 
89. I b i d . , no. 312 92. I b i d . , no. 357. 
90. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 93. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
91. I b i d . , no. 302 94. I b i d . , no. 362. 
95. I b i d . , no. 312. 
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troops vere given permission t o occupy Macedonia as f a r as 
the Pirot-Vranje-Skopje l i n e and from there down the east 
96 
side of the Vardar to the Greek border. 
Mo o f f i c i a l record e x i s t s of King Boris's t a l k w i t h 
97 
i i i t l e r on A p r i l 19, but von Papen, who was present, 
remembers t h a t "the King had come to present h i s demands to 
OA 
H i t l e r . " y King Boris had been c h i e f l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the f a t e 
of Macedonia and much of the discussion had centred upon c e r t a i n 
chromium deposits which were to be found i n the Ohrid d i s t r i c t . 
I t appears t h a t w h i l s t Bulgaria was i n t e r e s t e d i n Ohrid for-
purposes of n a t i o n a l expansion, I t a l y - or r a t h e r , Count Ciano -
99 
had a f i n a n c i a l investment at stake. The matter was s e t t l e d 
three days l a t e r i n Vienna, when Ciano and Bibbentrop met to 
100 
approportion out the s p o i l s to each of the i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s . 
The haggling over the extent of Bulgaria's gains continued 
f o r some t i m e . 1 0 1 Clodius, who saw Boris a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from 
H i t l e r , reported! 
" I n a conversation l a s t i n g two hours, the King 
very candidly presented h i s p o s i t i o n regarding a l l p o l i t i c a l 
and t e r r i t o r i a l questions a r i s i n g from the collapse of Yugo-
s l a v i a I would l i k e to emphasize t h a t the King i s 
p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h the question of determining 
the f r o n t i e r between Albania and Bulgarian Macedonia. He 
i s anxious t h a t Ohrid, Struga, Gostivar and above a l l , 
Tetovo should go to Bulgaria f o r ethnographic and geo-
graphic reasons." 
Wi t h i n two days, Germany had stated her willingmess to accede 
96. I b i d . , no. 367. 
97. No record e x i s t s of any of the conversations between 
H i t l e r and King B o r i s . 
98. von Papen, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 99. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 
100. GJ>., X I I , no. 385. 101. I b i d . , nos. 367 and 
385. 102. Clodius and Ridhthofen to Foreign M i n i s t r y , 
A p r i l 24, 1941, i b i d . , no. 393. 
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to B o r i s ' B w i s h e s . 1 0 ' Further discussions centred upon 
the northern boundary to the south-eas t of N i l . the region 
104 
around B i t o l j and Bulgarian claims i n Western Thrace. I n 
t h i s connection, and by way of c o n t r a s t , i t i s worth remembering 
t h a t i n J u l y 1939» King Boris had t o l d Clodius t h a t he d i d not 
intend to put forward any t e r r i t o r i a l claims against Yugoslavia 
i n the f u t u r e . 1 0 * * 
How then had the change taken place? On November 19, 1941, 
F i l o v t o l d the Sobranje of the way i n which Bulgaria had 
achieved her goal: 
"The p o l i c y of peace and n e u t r a l i t y which has been 
followed since the outbreak of war has been d i c t a t e d by 
our n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s and accords w i t h the i n t e r e s t s 
of the Axis powers. Bulg a r i a i s only a small power, yet 
her plan of a c t i o n has undoubtedly thwarted the plan of 
a Balkan bloc which was much discussed a t one time. I t 
was because of Bulgaria's f i r m p o l i c y t h a t t h i s bloc never 
m a t e r i a l i z e d and the p r o j e c t of concentrating 100 d i v i s i o n s 
to f i g h t the Germans was f o i l e d . These events emphasize 
t h a t B u l g a r i a pursued t h i s p o l i c y i n order t o be i n 
hasmony w i t h the Axis p o w e r s . " 1 ^ 
Mushanov, the former Prime M i n i s t e r , r e l a t e d t h i s f i n a l episode 
of Yugoslav-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s i n the i n t e r - w a r years to the 
broader canvas of Bulgarian p o l i c y , i n a speech he d e l i v e r e d 
to the Sobranje. I n r e p l y to the address from the throne, he 
r e c a l l e d t h a t 
"Bulgaria had not f o r g o t t e n A r t i c l e 19 of the Treaty 
(of N e u i l l y ) , nor had she agreed t o accept the boundaries 
s t i p u l a t e d t h e r e i n - a settlement so eagerly desired by 
103. Ribbentrop to Clodius, A p r i l 26, 1941, i b i d . , no. 405. 
104. Ribbentrop to Clodius, May 4, 1941, i b i d . , nos. 450 and 534. 
105. Memorandum by Clodius on conversation w i t h King B o r i s , 
J u l y 11, 1939, GJ>., V I , no. 673. 
106. Zora. November 20, 1941. 
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the L i t t l e Entente and the Balkan Entente. Today, the 
Bulgarian people r e j o i c e d a t the annexation of the enslaved 
Bulgarian t e r r i t o r i e s ; t h i s had been achieved through the 
help given by the great German people, and as a r e s u l t of 
the r e v i s i o n a r y p o l i c y which B u l g a r i a had always pursued. 
That part of the King's speech which gave expression to 
the people's g r a t i t u d e towards the Nation which had shed 
i t s blood for t h e i r l i b e r a t i o n , sprang from the h e a r t of 
107 
a people w i t n e s s i n g the end of an i n j u s t i c e . " 
As has been shown - even i n the period 1939-41 - there was 
ample opportunity for t h i s " i n j u s t i c e " to be remedied. Yugoslavia 
and the other Balkan s t a t e s were w i l l i n g ' to concede land which 
B u l g a r i a believed to be r i g h t f u l l y hers, the only precondition 
being t h a t B u l g a r i a should j o i n the Balkan Entente, where her 
i n t e r e s t s and future l a y . The f a c t t h a t B u l g a r i a chose to 
remain i s o l a t e d and worked a c t i v e l y to destroy the Yugoslav 
s t a t e , p l a c e s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the d e s t r u c t i o n of r e l a t i o n s 
squarely upon the S o f i a government and, most p a r t i c u l a r l y , upon 
the B u l g a r i a n King. I t i s perhaps hardly s u r p r i s i n g that, a f t e r 
the d e s t r u c t i o n of Yugoslavia, B u l g a r i a n propaganda should 
de s c r i b e King B o r i s as "the g r a n i t e foundation stone of the 
108 
Balkan New Order." Few could have had a more l e g i t i m a t e 
r i g h t to such a claim* 
107. Zora, November, 15, 1941. 
108. Padev, op. c i t . , p.73. 
( 2 0 5 ) 
Chapter 10 . 
Conclusion, 
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I t would be s a t i s f y i n g to end t h i s study of Yugoslav-
Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s upon a note of c o n s o l i d a t i o n and hope; 
to show tha t a second world war and Communist d i c t a t o r s h i p 
had succeeded where the Treaty of N e u i l l y and monarchy had 
f a i l e d . But, unfortunately, t h i s cannot be done. Since 1941, 
r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s have continued to r e f l e c t 
the p a t t e r n of the inter-war y e a r s . The p e r s o n a l i t i e s are 
d i f f e r e n t ; the motives are d i f f e r e n t ; but the problem has 
remained the same. 
From 1941 to 1944, B u l g a r i a administered the annexed 
region of Macedonia and a l s o occupied those areas of S e r b i a 
which had been agreed with German l e a d e r s . The r e t u r n of the 
Bulgarians to Macedonia was at f i r s t greeted with enthusiasm^ 
but t h i s s w i f t l y gave way to disappointment. Michael Padev, 
a former correspondent for "The Times" i n S o f i a , v i s i t e d 
Macedonia i l l e g a l l y i n June 1941; 
"Once we reached Macedonia, what s t r u c k us most was 
the ease and z e s t with which the Macedonian underground 
b a t t l e d a g a i n s t the Bulgarian occupying a u t h o r i t i e s . There 
was a curfew i n Skopje from seven i n the evening. We stayed 
there a week and not a night went by without f i g h t i n g i n 
the s t r e e t s . I t was the same i n B i t o l j which the Bulgarian 
n a t i o n a l i s t s claim as 'the most Bulgarian of a l l Macedonian 
towns.' We found the people there as a n t i - B u l g a r i a n as 
they are everywhere i n Macedonia. They had organized s e v e r a l 
groups which a t i n t e r v a l s r e t i r e d i n t o the mountains f o r 
1 . It. Seton-Watson, The E a s t European Revolution. London, 
1950, p. 123 . 
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' t r a i n i n g 1 . They were extremely v e i l organized and i n 
contact with a l l the g u e r i l l a s i n Yugoslavia, B u l g a r i a 
and Greece. I n J u l y 1941, while we were i n Skopje, the. 
Bulgarian' Court M a r t i a l sentenced to death twenty-six 
s o l d i e r s from the Bulgarian army of occupation who had 
2 
given t h e i r arms and ammunition to these g u e r i l l a s . " 
The number of Bulgarian troops employed i n the former area 
of Yugoslavia grew as the s c a l e of war in c r e a s e d and German 
troops were t r a n s f e r r e d to other f r o n t s . 100 ,000 men were 
a v a i l a b l e and during the big campaigns aga i n s t the Yugoslav 
p a r t i s a n s , twenty Bulgarian d i v i s i o n s were used i n an attempt 
to crush r e s i s t a n c e . 
Despite the obvious advantages, p a r t i s a n a c t i v i t y i n 
Macedonia was a cause of disagreement between the Yugoslav 
and B u l g a r i a n Communist p a r t i e s . The argument was quite simple; 
which party should have r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the p a r t i s a n s i n 
Macedonia? The Yugoslav l e a d e r s had ordered the S e c r e t a r y of 
the Macedonian party to provoke a general u p r i s i n g a g a i n s t the 
invaders - i e . the Bulgarians - but the C e n t r a l Committee of 
the Bulgarian party maintained t h a t s i n c e Macedonia was now 
par t of B u l g a r i a , the d i r e c t i o n of p a r t i s a n a c t i v i t y should be 
5 
under t h e i r l e a d e r s h i p . The matter was r e f e r r e d to Moscow. 
I n i t i a l l y , the Kremlin favoured the Bulg a r i a n c l a i m but once 
the Yugoslav p a r t i s a n s had achieved such s t r i k i n g successes i n 
the r e s t of t h e i r country, the Russians entrusted Macedonia 
to them. Late i n 1942, Vukmanovic, one of T i t o ' s c h i e f 
c olleagues, went to Macedonia and, overcoming the f r i c t i o n and 
resentment which had been caused, took command of m i l i t a r y and 
p o l i t i c a l operations. 
2 . M. Padev, Escape from the BalkanB. London, 1943,- p. 164. 
3. F. Maclean, Disputed B a r r i c a d e . London, 1957» p. 248. 
4 . V. D e d i j e r , T i t o Speaks. London, 1953, p. 171* 
5 . M. D j i l a s , Conversations with S t a l i n . London, 1962, pp 3 6 -
6. S. C l i s s o l d , Whirlwind, London, 1949, p. 135 . £f a l s o 
£. Barker, Macedonia, London, 1950, pp. 8 3 - 1 0 9 . 
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These d i f f e r e n c e s over Macedonia l e d many communists to 
think that the si m p l e s t post-war s o l u t i o n would be a f e d e r a l 
South S l a v s t a t e i n which Macedonia.would be an autonomous 
u n i t . These i d e a had been canvassed many times before, but the 
Communists bel i e v e d t h a t t h e i r common ideology would overcome 
many of the d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered by the pre-war p o l i t i c i a n s . 
Dr. Smodlaka, for e i g n commissar f o r the National L i b e r a t i o n 
Front, s a i d : 
"Our f i r s t aim would be to f r e e f e d e r a l Y u g o s l a v i a . 
But t h a t i s not enough to ensure peace i n the Balkans. We 
must have a Balkan f e d e r a t i o n , and the f i r s t step would be 
a union of B u l g a r i a and Yugoslavia..... 1 b e l i e v e t h a t 
the best s o l u t i o n to the problem would be to give Macedonia 
f u l l autonomy w i t h i n the f e d e r a l s t a t e . T h i s would end 
7 
the Yugoslav-Bulgarian dispute." 
His sentiment i s echoed by another w r i t e r : 
"They ( the National L i b e r a t i o n F r o n t ) t a l k of b r i n g -
ing B u l g a r i a i n t o a So u t h - S l a v i c f e d e r a t i o n , depending on 
the w i l l of the Bulgarian people. They know that f or a long 
time many Bulgarians have considered themselves Yugoslavs 
The i d e a of a s t i l l wider Balkan f e d e r a t i o n or 
confederation or union i n t r i g u e s a great many B a l k a n i t e s . 
I t might begin w i t h Greece and Yugoslavia, then take i n 
Albania, B u l g a r i a ( i f not a l r e a d y i n a new Sou t h - S l a v i c 
combination) and probably Rumania." 
I n London, the Yugoslavian r o y a l government-in-ekile was a l s o 
looking ahead to post-war developments. On January 15, 1942, 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Greek and Yugoslav governments-in-exile 
signed an agreement concerning the C o n s t i t u t i o n of a Balkan 
7. L.S. St a v r i a n o s , Balkan Federation: A H i s t o r y of the 
Movement towards Balkan Unity i n Modern Times, Northampton, 
Mass., 1944, p. 272. 
8. L. Adamic', My Native Land, London, 1944, pp. 446-47. 
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a 
union. They saw the agreement as 
"the foundation for the great c o n s t r u o t i v e work 
which awaits Greece and Y u g o s l a v i a a f t e r the war. The 
Agreement i s made so t h a t other Balkan s t a t e s can c o l l -
aborate with Greece and Y u g o s l a v i a i n t h i s c o n s t r u c t i v e , .,10 work." 
Since the r o y a l Yugoslav government had " n e i t h e r people, nor 
army, nor t e r r i t o r y " , nothing came of t h e i r i n i t i a t i v e but 
i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r i t shows tha t during the war the general 
trend of p o l i t i c a l events was towards the foundation of a 
Balkan union. 
Events i n B u l g a r i a speeded the process. Unlike t h e i r 
Yugoslav counterparts, Dimitrov and the l e a d e r s of the B u l g a r i a n 
Communist Party remained i n Moscow throughout the war, so 
contact between the l e a d e r s h i p and the a c t u a l r e s i s t a n c e remained 
remote. Nevertheless, a "Fatherland Front", embracing the Zveno 
group and the Agrarian and Communist p a r t i e s , was s e t up and 
13 
i n i t s f i r s t broadcast, put out on J u l y 17* 1942, the Front 
s t a t e d i t s i n t e n t i o n of destroying the B u l g a r i a n a l l i a n c e w i t h 
Germany and promised "immediately to withdraw the Bulgarian 
troops sent to crush the s t r u g g l e of the b r o t h e r l y Serbian 
14 
people a g a i n s t the German and I t a l i a n i n v a s i o n . " 
The f i r s t B u lgarian p a r t i s a n s were formed i n J u l y 1941, 
but i t was not u n t i l 1943 t h a t good and u s e f u l r e l a t i o n s were 
9. Yugoslav Information Department, Y u g o s l a v i a at War: Yugoslav 
Documents No. 2, A C o l l e c t i o n of O f f i c i a l Statements, London, 
1942, no. X I I , pp. 22 - 2 5 . 
10 . I b i d . , no. X I I I , pp. 26-27. 
11. D e d i j e r , op. c i t . . p. 2 2 3 . 
12. Padev, op. c a t . , p. 7 2 0 
13* From Moscow where the C h r i s t o Botev Broadcasting s t a t i o n 
was s i t u a t e d . 
14. S.G. Evans, A Short H i s t o r y of B u l g a r i a , London, 1960, 
pp.178-79. The use of the word "Serbian" i s i n t e r e s t i n g . 
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e s t a b l i s h e d between them, and the Yugoslav p a r t i s a n s . Evidence 
shows t h a t the s c a l e and achievements of the Bulgarian r e s i s t -
ance were s l i g h t when compared with the overt war which was 
15 
being waged between T i t o and the Germans i n Yu g o s l a v i a . The 
Bulgarian P a r t i s a n movement never became a h i g h l y organized 
n a t i o n a l or m i l i t a r y f o r c e . I t numbered l e s s than 20,000 and 
was s p l i t i n t o small groups which undertook l o c a l a t t a c k s , 
mostly a g a i n s t B u l g a r i a n pro-Nazi a u t h o r i t i e s . ^ ^ Nevertheless, 
i n so f a r as they were holding down enemy f o r c e s , they were of 
value to the A l l i e d war e f f o r t and l i a i s o n was e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h 
17 
them i n the summer of 1943. The extent of Yugoslav a i d to the 
Bulgarian p a r t i s a n movement and t h e i r co-operation with T i t o ' s 
f o r c e s has been o u t l i n e d by an o f f i c i a l Yugoslav re p o r t ; 
"The L i b e r a t i o n Movement of the Yugoslav peoples 
enabled and f u l l y contributed to the formation of Bulgarian 
p a r t i s a n b a t t a l i o n s , detachments and brigades on Yugoslav 
t e r r i t o r y . I n the l i b e r a t e d t e r r i t o r y of S e r b i a and Mace-
donia the following Bulgarian p a r t i s a n detachments were 
formed: the Georgi Dimitrov Brigade and the C h r i s t o Botev 
B a t t a l i o n . I t i s w e l l known t h a t these Bu l g a r i a n p a r t i s a n 
u n i t s , formed on Yugoslav t e r r i t o r y , played a s i g n i f i c a n t 
r o l e i n the development of p a r t i s a n detachments i n B u l g a r i a 
before the end of the war. The l e a d e r s h i p of the National 
L i b e r a t i o n Movement of the peoples of Y u g o s l a v i a o f f e r e d 
f u l l p o l i t i c a l and m a t e r i a l a i d and support to the Bulg-
18 
a r i a n p a r t i s a n detachments." 
15. I b i d . . pp. 180-81, for s t a t i s t i c s of r e s i s t a n c e a c t i o n . 
16. H. McNeil, How d i d the S a t t e l i t e s happen?. London, 1952,p 21 
17 . F. Thompson, There i s a s p i r i t i n Europe. London, 1947* 
g i v e s i n s i g h t to the Bulgarian p a r t i s a n movement. Major Thompson, 
the B r i t i s h l i a i s o n o f f i c e r , died i n B u l g a r i a . 
18. Yugoslav M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , The White Book on 
Aggressive A c t i v i t i e s by the Governments of the USSR, Poland. 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, B u l g a r i a , and A l b a n i a towards 
Yugoslavia. Belgrade, 1951, pp. 153-54. 
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I n Yugoslavia, the t i d e of m i l i t a r y events had brought 
supreme c o n t r o l over the d e s t i n y of Yug o s l a v i a to T i t o and 
the National L i b e r a t i o n Movement. On November 29* 1943i the 
second A.V„M.O,J. Assembly at J a j c e s e t up a p r o v i s i o n a l 
government, promised the c r e a t i o n of a f e d e r a l Y u g o s l a v i a 
and forbade the r e t u r n of King Peter and the r o y a l government. 
The r e s o l u t i o n s of the J a j c e Assembly were accepted by Subasic, 
the r o y a l Prime M i n i s t e r , i n an agreement signed w i t h T i t o on 
June 16 , 1944. 
I n B u l g a r i a too, the power of the monarchy had weakened. 
King B o r i s , who had r e t a i n e d f u l l c o n t r ol of Bu l g a r i a n p o l i c y 
despite powerful German i n f l u e n c e , died on August 28, 1943, 
eleven days a f t e r r e t u r n i n g from a stormy meeting w i t h H i t l e r . 
I t has been suggested t h a t the King, seeing the war turning 
a g a i n s t Germany, had decided, l i k e I t a l y , to come to an agree-
19 
ment w i t h the A l l i e s . His death l e f t a power vacuum i n Bulg-
a r i a which h i s successor, Crown Prince Simeon, s t i l l a minor, 
was unable to f i l l . A Regency l e d by the l a t e King's brother, 
C y r i l , was s e t up. The F i l o v government f e l l i n May 1944 and 
vas replaced by a new a d m i n i s t r a t i o n under Bagrianov, a former 
Agr a r i a n . On August 2 2 , 1944, i t was announced t h a t a l l B u l g a r i a n 
troops would be withdrawn from Serbian t e r r i t o r y and on the 
following day, B u l g a r i a d e c l a r e d t h a t she had " o f f i c i a l l y * 20 withdrawn from the war." On September 2 , the Regency s e t up 
• 
a new government l e d by the right-wing p o l i t i c i a n , Muraviev. 
I t . represented those p a r t i e s who opposed the pro-German p o l i c y 
but were u n w i l l i n g to renounce t h e i r country's gains i n Macedonia 
1 9 . N.P. Kikolaev, L a destinee tragique d'un r o i . Uppsala, 
1952, p. 186, would seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t a change of p o l i t i c a l 
o r i e n t a t i o n was imminent a t the time of B o r i s ' s death. For the 
connection between the two, see i b i d . . pp. 93-5 and I 8 6 - 9 6 . Cf. 
a l s o Padev, op. c i t . , pp. 77-78 and F. von Papen, Memoirs. 
London, 1952, pp. 5 0 1 - 2 . 
2 0 . M.Padev, Dimitrov wastes no b u l l e t s . London, 1948, pp. 3 4 -
( 2 1 2 ) 
The formation of t h i s government l e d the S o v i e t Union to 
d e c l a r e war on B u l g a r i a on September 5, Four days l a t e r , i n 
a coup d'etat timed to coincide w i t h the a r r i v a l of the Red Army, 
the Fatherland Front s e i z e d power, Kimon Gheorgiev once more 
became Prime M i n i s t e r and an a r m i s t i c e was signed between 
B u l g a r i a and the A l l i e s on October 28, 1944. According to the 
post-war government i n Belgrade: 
"The Yugoslav government allowed and rendered p o s s i b l e 
a c e r t a i n amount of p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the B u l g a r i a n Army 
i n the f i n a l operations a g a i n s t the German troops i n 
Yugoslavia, despite the heavy wounds i n f l i c t e d by the 
21 
Bulgarian F a s c i s t invaders of Yugoslav t e r r i t o r y . " 
Through i t s d i r e c t i o n of m i l i t a r y operations and i t s 
dominating i n f l u e n c e i n the National L i b e r a t i o n Front, the 
Communist Party was soon i n f u l l c o n t r o l of Y u g o s l a v i a . Marshal 
T i t o , who was Prime M i n i s t e r of the new r e p u b l i c , o u t l i n e d 
Yugoslavia's future p o l i c y w i t h B u l g a r i a i n a speech a t 
Mladenovac on J u l y 9, 1945: 
"Yugoslavia has c l o s e , comradely r e l a t i o n s of k i n s h i p 
with B u l g a r i a . Those b a r r i e r s which were created, not by 
the Bulgarian peasantry or workers, not by Yugoslav workers 
or peasants, but by Yugoslav and Bulgarian r e a c t i o n a r i e s 
and f o r e i g n i m p e r i a l i s t s , are down. The fence i s down. 
Today, Yugo s l a v i a and B u l g a r i a are on the road towards 
complete u n i t y a g a i n s t any who may dare to a s s a i l t h e i r 
22 
l i b e r t y and independence." 
This view was echoed by Kolarov, one of the leading Communists 
and Dimitrov's successor, on November 2 9 , 1945. L a t e r i n h i s 
speech, Kolarov. d e c l a r e d : 
"The Bulgarian people s i n c e r e l y welcome the formation 
21. Yugoslav White Book, op. c i t . , p. 154. 
22. Yugoslav Embassy O f f i c e , Review of P o l i c y . Speech by 
by Marshal T i t o . Belgrade, 1945. 
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of the Macedonian f e d e r a l u n i t w i t h i n the f r o n t i e r s 
23 
of the Democratic F e d e r a l Y u g o s l a v i a . " 
On October 9, 1946, the Bulgarian Vice-Premier a l s o admitted 
th a t Macedonia was no longer a source of f r i c t i o n between 
the two c o u n t r i e s : 
" T i t o ' s Yugoslavia and the B u l g a r i a of the Fatherland 
Front are ready to support w i t h a l l t h e i r might the 
union of the Macedonian people in. i t s own people's 
r e p u b l i c of Macedonia w i t h i n the framework of the 
24 
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." 
A f t e r the war, to prove th a t there was now no i l l - w i l l between 
the two c o u n t r i e s , Y u g o s l a v i a undertook a whole s e r i e s of 
measures to "normalize" her r e l a t i o n s w i t h B u l g a r i a . Reparation 
claims to the value of 25: m i l l i o n d o l l a r s f o r damage done by 
the Bulgarian Army on Yugoslav t e r r i t o r y were waived, as was 
a c l a i m for r e s t i t u t i o n of p a r t of the goods which Bulgarian 
25 
troops had removed to t h e i r country. Both these generous a c t s 
were acknowledged by the Bulgarian government, i n the Sobranje, 
on August 2 5 , 1 9 4 7 . 2 6 
Such a c t i o n s l e d to a speedy rapprochement and there were 
hopes of some kind of confederation between the two c o u n t r i e s . 
The question of Balkan f e d e r a t i o n and i n p a r t i c u l a r of a 
f e d e r a t i v e union between Yug o s l a v i a and B u l g a r i a had been 
under d i s c u s s i o n s i n c e November 1944 when K a r d e l j , one of the 
leading f i g u r e s i n the National L i b e r a t i o n Front, went to 
27 
S o f i a to t a l k i t over with B u l g a r i a n l e a d e r s . At that time, 
although both p a r t i e s were agreed t h a t i t was i n p r i n c i p l e 
d e s i r a b l e , no progress had been p o s s i b l e . T h i s was due to two 
f a c t o r s . One was the unfavourable a t t i t u d e of the Western A l l i e s , 
the other, the d i f f i c u l t y of deciding on what terms f e d e r a t i o n 
23. Yugoslav White Book, op. c i t . . p. 158. 
24. I b i d . . l o c . c i t . 25. D e d i j e r , op. c i t . . p. 313. 
2 6 . Yugoslav White Book, op. c i t . , pp. 155-56. 
27. D e d i j e r , op. c i t . , l o c . c i t . 
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should take place. The Bulgarians wished f or a union between 
the two co u n t r i e s on equal terms, w h i l s t the Yugoslav a t t i t u d e , 
as summarized by D e d i j e r , was as fo l l o w s . They maintained t h a t 
"Yugoslavia c o n s i s t s of s i x separate r e p u b l i c s which 
are equal members of the Yugoslav f e d e r a t i o n ; t h a t some 
of these r e p u b l i c s , l i k e S e r b i a and Montenegro for example, 
had been independent s t a t e s long before B u l g a r i a and th a t 
a f e d e r a t i o n could only be created i f B u l g a r i a became one 
28 
of the seven South S l a v s t a t e s i n the new f e d e r a t i o n . " 
Nevertheless, t h i s d i f f e r e n c e of opinion was regarded as a 
matter of p r a c t i c a l d e t a i l and not a genuine o b s t a c l e to the 
fe d e r a t i v e i d e a . 
From 1945-7i Russian i n t e r e s t i n E a s t e r n Europe was s t i l l 
p r i m a r i l y s t r a t e g i c and economic. As long as these c o u n t r i e s 
could be c o n t r o l l e d by teams of S o v i e t a d m i n i s t r a t o r s and experts 
and the Red Army maintain i t s dominating m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n i n 
the area, the i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s remained of minor 
importance. But by 1947t there was a movement among Communist 
le a d e r s towards a f e d e r a l or q u a s i - f e d e r a l bloc between t h e i r 
c o u n t r i e s which was l i a b l e to present S o v i e t R u s s i a with the 
f a i t accompli of a Balkan or E a s t European kind of t h i r d force:. 
I n June 1947, T i t o s a i d i n pub l i c f o r the f i r s t time -
and, s i g n i f i c a n t l y enough, to Western correspondents - that 
the " f r e e Balkan peoples" should form "a strong monolithic 
29 
e n t i t y . " At the end of J u l y , a Bulgarian delegation, l e d by 
Dimitrov, v i s i t e d Y u g o s l a v i a and had a t o p - l e v e l conference 
with Yugoslav l e a d e r s a t Bled. At the Conference, the d r a f t 
t e x t of a t r e a t y between the two c o u n t r i e s was approved and 
s e v e r a l agreements governing customs f a c i l i t i e s and economic 
co-operation were signed. At the end of the Conference, Dimitrov 
s a i d : "We are happy to note th a t a l l questions were s e t t l e d i n 
28. I b i d . , p. 314. 
2 9 . G. Ionescu, The Break-up of the S o v i e t Empire i n E a s t e r n 
Europe. London, I 9 6 5 , p. 3 0 . 
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f u l l unanimity between the two government d e l e g a t i o n s . " 
A Yugoslav government del e g a t i o n headed by Marshal T i t o , paid 
a r e t u r n v i s i t to B u l g a r i a i n November 1947. The v i s i t waa 
made the occasion f o r the s i g n i n g of the Treaty which had 
been approved at the Bled Conference. 
The Treaty of F r i e n d s h i p , Co-operation and Mutual A s s i s t -
ance, signed on November 27, 1947, pledged the two c o u n t r i e s 
to "co-operate c l o s e l y and f u l l y f o r the b e n e f i t of both count-
r i e s on a l l questions r e l a t i n g to the future of t h e i r peoples 
and t h e i r mutual r e l a t i o n s . " ^ ^ At the time, the Russians had no 
o b j e c t i o n to the T r e a t y . Before i t was signed, a d r a f t copy 
had been sent to Moscow. The only point which the Russians had 
questioned concerned the duration of the Treaty. They suggested 
t h a t the time l i m i t should be twenty y e a r s and not " f o r ever" 
32 
as had been o r i g i n a l l y proposed. There i s no reason to doubt 
the s i n c e r i t y of B u l g a r i a n l e a d e r s a t t h i s time. Dimitrov was 
speaking the t r u t h when he c a l l e d the Treaty 
"a s i n c e r e expression of the sovereign w i l l of our 
peoples to l i v e i n peace and brotherly: r e l a t i o n s , to help 
each other i n a f r a t e r n a l manner, to work together s i d e 
by side f o r p r o s p e r i t y , to defend o u r s e l v e s together 
a g a i n s t a l l enemies, to work together i n the s t a b i l i z a t i o n 
of a l a s t i n g peace i n the Balkans, i n South-East Europe 
33 
and the whole world." 
T i t o himself t o l d the crowds i n S o f i a t h a t "we s h a l l e s t a b l i s h 
co-operation so general and so c l o s e t h a t the question of 
34 
f e d e r a t i o n w i l l be a mere f o r m a l i t y . " ^ A f o r t n i g h t l a t e r , 
Koetov, then Bulgarian Vice-Premier, who was l a t e r to be k i l l e d 
during the S t a l i n i s t purge, s a i d c o n f i d e n t l y t h a t events would 
30. Yugoslav White Book, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 
31. I b i d . , l o c . c i t . 32. D e d i j e r , OP. c i t . . p. 328. 
33. Yugoslav White Book, op. c i t . , l o c . c i t . 
34. Maclean, op. c i t . , p. 360 
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l e a d " i n the near future to a union of a l l South S l a v s and 
35 
to the c r e a t i o n of a common Sl a v country." 
S t a l i n regarded these moves with some alarm. On January 
28, 1948, Pravda published a scathi n g condemnation of the whole 
idea . The paper de c l a r e d : "These c o u n t r i e s need no questionable 
36 
or f a b r i c a t e d f e d e r a t i o n or confederation or customs union" 
and, soon a f t e r , telegrams were sent to S o f i a and Belgrade 
37 
ordering t h a t they promptly send delegations to Moscow. 
According to D j i l a s , one of the Yugoslav r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s who 
was present, the two delegations met S t a l i n i n a b i t t e r and 
stormy encounter at the Kremlin on February 10. E a r l y i n the 
meeting, Molotov i s reported to have s t a t e d t h a t the Yugoslav-
Bulgarian Treaty had been signed not only without the knowledge 
of, but contrary to the wishes of, the S o v i e t Government, who 
wished B u l g a r i a to make no p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e s before a d e f i n i t i v e 
TO 
peace t r e a t y had been signed. L a t e r , S t a l i n ' s a i d t h a t he had 
nothing aga i n s t a f e d e r a t i o n between Yugoslavia and B u l g a r i a -
39 
i n f a c t they could create one immediately. The atmosphere 
of the meeting and the harsh a t t i t u d e of the Hussian leader 
mad? a bad impression upon the Yugoslav delegation: 
"When the Yugoslav delegates went back to t h e i r 
Embassy, t h e i r unanimous opinion was that S t a l i n had 
demanded an immediate f e d e r a t i o n between Yugoslavia and 
B u l g a r i a i n order to break up the u n i t y of Yugoslavia. 
Therefore the Yugoslav delegates came to the conclusion 
40 
that they should not hurry the f e d e r a t i o n with B u l g a r i a . " 
A month l a t e r , Molotov and S t a l i n began to att a c k the Yugoslav 
lea d e r s i n a s e r i e s of l e t t e r s . D e d i j e r has s a i d t h a t : 
"the t h r e a t of T i t o ' s p o p u l a r i t y coupled with the 
prospect of a South Slav f e d e r a t i o n , to a l l i n t e n t s and 
purposes independent of the Sov i e t Union and free from the 
35 . Ionescu, op. c i t . . l o c . c i t . 38« D j i l a s , op. c i t . . p. 157« 
3 6 . D e d i j e r , op. c i t . . pp. 323—4. 3 9 . I b i d . , p. I 6 0 . 
37 . 1 bid.. l o c . c i t . 40. D e d i j e r , op. c i t . . p. 332 . 
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d i r e c t i o n of the Kremlin, were the major f a c t o r s i n 
41 p r e c i p i t a t i n g the 1948 c r i s i s with the S o v i e t Union." 
Un June 28, 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the "family 
of f r a t e r n a l Communist p a r t i e s . " T h i s excommunication shat t e r e d 
the most recent hopes of a settlement between the two c o u n t r i e s . 
Although the Bulgarian government hastened to say that the 
Cominform r e s o l u t i o n would i n no way a f f e c t the f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s 
between them, contact between them d e t e r i o r a t e d and, a f t e r a 
few months, a Bulgarian spokesman on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s was forced 
to admit th a t i t was impossible to separate party i s s u e s from 
42 
those of the S t a t e . The expulsion a l s o heralded the r e t u r n 
43 
of the armed c o m i t a d j i s and the recurrence of f r o n t i e r i n c i d e n t s 44 45 reminiscent of pre-war days. Yugoslav o f f i c i a l s were ex p e l l e d , 
and there were reports of a t t a c k s against Yugoslav c i t i z e n s 
i n Bulgari 
p o l i c y as 
46 
i n B u l g a r i a . The Yugoslav a u t h o r i t i e s saw t h i s new Bulgarian 
"an attempt to break the ground for the f o r c i b l e 
detachment of the Peoples' Republic of Macedonia from 
Yugoslavia, which i s an expression of the Greater Bulgarian 
p o l i c y of the present Bulgarian s t a t e and Party l e a d e r s . 
The l a t t e r w i l l not and do not want to, r e c o n c i l e themselves 
to the f a c t t h a t the overwhelming m a j o r i t y of the Macedonian 
people won t h e i r ' n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n on the b a s i s of the 
r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , through the foundation of the 
47 
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." 
41. I b i d . . p. 314. 
«i 
42. Yugoslav White Book, p. 17. Documents nos. 23-24, pp. . 
78-79. 
43. I b i d . , p. 41. See a l s o document nos. 254 - 6 0 , pp. 393-401 
44. I b i d . , document nos. 270-75, pp. 417-24. 
45- I b i d . . document no. 7 3 , PP- 195 - 9 6 . Between June 1949-
January 1950, B u l g a r i a expelled 10 Yugoslav o f f i c i a l s . 
46. I b i d . . document nos. 78 (p. 206) and 80 (p. 209). 
47. 1 bid.. p. 41. See a l s o document nos. 254 - 6 0 , pp. 393-401. 
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I n f a c t , B u l g a r i a and the Macedonian i s s u e vere once more 
being used as pawns by an e x t e r n a l power opposed to Yugoslavia.. 
I n the past, i t had been I t a l y and Germany; now i t was R u s s i a . 
On October 1, 1949, a f t e r a mere two y e a r s , the Bulgarian 
government o f f i c i a l l y renounced the 1947 Treaty of F r i e n d s h i p . ^ 
S h o r t l y a f t e r t h i s , the m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h of B u l g a r i a was 
r a i s e d from the 65,000, permitted under the Peace Treaty, to 
220,000 and e i g h t Bulgarian d i v i s i o n s were assembled on the 
49 
Yugoslav f r o n t i e r . This manoeuvre came at a time when there 
was already great tension between R u s s i a and the Western n a t i o n s . 
Yugoslavia, which had refused to accept the Marshall Plan, now 
found h e r s e l f i n a d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n . Having been e x p e l l e d 
from the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia was now i s o l a t e d and a prey 
to e x t e r n a l m i l i t a r y i n t e r v e n t i o n . Such a t h r e a t to Yugoslavia's 
hard-won independence - and a r e p e t i t i o n of the events of' A p r i l 
50 
1941 was by no means out of the question - brought to an end 
a l l prospect of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s 
and the rapprochement of the post-war e r a , which of a l l attempts 
to u n i t e the South Slav peoples probably had the g r e a t e s t chance 
of s u c c e s s , came to nought. 
Thus the problem remained the same. Despite repeated e f f o r t s 
to bring them together, these two South S l a v s t a t e s of Y u g o s l a v i a 
48. I b i d . . document no. 57» pp. 153 - 6 1 . The Bulgarians broke 
three other t r e a t i e s at t h i s time. The Agreement on F a c i l i t a t i n g 
Crossing of the F r o n t i e r (signed on August 27 , 1947) was abrogated 
on October 3» 1949* the Protocol on P o s t a l and Telecommunication 
s e r v i c e s ( signed on February 7, 1945) was renounced on March 1, 
1950, and the Agreement on the u t i l i z a t i o n of p r o p e r t i e s cut 
by the Yugoslav-Bulgarian f r o n t i e r l i n e (signed on August 25, 
1947) was c a n c e l l e d by o f f i c i a l note on June 30, 1950 = 
49. I b i d . . p. 46. 50. Maclean, op. c i t . , p. 400. 
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and B u l g a r i a remain independent and di v i d e d . Everything -
language, race, r e l i g i o n , economics, h i s t o r y and, above a l l , 
p o l i t i c a l experience - demonstrates that they should be one. 
Yet each attempt to promote c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s between them has 
ended i n estrangement and renewed b i t t e r n e s s . Before the F i r s t 
World War, from 1918-41, and a f t e r the Second World War, the 
patte r n has been repeated again and again. On no fewer than 
51 -seven occasions, there were hopes tha t the work of dedicated 
men would be crowned w i t h s u c c e s s . On no fewer than seven 
52 
occasions, these hopes were dashed. No s i n g l e person, party 
or country can be held r e s p o n s i b l e and there i s no s i n g l e f a c t o r 
which can e x p l a i n t h i s sad i n a b i l i t y to create u n i t y , s t a b i l i t y 
and f r i e n d s h i p between them. 
Twenty-three y e a r s , the period from 1918-41, i s by h i s t o r i c a l 
standards a s i z e a b l e span of time; i t amounts to the passing 
of a generation. I t i s a period which tended to c r y s t a l l i z e 
the experience and d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t of a century of Yugoslav-
Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s . I n these years between the wars, there 
are c e r t a i n f i x e d points i n the p o l i t i c a l firmament. There are 
Yugoslavia's l e a d e r s and B u l g a r i a ' s l e a d e r s , the Yugoslav people 
and the B u l g a r i a n people. The supporters of Balkan Federation 
are there a l s o and the Macedonian " n a t i o n a l i s t s " F i n a l l y , 
outside the Balkans but deeply involved i n t h e i r a f f a i r s , there 
are the Great Powers;' I t a l y and Germany, R u s s i a , B r i t a i n and 
France. 
Y u g o s l a v i a emerged from the F i r s t World War as the most 
powerful and i n f l u e n t i a l n a t i o n i n the Balkans. I t had strong 
m i l i t a r y f o r c e s and clos e connections w i t h the West. The dynasty, 
drawn from Serbian and Montenegrin r o y a l f a m i l i e s , was f i r m l y 
e s t a b l i s h e d and went back to the days of the l i b e r a t i o n from 
the Turks. Above a l l , i t had been v i c t o r i o u s i n war - i n three 
s u c c e s s i v e wars, which had l i b e r a t e d the remaining S l a v s under 
51c I n 1867, 1904, 1912, 1923, 1934, 1937 and 1947. 
5 2 . I n 1885, 1913f 1915, 1923, 1934, 1941 and 1949. 
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f o r e i g n r u l e and u n i t e d them i n t o a s ingle Yugoslav s t a t e * 
For a century, Serbia had regarded h e r s e l f as the torch-bearer 
of the Yugo-Slav movement. Whether her mission was motivated 
by nationalism or "Serbian Imperialism", the task of u n i t i n g 
the Slav peoples of South-East Europe was accomplished and the 
Triune Kingdom represented the triumph of the Yugo-Slav movement. 
Despite t h e i r b i t t e r i n t e r n a l quarrels and r i v a l r i e s , the aim 
of Yugoslavian statesman i n the period 1918-41, was to consol-
id a t e t h e i r Kingdom and to maintain the B t a t u B quo. King Alex-
ander, Pas*ic',Stojadinovic and even Radic, subscribed to t h i s 
view. Thus, although Yugoslavia was sincere i n her desire to 
show f r i e n d s h i p towards, and seek closer r e l a t i o n s w i t h , Bulg-
a r i a , she was determined to avoid any a l t e r a t i o n to the status 
quo and reacted b i t t e r l y t o any Bulgarian attempt to undermine 
the Kingdom. 
To preserve the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Yugoslavia and 
give the Kingdom the necessary time to solve i t s i n t e r n a l 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , the country needed peaces As i n the Balkans, so 
i n the wider f i e l d of European diplomacy, Yugoslavia was a 
determined supporter of the Peace Settlements I n pursuing t h i s 
p o l i c y , she found common cause w i t h the other Succession states -
Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Greece. With them, Yugoslavia worked 
f o r an area-wide c o n s o l i d a t i o n of Eastern Europe, f i r s t through 
the L i t t l e Entente, then i n the Balkan Conferences, l a t e r i n 
the Balkan Entente and u l t i m a t e l y , i t was hoped, i n a Balkan 
union. Such a union or confederation would e s t a b l i s h a l a s t i n g 
peace i n the Balkans and present a u n i t e d f r o n t i n the event 
of of any f u t u r e European c o n f l i c t . The Balkans, then, would 
c o n s t i t u t e a s o l i d t h i r d force i n European a f f a i r s and no longer 
be a happy hunting ground f o r e x t e r n a l powers anxious to provoke 
war or seek cheap t e r r i t o r i a l gains. •' 
Bulgaria, however, d i d not see the s i t u a t i o n i n the same 
l i g h t , tier country had been l i b e r a t e d by Russia at a great 
expense i n money and human l i f e . A f t e r her l i b e r a t i o n and 
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by the Treaty of San Stefano, the proposed "Big Bulgaria" 
vas a huge Kingdom s t r e t c h i n g r i g h t across the Balkan peninsula. 
Even when the Great Powers blocked t h i s proposal at the Congress 
of B e r l i n , the Turkish government continued to recognize the 
Bulgarian Exarchate Church as the o f f i c i a l Orthodox body i n 
Turkish Macedonia. The Russian i n t e n t i o n and the Turkish 
r e c o g n i t i o n were seen by Bulgarian leaders to be an open 
admission of Bulgaria's r i g h t to Macedonia. Yet, on each occasion 
upon which she attempted to recover what she believed to be 
r i g h t f u l l y hers - i n 1912, 1913 and 1915, she met resistance 
from other Balkan s t a t e s , notably Serbia and Greece. Whether 
her aims were governed by n a t i o n a l greed or " l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s " , 
Bulgaria sustained a sense of thwarted greatness. One w r i t e r 
has s a i d : 
" I t i s because Bulgaria has a p r e - c a p i t a l i s t economy, 
i s free from any marked s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s , or r e l i g i o u s or 
i d e o l o g i c a l problems, t h a t , by reason of her remo.te p o s i t i o n 
from the main currents of ideas and economic developments, 
i t i s n a t u r a l t h a t p o l i t i c a l l i f e should t u r n p r i n c i p a l l y 
to sentimental questions of n a t i o n a l p o l i c y Schools, 
t r a d i t i o n , r e l i g i o n and Press have hammered home, from 
1914-44, the legend of San Stefano. For t h i s reason, 
Bulgaria's psychological s t r u c t u r e bears the i n d e l i b l e 
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marks of a happiness u n f u l f i l l e d . 1 1 
By 1918, the Bulgarian people must have r e a l i z e d the 
misfortunes which t h i s quest f o r greatness entailed,, As a 
people, they d i d not renounce what they believed to be h i s t o r -
i c a l l y t h e i r s but, l i k e Stamboliski, they looked to a s o l u t i o n 
of the problem through a p o l i c y of closer f r i e n d s h i p w i t h 
Yugoslavia. On a purely personal l e v e l , the a t t i t u d e of the 
Bulgarian people towards the Yugoslavs i n the inter-war period, 
was f r i e n d l y . Stamboliski's government of 1919-23 and the 
Fatherland Front of 1944-47 were probably the governments most 
53. P. P i p i n e l i s , C a i t i f f Bulgaria. London, 1944, pp. 57-8. 
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representative of popular f e e l i n g since the F i r s t World War. 
Both these governments vere i n t e r e s t e d i n the f a t e of Macedonia, 
but both shoved a desire to shelve the past and work towards 
a genuine South Slav rapprochement. 
Such a p o l i c y was apposed by a powerful m i n o r i t y i n 
Bulgaria. I n any country there are those who may be l a b e l l e d 
" r e a c t i o n a r i e s " and i n Bulgaria, those who found themselves 
unable to renounce t h e i r country's r i g h t t o greatness (and to 
Macedonia) r e s o l u t e l y refused t o accept the Peace Settlement 
aB binding upon t h e i r n a t i o n . Embittered by the country's poverty, 
inflamed by defeat, devoured by hatred and revenge, they were 
unscrupulous i n t h e i r attempts t o secure a r e v i s i o n of the 
Treaty of N e u i l l y . The p o l i t i c a l c a p i t a l of Bulgaria, Sofia, .. 
contained many of the most ardent Macedonian n a t i o n a l i s t s and 
because of t h e i r propensity f o r violence and murder, they obtained 
a power and a u t h o r i t y out of a l l p r o p o r t i o n to t h e i r numbers. 
Using as t h e i r weapons, vi o l e n c e , murder and i n t i m i d a t i o n , they 
secured support f o r t h e i r anti-Yugoslav p o l i c y and o f f i c i a l 
tolerance f o r t h e i r c o m i t a d j i r a i d s against Yugoslavia. The 
governments of 1923-34 and 1935-44, and the Bulgarian leaders 
of these years, represented not the Bulgarian people but t h i s 
more extreme and powerful m i n o r i t y . 
I n t h i s d i f f i c u l t p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n , the p o s i t i o n of the 
King was a l l - i m p o r t a n t . Unfortunately f o r B u l g a r i a , the F i r s t 
World War had s e r i o u s l y weakened the power of the monarchy, and 
King Boris - as h i s most trenchant c r i t i c has pointed out - was 
not a Bulgarian: 
"These Coburgs, an a l i e n dynasty, feared t h a t South 
Slav f r i e n d s h i p would lead to South Slav f e d e r a t i o n , and 
federatiox^implies a dual Bulgaro-Yugoslav monarchy i n which 
the n a t i v e Slav, Karadjordjevi6 dynasty, r e i g n i n g already 
over the greater Kingdom would be p r e f e r r e d . I t has also 
been said t h a t fear of a South Slav Federation was one of 
the prime motives i n King Ferdinand''s decision t o attack 
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Serbia i n 1915 - f o r had the two countries emerged from 
the World War as f r i e n d s or a l l i e s , the movement f o r 
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f e d e r a t i o n might v e i l have been i r r e s i s t i b l e . " 
Thus during the greater p a r t of the period from 1918-41, 
Bulgaria was l e d by men opposed to a l l t h a t Yugoslavia was, and 
to a l l t h a t she hoped to achieve. Royal approval f o r t h e i r 
p o l i c i e s endowed t h e i r h o s t i l e actions w i t h a c e r t a i n respect-
a b i l i t y . There i s ample evidence to show t h a t King Boris 
exercised f u l l c o n t r o l over h i s country*s f o r e i g n p o l i c y and 
t h i s p o l i c y was instrumental i n destroying a l l attempts a t 
Balkan u n i t y or co-operation. Without Bulgarian p a r t i c i p a t i o n , 
the schemes and p o l i c i e s of Yugoslavia, Rumania and Greece 
i n e v i t a b l y appeared to be d i r e c t e d 'against' Bulgaria and t h i s , 
i n a d d i t i o n to the b i t t e r n e s s and resentments which already e x i s t e d , 
created a potent and dangerous source of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n at the 
very heart of the Balkan peninsula. 
Having t h i s a t t i t u d e towards Yugoslavia and her Balkan 
neighbours, Bulgaria's n a t u r a l a l l i e s were the Central Powers 
and those who were equally i n t e r e s t e d i n destroying the "Yugoslav 
mosaic". For t h i s reason, Bulgaria proved susceptible to 
I t a l i a n i n f l u e n c e . More s i g n i f i c a n t however, i s the connection 
w i t h Germany. I n the event of any c o n t i n e n t a l war, Bulgaria 
stood to gain by a German v i c t o r y . Neither Russia nor the 
Western powers were i n a p o s i t i o n to o f f e r B ulgaria t e r r i t o r i a l 
gains at the expense of her neighbours - although they have on 
occasions sought to do so e But the Central Powers, who almost 
i n v a r i a b l y found themselves opposed to Serbia-Yugoslavia, were 
i n a p o s i t i o n t o a i d Bulgarian expansion. Furthermore, the 
geographical l i n k of the Danube, and the f i n a n c i a l t i e s w i t h 
bankers i n Vienna and B e r l i n were also c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r s . 
I n the inter-war years, both Bulgaria and Germany had a vested 
i n t e r e s t i n t r e a t y r e v i s i o n and both these i n t e r e s t s involved 
the p a r t i t i o n of Yugoslavia. When King Ferdinand f l e d from 
54. J. Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy, London, 1939» p« 23. 
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h i s country i n 1918, he said on h i s a r r i v a l i n Vienna: 
" f o r t h i r t y years, I t r i e d t o u n i t e Bulgaria w i t h Austria-Hungary 
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and Germany. I d i d not succeed. My mission i s ended." For 
dynastic reasons and also because the pro-German p o l i c y vas 
consonant w i t h the views of the most powerful p o l i t i c a l elements 
i n B u lgaria, King Boris adopted the p o l i c y of h i s f a t h e r , lie 
conducted i t i n a more subtle and cautious manner, but the 
object was the same* 
These then were the p r i n c i p a l obstacles i n the path of 
Yugoslav-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s i n the period 1918-41. Despite 
the great e f f o r t s which were made, the powers of d i s u n i t y , 
animosity and s t r i f e p r e v a i l e d . Post-war developments have 
shown t h a t the problems of the inter-war years were by no. means 
an i s o l a t e d episode. Although the Second World War brought an 
end to the jealousy and r i v a l r y between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 
i t l e d to exter n a l i n t e r f e r e n c e by the Soviet Union. Had i t not 
been f o r t h i s .Russian i n t r u s i o n , Yugoslavia and Bulgaria might 
w e l l have reached the stage where the question of f e d e r a t i o n 
would indeed have been a mere formality,. But ever since the 
d e c l i n i n g power of Ottoman r u l e .gave way to independent n a t i o n 
s t a t e s , the Balkans have been a prey to e x t e r n a l i n t r u s i o n , 
e i t h e r d i plomatic or m i l i t a r y . I n the course of a century, f i v e 
great nations - A u s t r i a , I t a l y , Germany, Russia and now China -
have established a p o l i t i c a l f o o t h o l d i n the Balkan peninsula. 
Perhaps i t i s j u s t because the Eastern Question was solved on 
n a t i o n a l r a t h e r than i m p e r i a l l i n e s t h a t these tensions have 
occurred. With the South Slav peoples d i v i d e d - and from time 
to time a c t i v e l y h o s t i l e towards each other - the peninsula 
has continued to present an open i n v i t a t i o n t o Great Power 
i n t r i g u e . Through t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to resolve t h e i r own d i f f e r -
ences, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria have in c u r r e d a legacy of hate 
55. K. Todorov, Balkan Firebrand. An autobiography of a 
Rebel. Soldier and Statesman, Chicago, 1943* p. 103« 
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and d i s t r u s t which only time can heal. Yet, as long as the d i r i 
d i v i s i o n l a s t s , e x t e r n a l and h o s t i l e forces can s t i l l inflame 
h i s t o r i c a l p r e j u d i c e , f o s t e r jealousy and fan the f i r e s of 
s t r i f e . I n the years from 1918-41, we have seen the most ac t i v e 
period i n the h i s t o r y of r e l a t i o n s between the two c o u n t r i e s . 
We have seen the greatest e f f o r t s f o r u n i t y and also the 
greatest f a i l u r e and despair. W h i l s t Belgrade and Sofia remain 
p o l i t i c a l l y d i v i d e d , there can be no sure foundation f o r peace 
and s t a b i l i t y i n the Balkans. For the South Slavs form the 
m a j o r i t y of the population and the t e r r i t o r i e s they occupy 
are s t r a t e g i c a l l y the most important. The axis - Belgrade-Sofia -
i s a genuine axis along which the d e s t i n y of the Balkans revolves. 
And t h i s i s why the f u t u r e of Yugoslav-Bulgarian r e l a t i o n s 
w i l l remain the l a s t and most perplexing aspect of the Eastern 
Question. 
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Appendix A 0 
The A p r i l Protocol of 1867. 
"Whereas the present circumstances c a l l upon a l l 
oppressed nations i n Turkey to take measures necessary f o r 
t h e i r l i b e r a t i o n , we, the Bulgarians l i v i n g i n Bulgaria, 
Thrace and Macedonia, are assembled to d e l i b e r a t e upon and 
discover means f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of our dear f a t h e r l a n d , i n 
order t h a t we might j o i n the ranks of the fr e e nations and 
manifest to the world t h a t we e x i s t . 
I n order to a t t a i n t h i s desirable end, i t i s necessary 
to s e l e c t a neighbouring n a t i o n which, f o r our mutual b e n e f i t , 
w i l l a i d us to a t t a i n our l i b e r a t i o n and f o r such a na t i o n 
we can pr e f e r no other than the Serbian, which i n i t s n a t i o n -
a l i t y , i t s f a i t h and i t s geographic p o s i t i o n , has been near 
us f o r ce n t u r i e s ; our i n t e r e s t s t h e r e f o r e are i d e n t i c a l , and 
hence only w i t h t h e i r close brotherhood we can and w i l l become 
an independent n a t i o n . 
As a basis f o r such f r a t e r n a l rapprochement, we propose, 
i n accordance w i t h e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s , to adopt the f o l l o w i n g 
twelve p o i n t s . -
1) A f r a t e r n a l union should be e f f e c t e d between the Serbs 
and the Buigars under the name of the Yugoslav Kingdom. 
2) The Yugoslav Kingdom s h a l l consist of Serbia and Bulg-
a r i a (the Bulgarian lands to include Bulgaria, Thrace and 
Macedonia). 
3) The head of the new government s h a l l be the present 
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Prince of Serbia, Michael Obrenovic w i t h the r i g h t of 
succession. 
4) The Kingdom s h a l l have one n a t i o n a l f l a g , composed of 
the i n s i g n i a of the two races.The same s h a l l hold f o r the 
f u t u r e coinage. 
5) Each country s h a l l r e t a i n i t s own d i a l e c t f o r o f f i c i a l 
use, hence the o f f i c i a l s w i l l be required to belong to t h a t 
n a t i o n a l i t y among which they serve and to speak the d i a l e c t 
of t h a t country. 
6) The Serbian laws i n force today are accepted by us and 
s h a l l be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o the Buigar d i a l e c t . A l l the decrees 
of the Yugoslav kingdom s h a l l be published simultaneously, 
withou t exception, i n the two d i a l e c t s , Serbian and Bulgarian. 
7) The State r e l i g i o n s h a l l be Orthodoxy but a l l confessions 
w i l l be f r e e . 
8) Religious matters s h a l l be governed by an independent 
synod, composed of both races. This synod s h a l l c onsist of 
a Met r o p o l i t a n Primate and the bishops of the dioceses acc-
ording t o the d i a l e c t of the population. These nominations 
must be confirmed i n every case by the governing a u t h o r i t y . 
9) The Head of State s h a l l " s e l e c t the members of the 
m i n i s t e r i a l cabinet from the two races. 
10) The n a t i o n a l r epresentation s h a l l be made up i n prop-
o r t i o n to the population of the st a t e and i n accordance 
w i t h the form e x i s t i n g i n Serbia today f o r t h i s purpose. 
11) The c a p i t a l of the Yugoslav kingdom s h a l l be selected 
by the n a t i o n a l representatives. 
12) The head of the cl e r g y and the synod s h a l l always 
reside i n the c a p i t a l . 
However, i n order to br i n g i n t o execution the common desire, 
we f i n d i t j u d i c i o u s to choose a coiiuuifctee of seven persons, 
r e s i d i n g at present i n Bucharest who w i l l occupy themselves, 
as best they can i n the circumstances, i n the accomplishment of 
our n a t i o n a l d e s i r e . 
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The members of t h i s committee (named), subject to the 
convention of the f u t u r e Yugoslav kingdom, w i l l act i n the 
s p i r i t of the two f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s : -
1) The accord w i l l come i n t o force on the day when i t 
i s signed by the Serbian government. 
2) The Serbian government considers i t s e l f bound by 
t h i s convention to lend a l l m a t e r i a l and moral a i d f o r 
the accomplishment of t h i s d e s i r e , conforming to the 
decisions of the committee. 
Hay God p r o t e c t us and help us i n our sacred d e c i s i o n . 
A p r i l 5, 1867. 
Appendix B. 
O f f i c i a l S t a t i s t i c s of the Bulgarian 
S t a t i s t i c a l Department 1926. 
The s t a t i s t i c s give the numbers of those born beyond 
Bulgarian f r o n t i e r s as f o l l o w s : -
From t e r r i t o r y now Greek, Macedonia 69,449. 
(108,648) Thrace 38,572. 
Elsewhere 627. 
From t e r r i t o r y now Yugoslav South Serbi 1,695. 
(52 ,311) W. F r o n t i e r 14,770. 
Elsewhere 5.846. 
From t e r r i t o r y now Rumanian Bobrudja 23 ,334. 
(29,846) Elsewhere 6,512. 
From t e r r i t o r y now Turkish I n Europe 69 ,734. 
(85,658) I n Asia 15.924. 
276.463. 
Of a l l these, 234,768 were o f f i c i a l l y described as Bulgarians. 
Of them, 221,191 emigrated between 1912-25. 
These s t a t i s t i c s show t h a t only 101,144 Macedonian immigrants 
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were i n Bulgaria, of whom two-th i r d s came from Greek t e r r i t o r y . 
These s t a t i s t i c s f l a t l y condemn Supremist propaganda 
which claimed t h a t the National Committee represented 
700,000 refugees from Yugoslav oppression. I t i s also to be 
noted t h a t the National Committee claimed to speak f o r "700,000 
u n l i b e r a t e d Bulgarians" i n Yugoslavia - whereas Yugoslav f i g u r e s 
f o r 1931 show the t o t a l Orthodox Slav population as only 
321,000 i n the areas ceded to Yugoslavia under and subsequent 
to the 1912 Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty ( i e . i n u n l i b e r a t e d Turkish 
t e r r i t o r y where the Bulgarian Exarchate Church had been the 
o f f i c i a l church. 
Appendix C. 
M i n o r i t i e s w i t h i n Bulgaria. 
The o f f i c i a l Bulgarian s t a t i s t i c s show t h a t , w h i l s t 
B u l g a r i a n ' n a t i o n a l i s t s bewailed the existence of "Bulgarian 
m i n o r i t i e s " abroad, there was a sizeable p r o p o r t i o n of a l i e n 
m i n o r i t i e s w i t h i n Bulgaria i t s e l f . These s t a t i s t i c s on 
the Bulgarian population i n 1926 are given by G. Guenov, 
Das Schicksal Buigariens. B e r l i n , 1940, p. 128. Guenov was 
a Professor of Sofia U n i v e r s i t y and h i s s t a t i s t i c s r e l a t e 
to a population of 4,557,706, where 20Jfc belong to m i n o r i t y 
groups:-
Turks 588,105. 
Tziganes 134,844. 
Humanians 70,631. 
Jews 46,558o 
Armeni ans 27,322. 
Greeks 10,564,, 
Others 43.011. 
?21 t 035. 
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Appendix D. 
Commercial Trade Treaties 
Albania w i t h Bulgaria (1926); Greece (1926); Yugo-
s l a v i a (1926)(1934). 
Bulgaria " Albania (1926); Greece (1927); Turkey (1930); 
Yugoslavia (1934). 
Greece " Albania (1926); Bulgaria (1927); Turkey 
(I930 ) ( l 9 3 4 ) s Yugoslavia (1927). 
Turkey " Bulgaria (1930); Greece (1930)(1934)I 
Rumania (1930); Yugoslavia (1933)• 
Rumania " Turkey (1930); Yugoslavia (1930). 
Yugoslavia " Albania (1926)(1934); Greece (1927); Rumania 
(1930); Turkey (1933); Bulgaria (1934). 
There were t h i r t e e n Trade Treaties signed between the 
Balkan nations i n the period 1926-34. I have l i s t e d them 
country by country. The source f o r these dates was R . J . Kerner 
and H,N. Howard, The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 
1930-35. Berkeley, C a l i f o r n i a , 1936, p. 22. 
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